The news that the Biden administration will pursue a “calibrated, practical approach to diplomacy with the North with the goal of eliminating the threat to the United States” is welcome. The question is how much risk the White House and Congress are willing to take in order to break the deadlock and bring North Korea back to the negotiating table.
President Donald Trump, to his credit, opened the possibility for a new kind of bilateral relationship with North Korea by engaging in direct talks with Kim Jong Un. The Biden administration should take full advantage of this opening by taking another unprecedented step in declaring the 70-year Korean War over and calling for a formal peace treaty. Such bold preemptive moves are urgently needed to end the original “forever war” and build trust between both countries.
Another open question is how the Biden administration will work with Congress on the North Korea issue. It is possible — even likely — that hawks in Congress will place unrealistic demands or create barriers to poison the atmosphere for negotiations. For example, some members of Congress may demand that the Biden administration appoint a hardliner for the role of Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights, rather than someone who will pursue a more holistic approach for tackling both human rights and humanitarian issues facing North Koreans.
Ultimately, any U.S. policy toward North Korea should advance American interests, even if that involves taking a certain amount of risk.
Jessica J. Lee was formerly senior research fellow on East Asia at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Previously, Jessica led the Council of Korean Americans, a national leadership organization for Americans of Korean descent. Prior to CKA, Jessica was a Resident Fellow at the Pacific Forum and a senior manager at The Asia Group, LLC
President Joe Biden salutes as he walks along the Colonnade of the White House on Friday, March 12, 2021, en route to the Oval Office. (Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz)
Top image credit: France's President Emmanuel Macron, Britain's Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Germany's Chancellor Friedrich Merz arrive at Kyiv railway station on May 10, 2025, ahead of a gathering of European leaders in the Ukrainian capital. LUDOVIC MARIN/Pool via REUTERS
Europe appears set to move from threats to action. According to reports, the E3 — Britain, France, and Germany — will likely trigger the United Nations “snapback” process this week. Created under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), this mechanism allows any participant to restore pre-2015 U.N. sanctions if Iran is judged to be in violation of its commitments.
The mechanism contains a twist that makes it so potent. Normally, the Security Council operates on the assumption that sanctions need affirmative consensus to pass. But under snapback, the logic is reversed. Once invoked, a 30-day clock begins. Sanctions automatically return unless the Security Council votes to keep them suspended, meaning any permanent member can force their reimposition with a single veto.
For Europe, the looming October 18, 2025 sunset clause — the date when these U.N. sanctions are set to permanently expire — has created a sense of urgency. By acting now, European governments hope to maximize leverage over Tehran and force renewed cooperation. Yet in doing so, Europe risks narrowing, if not closing altogether, the space for diplomacy at the very moment it is most needed.
The move comes in a deeply fraught context. The JCPOA was already fragile before this summer’s war. The unraveling began in 2018, when the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the deal despite repeated confirmations from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran was in compliance. Washington not only pulled out, but also reimposed sweeping sanctions, devastating Iran’s economy and undoing the bargain at the heart of the deal.
European leaders promised to shield Iran from U.S. pressure and preserve the agreement. But they failed to deliver the economic relief that was central to the JCPOA’s logic. By 2019, with no benefits forthcoming, Tehran began to exceed limits on enrichment and stockpiles. Iranian officials pointed to provisions in the accord that allowed such steps if other parties were not meeting their obligations.
The fragile balance collapsed further this summer. In June, joint U.S.–Israeli strikes targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities. In response, Tehran expelled IAEA inspectors and suspended cooperation with the agency, arguing that it had failed to condemn what Iran described as an unlawful act of aggression. Trust — already frayed — was all but destroyed.
Against this backdrop, Europe’s snapback gamble looks less like a path to reviving cooperation than an escalation designed to squeeze Iran into short-term concessions. Instead of restoring confidence, it risks locking both sides into a cycle of pressure and retaliation with no offramp.
Even the enforceability of snapback is questionable. Russia and China are almost certain to reject a unilateral reimposition of sanctions. That would fracture implementation, leaving sanctions applied inconsistently across the international system. The effect would be to weaken not only the JCPOA but also the credibility of the U.N. Security Council itself.
Europe insists there is an offramp: an extension of the October 2025 sunset clause if Iran resumes full cooperation with inspectors and re-engages in talks with Washington. But because this offer is tied to the snapback threat, diplomacy is compressed into a 30-day ultimatum. The E3 are effectively demanding immediate concessions: unrestricted IAEA access to sites damaged in June’s strikes, a full accounting of uranium stockpiles enriched up to nearly 60 percent, and a resumption of substantive U.S.–Iran negotiations — all under the gun of looming U.N. sanctions.
