Even as the war in Gaza rages on and the death toll surpasses 35,000, the Biden administration appears set on pursuing its vision of a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal that it sees as the path to peace in the Middle East.
But, the agreement that the administration is selling as a peace agreement that will put Palestine on the path to statehood and fundamentally transform the region ultimately amounts to a U.S. war obligation for Saudi Arabia that would also give Mohammed bin Salman nuclear technology.
As the Gaza War demonstrates, the Abraham Accords — which normalized relations between Israel and other Arab states — did not help bring peace to the Middle East. But instead of pushing for a ceasefire that could end the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and limit the chances of a wider regional conflagration, Biden is pushing to continue the legacy of the Abraham Accords in a move that only increases the likelihood of American troops being sent to fight another war.
Learn more in this new video by the Quincy Institute’s Khody Akhavi:
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Blaise Malley is a freelance writer and a former Responsible Statecraft reporter. He is currently a MA candidate at New York University. His writing has appeared in The New Republic, The American Prospect, The American Conservative, and elsewhere.
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Trying to accelerate Ukraine’s entry into the European Union makes sense as part of the U.S.-sponsored efforts to end the war with Russia. But there are two big obstacles to this happening by 2027: Ukraine isn’t ready, and Europe can’t afford it.
As part of ongoing talks to end the war in Ukraine, the Trump administration had advanced the idea that Ukraine be admitted into the European Union by 2027. On the surface, this appears a practical compromise, given Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s concession that Ukraine will drop its aspiration to join NATO.
However, the idea of accelerated entry for Ukraine has not been met with widespread enthusiasm in Europe itself. Diplomats in Brussels dismissed the notion as “nonsense: There needs to be an appetite for enlargement that isn’t there.”
There are two big problems with Ukraine’s rapid accession, the first being readiness and the second cost.
Firstly, Ukraine is nowhere near ready to meet the EU’s exacting requirements for membership. The process of joining the bloc is long and complex. At the start of November, in presenting its enlargement report, the EU said that it could admit new members as early as 2030, with Montenegro the most advanced in negotiations.
After it was formally granted candidate status in June 2022, Ukraine this year passed screening of its progress against the various chapters of the acquis (regulations) that it needs to pass before accession is granted. However, the EU enlargement report on Ukraine downgraded the country’s status from A+ to B, largely in light of the corruption scandal that first erupted in the summer and that rumbles on today.
The report indicated that Ukraine had made good progress on just 11 of the 33 chapters required for accession. It has made limited progress on 7 of the chapters, including on corruption, public procurement, company law and competition policy. It has yet to finalize negotiations on any of the chapters. And, of course, with war still raging, it is incredibly difficult to both agree and put in place the reforms needed to align itself with EU rules and standards. So, even if the war ended by Christmas, which despite the progress still appears optimistic, it would be unlikely to do all of the necessary work in the space of a year to be ready for accession.
The second, possibly more insurmountable challenge is cost.
In July, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz commented that Ukraine was unlikely to join before 2034. The EU has already formalized its next seven year budget through to that time, coming in at $2.35 trillion.
As I pointed out for Responsible Statecraft last year, Ukrainian membership of the EU would come with an enormous price tag. In total, according to a 2023 estimate, Ukraine could be eligible for over $31 billion per year in EU subsidies should it join on equal terms to existing member states. That would eat into the generous subsidies currently received by other member states. Neighbouring Poland, by far the largest recipient of EU subsidies, has a proposed allocation of $145 billion in the upcoming budget. The other winners are bigger, wealthier G7 countries such as France ($106 billion), Italy ($102 billion) and Germany ($80.5 billion). Unlike Poland, those countries pay into the budget more than they receive. But lower subsidies would effectively mean they had to pay in more.
