Amid the tragic scenes from Kabul this week in the aftermath of the Taliban’s complete takeover of Afghanistan, those on cable news programs and beyond claiming the U.S. military should never have left are rarely, if ever, asked key questions about what that actually would mean in practice.
How long would we have to stay? And at what cost?
Aside from American military casualties that would result in the likely event that the Taliban begin attacking U.S. troops again after having broken the 2020 Doha peace deal, or the billions upon billions it would cost to maintain an indefinite presence in Afghanistan propping up an illegitimate government rotted to the core with corruption, a new report from Brown University’s Costs of War projects points to perhaps another hidden price tag: long-term care for veterans.
The report estimates that from 2001 to 2050, it will cost U.S. taxpayers between $2.2 and 2.5 trillion to care for veterans of America’s post-9/11 wars, and that “the majority of the costs associated with caring for post-9/11 veterans has not yet been paid and will continue to accrue long into the future.”
According to the Costs of War project, “Expenditures to care for veterans doubled from 2.4 percent of the federal budget in FY 2001 to 4.9 percent in FY 2020, even as the total number of living veterans from all U.S. wars declined from 25.3 million to 18.5 million.” The total costs won’t peak “until decades after the conflict, as veterans’ needs increase with age.”
The report recommends establishing a fund to track and set aside money that will be needed for the long-term care of these vets.
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
President Joe Biden talks with Ret. Michigan Army National Guard Cpl. Bobby Body Friday, Jan. 29, 2021, at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in Bethesda, Maryland. Cpl. Body was injured in February of 2006 while deployed to Iraq where he suffered a left above knee amputation and multiple other soft tissue injuries from a mounted improvised explosive device. (Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz)
Top image credit: Steve Witkoff, the special envoy to the Middle East, makes an appearance moments before President Donald J. Trump holds a joint news conference at the White House with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 4, 2025. (Photo by Joshua Sukoff/MNS/Sipa USA)
With phase one of the Gaza ceasefire’s lapse on Saturday, Israel has cut off goods and supplies from entering Gaza in a move an Israeli source said was “coordinated with the Trump administration."
Israel’s Sunday supplies halt is intended to pressure Hamas into accepting a last-minute proposal it says was engineered by Trump envoy Steve Witkoff. The Trump administration has yet to confirm it’s behind such a proposal, though it’s said it will back whatever actions Israel takes.
In a video announcing the move, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thanked President Trump for supporting Israel, including its new goods and supplies halt. He also suggested “further steps” could be taken if Hamas doesn’t release the hostages.
“Israel has decided to stop letting goods and supplies into Gaza, something we've done for the past 42 days. We've done that because Hamas steals the supplies and prevents the people of Gaza from getting them,” Netanyahu alleged. “We will take further steps if Hamas continues to hold our hostages. And throughout this, Israel knows that America and President Trump have our back.”
“Thank you again, President Trump!”
Netanyahu said Hamas rejected the new, allegedly U.S. engineered, proposal. But while the original plan called for both sides to negotiate an exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, the new proposal does not mention a release of Palestinian prisoners by Israel. Further, a Hamas official told Drop Site News that Israel’s aid halt announcement came before the group could be briefed about the alleged Witkoff proposal.
Hamas called the move “cheap blackmail, a war crime and a blatant coup against the agreement” in a Sunday statement. Oxfam also called the supplies cut a “a reckless act of collective punishment.”
Hamas says Israel must abide by the original ceasefire terms and start phase two negotiations, which would facilitate an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and a final end to the war if successful.
In contrast, Israel has chosen to maintain IDF presence in a Egypt-Gaza border region it calls the Philadelphi corridor, in violation of the original ceasefire agreement which dictated that a corridor pull-out would have begun Saturday. According to Hamas, Israel has repeatedly violated the ceasefire with various attacks in Gaza, reportedly killing 116 Palestinians during what should be a truce.
Meanwhile, with the ceasefire and related negotiations on thin ice, the Trump administration expedited $4 billion in military aid to Israel over the weekend.
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Top photo credit: President Donald J. Trump, joined by Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong Un, makes history Sunday, June 30, 2019, as he becomes the first sitting U.S. President to step foot on North Korean soil, in his meeting with Chairman Kim Jong Un at the Korean Demilitarized Zone. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)
Kim Jong Un’s most recent cruise missile test is the second since President Donald Trump took office in January, reminding the administration that despite conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, the U.S. and North Korea have unfinished business.
