The Ukraine War has dragged on for nearly three years with no current end in sight. The United States' pledge to Ukraine's defense has grown increasingly costly and unpopular, and talks on both sides of escalation — and even the potential use of nuclear weapons, on the part of Russia — threaten to expand and inflate the conflict. Ukraine has defended itself admirably, but the time is now to set out a plan for negotiations and de-escalation.
In the above video, former CIA Russia Analysis Chief and Quincy Institute's Director of Grand Strategy George Beebe discusses the future outlook of the Ukraine War and the context and potential avenues for diplomacy with Russia.
Khody Akhavi is Senior Video Producer at the Quincy Institute. Previously he was Head of Video for Al-Monitor and covered the White House for Al Jazeera English, as well as produced films for the network’s flagship investigative unit.
On June 6, a Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel announced the Russian private military company’s (PMC) withdrawal from Mali, declaring “mission accomplished.”
After continuing operations in Mali nearly two years after the deaths of its founders, Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin, the Russian state has finally subsumed Wagner’s structures under the Russian Ministry of Defense-subordinate, Africa Corps.
The news of Wagner’s withdrawal was not surprising, as the handover process began almost immediately after Prigozhin’s death in August 2023. But much of the “withdrawal” is closer to a bureaucratic reorganization. Whole Wagner units with their structure, staffing and logistics have been retained, many employees and commanders continue to serve in the Sahel.
Still, Africa Corps’ official status as a Ministry of Defense (MoD) unit means there will be changes. Africa Corps employs a strict hierarchy. Wagner’s operational autonomy and the freedom of its commanders to make decisions on the ground will take a backseat to multi-stage approvals and red tape. The shift from Wagner’s direct participation in combat operations against the region’s jihadists and separatists to a more risk-averse Africa Corps is also at odds with the Malian military leadership’s expectations.
In late 2020, amid a rebel offensive against the Central African Republic’s (CAR) capital, Bangui, Wagner’s mission switched from training to combat operations. Around 1,500 additional contractors landed in the city with Dmitry Utkin. Their successful and brutal counteroffensive returned significant territory to the state and convinced Prigozhin and Russia’s leadership of the efficacy of military solutions to Africa’s varying insurgencies.
Impressed with Wagner’s operations in CAR, the Malian government signed an agreement with Prigozhin’s structures in 2021. Unlike in CAR, where Wagner largely operated independently, MoD military planners and advisors played a role in the intervention from the start. Formally, Wagner was to operate alongside the Malian military (FAMa) and answer to FAMa command and Russian MoD advisors. In practice, Wagner commanders had a high degree of autonomy in the field and often conducted military operations unaccompanied.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, the appearance of a PMC structure in Mali had little to do with “plausible deniability.” Prigozhin operated in an environment in which only private individuals could be responsible for failure, while success is shared with the state. Prigozhin’s efforts to escape these restraints in his March on Moscow, followed by his death, only accelerated the inevitable officialization of Wagner’s structures in Africa.
With the exception of its operation in CAR, the commercial component of Prigozhin’s African empire has either been divvied up or disappeared, while the group’s political advisory and information wings were divorced from military operations. The officialization of Wagner through Africa Corps, therefore, has only affected the PMC. The process of that officialization, however, has differed in each country where Wagner operated.
In Libya, Wagner’s operations were completely subordinated to Africa Corps and reinforced with new units, military equipment, and weapons. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the territory of Libya controlled by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar became a regional hub for Russian aviation. Libya’s port at Tobruk is now a de facto Russian logistics base.
In Sudan, where the Russian MoD now supports General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the civil war against the Rapid Support Forces, Africa Corps is not formally present. However, anonymous sources note military specialists do take part in special operations.
In Burkina Faso, Niger, and Equatorial Guinea, Russian intervention post-dates Prigozhin’s demise. Burkina Faso’s sociopolitical context is still an obstacle to foreigners’ direct participation in combat, and Africa Corps specialists train personnel and service weapons and military equipment. Missions in Niger and Equatorial Guinea are similar.
In Mali, however, the handover from Wagner to Africa Corps was far more difficult. Unlike in Libya, where a ceasefire between Haftar and Tripoli has largely held, Russian advisors and Wagner units in Mali found themselves engaged in complex, overlapping security, humanitarian, and political crises. With resources largely trapped in Ukraine, it was impossible to immediately replace Wagner units with a new structure. Nor were all Wagner fighters ready to sign new contracts.
