No, you heard it right. Last week in a Fox News appearance, South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham said outright that the war in Ukraine is “about money.”
Namely, Graham told Fox News host Sean Hannity that the U.S. stands to financially gain from Ukraine’s vast agricultural sector and “two to seven trillion dollars’ worth” of rare earth minerals alike in a prospective wartime deal with the war-torn, albeit resource-wealthy, nation.
“This war is about money. People don’t talk much about it. But you know, the richest country in all of Europe for rare earth minerals is Ukraine. Two to seven trillion dollars’ worth of minerals that are rare earth minerals, very relevant to the 21st century,” Graham declared. “Ukraine’s ready to do a deal with us, not the Russians. So it’s in our interest to make sure that Russia doesn’t take over the place.”
“[Ukraine] is the bread basket of…the developing world,” Graham mused. “Fifty percent of all the food going to Africa comes from Ukraine.”
Graham also emphasized that the incoming Trump administration is uniquely positioned to cash out on such resources. “Donald Trump is going to do a deal to get our money back, to enrich ourselves with rare earth minerals. A good deal for Ukraine and us,” Graham said. “And he’s going to bring peace.”
Trump has suggested repeatedly that he wants to bring all sides to the table to talk in order to end the war. Graham has been consistently on the other side of the debate where he has wanted Ukraine to keep fighting at all costs.
Yet Graham insists that Ukraine will benefit from the prospective “deal” he describes. His own history of hawkish comments, where he previously said that “with American weapons and money, Ukraine will fight Russia to the last Ukrainian,” suggests Ukrainians' best interests and meaningful peace both rank low amongst his priorities.
Notably, this isn’t the first time Graham has suggested that the U.S. could benefit from access to Ukraine’s natural resources. “[Ukrainians are] sitting on a trillion dollars’ worth of minerals that could be good to our economy,” Graham said in a video clip from September, where he was standing next to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
Meanwhile, war fatalities continue to mount, with the Wall Street Journal reporting in September that over a million people have died or been wounded in the Russia-Ukraine war since its inception. To hawks like Graham, such fatalities seem to be an acceptable price to pay in an apparent bid for Ukraine’s natural resources.
Stavroula Pabst is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft.
Top image credit: U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) attends a news briefing amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine March 18, 2024. REUTERS/Gleb Garanich
Top photo credit: Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, appears during a vote in Sudani's cabinet at the parliament in Baghdad, Iraq, October 27, 2022.
When Arab leaders arrived in Iraq last week for the Arab League Summit, they were greeted by a city determined to impress.
Driving into the city from Baghdad International Airport, they passed the statue marking the spot where, on January 3, 2020, a U.S. drone strike killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, commander of Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah militia. The strike, carried out on Iraqi soil without the consent of the government, amplified demands for the withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces.
These demands still reverberate in Iraq’s corridors of power — and its streets.
While negotiations were delayed for years, Coalition Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, the 30-nation force formed in 2014 to conduct military operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, finally agreed to terminate its mission and disband its headquarters in September 2025. Importantly, this does not fully end all foreign military presence in Iraq, as a provision in the agreement allows for continued military operations in Syria from an undetermined location until September 2026, as well as another provision that calls for “bilateral security partnerships in a manner that supports Iraqi forces and maintains pressure on ISIS.”
On these two provisions — continued operations against ISIS in Syria from an undetermined location (likely Northern Iraq/Kurdistan) and in-country bilateral security partnerships — there are significant disagreements within Iraq. Some Shia political and religious factions continue to push for a full and immediate withdrawal as do Iranian-backed paramilitary forces. Others argue that the international military support is critical, particularly considering the lingering threat posed by ISIS and regional instability such as developments in Syria.
One former senior official offers a frank assessment of the current landscape.
“Some [Shia] camps want the Coalition Forces to stay for the foreseeable future,” he says. “The pro-Iran militias of the ruling group parrot whatever Iran says. At present, they are lying low awaiting the Iranian position after the talks [with the U.S.]. Meanwhile, they are scared to bits of possible Israeli assassinations of their leadership. The prime minister speaks from both sides of his mouth. The Sunnis and Kurds want them to stay, not so much because of Daesh/ISIS resurgence, but as a counterweight to Iran’s presence.”
Yet for others, the very presence of foreign troops is seen not as a stabilizing force, but as a source of insecurity and foreign interference.
