The chairs of the Senate’s leading foreign policy committees are calling for an investigation into President Biden’s handling of the U.S. military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan amid the Taliban’s swift (and largely expected) takeover of Kabul last weekend, and the grisly scenes of Afghans trying to flee in its wake.
Sens. Jack Reed (Armed Services), Mark Warner (Intelligence), and Robert Menendez (Foreign Affairs) are piling on the frenzy in Washington where interest in America’s longest war waned long ago, a dynamic that is seemingly playing a significant role in the collective shock at the events unfolding in Afghanistan throughout the past week.
And nowhere is that dichotomy more apparent than in these same senators’ reactions to the Washington Post’s investigation in December 2019 — dubbed the “Afghanistan Papers” — which found “that senior U.S. officials failed to tell the truth about the war in Afghanistan throughout the 18-year campaign, making rosy pronouncements they knew to be false and hiding unmistakable evidence the war had become unwinnable.”
Reed, Warner, and Menendez said very little about the Post’s findings. Only Reed suggested (to a reporter) that there should be some kind of congressional investigation, but none of them made a proactive push for a hearing.* There is no record of any statement about the Afghanistan Papers on their senate websites.
This kind of selective accountability for the war in Afghanistan is indicative of how the Washington establishment is more interested in playing politics with national security while appearing to be immune to learning lessons from America’s failed militaristic foreign entanglements.
Indeed, as Sen. Bernie Sanders’ foreign policy adviser Matt Duss observed: “It is really something to watch this town attempt to absolve itself from two decades of jingoism, profiteering, barely existent oversight, and zero accountability by suddenly demanding answers about Afghanistan.”
*This conclusion is based on LexisNexis search terms: “Jack Reed OR Mark Warner OR Robert Menendez OR Bob Menendez AND Afghanistan Papers AND hearing OR investigation”
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
Images: Screen grabs from politico.com and huffpost.com|||
Top photo credit: US Marines aboard a LAV-25 Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) keep a sharp watch around their vehicle after their patrol was stopped by supporters of GEN. Manuel Noriega on the road leading into the town, 10/31/1989. ( J. Alan Elliott, USN/public domain)
This is the first in a new Quincy Institute/Responsible Statecraft project series highlighting the writing and reporting of U.S. military veterans. Click here for more information.
When the red tracers of an AC130 gunship’s minigun slashed through the warm, dry night skies above Panama City at 12:41 AM on December 20, 1989, few guessed that it would mark an opening stanza in America’s expansive unipolar moment.
In the hours that followed, more than 20,000 U.S. troops conducted a swift and violent invasion of a sovereign state to remove the inconvenient and venal regime of General Manuel Antonio Noriega, who had embarrassed and bedeviled U.S. policymakers for years.
Now nearly forgotten, this invasion — bequeathed with the trite and even cynical name of “Operation JUST CAUSE” — marked a tentative but crucial first step toward the “forever wars” of today. Freed from the frightening, but disciplining, constraints of the Cold War, American leaders were now unchecked by rival powers, and the very perception of success for Operation JUST CAUSE would help shape their decisions going forward.
Conceived as the illegitimate child of America’s late 19th and early 20th century flirtation with regional imperialism and the naval theories of U.S. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, Panama and its canal have long exerted significant pull over U.S. strategy and domestic politics. A more fulsome account of the U.S.-Panamanian relationship is beyond the scope of this essay, but the hypocrisy and bad faith on both sides in this tragicomic saga has few equals, even in the annals of U.S. hemispheric policy.
The 1977 Panama Canal Treaty was ratified against fierce Republican opposition, and it provided for a 22-year turnover transition during which time there would be a hybrid administration of the Canal Zone. By 1989, this resulted in a dizzying checkerboard of U.S. and Panama Defense Force (PDF) military installations interspersed next to and co-located with each other across the isthmus. The U.S. reserved the treaty right to intervene militarily to protect the canal.
