At his Senate confirmation hearing for secretary of state on Wednesday morning, Florida GOP Senator Marco Rubio called for an end to the war in Ukraine, including possible Ukrainian concessions to Russia.
Reflecting the views of his soon-to-be Commander in Chief Donald Trump, the Florida senator has become increasingly critical of the nearly three-year-long conflict in Ukraine, voting against a $95 billion Ukraine aid package in April of last year.
“I think it should be the official position of the United States that this war should be brought to an end,” Rubio said, while emphasizing the conflict’s collateral damages for Ukrainians. “The destruction that Ukraine is undergoing is extraordinary. It’s going to take a generation to rebuild it.,” he said.
“Millions of Ukrainians no longer live in Ukraine…how many of them are going to come back, and what are they going to come back to?” Rubio asked, noting that Ukraine’s infrastructure, especially energy infrastructure, has been decimated.
“The problem with Ukraine is not that they’re running out of money, but that they’re running out of people.”
Achieving an end to the war will not “be an easy endeavor… but it's going to require bold diplomacy, and my hope is that it can begin with some ceasefire,” Rubio said. “It’s important for everyone to be realistic: there will have to be concessions made by the Russian Federation, but also by Ukrainians.”
Interestingly, Trump national security adviser pick Mike Waltz recently pushed for the Ukrainian draft age to be lowered from 26 to 18, arguing Ukraine must be “all in for democracy.”
But if he was emphasizing peace in Eastern Europe, Rubio was pushing something altogether different with China, calling “the Communist Party of China…the most potent and dangerous near peer adversary the United States has ever confronted.”
“We have to rebuild our domestic industrial capacity” to counter China, Rubio claimed. “If we don't change course, we are going to live in a world where much of what matters to us on a daily basis, from our security to our health, will be dependent on whether the Chinese allow us to have it or not.”
Top photo credit: USS Bataan (LHD-5) conducts landing craft utility operations alongside the Harpers Ferry-class dock landing ship USS Carter Hall (LSD-50) in the Red Sea on Nov. 6, 2023. US Navy Photo
Why is Trump allowing 'free riding' in securing Red Sea from Houthis?
“We're doing the entire world a favor by getting rid of these guys and their ability to strike global shipping,” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Face the Nation on March 16 after President Donald Trump announced an extended campaign of U.S. military strikes intended to halt the Iranian-backed Houthis’ attacks on international commerce in the Red Sea.
You’ll have to forgive the rest of the world if it reacts with confusion rather than gratitude. After spending the past month justifiably browbeating European allies for their willingness to free-ride on U.S. military power, the Trump administration is allowing them — and shirking partners elsewhere — to do just that.
Far from a clear signal of resolve, U.S. military strikes in Yemen send a decidedly mixed message about the role Trump and his advisors want the United States to play in the world.
Houthi attacks against commercial shipping passing through the narrow Bab el-Mandeb Strait, purportedly in support of Palestinian militants battling the Israeli Defense Force, started about 16 months ago. Though the group paused operations with the onset of the January 2025 ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, it threatened to resume its operations after Israel cut off humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip at the beginning of March.
The temporary calm had little effect on international shipping, which has largely avoided the Red Sea passageway — formerly home to some 12% of global trade — since the Houthi campaign began. Most carriers have opted for the longer but safer route around the Cape of Good Hope.
The disruption has had economic costs, but fewer than expected, especially for the United States. The United States does not rely on trade running through the Middle East. With direct ocean access to markets in Asia and Europe and little dependence on Middle Eastern oil, U.S. trade has been resilient to Red Sea disruptions. Shipping rates to and from ports on the U.S. east and west coast have risen since 2023, but less than routes elsewhere, and they remain far below pandemic highs. U.S.energy prices and inflation have not seen long-term increases.
The effects of Houthi attacks have been more significant in Europe which depends heavily on Red Sea shipping routes for trade with Asia and oil and gas coming from the Persian Gulf. Though Europe’s markets have adjusted somewhat to the more expensive shipping route around Africa’s southern tip, the continent has suffered lasting supply chain disruptions and higher energy prices which have interrupted manufacturing in Germany and Belgium, contributed to delays for consumers, and slowed economic growth.
