The deep freeze in U.S.-Russia relations shows occasional, promising cracks. It happened recently not on the primary issue of conflict — the war on Ukraine — but on a matter of mutual survival. During the United Nations General Assembly President Donald Trump announced an initiative to address one of arms control's most intractable problems: verifying compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
"To prevent potential disasters, I'm announcing today that my administration will lead an international effort to enforce the biological weapons convention by pioneering an AI verification system that everyone can trust,” Trump said. He framed this as an urgent priority, claiming "many countries are continuing extremely risky research into bioweapons and man-made pathogens."
The proposal found immediate endorsement in Moscow. Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov offered unusually direct support, calling the initiative "brilliant in itself" and declaring that "Moscow supports it." Crucially, Peskov proposed concrete next steps, suggesting the U.S. proposal should be negotiated and formally codified in international agreements.
This high-level response is significant for at least two reasons: first, it signals to Washington that Moscow is open to dialogue on issues of strategic stability, despite Trump’s latest rhetorical shift suggesting Ukraine can win the war against Russia and calling Russia a “paper tiger.”
And second, it marks a departure from Moscow's persistent accusations of the U.S. running bioweapons development in Ukraine under the cover of legitimate health research (these allegations were never proven). Given that context, Peskov's constructive tone was particularly noteworthy.
That creates a tangible diplomatic opening with a critical deadline looming: the meetings of the BWC working group and of the state parties is scheduled for December 15-17 in Geneva. The U.S. could use Russia’s positive reaction to discreetly test the approach known as compartmentalization: separate the intractable conflict in Ukraine from managing existential risks between adversarial great powers.
Contrary to hawks who’d oppose any diplomatic engagement with Russia, engaging on BWC does not “legitimize” Russia’s war in Ukraine. It protects a fundamental U.S. security interest that exists independently of it. The inclusion of China in the same context would broaden the initiative’s strategic value. Beijing’s disposition is certainly worth testing — unlike on nuclear weapons where it guards its sovereignty zealously, its position on the biological weapons may be more cooperative.
The imperative to focus on BWC is even more compelling given that, unlike other weapons treaties, the bioweapons convention has never provided for a verification mechanism. The obstacles are substantial. Experts note that much of the legitimate biological research could be dual-use — both for benevolent (medicines) and malevolent (weapons) ends. The research involves thousands of institutions worldwide, while potential weapons programs could be hidden anywhere from industrial facilities to university laboratories.
The last serious effort to create a verification system collapsed in 2001 when the Bush administration rejected a proposed mechanism for the BWC, upending seven years of multilateral negotiations. The situation was further exacerbated by the mysterious, and still unresolved, anthrax incidents that in the febrile post-September 11 atmosphere caused panic of a terrorist biological attack.
After years of paralysis on that front, BWC members agreed in 2022 to resume the work on verification mechanisms. The December meeting in Geneva to review and codify the relevant working group’s recommendations (already drafted but not yet made public) offers an opportunity to advance on the initiative Trump talked about at the U.N.
However, any progress would require a patient, sustained diplomatic engagement that has characterized past successes in arms control, particularly in multilateral frameworks. This pace and method clash with the current administration’s preference for unilateralism and quick wins.
Trump’s own transactional approach to foreign relations may be another self-made hurdle. He may have undermined his own opening in the same U.N. speech by telling world leaders their countries "are going to hell" while appearing to question the purpose of the U.N. — hardly a way to build the multilateral cooperation necessary for success of an initiative he claims to champion.
Furthermore, questions persist about the level of technical expertise within government agencies necessary to enhance Washington's ability to navigate this complex landscape. Developing a credible verification system, enhanced by harnessing the AI potential — while managing the legitimate privacy concerns and technical hurdles — requires deep institutional, technical and legal knowledge that appears to have diminished in recent years.
The path forward requires extensive dialogue and technical work. The fundamental question is whether the administration can maintain focus on this welcome, but complex initiative. The December meeting represents more than just another diplomatic gathering — it’s a test as to whether the political will can be found and sustained in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing to walk through the unexpected opening. Success would not signal friendship, but a mature, pragmatic recognition that some existential dangers demand cooperation even among adversaries — or perhaps particularly among them.
A successful outcome in Geneva, measured by even a modest agreement on core principles for verification, compliance, transparency, and the use of AI, could generate good will to be invested in future, more complex negotiations — with nuclear arms control at the forefront.
