Something happened yesterday, and Trump is now determined to take the country to a war of choice. He can change his mind at the last minute, as he did in 2019, but short of that, there will be war.
It is important to understand that capitulation is most likely not an option for Iran for a variety of reasons.
First, Trump's conduct in the past 10 days has destroyed any confidence Tehran has in him and his desire for a peaceful outcome. For the Iranians to ever back down from their long-standing position to never give up enrichment, they must have confidence that backing down ends the conflict. They have no such confidence in Trump at this moment. They don't think he will stop there.
Second, Tehran has lost confidence in Trump's ability or willingness to say no to Israel (that confidence existed earlier to some extent). And Israel will not be content with even a complete dismantlement of Iran's nuclear program.
If the nuclear program is destroyed, Israel will then turn to Iran's missile program. It will not accept Iran having missiles that can wreak havoc on Israel — as Iran has done in the last few days. Without missiles, an air force, or a nuclear deterrent, Iran will be completely exposed and defenseless. Once that is achieved, the Israelis will push for regime change or regime collapse.
And after that, as the Israelis have done in Syria after Assad fell, they will push to destroy the rest of Iran's conventional military so that Iran won't be able to challenge Israel's emerging regional military hegemony for decades to come. Iran's territorial integrity will also be put at risk.
As a result, Tehran does not view capitulation — even if they desired it, which I don't think they do — as a stable outcome.
In their view, their only chance is to fight back.By making the war as costly as possible for the US — even if they will lose it — they think they can either deter Trump, or make him cut the war short. As he did in Yemen.
Thus, if new talks take place and Trump insists on capitulation, he will get war. Iran will pay an immeasurable price. As will the region. But the U.S. will also pay a very heavy price. Scores of American soldiers may be killed. Oil prices will skyrocket, and gas prices in hot summer months in the US will soar. Inflation will go up.
Trump's Iran war may destroy his presidency as Bush's Iraq invasion destroyed his.
Iran will lose. But so will the US. Israel is perhaps the only country that will benefit from this war of choice.
Top image credit: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits the country's nuclear material production base and nuclear weapons institute, at an undisclosed location in North Korea, in this photo released by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on January 29, 2025. KCNA via REUTERS
During North Korea’s parliamentary session last week, Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, delivered a speech expressing his clear willingness to engage in diplomacy with the United States. But under one strict precondition: the United States must stop seeking to denuclearize North Korea.
“Personally, I still have good memories of U.S. President Trump,” Kim said in his speech. He added, “If the U.S. drops its hollow obsession with denuclearization and wants to pursue peaceful coexistence with North Korea based on the recognition of reality, there is no reason for us not to sit down with the U.S.”
Kim emphatically rejected the possibility of diplomacy conditioned on denuclearization, stressing that “there will never, never be denuclearization for us,” and North Korea’s status as a nuclear power is “irreversible” and untradeable for sanctions relief.
Kim’s remarks reaffirm a statement from July made by his sister, Kim Yo Jong, who then described the relationship between her brother and Trump as “not bad” and urged Washington to drop its demand for denuclearization in order to restart diplomacy.
Kim’s statement is a straightforward response to Trump, who has been repeatedly calling for North Korea’s return to dialogue since his second term began early this year. Although Kim seems open to a new round of talks with Trump, he is also drawing a clear line. The position he adopted in the aftermath of the 2019 Hanoi summit’s breakdown — that he will never negotiate with the U.S. for denuclearization again — remains firm and will not change. If Trump and his administration keep holding onto the goal of denuclearizing North Korea, do not expect diplomacy.
Pyongyang’s stern rejection of denuclearization is disturbing and hard to accept for Washington, but it also provides a reality check as the Trump administration seeks to engage North Korea. Trump may have fond memories of his talks with Kim Jong Un from 2018 to 2019 and may hope for a repeat. The harsh reality is that diplomacy with North Korea based on “denuclearization” looks more unlikely than ever.
When the Hanoi summit collapsed, a number of experts lamented that Washington had walked away from the best nuclear deal it would ever get from North Korea. Such observations were not exaggerated. Leaving aside the technical aspects of Pyongyang’s offer to dismantle its main nuclear complex, which would have marked not entirely satisfying yet meaningful progress, Washington also overlooked how unique an opportunity it was to get Pyongyang to even consider rolling back its nuclear program — the regime’s only security guarantee.