There have been other losers from the two-thirds drop in international shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb precipitated by Houthi attacks, including the countries neighboring the Red Sea whose ports are now quiet. China, also dependent on oil trade through the region, has escaped largelyunscathed, reportedly by paying bribes to the Houthis themselves.
Although the costs of Houthi strikes to the United States have been modest and smaller by far than those borne by European allies or partners in the Middle East, Washington has paid the high costs of fighting back, with limited success.
As of January 2025, the U.S. Navy surface fleet has fired 120 SM-2 missiles, 80 SM-6 missiles, 20 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) and SM-3 missiles, part of its campaign to intercept Houthi missiles and drones. This amounts to close to $1 billion even before counting the years’ worth of production of air-launched missiles that the U.S. fighter jets have launched at targets inside of Yemen.
In its efforts against the Houthis, the United States has received precious little help from European allies or Middle Eastern partners who stand to gain much more from the return of shipping to Red Sea routes. The United Kingdom offered some support to U.S. air strikes on Houthi targets under President Joe Biden’s administration, and the French Navy often escorts to its own commercial ships in the region. But the European Union has contributed just four frigates to patrol Red Sea waters and countries in the Persian Gulf have been reluctant to meaningfully support U.S. activities.
In the Red Sea, as elsewhere, the world has been mostly content to free-ride off American military power.
Surprisingly, as it starts yet another round of military strikes against the Houthis, the Trump administration seems content to let this free-riding continue. This is a sharp departure from its past warnings to allies and partners.
Since returning to office in January, Trump and his national security team have been clear. The United States will no longer underwrite collective global security. It will not serve as Europe’s primary security guarantor and will not promise protection to allies who do not meet defense spending targets. The administration has sent similar signals to Taiwan and Japan, insisting that both increase military budgets and carry more of the burden for their own defense.
This shift in orientation is commendable and long overdue.
Now, in the Red Sea, the administration is sending allies and partners the opposite message, stepping in to bail them out once again by expending millions — maybe billions — in taxpayer dollars in pursuit of security objectives that — if achieved — will be of greater value to Europe and Arab partners than to the United States. True, freedom of navigation is a core U.S. national interest, one worth using military force to uphold when U.S. economic prosperity is threatened. This is hardly the case in the Red Sea, however.
More importantly, freedom of navigation is a global common good, whose benefits do not accrue to the United States alone. Accordingly, the United States should not be solely responsible for defending freedom of the seas. This should be a shared burden. Washington should demand that all those who stand to benefit from the return of commercial traffic to the Red Sea are willing to put their own ships, personnel, and dollars on the line.
Instead of rescuing them once again, for instance, Trump and his advisors should call on European allies to carry most, if not all, of the burden of defending the contested Red Sea waters, with support from Arab stakeholders. Their willingness to do so would, in fact, be a first real-world test of their stated commitment to do more for their own security.
Critics will argue that neither Europe nor U.S. Arab partners have the capacity to match U.S. military power against the Houthis. This is not a reason for the United States to fill the gap. First, U.S. vital interests and economic security are not at risk in the Red Sea, even if Houthi attacks continue. Second, U.S. military operations have not deterred or degraded the Houthis in a meaningful way and are unlikely to be so going forward, even if Trump expands the target list.
After surviving years of Saudi bombings, the Houthis are confident they can withstand American offensives too. If anything, their willingness to take on American attacks lend them credibility and win them popular support across the region. Whether or not Europe proves able to act effectively against the Houthis without American support, the most likely outcome in the Red Sea is a continuation of the status quo. Washington would still benefit from having Europe take the lead, since it could conserve U.S. military resources.
Trump and his advisors are right to push for defense burden-shifting and to let U.S. national interests, not those of allies, drive the use of U.S. military force. The renewed campaign in the Red Sea, however, is a page out of an old playbook that lets allies off the hook and puts America back in the “global security guarantor” role that Trump has rightly rejected.
In the Red Sea, Trump and his advisors should stick to their mantra. It’s time for the United States to step back and allies to step up.