As a result, Wagner assault groups retained partial independence from the MoD and Africa Corps. At the same time, they increasingly replaced FAMa formations in the bush and were further drawn into local conflicts and prerogatives. The announcement of Wagner’s withdrawal from Mali implies that an agreement between these units and the MoD in Bamako has finally been reached. It is less a physical retreat than a conclusive submission of these units to a more established chain of command.
This leaves the Central African Republic as the last holdout for legacy Wagner. And Wagner’s military and political leadership in CAR continues to lobby for retaining their unique structure. Wagner’s military, commercial, and political services are greater than the sum of their parts, they argue. Stripped of risk taking, on-the-ground decision making, and commercial incentives—in other words, Africa Corps— Wagner differs little from the European Union training missions it ousted. “We are confident,” a source in Wagner’s military leadership says, “that we will stay in CAR. And the government is of the same opinion.”
For now, at least, the Kremlin and MoD seem to agree with Wagner in Bangui, though a superficial name change may still be imposed. But Wagner’s commanders in CAR bring up points that spark continued debate within Russia’s military circles, particularly on the Sahel: how should Africa Corps, or Russia more generally, engage in the region’s complex, overlapping crises? And who is going to pay for it?
Budget for far-flung operations tends to decrease over time, a fact Prigozhin understood well. His commercial enterprises were an effort to make Wagner’s interventions in Africa self-financing and not reliant on ad hoc subsidies from the center. And while Africa Corps is, to a certain extent, designed to prevent the creation of another Prigozhin in Africa, the political economy of Russia will still foster the arrival of new, mini-Prigozhins to the continent.
Indeed, the growing geopolitical importance of Africa to Russia will foster a new crop of patriotic, entrepreneurial oligarchs to help fill budgetary gaps in places like the Sahel. Even bigger players contemplate entering the game. Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy giant, Rosatom, for example, has the budget and ambition necessary to play a larger role in Sahelian security.
Building nuclear power plants in fragile environments would require significant investment in security; and fixed-site protection is an ideal mandate for the less dynamic Africa Corps. Moreover, if Russia and Ukraine ever reach a ceasefire deal, there will be serious pressure on the state to provide employment opportunities for returning soldiers at home and abroad.
For now, though, Africa Corps in Mali finds itself a participant in a deteriorating conflict. The exigencies of today will invariably take precedence over the long-term strategies of tomorrow.
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Top image credit: 11.04.2025. Rohuneeme. Estonian authorities detained an oil tanker which forms part of Russia's "shadow fleet" and which had been sailing through Estonian waters in the Gulf of Finland. The vessel Kiwala is not permitted to sail on the open seas. Photo Eero Vabamägi, Postimees VIA REUTERS
The European Union’s latest moves (as part of its 17th package of sanctions against Russia declared in May) to target much more intensively Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” of oil tankers and other vessels illustrate the danger that, as long as the Ukraine war continues, so will the risk of an incident that will draw NATO and the EU into a direct military clash with Russia.
The EU sanctions involve bans on access to the ports, national waters and maritime economic zones of EU states. Ships that enter these waters risk seizure and confiscation. It does not appear that Washington was consulted about this decision, despite the obvious risks to the U.S.
As part of this strategy, on May 15, an Estonian patrol boat attempted to stop and inspect a tanker in the Gulf of Finland. Russia sent up a fighter jet that flew over the Estonian vessel (allegedly briefly trespassing into Estonian waters), and the Estonians backed off — this time. In January, the German navy seized a Panamanian-flagged tanker, the Eventin, in the Baltic after its engines failed and it drifted into German territorial waters.
Sweden has now announced that starting on July 1 its navy will stop, inspect and potentially seize all suspect vessels transiting its exclusive economic zone, and is deploying the Swedish air force to back up this threat. Since the combined maritime economic zones of Sweden and the three Baltic states cover the whole of the central Baltic Sea, this amounts to a virtual threat to cut off all Russian trade exiting Russia via the Baltic — which would indeed be a very serious economic blow to Moscow.
It would also threaten to cut off Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad, which is surrounded by Poland, from access to Russia by sea.