It is difficult for adversaries to set aside feelings of mutual distrust and hostility and engage in diplomacy to discuss compromises, especially for the weaker and more vulnerable side. For the perennially impoverished and unstable regime in Pyongyang, abandoning nuclear weapons, even on a gradual, long-term basis, is an extremely risky choice facing the far more powerful U.S.-South Korea alliance. That said, there were presumably motivations strong enough for Kim Jong Un back then to take a shot at high-risk negotiations with the U.S. — whether a lack of confidence in his nuclear deterrent against Trump’s threats of “fire and fury,” a desire to develop his country’s economic development with U.S. support, or uncertainty about the prospect of long-term ties with China and Russia.
However, such motives for Pyongyang to consider denuclearization appear to be largely irrelevant today. North Korea has dramatically advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities and is now better positioned to deter the U.S., should Trump escalate military threats as in 2017 to pressure Kim. North Korea has also formed an unprecedentedly tight strategic alliance with Russia and improved its relations with China as well. Both Russia and China no longer oppose and challenge North Korea’s nuclear buildup as they used to. In fact, Russia can now be seen as an open supporter of North Korea’s nuclear buildup; it actively helps Pyongyang evade sanctions and sustain its economic lifeline, and might even be sharing limited nuclear technology with the regime.
In sum, Pyongyang’s leverage to resist U.S. pressure has expanded significantly, while Washington’s leverage to pressure Pyongyang has substantially eroded. It seems only logical that Kim is ruling out any possibility of diplomatic negotiations that are conditioned on denuclearization.
Thus far, Washington appears to be largely in denial of this reality. Earlier this week, just days after Kim’s remarks, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts, declared a "resolute commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea,” reaffirming the decades-long U.S. position. The consequences of continuous denial would be predictably counterproductive, with Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal just getting larger and more sophisticated.
As the Trump administration explores a path to diplomatic negotiations with North Korea, it must reassess its objectives. Instead of seeking to denuclearize Pyongyang, Washington should aim for less ambitious goals. Kim seems fiercely determined not to let go of his nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, he has not necessarily expressed objection to a nuclear freeze and arms control measures. This leaves a negotiating space that may be far from ideal but could still serve to advance regional and global security interests — such as freezing North Korea’s nuclear production, moderating North Korea’s military and nuclear doctrines and deployments, preventing North Korea from selling its nuclear and missile technology overseas, and more.
One important thing for Trump and his administration to keep in mind as they pursue negotiations with North Korea is that the process should be accompanied by communication and coordination with South Korea. A more pragmatic U.S. approach to negotiations with North Korea, centered on nuclear freeze and arms control, would earn Seoul’s support; it would align with the direction the Lee Jae-myung administration seeks to promote and also resonate with over 90% of South Koreans who believe denuclearizing North Korea is impossible. But should a potential U.S.-North Korea deal exclude coordination with Seoul and fail to address South Korean security interests, it would severely damage the U.S.-South Korea alliance and intensify South Korea’s temptation for nuclear development — consequences Washington should want to avoid.
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Top image credit: The DoD found high levels of dangerous chemicals in the "PFAS family" around several military bases, including JOINT BASE LEWIS-MCCHORD, Wash., pictured here. (U.S. Air Force Photo/Abner Guzman)
The Defense Department plans to delay cleaning up a class of toxic "forever chemicals” that its activities have left at and around military bases across the country — even as it pursues other financially wasteful endeavors that do little to advance, or may even be counterproductive to, U.S. national security.
Although the DoD has said little about why it has put off the cleanups this year, environmental groups have previously cited lack of funds as a key issue, warning the DoD has chronically failed to request adequate cleanup funds to address PFAS contamination. Indeed, even as its overall budget continues to balloon, the DoD’s annual funding for cleanups sits at a 30-year low.
With the delay, a new timeline shows clean ups could take up to 10 years, leaving service members and defense community residents in contact with PFAS, often in drinking water and groundwater at and around affected military installations, at further risk of health problems including some cancers.
While putting off critical, yet relatively inexpensive PFAS cleanings, the Defense Department continues to put substantive funds toward questionable projects, whose woes include excessive costs, jeopardizing service member safety, and even risking U.S. national security.
Meanwhile, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), promoted initially as a project that would modernize the Navy, has incurred significant costs during its lifespan — while barely operating. The ships have frequently broken down and their weapons systems often failed, leading to sailors spending more time repairing the LCS than operating them. The program’s value-for-money has proven poor in the process: each LCS costs about $500 million, but the Navy has taken many of them out of commission after five to 10 years, despite an originally estimated 25 year life span. Despite the LCS’s operational issues, the Air Force is still moving to tack on lethality and survivability upgrades to the vessels it has not phased out.
Likewise, the V-22 Osprey military transport and cargo aircraft’s chronic design flaws have led to a ballooning budget to address them: its research and development costs went up 200% from 1986 through 2007.