“The presence of any foreign military troops has never been a source of stability. Even if there are still existential challenges threatening Iraq’s stability, facing them would require national unity, regional and international cooperation and solidarity and not breaching international laws and states’ sovereignty,” says Dhiaa Al-Asadi, a former state minister and ex-parliamentarian who once led the Al Ahrar (Sadrist) Bloc. “For these and other reasons most Shia forces insist that the U.S. troops should withdraw as soon as possible.”
Among Iraq’s Sunni population, the sentiment is largely ambivalent, often ranging from indifference to cautious pragmatism. Many Iraqis, across sectarian and political lines, express a desire for a more strategic, negotiated arrangement, rather than a hasty exit. These complex, often contradictory views show how an uncertain future weighs heavily on a nation still struggling to reach consensus.
Al-Asadi remains skeptical of any prolonged negotiations as long as foreign troops remain on Iraqi soil.
“Unless all foreign troops completely and unconditionally withdraw from Iraq, any negotiations would be impacted by their presence,” he says. “All pretexts and excuses used to justify their existence would lack solid ground. The point of departure should solely be ‘the Iraqi national interest’ seen from a pure and genuine Iraqi perspective — not one colored by partisanship, sectarianism or ethnicity.”
Fundamentally, the arguments surrounding the ending of the foreign troop presence come down to two issues: will the troops leave, and should the troops leave?
As is so often the case, the answers are conditional and ambiguous. It is a certainty that the troops of all countries will leave if instructed by the Government of Iraq. They deployed to Iraq in 2014 as the Iraqi military was reeling from the ISIS invasion, and this return was facilitated by the flimsiest of documents — an invitation letter from Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari inviting foreign countries to support Iraq in its fight against ISIS. The invitation letter did not invoke treaty obligations, nor did it elaborate a formal Status of Forces Agreement as was negotiated in 2009 and expired in 2011. Instead, it was an emergency measure crucial to reverse a rapidly deteriorating military situation.
Eleven years later, few would argue that ISIS is an existential threat to Iraq. It was declared defeated in 2017 and the few remaining “rogue elements” and “sleeper cells” in Iraq are primarily handled by an Iraqi Security Forces rearmed and rebuilt by the Coalition. Detractors note that its purpose was to Advise, Assist and Enable partnered forces until the Iraqi Security Forces could independently defeat ISIS in Iraq and to provide longer term security cooperation, but this was completed years ago. For many, the Coalition is no longer necessary, and the time has come to withdraw the invitation letter and end the presence of foreign forces.
Yet should all foreign forces leave? There is still an argument for longer term security cooperation. That implies foreign support, and likely support “on the ground.” The withdrawal agreement provides for a Higher Military Commission to routinely discuss these issues and provides a back door for retaining or deploying forces in the future.
For Al-Asadi, this is not needed. He argues that a strong national army could defend the country without relying on external support if the government provides the funds for training, modern equipment, intelligence support and technological upgrades.
“Building the capacity and infrastructure of the Iraqi army is far better and easier than relying on foreign forces,” says Al-Asadi. A “do-it-yourself” approach, alongside the bitter lessons learned from five years of brutal warfare against ISIS, he believes, is the correct decision.
The former senior official disagrees, noting, “A responsible Iraq position would be to keep the presence of Coalition forces but at the technical and intelligence side working with the counterterrorism forces of Iraq rather than combat troops in secured bases,” he explains.
“I think the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are able to handle a mid-level insurgency on two fronts, but not an invading terrorist army as in 2014. At its peak, ISIS had about 100,000 fighters on the Iraqi Syrian front,” he added. “The ISF cannot handle that.”
In many ways, both positions are correct. The threat from ISIS is diminished and there are few existential threats that require massive security forces armed and trained to first world standards. Even in its current state, the respected Global Firepower Power Index ranks Iraq as the sixth most powerful military in the Middle East, stronger than the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Qatar and other modern defense forces in the region.
Yet, the current Iraqi Security Forces have significant gaps in capability because of longstanding reliance on external support (in particular, effective air defense systems, sufficient fighter and transport aircraft and a near-absence of helicopters). Additionally, the ISF relies on intelligence mostly “fed” to them by allies. As both Al-Asadi and the former official note, the Iraqi Army still needs to mature, although they disagree if this should be done internally or externally.
In the wake of the Arab Summit, the development of the Iraqi Security Forces and the continued presence of foreign troops will return to the center of a national debate on sovereignty, security, and Iraq’s evolving role in a region gripped by shifting alliances and unresolved conflicts.