The risks are significant. If the E3 fail to reach an agreement and act on their threat, enforcement would be highly uncertain, with Russia and China almost certain to reject a unilateral reimposition. Tehran, in turn, could respond by doubling down on nuclear ambiguity — or even moving toward withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as its officials have warned.
This was the path North Korea took after the collapse of its deal with the United States: first cultivating ambiguity about its program, then expelling inspectors and exiting the NPT in 2003, and ultimately transforming uncertainty into a declared nuclear arsenal through repeated weapons tests. Europe now risks pushing Iran across a similar threshold — one where diplomacy becomes much more difficult, locking the confrontation into place for decades.
There are more constructive ways to preserve verification and create space for diplomacy. Iran was just bombed while already at the negotiating table, and by some accounts a deal was nearly within reach. Trust is a two-way street, and the responsibility now falls on Europe to act as a credible interlocutor rather than an escalatory force in the triangle of tensions between the U.S., Israel, and Iran.
Instead of wielding threats, Europe and its partners could pursue a short, clearly defined technical extension of the Resolution 2231 timelines. That could be coupled with an interim package of reciprocal steps and targeted sanctions relief — enough to restore inspector access, sustain monitoring, and ensure that Iran attains tangible economic benefits. This is the essence of diplomacy: measured give-and-take, not unilateral demands in exchange for nothing.
But if Europe chooses coercion over cooperation, it may find that the window has slammed shut — leaving only the prospect of a more dangerous, more isolated, and more nuclear-capable Iran.
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Top photo credit: President of Russia Vladimir Putin, during the World Cup Champion Trophy Award Ceremony in 2018 (shutterstock/A.RICARDO)
After a furious week of diplomacy in Alaska and Washington D.C., U.S. President Donald Trump signaled on Friday that he would be pausing his intensive push to end war in Ukraine. His frustration was obvious. “I’m not happy about anything about that war. Nothing. Not happy at all,” he told reporters in the Oval Office.
To be sure, Trump’s high-profile engagements fell short of his own promises. But almost two weeks after Trump met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska and European leaders in Washington, it is clear that there were real winners and losers from Trump’s back-to-back summits, and while neither meeting resolved the conflict, they offered important insights into where things may be headed in the months ahead.
Putin clearly fared best of all. He got a face-to-face meeting with his American counterpart on U.S. soil, avoided the economic penalties that Trump had threatened, and continued his war without making notable concessions. Putin had long wanted a bilateral with Trump, not only for the legitimacy such a meeting would give Russia’s great power aspirations, but also because keeping Trump engaged in negotiations is essential to Putin’s war aims. Only with U.S. involvement can Putin hope to address the “root causes” of the war in Ukraine, including NATO’s eastward expansion.
The substance of the meeting offered Putin additional wins. He convinced Trump to give up on the European demand for an unconditional ceasefire, and to accept in principle Russia’s territorial demands, though Trump acknowledged only Ukraine could agree to Putin’s terms.
Putin did not achieve all his goals, however. He arrived ready to bargain, but did not walk away with any of the U.S.-Russia deals that he seemed to hope for, on natural resources, arctic cooperation, or arms control, though these issues may have been discussed. Still, back in Moscow, Putin must have felt pleased, especially as he watched Europe’s sprint to Washington days later.
Trump didn’t leave empty handed either, though he did not get what he really wanted — an end to the war. For starters, Trump clearly welcomed the opportunity to play peacemaker, and relished the pageantry of his made-for-television Alaska summit, complete with a red carpet and stealth bomber flyover. Last Monday’s meeting at the White House gave Trump’s ego an additional boost, as Europe’s politicians fell over themselves praising his leadership.
But Trump’s biggest gains from Alaska had little to do with his efforts to end the war in Ukraine. First and most important was Putin’s validation of Trump’s longtime grievances against the Biden administration, including his claim that the war in Ukraine never would have started under a Trump presidency. Second, having backed himself into a corner with his 10-day ultimatum, the summit gave Trump an escape route and a way to defer economic punishments that he knew would not affect Putin’s calculus and did not want to impose in the first place.
That his subsequent meeting with Europe yielded fewer tangible outcomes could also be framed as a win. Europeans arrived determined to extract clear statements from the United States on security guarantees for Ukraine. Trump denied this aim by offering only the most vague and limited of U.S. commitments and muddying the waters further in subsequent interviews.
n doing so, he threw the ball back in Europe’s court, making clear that they would be providing the bulk of any security guarantee to Ukraine, no matter how they wanted to spin it.
Still, Trump’s position is not enviable. If his summit diplomacy revealed one thing it is how little leverage he actually has to end the war. He has few sticks he can wield to force Putin to the bargaining table, a fact he himself admitted weeks ago, and seems unwilling to coerce Zelensky into concessions, perhaps fearing the domestic political costs of being seen as the leader who “lost” Ukraine.