But the project’s cost increases have come with questionable pay-off. The V-22 Osprey suffers from an abysmal safety record, where more armed service members have been killed in the aircraft’s testing operations than in actual use. Recurring mechanical failures in its gearbox and clutch have led to deadly crashes. Contractors Bell and Boeing marketed the V-22 as a transport carrier that is faster, and has greater range, than helicopters. But, as a safety precaution, the aircraft is currently restricted to flying only 30 minutes away from landing spots — undercutting the V-22’s claims to speed and range in practice.
Other DoD projects on the way suffer from their own issues in kind. To this end, the prospective B-21 bomber could cost taxpayers more than $200 billion, despite critics saying it offers little more in capabilities than the B-2 bomber still in service. The B-21’s supposed stealth capabilities have been a key selling point, but that claim has not panned out for other aircraft, like the F-22 and F-35, that were also promoted along these lines.
And, an endeavor considered unnecessary for U.S. national security for years, lawmakers are now putting billions toward bringing the once-canned sea-launched, nuclear-armed cruise missiles, or SLCM-N, out of retirement: the reconciliation bill passed over the summer included $2 billion for the DoD to work on it.
But weapons experts fear the additional nuclear weapons proliferation SLCM-N would bring might frustrate diplomatic efforts with adversaries. And, its introduction could cause other practical issues. Indeed, conventional strike weapons are more likely to be needed than nuclear weapons in the event of combat; SLCM-s replacing them on some submarines could therefore negatively affect mission readiness.
Finally, costs for the recently proposed Golden Dome missile defense shield, an ambitious endeavor aimed at protecting the entire U.S. from aerial attack, are also off the rails. Even as the project’s plans remain nebulous, the DoD says Golden Dome could cost $175 billion — other estimates suggest it could cost trillions. Rather than advance U.S. national security, moreover, arms control experts say the initiative could compel adversarial states to produce more weapons, perhaps encouraging an arms build-up internationally.
Maintaining the status quo
Despite the Pentagon’s ongoing cleanup delays, lawmakers are moving to gut much-needed funding from PFAS cleanup efforts — even while seeking to hand the Pentagon more money than ever.
Indeed, the House version of the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), key annual legislation establishing defense priorities, cuts substantive funding — nearly $200 million — from PFAS cleanup efforts around military sites and communities compared with last year, even while surging the overall DoD budget past a record-breaking $1 trillion. The House NDAA also includes a section that delays a ban on the military buying and using the firefighting foam that has PFAS.
And, that same legislation gives runaway DoD projects more funding and resources. To this end, House and Senate versions of the NDAA would provide the Sentinel program with a further $400 million and $2 billion in funding respectively. The HASC NDAA markup, meanwhile, authorized 10 more F-35s than the FY 2026 Presidential Budget Request asked for, while also proposing to fund the SLCM-N with $100 million per missile and warhead.
The Pentagon has previously skirted accountability for PFAS prominence at and around military bases nationwide. Last year, the Air Force claimed no legal obligation toward a previous EPA order to address the likely presence of PFAS in drinking water in Tucson, Arizona — likely caused by the use of PFAS-containing firefighting foam at military sites and airports there.
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Top image credit: Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, also seen on a television monitor, addresses the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York October 1, 2013. (Reuters/Adrees Latif)
Is conflict in the Middle East at an inflection point? It might seem so, given how international outrage over Israel’s lethal conduct in the Gaza Strip has become increasingly intense and widespread in recent weeks.
Several major Western countries that previously had declined to join most other members of the United Nations in formally recognizing a Palestinian state used the opening of the current session of the General Assembly as the occasion to take that step. Popular demonstrations in the West in support of the Palestinians have been as large and conspicuous as ever, and recent polls show a sharp decline in the American public’s support for Israel.
Such responses are the least that can be expected in the face of new lows in barbarous Israeli actions against the residents of the Gaza Strip. An Israeli military assault on Gaza City has added to the rubble to which most of the city had already been reduced. The assault has given remaining inhabitants the choice of suffering and perhaps dying in place or fleeing once again to someplace else in the Strip with still no assurance of safety. The armed attacks and imposed starvation have seen the death toll of Gazans increase to what is now probably several times the officially reported figure of about 65,000.
The international responses, including diplomatic recognition of Palestine by Western governments, fall short of eliciting a constructive Israeli response. The recognition of a Palestinian state has been the target of criticism from some Palestinians who rightly point out that it does nothing to alleviate the immediate misery on the ground. Diplomatic moves and street demonstrations do not speak the only language that Israel appears to understand, which is one of force and compulsion.
