Follow us on social

google cta
Droning Russia’s nuke radars is the dumbest thing Ukraine can do

Droning Russia’s nuke radars is the dumbest thing Ukraine can do

Attacks on the early warning system actually highlights the fragility of peace between the world's nuclear powers

Europe
google cta
google cta

For a fleeting moment on May 22 the world may have come closer to a catastrophic nuclear accident due to a reckless Ukrainian drone attack on two Russian strategic nuclear early warning radars at Armavir.

Fortunately, a subsequent Ukranian drone attack on a third radar station at Orsk in Russia on May 26 failed.

The incidents underscore a few important things. First, the Ukrainians could have needlessly sparked a crisis in which the Russians, feeling like one of their defenses against a U.S. nuclear attack, were down, struck back hard in retaliation. And second, it highlights the need for Russians to acquire comprehensive space-based nuclear radar of their own.

What happened and what it means

The Ukrainian attack at Armavir was a big deal. It shut down both Russian radars immediately. And it’s likely that within minutes of the attack, an emergency meeting took place with the commander of the Russian strategic rocket forces along with his highest-level officers.

The attacks should not be taken lightly, and President Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken should be giving this special attention.

Even after decades of expensive Russian attempts to build a space-based early warning system that could provide global surveillance of U.S. submarine missile launches, Russia has been unable to marshal the extremely specialized high-technologies needed to build such a system.

To in part deal with this serious shortfall in Russia’s nuclear early warning capabilities, Vladimir Putin himself initiated and publicly supported a highly visible national effort to build a dense and capable nuclear strategic early warning radar system that utilizes numerous giant radars (typically about 30 to 35 meters high).

Since these radars basically form the singular foundation of Russia’s strategic nuclear early warning capabilities, any tampering with their functions in any unpredictable global situation is accompanied by very grave risks of misinterpretations of intentions that could lead to a massive launch of Russian nuclear forces.

Figure 1 below shows a satellite photograph of the two radars at Armavir. The radar beam from what is labeled “Radar Fan 1” is pointing in a counterclockwise direction from North of roughly 125°. Radar Fan 2 is pointing in a clockwise direction from North of roughly 125°.

Figure 2 shows the coverage of the two radar fans at Armavir, and the radar at Orsk drawn on a spherical earth. A side view of a radar fan is shown in the upper right corner. The side-on view shows an extremely important consequence of the fact that Earth is curved and the radar beam propagates basically in a straight line. Because of that, the radar cannot actually see objects near the surface.

For example, it is not possible for the radar to observe aircraft flying over Ukraine. Even ATACM missiles launched from the Ukrainian Black Sea coasts, which rise to altitudes of no more than 40km before they start gliding to their targets, cannot be reliably detected by these radars.

Thus, the radars at Armavir pose no surveillance threat to Ukrainian aircraft, cruise missiles, drones or ATACM missiles. The real threat to Ukrainian aircraft and missiles is from Russian airborne radar systems that are tightly queued into Russian ground-based surface-to-air missile systems.

Why these radars are so important

The importance of having a space-based satellite early warning system can be readily understood by re-examining figure 2.

For purposes of illustration, imagine that a Trident ballistic missile is launched at Moscow from the Indian Ocean at about the same latitude as Bombay on the West Coast of India (20° North latitude). The range to Moscow would be roughly 4,500 to 4,600 km.

If the ballistic missile were launched on a “minimum energy trajectory” (at a loft angle of roughly 34°) it would require the smallest missile burnout speed needed to reach Moscow. In this case the time between “breakwater” missile ignition and impact would be roughly 21 to 22 minutes.

However, the Trident missile is designed to launch its warheads to much higher burnout speeds. For example, it could launch its nuclear payload toward Moscow at a slightly higher speed and lower loft angle of 25° (this is often called a slightly “depressed” trajectory) and still easily reach Moscow in 18 to 19 minutes.

If a launch towards Moscow is on a slightly depressed trajectory, the Russians would not know they were under attack for at least six minutes, until the warheads and the rocket upper stages passed into the Armavir radar search fan. If the Armavir radar was not operating it would take eight to nine minutes from breakwater before the Russian radars in Moscow would indicate they were under attack.

The radar in Moscow would have to observe the incoming missile payloads for one or two minutes before it would have enough data to issue an alert — which means maximum decision-making time that might be available to Russian leaders would be about six or seven minutes!

So you can see why the Russians would be incensed over the Ukraine attacks, which would literally cut their already limited time in which to respond to a nuclear attack.

