One shouldn't be surprised to find Erik Prince popping up amid the chaos of the Afghanistan withdrawal. Or, that he is trying to profit from it.
Reports today indicate that he is offering to fly stranded people from the Kabul airport on his private plane for $6,500 — for extra, he will extricate people who are cannot get to the airport.
There are few details in the Wall Street Journal article and no sense where this nugget came from, or what kind of resources he has. A former Navy Seal, Prince is the founder of Blackwater, a private security company infamous for its work on behalf of the U.S. government in the early years of the 9/11 wars. He has had his hand in several incarnations and a litany of privateering schemes since then. Most recently he was accused (but has denied) of violating the arms embargo in Libya in a plot to arm militant Gen. Khalifa Haftar so he could overthrow the transitional government there. He has also been connected to a proposal to build a private army for Ukraine against the Russians. He has been tied to the UAE, Somalia and the Chinese government. In fact, his last company Frontier Services Group, co-founded in 2014, reportedly had a contract to train Chinese police in Beijing and build a training center in Xinjiang, home to the imprisoned minority Uighurs.
At any given time, Prince has had access to more than guns. He's had planes and even ships to battle pirates on the high seas. Most of his gun-for-hire proposals never pan out, and his multi-billion-dollar salad days with the federal government seem to be behind him. Maybe even his primo access to Capitol Hill (his connections to Trump put him in the hot seat during the Russiagate period, and his sister Betsy DeVos is no longer the education secretary) is gone too.
But that doesn't mean he's out of the game. Clearly, where there is human misery and conflict, Prince is around, nibbling at the edges of opportunity. Kind of like the "Howling Man," in that Twilight Zone episode:
Wherever there was sin. Wherever there was strife. Wherever there was corruption. And persecution. There he was also. Sometimes he was only a spectator, a face in the crowd. But, always, he was there.
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is the Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft.
Erik Prince arrives New York Young Republican Club Gala at The Yale Club of New York City in Manhattan in New York City, New York, U.S., November 7, 2019. REUTERS/Jeenah Moon
Top image credit: U.S. President Donald Trump holds a chart of military hardware sales as he welcomes Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington, U.S., March 20, 2018. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
President Trump is working on delivering what could be a big win for U.S. arms contractors. Politico Pro reported on Thursday that the White House is currently “drafting an executive order aimed at streamlining the federal government’s process of selling weapons overseas.”
The text of the executive order has not yet been released, but a source familiar with the order confirmed it will boost arms contractor interests and reduce congressional oversight by stripping down parts of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the law that governs the arms export process.
Close observers of the process say the order may track some initiatives promoted by the Biden administration, but worry about the possibility of significant weakening of the AECA. Among the Biden efforts to speed arms sales was the use of a “Tiger Team” to eliminate bottlenecks that were seen as slowing weapons deliveries to Israel. Former State Department official Josh Paul, who resigned over continued U.S. arms supplies to Israel despite its campaign of mass slaughter in Gaza, criticized Biden’s move.
“This shows that at all levels of government, from policy to implementation, the Biden Administration is doing all it can to rush arms to Israel despite President Biden’s recent explicit statement that Israel’s bombing of Gaza is ‘indiscriminate,’ and despite extensive reporting that the arms we are providing are causing massive civilian casualties,” he said back in December 2023.
The question is how widely a Trump administration initiative to rush weapons out the door will be applied, and how consistently it will be enforced. Given evidence to date from other policy areas, the Trump administration is likely to vigorously implement any pro-industry provisions of the new executive order. But only the formal release of the order will reveal how big a change the new policy will be from the Biden administration’s approach.
The arms industry is “helping shape” the order, according to Politico. Arms manufacturers — who have long criticized the Foreign Military Sales program — now see their opening to push for cutting what they see as red tape, but which may include further reducing essential human rights vetting of proposed sales, spurred by a newfound emphasis on government efficiency.
In January, General Atomics CEO Linden Blue wrote a letter to the Department of Government Efficiency criticizing “buck-passing” in the foreign military sales process and regulations on missiles and unmanned drone exports. Blue said that “execution is fragmented across the Department of State, multiple DoD agencies, and the military services, with none of them able to direct the others.” The new executive order will likely minimize the State Department’s role in the foreign military sales process while giving more deference to the Pentagon.
And it seems like Trump is listening. Out of one side of his mouth, the president lambastes the defense industry and their proponents as war profiteers; “I will expel the warmongers from our national security state and carry out a much needed clean up of the military industrial complex to stop the war profiteering and to always put America first,” he said on the campaign trail in Milwaukee.