The agreement, however, was predicated upon the assumption of good relations between the signatories, a dubious proposition even under the nationalist but pragmatic Panamanian regime of Omar Torrijos. When the cartoonishly duplicitous Manuel Noriega assumed de facto power in Panama after Torrijos’ death in 1981, he initially leveraged support for Reagan’s policies in Central America to mask his growing ties with drug cartels and other adversaries. This awkward fling ended, when Noriega’s 1987 indictment on federal drug charges ushered in a hostile turn in relations.
Noriega quickly became a political detriment to the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Anti-Noriega candidates decisively won elections in May 1989, only for regime militias to violently overturn the results. Performative U.S. sanctions caused considerable damage to the populace, but did little to dislodge Noriega, who also saw off two coup attempts in 1988 and 1989.
During the latter attempt, with Noriega in the custody of the golpistas, American forces sealed two of the three routes leading to PDF Headquarters (“La Comandancia”) in Panama City, but failed to put in a third roadblock allowing loyalist forces to defeat the coup, rescue Noriega, and inflict a humiliating defeat on the Bush administration.
As tensions skyrocketed, U.S. military preparations accelerated and evolved from a special forces “snatch” operation personally targeting Noriega into a massive strike designed to destroy the PDF and uproot the regime in its entirety.
When PDF troops killed a U.S. Marine at a checkpoint in Panama City and detained and brutalized another U.S. family, Bush acted. Thousands of U.S. troops conducted a crushing and aggressive night attack, achieving complete surprise and effectively destroying the PDF by daybreak. After hiding for several days, Noriega was forced to flee, seeking refuge at the Papal Nunciature. Resistance quickly faded, and Noriega was extradited to the U.S. after several days of negotiations.
The denied victors in the May election assumed the reins of power. In the following weeks, most U.S. troops returned home, although units in Panama battled a massive crime wave and rooted out pockets of Noriega supporters. Twenty-three U.S. troops were killed. Panamanian casualty estimates are mired in controversy, with SOUTHCOM estimating that 314 PDF troops had died, along 202 civilians, and leftist sources citing higher civilian tolls.
For the U.S., JUST CAUSE was at the time a clear success. A quick, decisive, low-cost military operation had laid to rest a humiliating years-long array of diplomatic and policy failures. The invasion was an important proof of concept as one of the first skirmishes fought after passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act which provided for new unified “Regional Commands.”
It also marked a tactical inflection point: for over 200 years, U.S. ground forces had followed a distinctly “solar powered” pattern of operating in the day and digging in at night. In Panama, U.S. troops emerged as lethal and effective night fighters. The All-Volunteer Force — whose performance in the 1970s and early 80s had been shaky at best — finally seemed to deliver the capabilities that its early boosters had envisioned.
Strategically, however, the invasion of Panama has not aged as well. In hindsight, it seems policymakers drew a series of suboptimal initial lessons from this venture, which were then amplified by the much larger 1991 Gulf War.
First, U.S. leaders were seduced by the low casualties, domestic popularity, and quick success achieved first in Panama, and then repeated in DESERT STORM. These two operations enabled a strategic recalculation of the perceived costs and benefits of military action and elevated the relative attractiveness of military options. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the greater policymaker demand for “kinetic” solutions throughout the 1990s led to a dramatic spike in military activity.
Second, the invasion of Panama was clearly a “false positive” for the efficacy of regime change operations. The quick and politically antiseptic removal of a hostile government, and the ease with which the U.S. installed a new one, incentivized policymakers toward maximalist demands, incrementally undermining the messy and emotionally unsatisfying drudgery of diplomacy.
Bu the “Cliffs Notes” version of the operation that the policy community took on generally dismissed the unique advantages the U.S. military enjoyed in Panama, such the solid intelligence picture gleaned from an eighty-year presence, Noriega’s overwhelming unpopularity among Panamanians, and the existence of a legitimate alternate government.
Finally, the rapid success of the invasion and the ease with which it lanced an ugly and embarrassing political boil for the United States (Noriega) encouraged policy planning that underestimated or even obviated the need to plan for messy post-conflict political engagement. This is not surprising: military success is clean and popular; diplomacy is hard and draining. We retroactively devalued having a viable, legitimate, indigenous political option in Panama.