If the Russians had an early warning space-based system, they would know that they were under attack roughly 19 minutes before the attacking warheads would arrive and destroyMoscow. They would also immediately know whether or not ballistic missiles were being launched from other parts of the world.

Although all of these warning times are shockingly short, it is clear that a warning time of 19 minutes versus one of eight to nine minutes could make the difference between forcing Russia to rely on an automated decision that could lead to the accidental destruction of the United States and Western Europe, or instead on a more reasoned assessment by political leaders and highly professional military commanders.

Any appropriately knowledgeable expert who has listened carefully to Putin’s numerous statements about nuclear weapons would know that he has a detailed knowledge of this warning system and its limitations. He has regularly shown up at the inaugurations of early warning radar sites, overtly indicating his concerns about the need for adequate and reliable early warning systems.

The Russians do currently have an extremely limited space-based early warning system. The system only observes the U.S. ICBM fields near its northern borders and cannot be proliferated to provide global coverage against U.S. submarine missiles. It does not even have 24-hour coverage of the U.S. ICBM fields, since nine satellites are needed to provide that coverage and only four are active at this time.

I have sought to warn the U.S. government leadership of this serious problem, which could have been solved 30 years ago by the U.S. “lending” certain technologies to the Russians. My proposals involved providing the Russians with specialized space-qualified infrared arrays and electronics that would allow them to build their own systems.

This technology would not give the Russians any sensitive military secrets. There would be no way for the Russians to “reverse engineer” these implementing components. Just like the most advanced computer chips, only a vast technical enterprise could achieve such an end.

Instead of recognizing that it is in the interest of the entire world for both Russia and the United States to have reliable and capable early warning systems, at that time, the Clinton administration largely ignored this serious problem, which I believe threatens the survival of civilization even today. Other administrations that followed did no better.

The bottom line is that this grave danger to human civilization, and possibly human survival, could have been solved by competent political leadership almost 30 years ago, to the benefit of the entire world. But it wasn’t, which makes the attack on the radars now a potential crisis.



metamorworks/shutterstock

google cta
Europe
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi
Top photo credit: Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi 首相官邸 (Cabinet Public Affairs Office)

Takaichi 101: How to torpedo relations with China in a month

Asia-Pacific

On November 7, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could undoubtedly be “a situation that threatens Japan’s survival,” thereby implying that Tokyo could respond by dispatching Self-Defense Forces.

This statement triggered the worst crisis in Sino-Japanese relations in over a decade because it reflected a transformation in Japan’s security policy discourse, defense posture, and U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in recent years. Understanding this transformation requires dissecting the context as well as content of Takaichi’s parliamentary remarks.

keep readingShow less
Starmer, Macron, Merz G7
Top photo credit: Prime Minister Keir Starmer meets Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and António Costa, President of the European Council at the G7 world leaders summit in Kananaskis, June 15, 2025. Picture by Simon Dawson / No 10 Downing Street

The Europeans pushing the NATO poison pill

Europe

The recent flurry of diplomatic activity surrounding Ukraine has revealed a stark transatlantic divide. While high level American and Ukrainian officials have been negotiating the U.S. peace plan in Geneva, European powers have been scrambling to influence a process from which they risk being sidelined.

While Europe has to be eventually involved in a settlement of the biggest war on its territory after World War II, so far it’s been acting more like a spoiler than a constructive player.

keep readingShow less
Sudan
Top image credit: A Sudanese army soldier stands next to a destroyed combat vehicle as Sudan's army retakes ground and some displaced residents return to ravaged capital in the state of Khartoum Sudan March 26, 2025. REUTERS/El Tayeb Siddig
Will Sudan attack the UAE?

Saudi leans in hard to get UAE out of Sudan civil war

Middle East

As Saudi Arabia’s powerful crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), swept through Washington last week, the agenda was predictably packed with deals: a trillion-dollar investment pledge, access to advanced F-35 fighter jets, and coveted American AI technology dominated the headlines. Yet tucked within these transactions was a significant development for the civil war in Sudan.

Speaking at the U.S.-Saudi Investment Forum President Donald Trump said that Sudan “was not on my charts,” viewing the conflict as “just something that was crazy and out of control” until the Saudi leader pressed the issue. “His majesty would like me to do something very powerful having to do with Sudan,” Trump recounted, adding that MBS framed it as an opportunity for greatness.

The crown prince’s intervention highlights a crucial new reality that the path to peace, or continued war, in Sudan now runs even more directly through the escalating rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The fate of Sudan is being forged in the Gulf, and its future will be decided by which side has more sway in Trump’s White House.

keep readingShow less
google cta
Want more of our stories on Google?
Click here to make us a Preferred Source.

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.