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The New York Times opinion desk has a neoconservative problem

The Times' recent decision to publish an op-ed by Sen. Tom Cotton calling for the military to quash Black Lives Matter protests highlights a militaristic pipeline to the nation's paper of record.

Analysis | Reporting | Washington Politics

When The New York Times published an incendiary op-ed by Republican Senator Tom Cotton calling for the U.S. military to crush Black Lives Matter protests, the paper did more than spark an internal staff revolt. 

The Times’ decision to publish Cotton also highlights a neoconservative media network’s  pipeline into America’s paper of record — and how figures from that network have embroiled the Times in controversy after controversy.

The Cotton article —brimming with bloodlust for black people and their allies, and riddled with factual inaccuracies — was edited by Adam Rubenstein, a young editor who joined the Times’ opinion section last year.

According to the New York Times’ own reporting on the matter, as part of the editing process Rubenstein asked for photographs of federal troops enforcing desegregation orders in Mississippi in 1962 to illustrate Cotton’s comparison between anti-segregation federal troops and what he wanted the military to do now. Times photo editor Jeffrey Henson Scales criticized the use of the photos as a “false equivalence.” While it's unclear what Rubenstein thought of Scales' criticism, the photos were ultimately published in the Cotton article.

Before joining the news industry, Rubenstein participated in discussions on the Iraq War and Jewish thought and politics at the Hertog Foundation — the foundation of neoconservative funder Roger Hertog — and the Tikvah Fund, which has seeded an array of right-wing publications devoted to defending Israel and neoconservative thought.

Rubenstein began his media career in May 2017 as a Robert Bartley Fellow for the Wall Street Journal, a paper that has become a training ground for neoconservatives who go on to the Times. The fellowship is for beginner journalists at the Rupert Murdoch-owned conservative paper.

After his stint at the Journal, Rubenstein became an assistant opinion editor at The Weekly Standard, the magazine founded by Bill Kristol, a key neoconservative force behind the U.S. invasion of Iraq, now better known for being one of the most prominent Never Trump elites. (The Weekly Standard has since closed down.) While at The Weekly Standard, Rubenstein won plaudits for dogged reporting critical of Steve King, the racist Republican representative who just lost his hard-fought GOP primary in Iowa.

The Weekly Standard, though, is known for far more than its reporting on King. It’s a magazine that provided the intellectual firepower for the invasion of Iraq and had long pushed for regime change in Iran.

Cotton himself was part of the force that invaded Iraq in 2003, and he became famous in conservative circles when in 2006 as an active duty officer stationed in Iraq, he penned a letter to the Times attacking it for publishing a story on a classified Bush administration program that purported to trace terrorist finances.

Soon after, Kristol took him under his wing and the Standard promoted Cotton’s career as he rose through the conservative ranks from becoming a congressman to later winning election as a U.S. senator. Now, Cotton is widely seen as a potential heir to Donald Trump (Kristol pushed for Cotton to run for president in 2016).

Rubenstein joined the Times in July 2019. But his ascent from neoconservative institutions straight to America’s most valuable opinion pages was not unique.

It’s a path that was followed by two of his most controversial colleagues at the Times opinion page: Bret Stephens and Bari Weiss. Both of them, too, were at the Wall Street Journal before joining the New York Times, where they have since pushed a militarist and right-wing agenda.

Both Weiss and Stephens have been enveloped in their own controversies in recent years. Weiss — who has gone after critics of Israeli government policies — has used the New York Times to smear organizers of the the Women’s March and to boost the so-called “intellectual dark web,” the term given to right-wing adjacent figures who take umbrage at being asked to respect transgender people and Muslims. After Cotton’s op-ed was published this week, Weiss defended the decision in a Twitter thread that was panned as misleading and inaccurate.

Stephens has used his platform to continue to call for military action against Iran and extol the virtues of “Jewish genius.” But his biggest blow-up came when he e-mailed a George Washington University provost to complain about a tweet written by a GW professor that had compared Stephens to a “bed bug.” Stephens, who quit Twitter after being subjected to thousands of mocking messages on the platform, then wrote an article obliquely comparing the professor’s’ joke to Nazi rhetoric.

Now The New York Times finds itself in yet another controversy provoked by its dalliance with the neoconservative right, with more than 160 staffers planning to participate in a virtual walkout over the publication of Cotton’s piece. Moreover, the paper’s senior staff claim publication of Cotton’s article was rushed and did not go through the normal editorial process. It’s enough controversy to question the wisdom of tapping into the neoconservative media pipeline to staff its opinion pages.

This article was updated for clarity. 


Photo: Osugi / Shutterstock.com
Analysis | Reporting | Washington Politics
Trump Zelensky
Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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Top image credit: People line up to buy bread, after Syria's Bashar al-Assad was ousted, in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria December 23, 2024. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Lifting sanctions on Syria exposes their cruel intent

Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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Taipei skyline, Taiwan. (Shutterstock/ YAO23)

The 8-point buzzsaw facing any invasion of Taiwan

Asia-Pacific

For the better part of a decade, China has served as the “pacing threat” around which American military planners craft defense policy and, most importantly, budget decisions.

Within that framework, a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has become the scenario most often cited as the likeliest flashpoint for a military confrontation between the two superpowers.

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