As President-elect Donald Trump assembles his cabinet and key advisers, the backgrounds of his appointees and his first term offer clues to his potential strategy for the Middle East. What direction might his choices signal?
First, his picks for the Pentagon, State Department, national security adviser, Special Envoy to the Middle East, and ambassador to Israel all share a strong, in some cases theologically rooted, attachment to Israel and commitment to the U.S.-Israel relationship.
At the 2019 National Council of Young Israel Gala, Trump’s choice for secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth, who affiliates with groups that identify as Christian nationalist, stated, “Zionism and Americanism are the frontlines for Western civilization and freedom.” Meanwhile, former Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee, Trump’s choice for ambassador to Israel, adheres to the Christian Evangelical belief that the return of Jews to Israel validates the biblical narrative. “Everything that I embrace as a Christian,” he says, “is rooted in the promises that God gave to the Jewish people.”
In Trump’s first administration, there were religiously motivated individuals in key national security roles, like former national security adviser Gen. Michael Flynn (ret.), but not to the extent seen in the current lineup. Others, like Trump’s pick for secretary of state, Marco Rubio, and Ambassador to the U.N., Elise Stefanik, rely less on specific doctrinal themes, but are strong supporters not only of Israel but also of its current government’s policies.
Trump’s pick for special envoy to the Middle East, Steven Witkoff, an ardent supporter of Israel, is not a mere Trump apparatchik, but a close friend of the president-elect, who golfs with him and appears to be treated by Trump as an equal. When there’s a special envoy, especially one close to the White House, the State Department often finds itself sidelined on the issue. So whatever Rubio thinks about Israel and Israeli-Palestinian matters may largely be irrelevant — on those issues, he will essentially be a bystander.
The bottom line is that for the next four years, Israelis will likely feel relatively free to act as they wish, both in their own backyard and across the broader region. The individuals discussed above range from staunch defenders of Israel on strategic grounds to those who view its defense through the lens of Scripture and a clash-of-civilizations worldview.
Second, Jared Kushner — known for his “deal of the century” Middle East initiative — is notably absent from the list and has told the media he intends to focus on his business interests. However, in the Trump family, the line between business and government has always been blurred, so we may see him return in an official or semi-official role, especially since a renewed initiative for the Palestinians will likely entail the goal of an economic peace, rather than a political one.
His previous plan could reappear with revisions necessitated by the destruction resulting from the Gaza war .Indeed, given Israel’s current rejection of a two-state solution, the Kushner Plan would be the only game in town.
At a lower level, Brian Hook is expected to be the point man on Iran as he was during most of the previous Trump administration, and Joel Rayburn may join the State Department or, more likely, the National Security Council, potentially replacing Brett McGurk as Middle East Coordinator. McGurk resigned from the NSC during Trump’s first term, partly due to Trump’s plan to withdraw from Syria, making his return unlikely, though not impossible should the new national security adviser, Rep. Mike Waltz, want to maintain some continuity on the NSC staff.
Third, a bilateral treaty with Saudi Arabia has been teed up by Biden, and now it’s up to Trump to putt. While ratification may still face challenges due to Democratic opposition, this hurdle is much lower now, especially if Israel supports it. Under Trump, the chance of including concessions on nuclear energy is also more likely.
Whether Israel backs the treaty could depend on how Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, follows up on his strong rhetoric about genocide at the Riyadh Summit this month. Kushner would be the obvious intermediary.
Fourth, there’s the question of Iran. Tehran has been cautious, even responding positively to Biden’s secret message warning against an assassination plot against Trump. (Ayatollah Khamenei, however, has publicly urged that the ICC have Netanyahu and Gallant put to death.) The Iranian leadership is signaling its desire to reduce the risk of war with the U.S., especially with Trump’s renewed commitment to “maximum pressure.”
The key question for the U.S. is whether Trump will make war with Iran more likely, either by giving Israel carte blanche, or creating the impression that it has. Trump doesn’t seem eager for war, and if he believes he can strike a nuclear deal with Iran, he will likely pursue it, especially if Elbridge Colby, a first-term Trump Pentagon official who contends that the U.S. should focus on China, or someone with similar views on China returns. and teams up with his national security adviser.
Despite Trump’s 2020 assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Gen. Qassem Soleimani, Iran will likely be open to negotiations with him, as Trump has shown a tendency to shift between the use of force and bold diplomacy in dealing with traditional U.S. adversaries.
Fifth, there’s the question of whether Trump will protect his legacy of negotiating a withdrawal from Afghanistan and follow through on the Biden administration’s deal with Iraq to bring U.S. troops home from Iraq — and likely from Syria as well. This would require him to maintain some form of diplomacy with the Taliban, unless his advisors, particularly Waltz, who was highly critical of the withdrawal, push for a more coercive policy, possibly including military strikes.
If Trump’s administration adopts a hawkish stance on Iran, U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria may face increased targeting by Iran-aligned militias, which could lead to pressure for a strong military response and potentially trigger an escalating cycle of violence. On the other hand, Iran may take a more cautious approach.
This brings us to the sixth and final variable: Trump’s unpredictability. Even Israelis worry that Trump could diverge from the expectations he’s set if he thinks it benefits him.
Importantly, if the Republicans truly are his party now, Trump won’t need to worry about his base or congressional Republicans if he decides to surprise them with outreach to Iran and a potential agreement; think Nixon in China, less beholden to Republican pressure when making decisions.
Finally, we must consider domestic fallout in two ways: first, the suppression of protest against Israeli policy, particularly on college campuses; second, the possibility of a terrorist attack on the U.S. in retaliation for its support of Israel. This could reignite Islamophobia at home and intervention in the Middle East.
The direction the Trump administration ultimately takes in the Middle East will largely depend on whether the president-elect follows his instincts toward disengagement, particularly militarily, and the promises made during his campaigns, or listens to his more hawkish advisers.
In reality, his Middle East policies are likely to blend interventionist and restraint elements, resulting in the same unpredictability and, at times, incoherent maneuvers seen in his first term.