Some inside the beltway appear to take this threat to arms exports seriously, namely in response to Trump's decision to pause funding to Ukraine. In an article titled, "How Trump is Killing the US Defense Industry,” an Atlantic Council senior fellow sounded the alarm that the "erosion" of the military industrial-complex had arrived, pointing to Lockheed Martin's stock dropping from $500 a share to $450.
But out of the other side of his mouth, Trump extols his record in enabling the very same warmongers to sell arms to destabilizing regimes. His first trip abroad as president in 2017 was to Saudi Arabia, which was then engaged in a military intervention in Yemen, where he proposed a staggering $110 billion arms sale. Major arms sale notifications reached an all time high, adjusted for inflation, under Trump’s stewardship. The Biden Administration continued the breakneck pace of sales set by Trump, despite policies on paper that acted as little more than a fig leaf to elevate human rights and civilian harm into consideration of the arms exports process.
Back in office, Trump has picked up right where he left off, with over $17 billion in major arms sales approved so far this year. On Thursday, the State Department announced the approval of another 2,000 laser-guided rockets to Saudi Arabia.
The AECA gives Congress authority to block major arms sales by passing a joint resolution of disapproval. This has yet to happen, since Congress would need a veto-proof majority; Congress invoked the AECA in an attempt to block arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the wake of the murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, only for Trump to promptly veto its effort. He justified his continued arming of Saudi Arabia because of the revenue it brought to major U.S. weapons contractors like Raytheon (now RTX) and Lockheed Martin — companies that produced bombs used by the Royal Saudi Air Force that were involved in prominent cases of killing of civilians.
It’s unclear what aspects of the AECA may be stripped, but defense contractors need more oversight, not less. Other Trump administration initiatives that may aid arms exporters large and small were decisions to suspend enforcement of laws prohibiting overseas bribery by U.S. companies, and revealing the beneficial owners of shell companies that are used for everything from money laundering and illicit arms trafficking.
Congress should oppose efforts to make it easier to export weapons by further reducing government vetting. Given the frequency with which U.S. weapons end up with aggressor nations and anti-democratic regimes, this is no time to be rushing them out the door without careful consideration of whether they serve long-term U.S. interests or foster peace and stability in key regions.
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Top photo credit: A supporter of Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro wears a shirt with U.S. President Donald Trump's face that reads "Yankee Go Home" during a rally to mark the anniversary of late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's initial coup attempt in 1992, in Caracas, Venezuela February 4, 2025. REUTERS/Leonardo Fernandez Viloria
For successive U.S. administrations, the big region below the American southern U.S. border was considered a bit of a backwater.
Sure, there were a few internal conflicts left outstanding, a couple of old-school leftist insurgencies still in operation, and the perpetual problem of drug trafficking. But after the Soviet Union collapsed, Latin America was never thought of as an epicenter of great power competition. The United States, frankly, didn’t have to worry about a geopolitical contender nosing into its own neighborhood.
The Trump administration, however, isn’t like any other administration before it. Trump campaigned on stopping narcotics from entering the U.S., defanging the drug cartels that have proven to be almost as powerful as the Mexican state, and dealing with irregular migration. So Latin America is now a center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio chose the region for his first trip as America’s top diplomat.
As we speak, the USS Gravely, a guided-missile destroyer, is steaming toward the Gulf of Mexico on a mission that Gen. Gregory Guillot, the commander of U.S. Northern Command, says is intended to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the U.S.
If the Trump administration’s first eight weeks tell us anything, it’s that the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, which carved out the Western Hemisphere as Washington’s exclusive sphere of influence, is again at the forefront. Whether it’s threatening unilateral U.S. military action against the Sinaloa and New Jalisco Generation Cartels in Mexico, yelling about taking back the Panama Canal, or leveraging tariffs to coerce smaller states to cater to his policy priorities, Trump is treating the entire area as his own personal piñata.
To be fair, Washington has won some short-term wins. Either out of deference to a superpower or because they don’t have other alternatives in the short-term, the region’s governments have largely acceded to Trump’s wishes. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, for instance, has been far more aggressive against the cartels than her predecessor and mentor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) ever was during his six-year presidency. Law enforcement operations, often conducted by the Mexican military, have resulted in a steep increase in arrests, the seizure of 7 tons of narcotics and the dismantling of more than 100 fentanyl labs over a 10-day period.