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Top image credit: Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov (L), Armenia's Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan (R) and Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu pose for a picture before the Armenia-Azerbaijan talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan May 10, 2024. REUTERS/Pavel Mikheyev
On March 13, speaking to reporters backstage at the 12th Global Baku Forum, Jeyhun Bayramov, Azerbaijan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, unexpectedly broke the news that Armenia and Azerbaijan had finally agreed to all 17 points of their framework agreement on the establishment of peace and interstate relations.
This apparent breakthrough comes some four years after the negotiating process began in the wake of Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. While such diplomatic triumphs are to be applauded, especially as an alternative to continued threats of military violence, the devil is in the details. And the details leave much to be desired.
Bayramov, when announcing this news, stressed that Azerbaijan now expects Armenia to implement changes to its constitution to remove a reference in the document’s preamble to Armenia’s declaration of independence, which Baku says implies territorial claims against Azerbaijan by mentioning the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with the then-Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic.
The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs followed up with a statement that stressed that such changes are “a prerequisite to allow the signing of the negotiated text.” In addition, the MFA noted the need to dissolve the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group, the international body co-chaired by France, the U.S., and Russia and empowered to spearhead a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While Yerevan had effectively already expressed support for this in the event of the agreement’s signing, it would symbolize, in Baku’s view, a definitive Azerbaijani victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev later echoed these sentiments and added that “we do not trust any of their words. Because these are not people we can trust, including today’s government.”
The Armenian side, noticeably caught by surprise by Azerbaijan’s “unilateral statement,” explained that Yerevan had accepted “the proposals of Azerbaijan on the two unresolved articles” of the draft agreement. Furthermore, Yerevan stressed its view that “the Peace Agreement is ready for signing” and that they are “prepared to initiate consultations with the Republic of Azerbaijan regarding the time and venue for the signing of the Agreement.”
Those two previously unresolved articles of the agreement concerned the absence of any third-party presence along the border and the mutual withdrawal of claims from international courts. The former is a reference to the presence of European Union civilian monitors on Armenia’s side of the border, whose mandate was recently extended by two years. Yerevan appears to have acquiesced to Baku’s wording of these two points, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan saying that following consultations with his security council “the current content can be considered a compromise option acceptable to Armenia.”
Any current optimism deserves equal, if not greater, levels of accompanying caution as Azerbaijan continues to present further concessions by Armenia, including constitutional changes, as the only means by which the agreement can be signed.
These developments take place as American pressure builds on Iran and discussions between the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia advance, potentially indicating Yerevan’s consideration of the broader international dynamic when agreeing to these additional compromises. Not to mention Armenia’s own interest in precluding, or forestalling, any escalation of violence in the region.
As Russia has been distracted by its war in Ukraine, a unique window of opportunity, amplified by Moscow’s own strategic miscalculations, presented itself to Armenia to decrease its dependencies and exploit new openings.
With the new Trump administration seeking an end to the war in Ukraine and even a potential reconfiguration of U.S.-Russia relations writ large, Armenia’s window of opportunity may be fading. If Russia is able to secure a favorable agreement in Ukraine and, more importantly for the South Caucasus, the start of a broader strategic discussion with the U.S. and NATO, Moscow’s ability to devote renewed attention to its other border regions will likely increase. These broader shifts have also resulted in a European Union that is struggling to adjust to and define its own role in this rapidly shifting world, potentially contributing to Yerevan’s calculations.
Over the last few years, Armenia has made an overt effort to normalize relations with Turkey in the hopes of decreasing its overreliance on Russia and better connecting itself to Europe and elsewhere. In addition to Armenia’s closed border with Azerbaijan, the Armenia-Turkey border has been closed for over 30 years, severely limiting Yerevan’s strategic maneuverability and its economic potential. However, Ankara has linked its normalization with Yerevan directly to advancements in Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations, the outcome of important Azerbaijani leverage in Turkey and a uniquely close relationship between the two countries.
Armenia likely hopes that this development — Azerbaijan’s obstinance notwithstanding — will be enough for Turkey to press ahead with normalization of relations and the opening of the border, though Ankara has previously said progress will be connected to the signing of the agreement between Yerevan and Baku.
The agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan follows weeks, if not months, of speculation that Azerbaijan is preparing to escalate militarily against Armenia with the intention of pressuring Yerevan to accept Baku’s demands. This is reminiscent of previous Azerbaijani tactics, threatening continued violence in order to exact concessions from Armenia.
This negotiating process has been ongoing while at least 23 Armenians are being held and tried in Baku over their involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, as Azerbaijan continues to occupy internationally recognized Armenian territory, and as Baku continues to demand Armenia open the so-called Zangezur corridor for unhindered Azerbaijani traffic, amongst other stipulations.
The most important development to watch is whether the finalized agreement will be signed and ratified in short order or if Azerbaijan will not acquiesce to this until Armenia implements changes to its constitution, a process not expected to take place before parliamentary elections in June 2026.
In addition, Turkey’s response will also be critical: Is this finalized, but not yet signed, agreement enough for Ankara to move its normalization process with Yerevan forward?
While this agreement has receivedinternationalsupport, Washington and other capitals must not lose sight of the still unresolved elements of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and their outstanding disputes.
An intense rivalry with decades of heavy baggage cannot merely be resolved by the (still absent) stroke of a pen. In an atmosphere of deep mistrust and lingering insecurities, real peace will likely take a generation to build. There is still much hard work to be done, and the signing and ratification of any agreement would only be the first step along the winding road ahead.
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Top photo credit: Amb. Chas Freeman in 2011 (New America Foundation/Flickr/Creative Commons)
Almost exactly 16 years after the Israel lobby won a bitter high-profile battle against a key appointment by the then-director of national intelligence, it seems to have one won another, virtually without firing a shot.
The abrupt withdrawal this week of the appointment of Daniel Davis, who has criticized Israel’s conduct of its war in Gaza, as deputy director of national intelligence for mission integration under DNI Tulsi Gabbard reportedly resulted from complaints by pro-Israeli forces within the Trump administration and Congress, as well as outside groups, including the Anti-Defamation League.
The withdrawal recalled a much more protracted and dramatic fight over the appointment by former DNI Adm. Dennis Blair (Ret.) of former Amb. Chas Freeman, Jr., a legendary Foreign Service Officer and former senior Pentagon official, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) at the outset of the Obama administration in March 2009. After several weeks of controversy and in the face of fierce and arguably defamatory criticism, Freeman took himself out of consideration.
Davis, a senior fellow at Defense Priorities and a retired Army officer who helped expose the failures of the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan during the Obama administration, fell victim to what had been a quiet campaign to prevent his appointment that surfaced publicly Wednesday when the Jewish Insider website reported that he had been tapped for the job.
The Insider reported that, as recently as January 12, Davis had called Israel’s Gaza campaign “ethnic cleansing” and Washington’s support for the war “[o]n a moral level…a stain on our character as a nation, as a culture, that will not soon go away.” It also quoted him as saying “the ramifications [of a military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities] “could be “terrible for us and for Israel.”
Pro-Israel forces were quick to pounce. The ADL immediately denounced Davis’ appointment on X as “extremely dangerous,” noting that he “has diminished Hamas’s 10/7 attack, undermined US support for Israel’s right to defend itself, and blatantly denies the grave threat the Iranian regime poses to global stability and American interests.”
Opposition was also reportedly voiced by more traditional, pro-Israel Republicans within the administration and Congress, and, while the New York Times noted that his criticisms of Israel were “similar to certain critiques by liberal Democrats,” the top Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Agency, Virginia Sen. Mark Warner told Politico Davis was “utterly unqualified.”
While the result was the same, Davis’ moment in the D.C. spotlight was mercifully brief compared to the three-week ordeal undergone by Freeman in February 2009 when Blair hand-picked him to chair the NIC, which, among other responsibilities, is tasked with producing National Intelligence Estimates — that is, the consensus judgments on a given issue of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies.
A polyglot with unusually wide-ranging experience, Freeman served as chief interpreter during Richard Nixon’s historic 1972 trip to China, deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing in the 1980s and ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War. He was also principal deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, among other posts.