Even with these setbacks, however, Trump came out far better than Europe. After their meeting in Washington, European leaders were upbeat. They had prevented Trump from strong-arming Zelensky and saw Trump’s apparent openness to U.S. involvement in security guarantees as a victory, even if that commitment was flimsy at best.
Their reality, however, was less rosy than their post-meeting soundbites. They were unable to change Trump’s mind on the wisdom of land swaps and unable to win him back to their view that an immediate ceasefire was necessary. They failed to get “iron-clad” U.S. support for Ukraine or even specific U.S. contributions to a European reassurance force, though some proposals have now been offered.
Worse, in a repeat of the March 2025 “coalition of the willing” drama, it is still unclear whether Europe can find the manpower or willpower to resource a long-term force based inside Ukraine that they themselves have proposed. In any case, the Europeans are fooling themselves if they think Trump, who has been unwilling to impose economic penalties on Moscow, would really put U.S. forces at risk in Ukraine if it came down to it.
Most damaging for Europe were the optics. Racing across the Atlantic to meet with Trump, European leaders looked desperate and panicked. They insisted that they deserved a seat at the table, after being left out of Alaska, but their performance in Washington suggested instead just how little they have to offer. After all, they have few weapons to provide Ukraine, limited economic leverage on Moscow, and no plan for ending the war.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Ukraine came out worst of all. True, it did not have to make major concessions and was not forced into surrender. But the writing seemed to be on the wall. Over the course of four days, Trump made clear that Ukraine would not be in NATO and would have to give up territory. He pressed Zelensky on when he would hold elections and at points returned to blaming Ukraine for starting the war. He offered nothing concrete in the way of military aid or security commitments that would help end the war or keep Ukraine secure over the longer term.
Kyiv’s real problem is that time is not on its side. Its battlefield position is eroding rapidly, largely due to lack of sufficient personnel, while Russia is gaining ground in the Donbas and elsewhere. The longer the war endures, the worse Kyiv’s position becomes. Eventually, Ukraine’s front lines will collapse, and at that point the terms of any settlement will look considerably worse than what’s on offer today.
The high-stakes summits and the scramble afterwards to come up with security guarantees for Ukraine ultimately made things worse for Kyiv. Russia has already indicated that it will reject any settlement that includes provisions for NATO member states to position forces inside Ukraine, especially if U.S. military assets are involved—but this is just the solution that Europeans are offering. Putin is likely to keep fighting if this is the deal on the table, rather than settle, extending the war. For Ukraine, this is the worst possible outcome.
Zelensky left Washington last week with no good options, the two summits having underscored just how dire his position is. The only security guarantees the West might offer are strong enough to keep Putin in the war today but too weak to protect Ukraine or to sell to his domestic population as compensation for concessions elsewhere.
Meanwhile, his most vocal backers, the Europeans, have revealed themselves to be largely incapable of influencing the trajectory of the war. They will continue to advocate for Kyiv, but are likely to be bystanders in meaningful developments to end the conflict.
For his part, Trump really does seem to want peace, but he cares at least as much about how the war and its end affects his political legacy as he does about the details of the conflict or the settlement reached. This is not a good starting place for what will eventually be a challenging negotiation with Russia to end the war. An agreement that leaves the door open to recurring war could easily result if Trump rushes to reach a deal for his own sake.
Giving Russia and Ukraine his famous “two weeks” notice last Friday, Trump found himself in the same position he was a month ago. He issues deadlines, the war continues, and there’s not much he can do about it.
Russia can’t fight forever, but for now, the timeline for peace remains firmly in Putin’s hands.
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Top image credit: U.S. Marines with Force Reconnaissance Platoon, Maritime Raid Force, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepare to clear a room during a limited scale raid exercise at Sam Hill Airfield, Queensland, Australia, June 21, 2025. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Alora Finigan)
There is a dangerous pattern on display by the Trump administration. The president and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth seem to hold the threat and use of military force as their go-to method of solving America’s problems and asserting state power.
The president’s reported authorization for the Pentagon to use U.S. military warfighting capacity to combat drug cartels — a domain that should remain within the realm of law enforcement — represents a significant escalation. This presents a concerning evolution and has serious implications for civil liberties — especially given the administration’s parallel moves with the deployment of troops to the southern border, the use of federal forces to quell protests in California, and the recent deployment of armed National Guard to the streets of our nation’s capital.