Trump’s erratic tariff threats, like slapping a 25% tax on Mexican goods destined for the U.S. market, compelled the Mexican government to deploy an additional 10,000 troops to the U.S.-Mexico border for counter-narcotics operations (although how successful this operation will be in the long-run is up for debate). And while the evidence is circumstantial, it’s likely Mexico’s decision to hand over 29 of the country’s senior cartel leaders to the U.S. Justice Department had something to do with the tariff cudgel Trump is so fond of yielding.
There is movement further south as well. Despite Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino’s vocal declarations that the Panama Canal will forever remain under Panama’s control, his government has nevertheless tried to mollify the Trump administration by cooperating with Washington’s deportation schemes, getting out of China’s Belt and Road Initiative earlier than anticipated, and announcing an audit of a Hong Kong-based company that owns two ports on either end of the strategic waterway.
The heavy-handed U.S. approach is also working to an extent with some of Washington’s few adversaries. Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro, the same man Trump tried to dethrone during his first term by recognizing his main competitor, Juan Guaidó, as Venezuela’s rightful president and instituting a maximum pressure sanctions policy on the Venezuelan economy, is now exploring whether a detente with Trump’s second administration is possible. Despite labeling Maduro’s regime an enemy of the state and alleging that it cooperates with Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua to destabilize the U.S, Maduro agreed last week to resume accepting flights of Venezuelans who were deported from the U.S., likely in an attempt to ensure Chevron can continue to operate in Venezuela.
The record at this early stage is clear: Trump can legitimately claim that his tactics have produced results.
U.S. policymakers, however, would be wrong to assume that these tactics will work over the long-term or don’t have costs attached to them. Today, Latin American countries might be wary of confronting the U.S. But that wariness is unlikely to last if the Trump administration continues to throw around the stick at the exclusion of the carrot. Even small states have pride, dignity and an aversion to getting mercilessly kicked in the teeth at every opportunity. Look no further than Iran and North Korea, two relatively weak states that continue to thumb their nose at Washington’s demands notwithstanding the economic vise the U.S. has put them in.
Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Panama aren’t Iran and North Korea, of course. Outside of tariffs, it’s hard to envision that even Trump would go so far as to lock these countries out of the U.S. financial system, station warships off their coasts without their consent or shut down their respective embassies on U.S. soil. Yet Trump doesn’t have to do any of this to cause resistance and antagonism in these countries. The U.S. already has a bad reputation throughout Latin America thanks to its Cold War-era history of interventions, coup plotting and support for right-wing authoritarian regimes, particularly in Central America, which were more adept at killing civilians than servicing the basic needs of their populations.
Even more significant, Latin America has other options. In the past, these states couldn’t do much of anything to register their disapproval to U.S. actions. Most of them relied on the U.S. market and didn’t want to jeopardize the hand that fed them. Others relied on U.S. aid to ensure their militaries were still functioning. Outside of Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, the region was America’s domain, a place where it could afford to be dismissive precisely because near-peer competitors didn’t have the capability or intent to challenge U.S. power.
But this is no longer the case. China isn’t about to displace the U.S. in Latin America but it’s by far a more palpable alternative for the region’s states today than it was at the turn of the century, when the Chinese economy was still scraping the bottom of the barrel. The statistics bear this out; between 2002 and 2022, trade between Beijing and Latin America increased from around $18 billion to over $450 billion. China provides investment and capital for major infrastructure projects in the region, from mines in Peru and ports in Ecuador to rails in Mexico and flashy soccer stadiums in El Salvador.
The Chinese aren’t doing all of this out of the goodness of their hearts—they’re doing it to undermine U.S. power in its own neighborhood.
The U.S. would be wise not to overreact. But it shouldn’t be making China’s work easier either. There’s a substantial risk that the Trump administration’s policy could be counterproductive. Hopefully Trump will recognize this sooner rather than later.
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Top image credit: Kenyan police officers disembark from a plane while arriving as part of a peace-keeping mission to tackle violence in Haiti, at the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti January 18, 2025. REUTERS/Ralph Tedy Erol
Haiti is sinking deeper into crisis as gangs tighten their stranglehold on the country, now controlling more than 85% of the capital Port-au-Prince.
More than one million people are internally displaced, sexual violence against children has increased by 1,000% and thousands struggle to receive food, water, and health and sanitation services. U.N. Independent Expert on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti William O’Neill said in a press statement last week that he saw in Haiti “the pain and despair of an entire population,” and called on the international community to intervene “without delay,” as the crisis reaches a tipping point.
Haiti has a long and fraught history of prolonged foreign interventions that have failed to secure lasting political stability, and the current crisis is no exception. Experts argue that international actors must rethink how they allocate their efforts and resources in Haiti to more effectively support the country’s path to stabilization.
