On the question of an early temporary ceasefire in Ukraine, the Trump administration might be described as being wrong for the right reasons, and the Putin administration as right for the wrong reasons.
The hideous cost of the war was emphasized last week when a Russian missile struck a playground in Krivyi Rih in Ukraine, killing 20, including nine children. This should be a spur to all sides to move as fast as possible towards a peace settlement.
However, the goal should be a full peace settlement, not a temporary ceasefire that would risk entrenching a very dangerous and damaging situation for the U.S., Europe, and Ukraine. A ceasefire that lasted only a month would be pointless. The goal should be to make the ceasefire permanent while talks continue. This however would risk replicating the Donbas ceasefire of 2015-22, that solved none of the underlying issues, was repeatedly broken by clashes and provocations on both sides, and eventually led to full-scale Russian invasion.
Such a ceasefire would encourage hardliners on both sides to reject a peace settlement in the hope of successfully renewing the war later. Russian hardliners would hope that the breathing space would allow the Russian army to be decisively strengthened for a new offensive. Ukrainian hardliners would hope that a Democratic victory in the U.S. 2028 presidential elections would renew unconditional U.S. aid for Ukrainian victory. If it saw good reasons to fear this, the Russian government would surely be tempted to launch a preemptive strike.
Absent a peace settlement, and in circumstances of repeated exchanges of fire, it is highly unlikely that neutral countries could be persuaded to send peacekeeping forces. That would make the outbreak of a new war even more likely. It is also possible that in circumstances of an unstable ceasefire and continuing clashes, the Zelensky administration might be encouraged to continue martial law and go on delaying presidential elections. This would reduce its international legitimacy and risk growing political instability in Ukraine.
With Ukraine no longer under military pressure, the EU and some European governments would continue to press for a European “reassurance force” in Ukraine — something that is absolutely unacceptable for Russia and which would make a peace settlement impossible.
On the other hand, a ceasefire without a settlement could endanger European support for Ukraine, because with Ukraine seemingly no longer under imminent threat, other leaders and populations would be tempted to reduce or end their military aid to Ukraine. President Trump would undoubtedly also be tempted to do this.
Perhaps most importantly, absent a peace settlement it will be far more difficult for Ukraine to begin economic reconstruction and institute the economic, judicial and administrative reforms necessary if the country is to have any chance of progressing towards membership of the European Union.
The war has led to severe restrictions on media independence, freedom of speech, and political pluralism in Ukraine. Several formerly leading political parties and media outlets remain banned, and critics of the Zelensky government have been hounded into exile. Strengthening liberal democracy in Ukraine will be impossible if the country remains on a war footing. In Russia, a continued state of semi-frozen conflict will also give cover to the Putin administration’s intensified authoritarianism.
Ukrainian economic reform will be equally impossible if the economy is mobilized for war; and of course private investors will be far less likely to put their money into Ukraine if they think that there is a likelihood of the war resuming. The $300 billion in Russian assets seized by the EU would either be left in limbo, or used unilaterally by the EU to pay for Ukrainian reconstruction — thereby removing a major incentive for Russia to agree to a compromise peace.
A long-term semi-frozen conflict in Ukraine will also be extremely bad for the economies of the EU; and we have seen in Romania and elsewhere how allegations of Russian influence have been used to justify extremely undemocratic measures by ruling elites.
But if the Russian government is right in saying that a ceasefire must be preceded by real progress in addressing the “root causes” of the war, that does not of course mean that the demands or proposals being made by the Russian government are correct. Three in particular are completely unacceptable, at least in the form originally stated.
Last June, Putin demanded that as a condition of a ceasefire, Ukraine withdraw from the territory it still holds in the five provinces that Russia claims to have annexed (including the capitals of two of these provinces); and that Ukraine reduce its armed forces to a level where they could not hope to defend the country. Putin has not repeated these demands in his recent statements. On the other hand, he has suggested that Ukraine be placed temporarily under an external, U.N.-supervised government that would be charged with negotiating a peace settlement.
Any viable peace settlement must be based on the principles that the ceasefire line should run where the eventual battle line runs (possibly with limited and equal land swaps); that any limitations on the Ukrainian armed forces and Western arms supplies to Ukraine must apply only to certain limited categories of weapons (for example long-range missiles); and that the choice of a Ukrainian government must be entirely for the Ukrainian people themselves.
There are essentially two ways (either independently or combined) to get Russia to accept these principles and compromise on its maximalist demands. The first is for the Ukrainians with Western help to fight the Russian army to a standstill or near-standstill on the ground. This is indeed possible. The Russian army has advanced in recent months, but at a grindingly slow rate.
If Russian troops fail to make much greater progress this year, Moscow will presumably be much more inclined to compromise. This is however a very risky strategy for Ukraine and its Western backers. Given the huge imbalance in resources between Ukraine and Russia (especially in manpower) and the reported exhaustion of Ukrainian units, the possibility of a Ukrainian collapse cannot be excluded.
The other fruitful path towards peace would be for the Trump administration in talks with Moscow temporarily to set the issue of Ukraine to one side, and concentrate instead on drafting a comprehensive set of formal bilateral agreements with Moscow, in return for Moscow abandoning its maximalist demands on Ukraine and reducing its ties to Iran and North Korea.
The basis for the first of these agreements is already in place, with the Trump administration’s statements excluding NATO membership for Ukraine. This could be extended to a U.S. guarantee of no further NATO enlargement beyond the alliance’s existing borders (though also guaranteeing that EU enlargement to the countries concerned would be open, and no U.S. backing for any troops from NATO countries in Ukraine).
In line with the Trump administration’s desire to reduce U.S. military commitments in Europe, Washington could guarantee the withdrawal of U.S. troops from countries on Russia’s borders, in return for certain reciprocal withdrawals by Russia. A new intermediate missile agreement could guarantee that the U.S. would not carry through on its plan to deploy such missiles in Germany, in return for Russia withdrawing its missiles from Kaliningrad and Belarus.
Both sides could agree jointly to propose a permanent consultative mechanism on European security, possibly involving the five members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany and any neutral states willing to contribute significant peacekeeping forces to Ukraine. This would aim to ward off in good time the sort of unintended crises that led to the revolution and civil war in Ukraine in 2014, and the war in Georgia in 2008.
Such draft agreements between the U.S. and Russia, leading in turn to a draft peace treaty for Ukraine, could be achieved without the direct involvement of the EU and Ukraine. Of course, the agreement of both would be necessary for the peace settlement to become final and formal. The Ukrainian government by definition would have to agree to the terms of a ceasefire, and any guarantees for minority rights in Ukraine. The EU would have to agree to suspend its sanctions against Russia, and on the fate of Russian assets.
If however the U.S. and Russia had already reached a viable agreement between themselves, it would be very hard — and very foolish — for Brussels and Kyiv to reject it, unless they were willing to risk the Trump administration abandoning Ukraine altogether.