This is the kind of action that has traditionally led to war. The Swedish assumption seems to be that the Russian navy and air force in the Baltic are now so weak — and so surrounded by NATO territory — that there is nothing Moscow can do about this. However, it is very unlikely that the Swedes would take this step unless they also believe that in the event of a clash, Washington will come to Sweden’s defense — even though the EU and Swedish decisions were made without U.S. approval and are not strictly covered by NATO’s Article 5 commitment.
And despite all the hysterical language about Russia being “at war” with NATO countries, these moves by the EU and Sweden are also based on an assumption that Russia will not in fact lose its temper and react with military force. European policymakers might however want to think about a number of things: for example, what would the U.S. do if ships carrying U.S. cargo were intercepted by foreign warships? We know perfectly well that the U.S. would blow the warships concerned out of the water and declare that it had done so in defense of the sacred rule of free navigation — in which the EU also professes to believe.
EU leaders, and admirals, should also spend some time on Russian social media, and read the incessant attacks on the Putin administration by hardliners arguing precisely that Moscow has been far too soft and restrained in its response to Western provocations, and that this restraint has encouraged the West to escalate more and more. Such hardliners (especially within the security forces) are by far the greatest internal political threat that Putin faces.
It is important to note in this regard that moves to damage Russia’s “shadow fleet” have not been restricted to sanctions. In recent months there have been a string of attacks on such vessels in the Mediterranean with limpet mines and other explosive devices — developments that have been virtually ignored by Western media.
In December 2024, the Russian cargo ship Ursa Major sank off Libya after an explosion in which two crewmembers were killed. The Reuters headline reporting these attacks was rather characteristic: “Three tankers damaged by blasts in Mediterranean in the last month, causes unknown, sources say.” Unknown, really? Who do we think were the likely perpetrators? Laotian special forces? Martians? And what are European governments doing to investigate these causes?
If the Russians do sink a Swedish or Estonian warship, the Trump administration will face a terribly difficult decision on how to respond to a crisis that is not of its own choosing: intervene and risk a direct war with Russia, or stand aside and ensure a deep crisis with Europe. The U.S. administration would therefore be both wise and entirely within its rights to state publicly that it does not endorse and will not help to enforce this decision.
Washington also needs — finally — to pay attention to what the rest of the world thinks about all this. The overwhelming majority of senators who are proposing to impose 500% tariffs on any country that buys Russian energy have apparently not realized that one of the two biggest countries in this category is India — now universally regarded in Washington as a vital U.S. partner in Asia. And now America’s European allies are relying on U.S. support to seize ships providing that energy to India.
The U.S. administration would also be wise to warn European countries that if this strategy leads to maritime clashes with Russia, they will have to deal with the consequences themselves. Especially given the new risk of war with Iran, the last thing Washington needs now is a new flare-up of tension with Moscow necessitating major U.S. military deployments to Europe. And the last thing the world economy needs are moves likely to lead to a still greater surge in world energy prices.
European governments and establishments seem to have lost any ability to analyze the possible wider consequences of their actions. So — not for the first time — America will have to do their thinking for them.
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Top photo credit: A rescue personnel walks next to a damaged vehicle at an impact site following missile attack from Iran on Israel, in Ramat Gan, Israel, June 14, 2025. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
Israel’s war of choice with Iran is proving far less decisive than President Donald Trump initially believed when he praised Israel’s performance as “excellent.” What now appears to be an escalating, inconclusive conflict with no clear end in sight will soon force Trump into a challenging decision: end the war — or enter it.
Israel’s opening strike was undoubtedly a tactical success. Caught off guard by the assumption that Israel wouldn’t act before the sixth round of nuclear talks, Iranian leaders had taken no precautions. Many were asleep in their homes in northern Tehran, alongside their families, when Israeli strikes killed them in their beds. Iran’s air defenses were also unprepared and inactive.
Israel aimed to eliminate as many Iranian commanders as possible to disrupt Iran’s command and control structure and effectively paralyze its military response. Initially, the strikes were so successful — and Iran so subdued — that it was unclear whether Tehran retained any meaningful capacity to retaliate.
Impressed by Israel’s early success, Trump moved quickly to claim credit for the operation, despite Secretary of State Marco Rubio having declared just hours earlier that the strikes were a "unilateral action" by Israel and that the U.S. was not involved. As the saying goes: success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan.
But within 18 hours, Iran had restructured its chain of command, activated its air defenses, and, most critically, launched four missile barrages aimed primarily at Israeli air defense systems. Many of the missiles penetrated Israel’s multilayered defenses, lighting up the Tel Aviv skyline as they struck their targets — including a direct hit on Israel’s Ministry of Defense.