The Israeli response to the latest diplomatic moves has been one of defiance and threats to inflict still more depredations on the Palestinians. The Israeli national security minister, right-wing extremist Itamar Ben-Gvir, is pushing to make annexation of the West Bank the main Israeli response to Western recognition of Palestine.
Most Israelis, and not just their government or the extremists within it, see international pressure as just more evidence of bias against Israel and of the need for Israel to use force to protect itself, regardless of worldwide outrage. Survey research shows that most Israelis believe there are "no innocents" in Gaza and favor expulsion of residents from the Gaza Strip. An appeal to morality will not get a positive response from a government that has this population as its political base. Only the imposition on Israel of significant costs and consequences would lead it to change its policies.
Although we may not be at an inflection point regarding the Palestinian-Israeli tragedy, the thinking of Arab regimes in the region has reached an inflection point of sorts in recent weeks. The Israeli attack in early September on the territory of Qatar, in an unsuccessful attempt to kill Hamas leaders engaged in Gaza-related negotiations, shocked that thinking.
The attack in Qatar comes amid a fusillade of Israeli armed attacks against other regional states, including Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran, in addition to the carnage in Palestine. These and other regional states (such as Iraq and Egypt) have been the targets of Israeli attacks — both overt military and clandestine — for many years, but it is the near-simultaneity of some of the attacks over the past month that has added to the shock.
The attack in Qatar demonstrated to the Arab governments not only that Israel is the most destabilizing state in the region but also that any one of their own nations could be similarly attacked. Qatar’s security relations with Israel’s prime backer, the United States — which has a large military presence at the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar — did not protect it from the Israeli aggression. Although Arab governments may be showing signs of fatigue in their decades-long support of the Palestinian cause, they are highly concerned about the possibility of any assault on their own territories.
The concerns of Egypt — party to the first Arab peace treaty with Israel — are great enough for Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to label Israel an “enemy” in his remarks at an emergency Arab summit following the attack in Qatar. Egypt, like Qatar, has mediated ceasefire talks on Gaza, and could become another target of Israeli determination to kill Hamas officials wherever they may be, even ones involved in peace negotiations. Egypt also fears consequences for its own security of continued Israeli ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip, which adjoins Egypt. Jordan has similar fears regarding how increasingly aggressive Israeli moves against Palestinians in the West Bank could push them eastward and upset Jordan’s already fragile domestic situation.
One result of these events is to remove, at least for now, the possibility of more diplomatic normalization agreements between Arab states and Israel, to add to the ones that Bahrain, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates signed during President Trump’s first term. There might even be some retreat from cooperation by governments that did sign such agreements. The UAE responded quickly to talk in Israel about annexing the West Bank by warning that annexation would cross a “red line.”
A benefit of this development is to help debunk the notion, which one sometimes hears in the United States, that the upgrading of relations with Israel — the so-called “Abraham Accords” — represents progress and even a step toward Israeli-Palestinian peace. To the contrary, such upgrading is an alternative to Israel making peace with the Palestinians. It is a way for Israel to enjoy, and be seen by the world to enjoy, full relations with regional neighbors while continuing the subjugation of Palestinians and occupation of their territory. Given the Israeli inclination also to view such agreements as the core of an anti-Iranian alliance, these supposed “peace agreements” also have sharpened lines of conflict in the Persian Gulf.
An implication for the United States is that it should discard the fixation, which has characterized both the Trump and Biden administrations, on seeking more normalization agreements between Israel and Arab governments. Given the other circumstances in the region, including what is transpiring in Gaza, such agreements do nothing to advance peace and security in the Middle East or other U.S. interests.
Another implication flows from the decreased value that Arab governments are almost certainly placing on security cooperation with the United States. Arab doubts about that value were stimulated in 2019 by the U.S. non-response to an Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities (which was part of the Iranian response to the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy, reaffirmed in Trump’s second term, that was aimed at cutting off Iran’s oil exports). The Israeli attack in Qatar, a small state that had implicitly placed much of its security in the hands of the United States, has amplified the Arab doubts. The United States may need to prepare for lesser military access to Arab territories.
It is good for U.S. interests that a new formal security agreement with an Arab state, such as what the Biden administration pursued with Saudi Arabia, has become less likely than before. This development helps to minimize the risk of the United States getting ensnared in conflicts not of its own making. But as the Qatar episode illustrates, even just an implicit guarantee entails costs and risks. With Israel primed to repeat such attacks anywhere in the region, the United States, owing to its close association with Israel, may again be put in a difficult position.
The United States needs to get beyond the familiar mantra about Iran supposedly being the biggest source of instability in the Middle East. It needs to consider what other state actually has started more wars and attacked more nations — and currently is killing more civilians — than any other state in the region, and to fundamentally reappraise its relationship with that state.
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