Indeed, Trump has indicated on various occasions his desire to revive dialogue and negotiations with Pyongyang. At his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba earlier this month, he expressed confidence in having good relations with North Korea, touting his relationship with Kim.
Trump has shown that his willingness to engage with North Korea is not all talk. He brought back many of the key officials and veteran negotiators who were heavily involved in the summit diplomacy with North Korea during his first term and placed them in even more influential positions.
Alex Wong, who was formerly at the State Department and is now the deputy national security adviser in the White House, and Allison Hooker, the appointee for State Department undersecretary for political affairs and formerly a senior Asia policy advisor in the National Security Council, led working-level negotiations for Trump’s two summits with Kim Jong Un in 2018 and 2019.
Kevin Kim, the deputy assistant secretary for East Asian affairs at State, also helped shape those negotiations during his time as the chief of staff to Stephen Biegun, former U.S. Special Representative for North Korea. Beau Harrison, the deputy chief of staff for operations in the White House, was also known to be an important planner of Trump-Kim summits.
Trump’s diplomatic intent seems serious and is indeed a welcome sign, given the perilous situation Washington, Seoul, and their regional allies face in dealing with increasing North Korean nuclear threats.
Since the collapse of the second summit in 2019, Pyongyang has test-fired more missiles than in the preceding decade while also revealing an array of new weapons. As the ever more assertive testing and muscle-flexing suggest, North Korea’s nuclear program has grown rapidly in recent years.
In the meantime, North Korea has also significantly expanded its military and strategic ties with Russia. Their burgeoning cooperative partnership has chilling implications for North Korea’s nuclear threats: Pyongyang might gain access to Moscow’s advanced missile and nuclear technology. No hard evidence that Russia has transferred any of its technology to North Korea has emerged to date, but the possibility itself has been alarming enough.
In light of the overall accelerating momentum in North Korea’s nuclear buildup and the intensified saber-rattling between North Korea and U.S.-South Korean forces on the Korean Peninsula, Washington and Seoul have lost even basic hotline communications with Pyongyang for crisis management — raising the risks of inadvertent escalation and conflict.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration failed to recognize the urgency of the situation, simply waiting for North Korea to yield to Washington’s economic and diplomatic pressure and return to dialogue. The reality is that time has not been on America’s side. The more time wasted, the more advanced Pyongyang’s nuclear program will become. The Trump administration should not make the same mistake and instead invest serious efforts into reopening talks with Pyongyang.
If Trump and his administration indeed intend to reengage with Kim, he has the unique advantage of the previous experience of direct communications and negotiations with the North Korean leader. Understanding the counterpart’s character, style, and needs is always advantageous in negotiations, and Trump no doubt gained a better sense of Kim from their private conversations.
Trump’s personal relationship with Kim and his team’s overall experience of negotiations with the North Koreans can certainly be assets as the administration prepares for future diplomacy.
Another opportunity for Trump’s diplomacy with North Korea lies in the probable return of a liberal government in South Korea in the coming months.
Trump was unlikely to get the strong South Korean support for engagement with Pyongyang that he enjoyed during his first term if South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol, who is hawkish toward North Korea, were to remain in power. However, Yoon’s declaration of martial law and failed self-coup attempt in December resulted in his impeachment by the South Korean parliament, an action that is widely expected to be upheld by the South Korean constitutional court soon. And in the anticipated snap election that would follow, the opposition liberal party, which prefers a diplomatic approach to North Korea, will likely win.
With the return of a liberal administration in Seoul, Trump will likely have its full support for a diplomatic initiative with North Korea, as he did from former President Moon Jae-in. Policy coordination to reduce tensions with North Korea, such as toning down allied rhetoric and reducing or halting joint military exercises, would have faced resistance from Yoon but would likely be supported by his liberal successor. In coordinating concessions for negotiations, Yoon’s liberal successor will also likely be more open to easing sanctions and pursuing a peace treaty with North Korea.
Trump’s ongoing efforts to end the war in Ukraine and improve relations with Russia could also augur well for diplomacy with North Korea. Kim’s relationship with Beijing, its main external source of economic support, has recently been rocky, and any detente between Moscow and Washington could put Kim at greater risk of isolation.