By contrast, when we went into Afghanistan and later Iraq, swift military success was followed by a policy vacuum and then by chaos and violence.
Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates once said that “success is a lousy teacher. It seduces people into thinking they can’t lose.” This was certainly the case for Operation JUST CAUSE. As we look back on decades of perpetual conflict and consider the path that brought us here, it is hard to look at the invasion of Panama as anything other than an early success that subsequently helped teach policymakers a slew of very dubious lessons.
And as any pre-GPS traveler remembers, it is hard to recover from an early wrong turn, especially when the mistakes only become clear miles down the road.
What’s worse than the Pentagon spending taxpayer dollars on golf courses? Spending taxpayer dollars on golf courses that nobody uses.
Even as the Department of Defense renovates some of its 145 golf courses, the Army acknowledged in a new Pentagon study on excess capacity that it owns at least six facilities labeled “Golf Club House and Sales” that almost no one uses. The Navy owns at least two more golf facilities that it listed as underutilized.
But the problem goes far beyond golf courses. The Pentagon oversees some $4.1 trillion in assets and 26.7 million acres of land — a sprawling network of military installations across the United States and the globe. Wasted space and resources in that network could be squeezing taxpayers out of billions of dollars.
A Defense Department official familiar with the data included in the new report, which is only available for viewing in person at the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in Congress, explained to RS that the Pentagon’s problem of empty buildings has gotten out of hand.
“Most installations are incentivized to hang onto empty or partially empty spaces until they know for sure that the building is totally failing,” they said. Otherwise, installations will lose their funding.
In other words, the Pentagon has a phantom infrastructure problem made up of empty storage warehouses and training facilities that collect dust. The only thing real about them is the cost, brought to you by the U.S. taxpayer.
But just how bad has this problem gotten? Well, the Pentagon itself doesn’t have a consistent answer, meaning the real number of underused facilities could be much higher.
The last time the Pentagon tried to answer this question publicly was in a 2017 infrastructure capacity report, which found that roughly 20 percent of the Pentagon’s infrastructure was excess to need.
However, this new report — responding to a requirement in the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which the House and Senate Armed Services Committees just received this month — tells a different story. Taken together, these two reports reveal flawed and incongruous systems for assessing the Pentagon’s costly excess infrastructure capacity, which in turn serve to undermine the case for reducing this excess infrastructure through a new round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).
In the new report, dated September 2024, each of the military service branches responded separately to a list of ten prompts included in the NDAA. One of these prompts seeks information on the total number of excess assets (i.e. buildings) and their total square footage. Another requests information on “the number of underused facilities with the associated use rate…”
One of the more obvious shortcomings of this report is that the Army is the only military service that listed total assets and their square footage alongside excess assets and their square footage; the Navy and the Air Force simply listed excess assets and square footage, obscuring the percentage of their assets that are excess to need. By searching a General Services Administration (GSA) database of government property, we were able to correct for this shortcoming (though numbers represent our best estimate because GSA’s methodology for assessing total assets may differ from the Pentagon’s).
The following table compares the 2024 report’s findings (and conclusions drawn from them based on GSA data) to findings in the 2017 report.
Taken at face value, this data appears to show that the Pentagon’s excess infrastructure has shrunk significantly in the seven-and-a-half years since its last public report on infrastructure capacity.
In particular, the Air Force may appear as if it has unlocked the secret to shedding excess capacity without the politically challenging work of a new BRAC process, having cut excess capacity from around 30 percent to less than 0.1 percent in under eight years. That news might come as a surprise to Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allen, who has been pointing to the Air Force’s roughly 30 percent excess infrastructure in a dispute with lawmakers over the Pentagon’s backlog of deferred maintenance at its facilities.
Still, the new data would be welcome news, if it were sound. Unfortunately, methodological differences between the reports make it difficult to assess progress, and insight from an official familiar with the data suggests the new numbers are severely underestimated.
For one, Pentagon officials responsible for listing excess capacity in the report are incentivized to underreport, according to the Department of Defense official who was granted anonymity to discuss the report.