Let’s take agricultural subsidies, from which Ukraine might benefit to the tune of $113.5 billion over an EU budget cycle of seven years. This would lead to a 20.3% cut to agriculture subsidies to farmers in other member states. So, for example, that would lead to France losing around $2.2 billion per year in farming subsidies, and Poland losing around $1.2 billion. Polish farmers have consistently protested since the start of the war at the inflow of cheap Ukrainian food products. French farmers have historically been extremely protectionist and will almost certainly resist any loss of their subsidies – the most generous in Europe.
So the economic cost of delivering Ukrainian membership may not be politically viable any time soon, and certainly not before 2034, as the German premier has indicated.
To be clear, I have consistently supported Ukraine’s membership in the EU. Neighboring Poland has enjoyed an average economic growth of nearly 4% since it joined the EU in 2004. Of course, the Ukraine crisis initially bubbled up in 2013 because of a tug-of-love over whether that country should sign a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU or join the Russian-inspired Eurasian Economic Union. With practically all Russia-Ukraine economic ties severed over the past decade, Russian President Vladimir Putin has dropped his opposition to EU membership for Ukraine. An end to the war would allow Ukraine, finally, to start to reform and rebuild its bankrupt economy, and EU membership could accelerate that process.
That’s why Zelensky’s decision to drop the aspiration to NATO membership is such an important stepping stone. It has been abundantly clear since the start of the war that Russia’s NATO red line will never change. Russia has verbalized its opposition at least since Putin’s Munich Security Conference speech in 2007, when he said that NATO expansion “represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.” He followed that up at the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit by saying, “we view the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders...as a direct threat to the security of our country.”
Ukraine needs hope that EU membership will sweeten the bitter pill of losing out on NATO. However, it faces other challenges too. Countries like Hungary oppose Ukrainian membership in the EU, having had fraught relationships throughout the war. If Ukraine is allowed to jump the queue, other countries much further forward in the accession process — such as Montenegro, which because of its size doesn’t carry the same price tag as Ukraine — may rightly ask, ‘what about us?’
That’s not to say that a political workaround might not be found to allow Ukraine to declare itself an EU member by 2027, as part of Washington's monumental efforts to end this needless war. But if that be so, I should be surprised if membership amounts to much more than an EU flag to fly over Ukrainian buildings.
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Top photo credit: American soldiers march a group of German prisoners along a beachhead in Northern France after which they will be sent to England. June 6, 1944. (U.S. Army Signal Corps Photographic Files/public domain)
As the Trump Administration continues to kill so-called Venezuelan "narco terrorists" through "non-international armed conflict" (whatever that means), it is clear it is doing so without Congressional authorization and in defiance of international law.
Perhaps worse, through these actions, the administration is demonstrating wanton disregard for centuries of Western battlefield precedent, customs, and traditions that righteously seek to preserve as many lives during war as possible.
Continuing down this path will not only be a stain on our national honor that will spread like spilled ink, but will also ensure reciprocal treatment of our troops.
The most egregious example of this abandonment of American civility on the battlefield is the now-infamous "double tap" incident, which occurred in September off the coast of Venezuela. The U.S. military guided a missile that effectively vaporized two unarmed men as they allegedly called for help by radio. As Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) said on Dec. 2 about the unarmed survivors who were deliberately killed in that second strike: "It's a debate if they ever were a threat."
According to the Pentagon's own Laws of War Manual, this is a gross violation: "Persons who have been incapacitated by wounds, sickness, or shipwreck are in a helpless state, and it would be dishonorable and inhumane to make them the object of attack."
However, even if it is deemed legal under Hegseth's Rules of Engagement, in which he has called boat crews calling for help post-strike a "hostile act," it is ethically and morally unconscionable and severely damaging to America's reputation. Simply, this kind of action is not in line with the U.S. military's tradition or ethical standards. Instead, it is the kind of act that made German U-Boat crews infamous in the 20th Century.