Last week, the Pentagon sent three guided-missile destroyers to interdict drug cartel operations off the coast of South America, giving the U.S. Navy unprecedented counternarcotics authority and foreshadowing a potential military stand-off against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, who is wanted by the United States on charges of narco-terrorism. This development is echoed by President Trump reportedly seeking authorization to deploy U.S. military forces on the ground against drug cartels in Mexico.
These efforts are not new. Trump and the GOP have increasingly called for U.S. military interdiction against Mexican drug cartels under the banner of counterterrorism. During his first administration, Trump seriously considered launching strikes at drug labs in Mexico in an effort that was successfully shut down by then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper.
But there are no such guardrails in the new Trump administration, and the rhetoric has progressively crept toward the use of U.S. special operations, specifically. During an interview on Fox News in November, incoming Border Czar Tom Homan announced that, “[President Trump] will use the full might of the United States special operations to take [the cartels] out.”
If that is indeed the direction the administration wants to go, it appears to be taking action to set plans into motion, starting with an executive order on day one that designated cartels as foreign terrorist organizations — thus opening a Pandora’s box of potential legal authority to use military force. On signing the order, President Trump acknowledged, “People have been wanting to do this for years.” And when asked if he would be ordering U.S. special forces into Mexico to “take out” the cartels, Trump replied enigmatically, “Could happen … stranger things have happened.”
The executive order upholds that drug cartels “operate both within and outside the United States … [and] present an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” It declares a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The specificity of both “within and outside” the U.S. combined with the declaration of a national emergency is perhaps the first step toward the broader use of executive power to deploy military forces in counternarcotics operations not only within Mexico, but potentially the United States too.
To be sure, the Trump administration is already testing the limits of Posse Comitatus — the law that prevents presidents from using the military as a domestic police force — by invoking questionable authorities to use National Guard and active duty troops during the counter-ICE protests in California and, most recently, to declare a “crime emergency” in Washington, D.C. federalizing the police force and deploying troops to patrol the district’s streets. Reports this week suggest the administration is preparing to do the same in Chicago.
The naval operations in South America are likely just the beginning. If the U.S. military were to engage in Mexico, the most likely forces to execute an operation would be a task force under the U.S. Army’s 7th Special Forces Group, whose area of responsibility includes Central and South America, or a specialized task force under the Joint Special Operations Command.
Historically, along with past administrations, Trump has been inclined toward the use of special operations forces as his default problem-solver. Hegseth has amplified the same proclivity, noting at an industry forum in May that the presidentially-directed use of special operations forces has increased exponentially in the past three years and will only continue, pledging a significant increase in funding for the U.S. Special Operations Command.
Under both Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (2001, 2002) to counter global terrorism, recent presidents, including Trump, have enjoyed an incredible level of authority to unilaterally deploy U.S. military forces for crises or other contingencies without congressional approval. Because of their relatively low troop footprints and the ability to accomplish targeted and short-duration missions (creating a convenient perception of limited military involvement) special operations forces are often preferred.
However, the prospect of using military force in counterdrug operations under the banner of counterterrorism is not only legally debated, it is doctrinally unsound. The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of violence, or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.” This is paralleled by the FBI’s definition of terrorism. However, there is no evidence that America’s illicit drug problem is driven by anything other than the pursuit of profit on part of disparate criminal organizations and individuals — fueled by the desire and demand for illicit drugs on part of the millions of Americans consuming them. Therefore, America’s drug problem, as concerning as it is, does not meet the United States’ own definition of terrorism.
While there are malign actions on part of the cartels that parallel activities committed by terrorist organizations — such as the use of violence and intimidation against the civilian populace, government officials, and military and law enforcement — the overriding motivation of drug cartels is not inherently political, or religious, or ideological in nature. Rather, it is largely financial. As with many other categories of criminal activity, illicit drug activity must remain within the domain of law enforcement, and any undermining of government authority by drug cartels is done mainly in the interest of securing profit.
This is a very important delineation when contemplating the use of American warfighters. During the “war on terror,” U.S. forces conducted counterdrug operations across the Middle East. I was directly involved in counternarcotics activities against ISIS-K as a part of the Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan. However, ISIS was carrying out these operations to directly fund terrorist activities toward the deliberate, ideologically- and politically-driven aim of overthrowing state governments.
Equally important, the Mexican government has made it clear that the deployment of U.S. military forces within Mexico is neither desired nor welcomed and would be considered a violation of Mexico’s sovereignty. Mexico already collaborates with U.S. federal law enforcement in its fight against the drug cartels.
Rather than deploying special operations forces to conduct the kind of activities that would likely lead Mexico into full-scale counterinsurgency conflict — with U.S. forces directly entangled — we should instead nourish long-standing law enforcement partnerships. This would be the most legally appropriate and strategically sound course of action both diplomatically and in interest of regional security.
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