In such a scenario, the Trump administration may be able to more effectively leverage Moscow, which presumably prioritizes a deal to end the Ukraine war on favorable terms over its relationship with Pyongyang.
Overall, Trump’s personal enthusiasm for diplomacy with North Korea, his experienced team of policy professionals and negotiators at both senior and working levels, the likely return of a diplomacy-friendly government in Seoul, and potential improvements in U.S.-Russia relations could impart new momentum for reengagement.
Nonetheless, there remains one major obstacle to such a scenario: Washington’s maximalist demand for North Korea’s complete denuclearization.
Seeking the same goal that led every U.S. president, including Trump himself, to failed negotiations with North Korea would be unwise. Kim has reiterated that he will never abandon nuclear weapons and he very likely truly means it; nuclear weapons are the only reliable security guarantee for his regime. Kim now likely possesses far more nuclear weapons than the last time Trump met him in 2019. Accordingly, the price he may charge for a new round of negotiations may be higher. If Trump insists on playing the denuclearization card from the start, failure is virtually certain.
Instead, Trump and his administration should accept the reality of North Korea’s nuclear status and adopt more realistic goals. A growing number of experts have proposed an arms control-centric deal aimed, initially at least, at capping Pyongyang’s nuclear program and restricting selective particularly dangerous capabilities, such as tactical nuclear weapons.
The Trump administration should explore this approach. While arms control is not ideal compared to complete denuclearization, its chances of succeeding are greater than starting with the demand for complete denuclearization. Convincing South Koreans to accept Pyongyang’s nuclear status will not be easy, but it may be more acceptable to a liberal South Korean administration which might understand that there is no other viable option for peaceful coexistence with the North.
President Trump has promised that his “proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker” and might have a real shot at promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula this time. But that breakthrough may only come with an audacious departure from the decades-long, exhausted conventional wisdom of maximum pressure and complete denuclearization of North Korea.
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Top photo credit: U.S. President Donald Trump meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., February 28, 2025. REUTERS/Brian Snyder/File Photo
Finally, there is a prospect for bringing the war in Ukraine to an end. President Trump and his foreign policy team have created the conditions for a negotiated end to the war, replacing a fundamentally flawed and dangerous set of policies adopted by his predecessors including, ironically, the Donald Trump of his first administration.
This is true even after the very public blowout in the Oval Office on Feb. 28. What brought on Trump’s ire was Zelensky’s comments on the minerals deal and then his repeated complaints about negotiating with Putin, something Trump has made clear he will do. Trump had apparently expected a quick signing ceremony to convince Ukraine supporters in his own party like Senator Lindsey Graham — who were invited to witness — that a negotiated peace would be advantageous to the United States. When Zelensky turned the meeting into a debating session and aroused Trump’s memories of the bogus “Russiagate” charges that plagued his first administration, Trump reacted predictably.
Indeed, anyone interested in peace rather than the threat of nuclear war should be congratulating President Trump. After all, if the war does end and Russia is brought back into cooperative economic relations with Europe and the United States, everyone will benefit. If the war and the attempted isolation of Russia continues, all will suffer and cooperation to deal with common problems such as environmental degradation, mass migration and international financial crime will become impossible.
I say this not as a Trump supporter — I did not vote for him and have been critical of most of his moves. But in regard to the war in Ukraine and relations with Russia, I believe he is on the right track.
My judgments are based on decades of diplomatic experience negotiating the end of the Cold War and on a close knowledge of both Ukraine and Russia, their languages and their history. I am proud that my generation of diplomats achieved a Europe whole and free by peaceful negotiation. I have been appalled that a succession of American presidents and European leaders discarded the diplomacy that ended the Cold War, abandoned the agreements that curbed the nuclear arms race, and provoked a new cold war which has now become hot.
President Trump’s restoration of the diplomacy that President Reagan and the first President Bush used to end the Cold War should be welcomed. Reestablishment of direct communication between the Russian and American presidents is an essential precondition for any settlement.
The agenda announced by Secretary of State Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov after their meeting in Riyadh makes sense: (1) expansion of diplomatic capacity between the U.S. and Russia, dangerously eroded by a series of mutual expulsions, (2) cooperation on common geopolitical and commercial interests, and (3) ending the war in Ukraine.