During WWII, our reputation for just and humane treatment of our adversaries led directly to millions of German soldiers surrendering to the U.S., undoubtedly shortening the war and preventing additional American casualties. It should be noted that less than 1% of Germans captured by the US died in captivity. Overall, the number of surrendered Germans dwarfs the number of Germans that U.S. troops killed on the battlefield. Further, many of these Germans intentionally fled away from a Soviet Army known for its barbarism, to the Western Front, to surrender to advancing Americans.
Prussian General and Theorist Carl von Clausewitz may have summed it best when he said, "War is a continuation of politics by other means." In other words, the objective is not just to kill or simply slaughter. Without question, during war violence must be and is used, but it is applied to achieve a specific political outcome, i.e., the capitulation, not the massacre of an adversary. In short, violence is tailored, and you kill only when it is necessary. It is your legal, moral, and ethical duty to preserve life, both civilian and combatant, whenever you can.
For most of our history, Americans have adhered to Clausewitz's perspective and have rightfully earned a reputation as both tenacious warriors on the battlefield and as magnanimous victors. Why? Not only because it's the morally correct thing to do, but also because doing so is practical and protects our own troops should they find themselves in a position where their lives are at the mercy of an adversary.
A particularly evident historical example of how this reciprocity works was again in WWII. Over the duration of the conflict, nearly 99% of U.S. POWs captured by the Germans and Germans captured by the U.S. returned from captivity unharmed. This was not the case in other theaters of war. For example, it was rare for the Japanese to take American prisoners, and if they did, more than 40% perished in brutal captivity. The numbers on the eastern front, which was the scene of a clash between two of the most violent ideologies in human history, saw even greater disregard for human life.
While there are considerable legal and ethical ramifications for the killing of so-called 'narcos' at sea, an unspoken one is of potential moral injury to the servicemembers carrying out the orders. Our military is full of good men and women who want the best for their country. They trust that their leaders, all the way up to the Commander in Chief, have their best interests at heart.
Only those who have not seen war up close and personal would dare to revel in the bloodshed and violence it produces. While sometimes necessary, it is preferable to avoid such encounters, even if they are entirely justified. Once you participate, it never leaves you. As such, it is the responsibility of senior leaders to ensure their troops only engage in lethal violence when essential and justified.
Nearly 20 years ago, my father and I had a conversation that remains crystalized in my mind as if it were yesterday.
During a sweltering late-summer North Carolina afternoon in 2006, my father and I soaked up the AC in his hotel room, clinging to the final moments before I deployed to Ramadi, Iraq, as a Marine infantryman. Attempting to avoid what was to come for a few more precious moments, my brain wanted to focus on baseball, fishing — anything other than the impending immersion into a world of violence.
My father, a heavily decorated Vietnam Marine, had other ideas. Interrupting eventually, while locking me in with almost an electric stare, he said coolly, "When you pull the trigger, make sure it's for the right reason. The decision will stay with you the rest of your life."
The Administration would be wise to absorb that kind of wisdom before moving further down a path from which neither lives, souls, nor national honor can be reclaimed.
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Top photo credit: Amanda Sloat, with Department of State, in 2015. (VOA photo/Wikimedia Commons)
When it comes to the Ukraine war, there have long been two realities. One is propagated by former Biden administration officials in speeches and media interviews, in which Russian President Vladimir Putin’s illegal invasion had nothing to do with NATO’s U.S.-led expansion into the now shattered country, there was nothing that could have been done to prevent what was an inevitable imperialist land-grab, and that negotiations once the war started to try to end the killing were not only impossible, but morally wrong.
Then there is the other, polar opposite reality that occasionally slips through when officials think few people are listening, and which was recently summed up by former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe at the National Security Council Amanda Sloat, in an interview with Russian pranksters whom she believed were aides to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
“We had some conversations even before the war started about, what if Ukraine comes out and just says to Russia, ‘Fine, you know, we won’t go into NATO, you know, if that stops the war, if that stops the invasion’ — which at that point it may well have done,” Sloat told the pranksters. “There is certainly a question, three years on now, you know, would that have been better to do before the war started, would that have been better to do in Istanbul talks? It certainly would have prevented the destruction and loss of life.”
