Follow us on social

Shutterstock_441664639-scaled

Russia’s growing ties with Gulf Arabs

Moscow’s ability to build relationships with US regional allies is raising flags with the Biden administration.

Analysis | Middle East

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar earlier this month raises some uncomfortable issues for the Biden Administration. At a time when the new administration is taking a harder line on Russia and its leader Vladimir Putin, three of America’s closest Gulf Arab allies are instead pursuing better relations with Moscow.

One issue that unites Moscow with these Gulf Arab governments is their common wariness of the Biden administration’s renewed emphasis on human rights concerns — something that the Trump administration downplayed. For Saudi Arabia in particular, warming relations with Russia may be intended to serve as a warning to Washington that if the United States intends to take punitive actions against the kingdom over human rights concerns, Riyadh can respond by buying more Russian and fewer American weapons.

The hope for economic gain is one of Moscow’s main motives for improving ties with Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha. These three Gulf Arab states have far greater potential to trade with and invest in Russia than Moscow’s traditional anti-American partners in the region, Iran and Syria. What is especially remarkable, though, is that Russia and the UAE, in particular, appear to be working together to subvert U.S. economic sanctions related to Syria.

As Kirill Semenov noted in Al-Monitor, in parts of northeastern Syria there are areas where both Syrian Kurdish as well as Assad government forces are present. This raises the possibility that activities by UAE firms in these gray zones will evade U.S. Caesar Act sanctions against economic interaction with enterprises and individuals linked to the Assad regime. If so, this would be a remarkable example of a U.S. ally working with Russia to thwart U.S. sanctions policy. What it also suggests is that, while the UAE shares Washington’s hostility toward Iran, Abu Dhabi sees working with Russia and the Assad regime as an effective means of limiting or even reducing Iranian influence in Syria.

This highlights the difference between the U.S. approach to Russia and Iran and that of Saudi Arabia and the UAE (as well as Israel) toward them. The Biden administration sees Russia as an adversary throughout the world (including the Middle East) and Iran as a concern whose behavior might be positively modified through the revival of the JCPOA. By contrast, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel see Iran as the principal threat to them. While concerned about Russian cooperation with Iran (including in Syria), they see the possibility of nudging Moscow away from Tehran through Gulf-Russian economic cooperation. Moscow, naturally, is quite willing to take advantage of this difference in threat prioritization on the part of the United States on the one hand and some of its Middle Eastern allies on the other.

Iran, of course, is not the only concern that the Gulf Arab states have. Russia and the United Arab Emirates in particular both oppose Turkish efforts to extend Ankara’s influence, especially in Syria and in Libya. But at the same time, Russia has been increasing its cooperation with Turkey and its Gulf ally, Qatar, which has recently been at odds with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This is yet another example of Putin supporting opposing sides simultaneously without falling out with either.

Indeed, what is remarkable about Russian foreign policy toward the Middle East as a whole — not just in the Gulf — is that Moscow now has good relations with all American allies in the region. What this means for the Biden administration, then, is that any U.S. effort to reduce Russian influence in the Middle East — or to get the U.S.’s Middle Eastern allies to support U.S. sanctions against Russia over Ukraine, Europe, and (most especially) human rights inside Russia — is unlikely to succeed.

But Moscow’s improved relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar along with Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and others is uncomfortable not just for Washington, but also for Tehran. Russia’s willingness to cooperate closely with all America’s Middle Eastern allies — including those that are hostile toward Iran — shows Tehran that solidarity with Iran is hardly Putin’s highest priority.

Indeed, Tehran is undoubtedly well aware that continued hostility between the United States. and Iran means Moscow does not have to fear that Tehran can turn to Washington or anyone else if it objects to Russian cooperation with its regional rivals. Nor can Iran outbid the Gulf Arabs in particular with economic incentives for taking its interests into account. Even if it could, Moscow would undoubtedly seek to pocket concessions from both sides (just as it does with Qatar and the UAE in their ongoing rivalry).

It would be a major achievement for Russian diplomacy if Moscow can persuade the Gulf Arabs to fund any Moscow-backed reconstruction efforts in Syria, even if mainly in the gray zones where Assad government and Syrian Kurdish forces are present. Russian, and not Iranian, enterprises would undoubtedly obtain these contracts. Still, as much as they cooperate with Russia, the Gulf Arabs are unlikely to forego their close ties to Washington — especially since they are well aware that Moscow is not going to abandon its ties with Iran.

Just as Moscow is willing to work with opposing sides in the Middle East, Middle Eastern governments are willing to work with opposing external great powers. Nor are the United States and Russia their only choices of external partner. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi this week began his visit to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman.


Photo: ID1974 via shutterstock.com
Analysis | Middle East
Trade review process could rock the calm in US-Mexico relations
Top image credit: Rawpixel.com and Octavio Hoyos via shutterstock.com

Trade review process could rock the calm in US-Mexico relations

North America

One of the more surprising developments of President Trump’s tenure in office thus far has been the relatively calm U.S. relationship with Mexico, despite expectations that his longstanding views on trade, immigration, and narcotics would lead to a dramatic deterioration.

Of course, Mexico has not escaped the administration’s tariff onslaught and there have been occasional diplomatic setbacks, but the tenor of ties between Trump and President Claudia Sheinbaum has been less fraught than many had anticipated. However, that thaw could be tested soon by economic disagreements as negotiations open on a scheduled review of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA).

keep readingShow less
Trump Rubio
Top image credit: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (right) is seen in the Oval Office with US President Donald Trump (left) during a meeting with the King of Jordan, Abdullah II Ibn Al-Hussein in the Oval Office the White House in Washington DC on Tuesday, February 11, 2025. Credit: Aaron Schwartz / Pool/Sipa USA via REUTERS
The US-Colombia drug war alliance is at a breaking point

Trump poised to decertify Colombia

Latin America

It appears increasingly likely that the Trump administration will move to "decertify" Colombia as a partner in its fight against global drug trafficking for the first time in 30 years.

The upcoming determination, due September 15, could trigger cuts to hundreds of millions of dollars in bilateral assistance, visa restrictions on Colombian officials, and sanctions on the country's financial system under current U.S. law. Decertification would strike a major blow to what has been Washington’s top security partner in the region as it struggles with surging coca production and expanding criminal and insurgent violence.

keep readingShow less
Trump Vance Rubio
Top image credit: President Donald Trump meets with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance before a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Monday, August 18, 2025, in the Oval Office. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

The roots of Trump's wars on terror trace back to 9/11

Global Crises

The U.S. military recently launched a plainly illegal strike on a small civilian Venezuelan boat that President Trump claims was a successful hit on “narcoterrorists.” Vice President JD Vance responded to allegations that the strike was a war crime by saying, “I don’t give a shit what you call it,” insisting this was the “highest and best use of the military.”

This is only the latest troubling development in the Trump administration’s attempt to repurpose “War on Terror” mechanisms to use the military against cartels and to expedite his much vaunted mass deportation campaign, which he says is necessary because of an "invasion" at the border.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.