Gangs in Haiti have steadily expanded their control of the country since the 2023 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, seizing the power vacuum left in his wake. The crisis deepened in April 2024 when acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry resigned, paving the way for a transitional government. But the U.S.-backed Transitional Council has since struggled to stabilize the country or move it closer to presidential elections.
In a bid to restore order to the increasingly insecure state, the U.S. and Kenya entered into a defense agreement in 2023 to deploy Kenyan troops to Port-au-Prince. But since their delayed arrival to the capital in June, the Kenyan troops’ haven’t made meaningful progress in curbing gang violence. Jake Johnston of the Center for Economic and Policy Research says the mission’s shortcomings underscore a broader issue: foreign intervention in Haiti has lacked the strategic planning necessary to address the root causes of the crisis, both in the short and long term.
One major obstacle is that the mission is operating well below its already limited capacity. The mission currently consists of approximately 800 of the pledged 1,000 Kenyan officers so far, 168 of whom arrived in February. This number has proven inadequate in the face of the estimated 200 active gangs in the country.
O’Neill said in a statement to the press that stabilizing the country would be “doable" if the force was expanded to 2,500 or 3,000 officers.
However, Johnston says that while additional personnel could help in regaining territory from gangs, a larger force won’t resolve the mission’s deeper structural flaws.
The Kenyan mission was originally intended to support the Haitian National Police (HNP) in stabilizing violence while the transitional government worked towards establishing political stability. Johnston says this plan failed to contend with the HNP’s deeper issues — the organization is deeply politicized and many underpaid officers deal directly with gang members to privately make money.
“Strengthening that through this imported security force was an incredibly fraught proposal from the very beginning,” Johnston says, adding that a more sustainable approach would have prioritized reforming the Haitian police force to address these entrenched problems.
Another critical yet overlooked driver of the conflict is the steady influx of arms into Haiti, most of which come from Florida. Cutting off the gangs’ ammunition would significantly weaken them, Johnston says, yet this is not a focus of the Kenyan mission.
These shortcomings raise the question of whether limited resources and energy from foreign actors are being directed to the right priorities. Millions of dollars have been funneled into supporting the police force, while support of other critical areas — such as anti-corruption mechanisms and governance reforms that have long plagued Haiti's government — have been neglected.
“You can’t address this phenomenon strictly through force. It’s putting all of the eggs in this one basket to the detriment of other things,” Johnston says.
International actors have a role to play in supporting Haiti’s electoral and constitutional process, which will be essential for restoring legitimacy between Haitian civil society and its leaders and establishing long term stability, says Eduardo Gamarra, an international relations professor at Florida International University who has advised security reform and democratization in Haiti. This includes rebuilding Haiti's electoral system “from scratch” by updating outdated voter registries, establishing electoral oversight mechanisms, and implementing protections against fraud.
However, such efforts demand sustained investment from the international community. The question of which country or international body would support these more meaningful reforms remains unclear, as few countries want to absorb the challenges Haiti is facing, Gamarra adds.
Haiti’s current vulnerability is further exacerbated by its reliance on foreign aid, the majority of which comes from the U.S. and has now been abruptly pulled back after the Trump administration issued a 90-day pause on foreign aid last month. More than $300 million in aid to Haiti has now been halted, much of which was allocated for humanitarian assistance. The consequences are already being felt on the ground, as shortages of food and critical health supplies worsen.
“The money wasn’t much, but its impact was huge given Haiti’s current reality,” Gamarra says.
For now, U.S. support of the Kenyan mission will continue. In a February press conference, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that the Trump administration was committed to continuing to work with the Kenyan forces, and that its numbers need to increase to restore stability to the country. Rubio also approved exemptions in the funding pause for $40.7 million in foreign aid for the mission. However, Johnston says it is unlikely that the Trump administration will follow through with the Biden administration’s plans to transform the mission into a U.N. peacekeeping operation, which would allow for funding for the mission to come from member nations.
While reducing Haiti’s reliance on foreign aid should remain a long-term goal, Johnston emphasizes that an abrupt loss of international support presents immediate and significant challenges to the country’s stability.
This reality becomes even more critical when considering that current international efforts on the ground, meant to quell the severity of the situation, are failing to address Haiti’s most urgent security needs.
“Foreign intervention is a daily reality in everything that's happening in Haiti. Even if it's not direct, the situation has been defined by that in the past and as a result of those past interventions,” Johnston says. “You can't disentangle these things. So, the key is to change the modality of intervention.”
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