Days before the agreement was announced in Riyadh, Vice President Vance and Secretary of Defense Hegseth made policy statements at the Wehrkunde conference in Munich that raised the ire of some European allies and prominent politicians and journalists in the United States.
In fact, these comments were either statements of fact (Ukraine is not a member of NATO) or of policy adjustments that are not only essential if the war is to end but in fact would have prevented the war if they had been adopted by earlier presidents: (Ukraine will not become a member of NATO; direct American involvement in the fighting will end; the U.S. will not act to protect European NATO forces deployed in Ukraine.)
If these had been the policies of previous American administrations, the war in Ukraine would not have occurred. They are not capitulations in advance or appeasement as some critics have charged. They get at the roots of the war.
President Zelensky, French president Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, among others have objected to Trump’s plan to negotiate with Russia first, then bring in the others. Actually, bilateral talks between the U.S. and Russia make sense. Former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin let the cat out of the bag when he observed that the purpose of supporting Ukraine was to weaken Russia. That policy has to end if there is to be peace in Europe in the future and it must be negotiated by the U.S. and Russia.
This is exactly the procedure used by the first Bush administration to negotiate the unification of Germany. In 1990 the United States first engaged in bilateral talks with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev before referring the agreements to the other four parties involved in German unification: Britain and France because of their rights in agreements that ended World War II, and the two German states directly affected. The other parties were kept informed of these negotiations as they progressed and all accepted the outcome.
As a participant in these negotiations, I can testify that assurances were given to Gorbachev orally by the American secretary of state, James Baker, that NATO jurisdiction would not move to the east if the Soviets agreed to let East Germany join West Germany on conditions specified by West Germany. Soviet approval was required because of agreements that ended
World War II. Declassified documents now available also show that British prime minister, John Major, and also the West German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, gave similar assurances. In fact, it had been Genscher’s idea.
It is these assurances to which President Vladimir Putin refers repeatedly as broken promises. Although they were not formalized in a treaty, they were promises and they have been broken. President Putin is neither lying nor engaging in baseless propaganda when he says so.
It is often alleged that Russia has nothing to fear from NATO because it is purely a defensive alliance. Yes, it was conceived as a defensive alliance to protect Western Europe from an attack by the Soviet Union. But, after Eastern Europe was liberated and the Soviet Union shattered into fifteen countries, Russia was not a threat or even a potential threat. In the late 1990s NATO began to be used as an offensive alliance.
Proposals to construct a security structure for Europe that would protect all countries were simply sidelined by the United States and its allies. None seemed to ask what they would do if the shoe were on the other foot and how they would react to the prospect of military bases by a hostile alliance on their borders.
If American behavior throughout its history as an independent state is any guide, the prospect of military bases controlled by a foreign power near its borders — in fact, anywhere in the Western Hemisphere — has been a casus belli if not removed.
The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 provided an illustration of how the United States reacts to a perceived threat from abroad. I was stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow when the Soviet Union deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba and have vivid memories of this crisis.
I translated some of the messages Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev sent to President John F. Kennedy. If Khrushchev had not backed down and removed the missiles, Kennedy would have attacked, but if he did local commanders could have launched nuclear missiles against Miami and other cities with the U.S. responding with strikes on the Soviet Union. So Kennedy made a deal: you take your missiles off Cuba and I will remove ours in Turkey. It worked, and the world breathed easier.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was initiated by President Putin because he believed, with reason, that the United States was trying to draw Ukraine into a hostile military alliance. Therefore, in his eyes it was provoked. In 2003 the United States invaded, devastated and occupied Iraq when Iraq posed no threat to the United States. So now, how is it that the U.S. and its allies are conducting an all-but-declared war against Russia for crimes they themselves have not only committed, but have committed with less provocation? The pot is calling the kettle black and trying to damage it.
This is not to justify the Russian invasion in Ukraine. Far from it. It is a catastrophe for both nations and its effects will be felt for generations, but the killing must stop if Europe is to deal effectively with the many challenges it confronts now.
We cannot know what deal President Trump has in mind or how President Putin will respond. The negotiations will be difficult and, most likely, lengthy. But, at last, the American president has defined a viable road to peace and the Russian president has greeted this effort. This is a welcome start of a process Americans and Europeans should support.
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