As US-Iran talks resume, will Israel play spoiler (again)?

This Friday, the latest chapter in the long, fraught history of U.S.-Iran negotiations will take place in Oman. Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi and President Trump’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff will meet in an effort to stave off a war between the U.S. and Iran.

The negotiations were originally planned as a multilateral forum in Istanbul, with an array of regional Arab and Muslim countries present, apart from the U.S. and Iran — Turkey, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.

Iran insisted — and won — a shift to a bilateral format with the U.S. in Oman, focused exclusively on the nuclear file. Washington initially refused, only to be persuaded by Turkey and Gulf allies, who fear the regional fallout of what a war may bring.

The fact that Washington agreed to hold talks after their cancellation in Istanbul speaks to the leverage countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have on Washington. The U.S. may dismiss Iranian threats of regional retaliation in the case of an attack, but its own partners are more directly threatened by the consequences — a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, retaliatory strikes on their own soil hosting U.S. bases and personnel, and the general fallout from Iran’s disintegration as a result of a prolonged war. Mindful of these dynamics, Tehran has adroitly leveraged its neighbors’ fears to win another chance to avoid a war it does not want, at a moment of an increased external pressure and domestic turmoil.

Yet, the regional leverage is finite. It can persuade Trump to get to the table, but it cannot force Washington and Tehran for a deal either side does not want or cannot accept.

Iran’s very insistence on controlling the venue, format, and agenda signals a critical reality: even under an immense external and domestic pressure, Tehran is not coming to capitulate, but to negotiate from a position of resistance.

This sets the stage for a fundamental clash. Trump, after boasting of having amassed “an armada” in the Persian Gulf, has painted himself into a corner: he now needs a loud, quick victory — military or diplomatic — or risk losing face. Iran is not offering the unconditional surrender that could be presented as such a win. A military action, however, would be highly risky, unpredictable, prolonged and likely involving U.S. casualties. In other words, it would be nothing like a flashy Venezuela operation to kidnap that nation’s president Nicolas Maduro.

This is a crisis of Trump’s own making, however. The administration keeps insisting that Iran can have no nuclear weapon — Vice-President JD Vance repeated the theme in a recent interview. But if that is indeed a real red line, then Washington is forcing down an open door. Iranian officials have consistently signaled that they are not interested in weaponization. Araghchi and Witkoff were negotiating on this basis in the first half of 2025, until Israel attacked Iran, and then the U.S. joined.

Remarkably, even after the U.S.-Israeli attack, Tehran still wants to negotiate, and Araghchi is fully authorized to represent its position. It is true that Iran keeps insisting on the right to domestic enrichment of uranium, but even Iranian officials admit that no such enrichment is taking place since the U.S. strike on Fordow and Natanz in June 2025.

If Washington’s goal is to codify this endgame — “no enrichment” as opposed to “no weaponization” — it has to offer Tehran an immediate and implementable sanctions relief, including removing both primary and secondary sanctions on trade and investment. Such a proposal would put a stark choice in front of the leaders in Tehran: accept economic relief at a time of an unprecedented internal upheaval in exchange for giving up what is now a largely theoretical enrichment right.

Since Tehran insists it seeks no nuclear weapons, what purpose does the accumulated highly enriched uranium (up to 60% which is close to weapons grade) — under the rubble in Fordow — serve anyway, other than perpetuating the crippling sanctions regime? If Washington were to make such a proposal, chances are it would at least spark some internal debate within the Iranian system between those who seek normalization and stabilization on the one hand, and hardline maximalists on the other. A compromise solution could be found, such as a regional consortium with the participation of Saudi Arabia to manage civilian nuclear fuel, providing strict guarantees to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S.

The problem is not the absence of a technical solution; it is the rejection of its political premise. If the nuclear issue is technically solvable, why are we on the brink? Because for key U.S. ally, Israel, the Iran issue is not about its nuclear problem, and much less about “freeing” Iranians from theocracy. Many in Israel and in Washington are pushing Trump to go for regime change.

Israel is also concerned about Iran's ballistic missiles because it’s the last real deterrence Iran has against a total Israeli domination in the region and Iran’s own transformation into a new Syria — a state so hollowed out that it can be bombed at will. For Iran, missiles are not bargaining chips; they are the non-negotiable pillars of its national defense.

Does that mean that Tehran should resist at all costs talking about the missiles with Washington? No. Talking is not the same as making unacceptable concessions. At a minimum, talks could provide a platform for Tehran to convey its strategic outlook and concerns directly to the Americans.

Trump obviously wants to solve the “Iran issue” for good. His non-ideological transactionalism could in fact play in Tehran’s favor. Trump does not appear to be buying the argument, advanced by both Republican and Democratic hawks, that talking to Tehran would legitimize the regime that just killed thousands of its own people.

Yet Trump is also not interested in drawn-out negotiations. But the kind of a strategic realignment of Iran from an enemy to at least a neutral that he could claim as a major win is not in the cards for as long as Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is in charge. He sees “resistance” to the “Great Satan” as an ideologically non-negotiable pillar of the Islamic Republic, safeguarding which is his main priority, even to the detriment of Iran’s national interest.

Khamenei’s thoughtless taunting of Trump on social media doesn’t help either. But even putting the ideological rigidity aside, the main reason why Tehran seeks to limit talks to the nuclear issue alone is a profound lack of trust in Washington, and, on the face of Trump’s own track record — withdrawal from the JCPOA, bombing of Iran in the midst of negotiations, acquiescence to nearly every Israeli wish — it is difficult to fault Iranians for that.

If the talks in Oman are to avert a disastrous regional war, putting Americans in harm's way and shattering the global economy, Trump should quit listening to the Israeli government and instead heed the advice of Qataris, Omanis, Saudis, Turks and Egyptians, all of whom urge him to engage in real diplomacy with Iran, and not use it as a mere prelude to war.