That Tehran could mount such a response just hours after losing several top military commanders was the first clear sign that Israel’s initial success would be short-lived.
Although Iran continued to absorb heavy blows on Saturday — including Israeli strikes on oil refineries, Mehrabad Airport in Tehran, and other civilian and economic infrastructure — it responded with additional missile barrages. These were fewer in number but notably more effective. As Israel’s air defenses degrade, Tehran is likely to shift to missiles with larger warheads, increasing the scale of destruction.
Meanwhile, despite inflicting significant damage on the Natanz nuclear site, Israel has failed to penetrate the far more critical and heavily fortified Fordow facility. As a result, the actual impact on Iran’s nuclear program appears limited. Reports indicate that the U.S. military has provided its missile defense capabilities to shoot down Iranian drones and missiles but it has so far not joined Israel in offensive strikes.
It is becoming increasingly clear to Washington that Israel’s war of choice is far from a success, and a decisive outcome may not materialize at all. While Israel likely holds escalation dominance, it faces a critical disadvantage: it has fewer air defense interceptors than Iran has long-range missiles. Israel needs a swift and decisive victory — but a prolonged war of attrition may ultimately favor Iran. And such a victory now seems out of reach.
Unsurprisingly, Israeli officials and their allies in Washington — including groups like the Foundation for Defense of Democracies — have begun lobbying President Trump to bring the U.S. into the war and to join them in offensive strikes. For Trump, this must be a serious letdown. Aware of his reluctance to launch another Middle East war, the Netanyahu government had recalibrated its approach when it pressed Trump earlier in January: rather than urging the U.S. to strike Iran directly, it sought a green light for Israel to act. Through an intense lobbying campaign, Israel appears to have secured at least tacit approval from Trump for this campaign.
Just 24 hours into its war of choice with Iran, Israel was already back in Washington, knocking on Trump’s door with new demands. What began as “Give us the green light and Israel will bomb Iran for America” quickly shifted to “Hurry up, America, and bomb Iran for Israel!”
Israel faces two key challenges with this request. First, seeking America’s blessing to go to war is a far lighter ask than requesting America’s direct military involvement. Trump, unexpectedly, agreed to the former — but it would be exceptionally unwise for him to agree to the latter.
Secondly, as noted earlier, Trump likes winners — and by asking him to intervene, Israel is signaling that it’s losing. It has failed to eliminate Iran’s regime or cripple its nuclear program, and is now absorbing unexpected blows in return (today Iran sent a barrage of missiles during daytime rather than night to throw the Israelis off). Why would Trump risk American lives, endanger his presidency, and join a war he didn’t start — just to rescue Israel from a failed and unprovoked conflict? Trump prefers to take credit for victories, not inherit blame for someone else’s potential fiasco.
After all, it was Israel that persuaded Trump to adopt the zero-enrichment negotiating stance — the very position that led to the diplomatic deadlock Israel later exploited to secure a green light for its faltering military campaign. Had Trump stuck to his original red line — no weaponization — he might now be on the verge of a historic nuclear agreement with Iran.
Trump listened to Netanyahu—just as he did to John Bolton and Mike Pompeo in 2018—and once again, his path to an America First deal with Iran was derailed. This is precisely the outcome Netanyahu sought. If it’s not what Trump wants, he should change course immediately—just as he did in Yemen. Rather than joining Israel’s war, he should compel Israel to end it.
With its unprovoked war, Israel has undermined Trump’s negotiating position in two key ways. First, support for acquiring a nuclear weapon has surged among Iran’s elite and broader society in response to the Israeli bombings. This has raised the political cost for Tehran to agree to limit enrichment to civilian levels, making a deal more difficult.
Second, America’s backing of Israel’s attack — coupled with Trump’s self-congratulatory rhetoric — has led Tehran to believe he deliberately lulled Iran into a false sense of security to boost Israel’s chances. As a result, what little trust remained in Trump as a negotiating partner has further eroded. And the less trust there is, the narrower the path to a deal.
Still, a deal remains possible. But the sooner Trump halts Israel’s war, the better his chances. One thing is certain: if Trump and Iran return to the negotiating table, he must quickly abandon the self-defeating zero-enrichment demand championed by Israel and Bolton — the very stance that gave birth to this needless and messy war.
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