Freeman was also known for his outspoken, iconoclastic, and often critical views of U.S. foreign policy, including the George W. Bush administration’s “global war on terror” and Washington’s de facto support of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.
“Our unconditional support …aids and abets the adoption of policies [by Israel] that are unilateralist, militarist, counterproductive, and inevitably self-defeating,” he noted in a lecture at MIT a few months before his appointment as NIO chair in a typical observation that enraged the Israel lobby, particularly hardline neoconservatives whose views generally aligned with Israel’s Likud Party. (Two decades of Freeman’s lectures on the Middle East, China, and U.S. foreign policy can be found here.)
The campaign, conducted mainly through the blogosphere and on Capitol Hill, was spearheaded by Steven Rosen, a former top official at the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). In the first of nearly daily blog posts published by the hardline neoconservative Middle East Forum, Rosen called Freeman’s views on Israel a “textbook case of old-line Arabism” and his appointment “profoundly disturbing.”
“Chas Freeman Is Bigoted And Out Of Touch” was the headline of an editorial by The New Republic’s then-publisher Martin Peretz, who claimed that the decorated ambassador was “bought and paid for” by the Saudi government via his chairmanship at the time of the Middle East Policy Council (MEPC), a Washington-based think tank that was partially funded by members of the royal family.
The current editor of The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg, likewise argued that Freeman, “well-known [sic] for his hostility toward Israel,” was also “a well-known advocate for the interests of Middle Eastern autocracies.” He was particularly incensed that the MEPC had published “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” an article by foreign policy realist scholars John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, that was denounced by, among other pro-Israel groups, the ADL as a “classical conspiratorial anti-Semitic analysis…”
The charges didn’t end with his alleged attitudes toward Israel and the Middle East. In his Wall Street Journal op-ed, Gabriel Schoenfeld and other neoconservative commentators claimed Freeman was unfit due to what they alleged was his downplaying of China’s military buildup, his past service on an advisory board of China’s largest oil company, and his alleged defense of Beijing’s bloody 1989 crackdown against protests in Tiananmen Square based on an uncontextualized excerpt from a post by Freeman in a private Internet discussion group of China hands.
A number of China experts known for their human rights advocacy, however, rejected the charge that he was a “panda hugger” and affirmed that he was a “stalwart supporter of human rights” during his China-related service at the embassy and the State Department.
The neoconservative campaign against Freeman also received pushback from more establishment media sources, including Washington Post columnist David Broder; Time’s Joe Klein, who called the attacks “assassination;” Foreign Policy’s David Rothkopf (“lynching by blog”); The Atlantic’s Andrew Sullivan; and Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria, who hosted Freeman on his CNN program, “GPS.”
Seventeen retired ambassadors, including several former U.S. ambassadors to Israel, also came out in support in a letter to the Journal. But much of that pushback came either after weeks of online attacks or, as in his “GPS” appearance, after Freeman had taken himself out of consideration.
Unlike Gabbard, DNI Blair stuck by his appointee throughout the assault, even testifying before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee to rebut the various charges that had been leveled against Freeman just hours before Freeman announced he was withdrawing.
In a statement issued immediately after his withdrawal, Freeman was characteristically direct both about the campaign against him and its implications. “The outrageous agitation that followed the leak of my pending appointment will be seen by many to raise serious questions about whether the Obama administration will be able to make its own decisions about the Middle East and related issues,” he wrote. “I regret that my willingness to serve the new administration has ended by casting doubt on its ability to consider, let alone decide what policies might best serve the interests of the United States rather than those of a Lobby intent on enforcing the will and interests of a foreign government.”
Asked by RS for his reaction to Davis’s withdrawal, Freeman emailed:
“Daniel Davis is a morally grounded, articulate, and intellectually honest realist. He has always focused on the national interests of the United States, as anyone familiar with his online and other commentary can attest. He's exactly the sort of person who should be speaking truth to power in the Trump administration. But …the Israel Lobby insists on Israel – not America – first, and opposes the American intelligence community engaging in the sort of objective analysis that Israel insists its own intelligence agencies provide. …Can any honorable person now hope to serve our country in positions of public trust without being subject to baseless but incapacitating caricature by special interests?”
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