“Facility utilization data included in the report varies widely in its accuracy and timeliness,” they said. “The information is self-reported, labor-intensive to compile, and installations have an incentive to avoid declaring facilities as ‘excess’ because once they change the facility status from ‘active’ to ‘excess,’ the projected sustainment funding associated with the square footage of the facility (or other unit of measure) will drop by 85%.”
This not only makes access to accurate information exceedingly difficult, but it also creates a perverse incentive structure in which installations hang onto empty and partially empty spaces.
“For instance,” the official explained, “if an installation is receiving $250,000 annually in sustainment funding for a warehouse — but the base no longer needs or uses the warehouse — the installation commander and their public works director will likely keep the warehouse listed as ‘active’ rather than changing its real property status as ‘excess’ to avoid slashing their sustainment funds down to a meager $37,500 per year. While it’s empty and locked or boarded up, they can spend almost nothing on it, but still use the $250,000 a year for the installation and use that money on other needed repair and sustainment projects across the base.”
The new study acknowledges some issues with the data. For instance, the Army reported that it lacks “the manpower to do required utilization studies.” In other instances, military departments just blatantly ignored the data request, providing incomplete answers. But the study does not address the fundamentally perverse incentive for installations to underreport excess capacity.
The 2017 report by contrast, paints a much starker picture regarding Pentagon waste. Rather than detailing individual installations, that study assessed excess capacity by service using a baseline year of 1989 to maintain consistency with earlier infrastructure capacity reports.
However, the report itself still underscores that its findings are highly conservative, pointing to its assumption that there was not excess capacity in 1989. As the methodology section explains, “using 1989 as a baseline indicates the excess found in this report is likely conservative because significant excess existed in 1989, as evidenced by the subsequent BRAC closures.”
The Pentagon has said that past BRAC rounds are collectively saving taxpayers some $12 billion per year. Congress should work to authorize a new round of BRAC, which could save taxpayers additional billions of dollars per year, without further delay.
As a start, lawmakers should include a new reporting requirement in this year’s NDAA that requires the Pentagon to report on its excess infrastructure capacity on an annual or biennial basis and lays out clear parameters around methodology to ensure accuracy and consistency across reports. Failing that, lawmakers and taxpayers will continue to be kept in the dark as to the true scale of the Pentagon’s waste and the squandering of taxpayer dollars it entails.
The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.
When it comes from the Trump White House
Stop reading now if you don’t like math.
There were plenty of headlines over the weekend about how President Donald Trump delivered on his pledge to try to boost U.S. defense spending to $1 trillion(PDF) in 2026. But — surprise! — he did it with smoky mirrors and sketchy math. In reality, Trump is seeking “only” $893 billion for the Pentagon next year. But, like a carnival huckster with a good SAT math score, the administration added $113 billion contained in a separate, one-time Republican congressional reconciliation bill. That pushes the total sought to, um, $1.01 trillion. Coincidence, or sideshow sales job? You decide!
That bit of May 2 legislative legerdemain is why Republican anger over the trillion dollars topped muted Democratic opposition to the historically high budget proposal. The Trump administration “is not requesting a trillion-dollar budget,” griped Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS), who chairs the armed services committee. Senator Mitch McConnell, (R-KY), who chairs the appropriations committee’s defense subcommittee, agreed. Such “accounting gimmicks” will leave the U.S. military impoverished, he said, unable to counter “China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and radical terrorists.”
Both senators accused Trump of the worst possible sin: coming up with a military budget not much different from Joe Biden’s. Given a supine Congress and the ridiculous caterwauling calls that the nation is starving its armed forces, the view from here is that lawmakers will approve Trump’s request. Then they’ll ladle on some extra lard for good measure. Trump’s top defense priorities include his Golden Dome missile shield (and no, that Madison Avenue moniker officially doesn’t refer to the presidential pate), nuclear weapons, and ship-building.
Mind you, national security has been costing the country well north of a mind-blowing $1 trillion annually recently, assuming a full and complete accounting (something else that’s stealthy at the Pentagon, which has never passed an audit). For example, the Department of Veterans Affairs — which, for some strange reason, isn’t part of the U.S. military budget — now spends $350 billion a year.