When asked moments later if Ukraine and its Western partners could have avoided the whole war and if they had “made a mistake somewhere,” Sloat again suggested, unprompted, that addressing Russian concerns around NATO’s expansion into Ukraine may have been the way to prevent the war.
“If you wanna do an alternative version of history, you know, one option would have just been for Ukraine to say in January 2022, ‘Fine, we won’t go into NATO, we’ll stay neutral,’” Sloat said. “Ukraine could’ve made a deal in March, April 2022 around the Istanbul talks.”
It’s worth breaking down these few sentences to understand their full significance. Sloat, a high-ranking former Biden official closely involved in Ukraine policy, is saying that:
1. Ukraine explicitly affirming its neutrality would have likely stopped the invasion from happening.
2. This would have prevented the enormous death and destruction experienced by Ukraine at Russia’s hands the last three years.
3. Ukraine could have made this deal at least as late as the Istanbul talks shortly after Russia’s invasion.
4. The Biden administration explored doing this to prevent the war, but ultimately rejected the idea.
But why did the Biden team reject it, if it would have meant preventing a war that by any estimation has been enormously bloody and costly for millions of Ukrainians?
“I was uncomfortable with the idea of the U.S. pushing Ukraine not to do that, and sort of implicitly giving Russia some sort of sphere of influence or veto power over that,” Sloat said about her own position. When asked about Biden’s thinking, she offered: “I don’t think Biden felt like it was his place to tell Ukraine what to do then. To tell Ukraine not to pursue NATO.”
Sloat, in other words, quietly admitted that she at least preferred letting the war happen if the alternative was giving Russia a de facto veto over NATO membership. Her claim, however, that she and Biden were squeamish about pressuring Ukraine is harder to take seriously.
U.S. policy toward Ukraine has often involved pressuring both its officials and its population to reluctantly accept measures they were against, particularly when it came to NATO. George W. Bush pushed Ukraine’s entry into NATO despite overwhelming, vehement public opposition among Ukrainians in the early 2000s, and leaked diplomatic cables I reported on two years ago show U.S. officials at the time discussing with their Ukrainian counterparts how to make the Ukrainian public “more favorable” to the idea. In fact, this was often Biden’s personal role during the Obama years, pressing Ukrainian officials to pass unpopular domestic reforms imposed by the IMF.
Sloat also makes another potential admission, when mentioning that Ukraine could have made a deal over its NATO status in the Istanbul talks in early 2022. “I know then there were differing views between our countries’ militaries around the counter-offensive,” she said. “I think during the Biden administration that had been the big hope of Ukraine getting back territory and being able to negotiate a better deal. That didn’t go as anybody wanted it to.”
This hews awfully close to what has long been both alleged by a variety of officials and other sources about the talks: that, as Ukraine’s Pravda newspaper first reported, Zelensky had been pressured to reject a deal to instead seek victory on the battlefield, with the governments of the U.K., U.S. and a variety of Eastern European NATO states reportedly being especially favorable to this ultimately disastrous idea.
Sloat is not the first to have made this admission. As I documented two years ago, former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and former Biden Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines both likewise explicitly said that NATO’s potential expansion into Ukraine was the core grievance that motivated Putin’s decision to invade, and that, at least according to Stoltenberg, NATO rejected compromising on it. Zelensky has now publicly agreed to this concession to advance peace talks — only three years later, with Ukraine now in physical ruins, its economy destroyed, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and survivors traumatized and disabled on a mass scale.
All of this will surely go down as one of the great missed opportunities of history. Critics of the war and NATO policy have long said the war and its devastating impact could have been avoided by explicitly ruling out Ukrainian entry into NATO, only to be told they were spreading Kremlin propaganda. It turns out they were simply spreading Biden officials' own private thoughts.
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