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Can Millennials save U.S. foreign policy?

A new survey finds that those Americans who have lived most of their lives with the U.S. at war are looking for something new.

Analysis | Washington Politics

In mainstream media outlets, Millennials (a generation with shockingly little wealth) have spent the last decade on a multi-industry killing spree. Now Millennials, along with neighboring Gen X and Gen Z, are coming for your politics.

In both the 2016 and 2018 elections, Gen X, Millennials, and Gen Z have combined to cast more votes than Boomers and older generations. In the 2018 midterm elections, Millennial turnout nearly doubled from the prior 2014 midterm election. Still, Millennials haven’t taken over: while 42 percent of eligible Millennials voted, that still lags behind the 64 percent of Boomers who trekked to the polls.

But as Millennials and younger generations of Americans claim a larger share of the electoral pie, the issues on which they differ from older Americans become more salient. And there are many. As Pew says in their 2018 report, “The Generation Gap in American Politics”:

From immigration and race to foreign policy and the scope of government, two younger generations, Millennials and Gen Xers, stand apart from the two older cohorts, Baby Boomers and Silents. And on many issues, Millennials continue to have a distinct – and increasingly liberal – outlook.

It should be no surprise that Millennials think about U.S. foreign policy differently than older generations. Unlike older generations, Millennials have little to no experience of the Cold War. The oldest Millennials, born in 1981, were in elementary school when the Berlin Wall fell, while the youngest Millennials, born in 1996, have only read about the Soviet Union in textbooks.

Instead of a superpower standoff, Millennials’ life experience of U.S. foreign policy has been defined by the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent decades of war in the Middle East. The U.S. has been at war for more than half their lifetime. These different patterns of life experience have produced some notably different views among Millennials on foreign policy issues. So, alongside starter homes and chain restaurants, what foreign policies are Millennials killing?

For one, belief in American exceptionalism. When asked whether the United States is the greatest country in the world or whether it is no greater than other countries, a majority of Millennials (57 percent) say the U.S. is no greater than other country — a minority viewpoint among older generations. Millennials are also the least likely to say they are “extremely proud” to be Americans (32 percent, compared to 54 percent of Boomers).

Drone strikes may also be on the chopping block. The January assassination of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani via U.S. drone strike was not greeted with the same sort of jubilation as the death of Osama bin Laden. Instead, the attack was met with skepticism from many corners. Vice President Joe Biden, a leading candidate for the Democratic nomination for president, called it “a hugely escalatory move,” while Sen. Elizabeth Warren, another leading presidential candidate, argued that “our priority must be to avoid another costly war.” As longtime former State Department official Nabeel Khoury put it, “The first casualty of the assassination of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani is diplomacy…it only raises the temperature and the stakes of US-Iran confrontations.”

Polling released in January from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs shows that Millennials are among the most skeptical of Soleimani’s assassination. Six in ten Millennials (59 percent) said the strike would make the U.S. less safe; only 16 percent thought it would make the country safer. By contrast, Boomers were divided, with similar proportions saying it would make the U.S. more safe (39 percent) or less safe (41 percent).

Millennials’ skepticism of the effects of Soleimani’s assassination matches their general skepticism of drone strikes as a way to keep the country safe. In a 2019 Chicago Council survey, a majority of Boomers (58 percent) said that conducting drone strikes against suspected terrorists in other countries makes the U.S. safer. Only 36 percent of Millennials agreed. Instead, four in ten (42 percent) said they make the United States less safe.

Could this simply reflect Millennials’ partisan preferences? As others have pointed out, Millennials as a generation are more likely to be Democrats or Democratic-leaning, particularly compared to older generations. And Democrats as a group are less likely to see drone strikes as making the U.S. safer. But the pattern — Millennials being more likely than older generations to see drone strikes against suspected terrorists abroad as making the U.S. less safe — persists across partisan preferences.

To be clear, Millennials haven’t rejected the U.S. drone program entirely. Two-thirds still see drone strikes against suspected terrorists in other countries as an effective approach to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals. But Millennials are notably less likely to see drone strikes as a very effective approach (26 percent, vs. 44 percent of Boomers). And it’s hardly their preferred approach to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals.

Instead of drone strikes, Millennials’ most favored approach to making the United States safe are alliances with other countries. Seven in ten Millennials say that U.S. alliances make the US safer (72 percent), far and away the most popular policy option. Additionally, a majority of Millennials (53 percent) say that maintaining existing alliances is a very effective means of achieving U.S. foreign policy goals; no other policy has such high support. On the other end of the spectrum, half of Millennials (50 percent) say intervening militarily in other countries to solve conflicts makes the U.S. less safe, and three in four (74 percent) say the same about selling weapons to other countries.

It’s possible that Millennials’ attitudes will shift as they continue to age. Perhaps the intra-generational cultural split between older and younger Millennials will cohere into different sets of policy preferences. But Millennials aren’t young impressionable kids anymore — they are the largest adult generation in the U.S. Half of households are headed by a Millennial with children and there are 26 millennials in Congress. There’s a good chance their views on drones — and more broadly on U.S. foreign policy — are be here to stay.


Analysis | Washington Politics
Trump Zelensky
Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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Syria sanctions
Top image credit: People line up to buy bread, after Syria's Bashar al-Assad was ousted, in Douma, on the outskirts of Damascus, Syria December 23, 2024. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra

Lifting sanctions on Syria exposes their cruel intent

Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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The 8-point buzzsaw facing any invasion of Taiwan
Taipei skyline, Taiwan. (Shutterstock/ YAO23)

The 8-point buzzsaw facing any invasion of Taiwan

Asia-Pacific

For the better part of a decade, China has served as the “pacing threat” around which American military planners craft defense policy and, most importantly, budget decisions.

Within that framework, a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has become the scenario most often cited as the likeliest flashpoint for a military confrontation between the two superpowers.

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