Three days before Trump’s announcement, the Government Accountability Office reported that the Pentagon itself acknowledged it found “confirmed fraud” totaled $10.8 billion between 2017 and 2024. “The full extent of fraud affecting DOD is not known,” the GAO said, “but is potentially significant.”
But not to worry. When you’re spending a trillion dollars a year, no matter where it comes from, you don’t have to fret much about waste.
Projected cost of U.S. nuclear forces skyrocket
The U.S. government plans to spend $946 billion through 2034 to buy and operate the nation’s nuclear weapons. That’s a 25% hike over 2023’s estimated cost for the decade ending in 2032, the Congressional Budget Office reported April 24. And that 2023 cost of $756 billion was $122 billion more (19%) than the 2021 projection. Let’s call it ICBMnflation.
The latest estimate includes $357 billion to operate the nukes we’ve got, and $309 billion to buy new ones and the platforms — largely subs, bombers and missiles — to deliver them. That doesn’t include all of the stunning 81% cost growth associated with the troubled Sentinel ICBM program now under development (and it’s getting worse). CBO estimates the U.S. will also spend $79 billion improving command and control of its nuclear forces over the coming decade, and $72 billion for upgrades to its nuclear-weapon labs.
CBO also is padding the cost estimates of the Pentagon and Department of Energy (which builds the nation’s nuclear weapons) by $129 billion. “That amount represents CBO’s estimate of additional costs that would be incurred over the 2025–2034 period if the costs for nuclear programs grew at roughly the same rates that costs for similar programs have grown in the past,” the CBO report said (taxpayers might ask why the Defense Department doesn’t do that on its own).
This insane spending on weapons that no sane person wants fired is taking place as the U.S., China, and Russia are engaged in a stubborn showdown over the size and shape of their nuclear arsenals. “There’s no reason for us to be building brand-new nuclear weapons,” Trump said in February. “You could destroy the world 50 times over, 100 times over. And here we are building new nuclear weapons, and they’re building nuclear weapons.”
Stop dilly-dallying and start doing, Mr. President, before it’s too late.
The Army gets its latest marching orders
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth lobbed a 4-page memo(PDF) into Army HQs April 30 designed to obliterate inefficiency and maximize killing. “To build a leaner, more lethal force, the Army must transform at an accelerated pace by divesting outdated, redundant, and inefficient programs,” he ordered, “as well as restructuring headquarters and acquisition systems.”
Good luck with that, SECDEF!
The Bunker’s all for a better, cheaper Army, but the memo is simply a wish list handed down from the E-ring. Like so much Pentagon-brass boilerplate, there’s no roadmap showing how to get it done. Hegseth’s mandate to fold Army Futures Command into the service’s Training and Doctrine Command isn’t sufficient, R. D. Hooker, Jr., a retired Army colonel now at Harvard, toldDefense One. “This is probably a move in the right direction, but much more detail is needed to fully assess,” he said, adding: “Overhauling the entire acquisition process is the more fundamental need.”
That’s for sure. After all, it was only seven years ago — during Trump’s first term — that Army Futures Command was created as the key to the Army’s, well, future. “Our Futures Command will have a singular focus: to make Soldiers and leaders more effective and more lethal today and in the future,” General John M. Murray, first head of Futures Command said as the new outfit stood up in 2018.
As the Trump administration continues to cashier and otherwise thin the ranks of its senior military officers, the Xi administration is doing the same in China, and risking their trust, Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow of the Pentagon’s National Defense University wrote May 5 in the New York Times.
President George H.W. Bush said the U.S. had “kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all” after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. But Casey Chalk argued in The Federalist April 30 that the nation actually continues to suffer from a Vietnam hangover 50 years after the war in Southeast Asia wrapped up.
Global military spending hit $2.7 trillion in 2024, a 9.4% hike and the steepest since 1988, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute said April 28, in its annual accounting on the financial costs of waging and readying for war.
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