Instability is the order of the day, with a Gaza crisis that lures in Iraqi militias unaccountable to sovereign control, Israeli and U.S. airspace violations, airstrikes against terrorist targets, and looming aftershocks should U.S.-Iran nuclear talks break down. For these reasons, Iraq needs a competent security establishment to provide external and internal defense. But the question remains: who should safeguard Iraq’s future — an alliance or itself?
keep readingShow less
Top photo credit: Britain's Prime Minister Keir Starmer ( Benjamin Cremel/Pool)
On May 19, the British and Canadian prime ministers and French president issued a joint statement against Israel’s actions in Gaza. Beyond the grand gestures, the statement was weakly worded and will have no impact.
It is consistent with the British government’s policy of going soft on Israel since 2023 and shows the weakness of parliamentary accountability in Britain.
The statement opposed the “expansion” of Israeli military operations but supported Israel’s right to so-called self-defense. It claimed that the denial of essential humanitarian assistance “risks breaching international humanitarian law,” when the deliberate starvation of civilians as a tactic of war is a prosecutable war crime.
Indeed, Israel’s starvation policy forms the basis of the ICC arrest warrant issued against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on November 21, 2024. The joint statement threatened further concrete actions. In terms of specific action, the best the current UK government has done is to reverse the previous Conservative government’s mooted objection to the ICC’s jurisdiction over Israeli nationals. Britain has not so far sanctioned a single member of the Israeli government over its actions in Gaza.
Britain has also imposed miniscule restrictions on arms sales to Israel. The UK government is now facing a High Court challenge over its continued sale of F-35 spare parts to Israel. Following a written Parliamentary question in December on the issue of F-35 part sales, the UK government replied that “it is not currently possible for the UK to suspend licensing of F-35 components for use by Israel without prejudicing the entire global F-35 programme, including its broader strategic role in NATO and Western support to Ukraine.”
In other words, if we stop selling parts to Israel, then America’s 19 allies who are buying F-35s might not want to buy them anymore.
From the UK side, the statement reinforced the minimalist position both the previous Conservative and current Labour governments have taken on alleged Israeli atrocities in Gaza. And, unfortunately, the UK Parliament has a poor record in holding the government to account. If you search through the UK Parliament website, you’d find that since October 2023, parliamentarians have tabled 2,243 written questions for the UK foreign secretary to answer about all aspects of Israel’s campaign in Gaza. Without exception, the answers have been vague and evasive.
The first serious questions were raised just 10 days after the October 7 attack, when Marsha de Cordova MP and Richard Burgon MP both asked whether the government had received legal advice on the Israeli government’s military actions in Gaza. The government sent them each the same standard reply which was glib and meaningless. “The Foreign Secretary and his ministerial team receive legal advice on all matters related to foreign policy, including the unfolding situation in Israel and Gaza.”
This kind of reply is typical. During my diplomatic career, I drafted countless written and oral responses from government ministers to parliamentary questions and the aim was at all times to provide as little useful information as humanly possible. Every government response to a parliamentary question on the Gaza war since that time has stayed true to that approach.
Underlying the British government’s stance has been a consistent foundation of belief that Israel has a right to defend itself in this way. On November 7, Stephen Morgan MP asked what recent steps the government had taken to help protect medical infrastructure in Gaza. The government reply confirmed that “all states, including Israel, must exercise their legitimate right to self-defence.”
On November 8, Crispin Blunt MP, former chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, asked whether the government planned “to make an assessment of the adequacy of Israel's compliance with the Geneva convention during its operations in Gaza.” The government replied that “Israel has the right to defend itself proportionately, and its military operations must be conducted in accordance with International Humanitarian Law.”
On November 9, 2023 Andrew Western MP asked whether the government had held discussions with Israeli counterparts on the military detention of Palestinian children. The government replied that “our focus right now is getting humanitarian aid into Gaza.”
Debbie Abrahams MP asked on November 14 what estimate the government had made of the number of deaths of Palestinian civilians. The government replied, “we have no means of independently verifying exact casualty numbers, and it is difficult for organisations like the UN to accurately verify estimates in Gaza.”
And yet when the table is turned and questions are asked about Hamas, the government’s response is more vociferous and indignant. Take this very recent question from May 1 when Neil Coyle MP asked what steps he has taken to verify the number of UNRWA operatives involved in the October 7 2023 attacks in Israel. The British government responded, “we condemn in the strongest possible terms the brutal terror attacks by Hamas and were appalled by the Government of Israel's allegations that United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) staff members were involved.”
Since the October 7 attack, the UK government has committed a paltry £364 million in aid to Gaza, made up of £111.5 million in 2023/4, £123 million 2024/5, £129 million in this financial year. In April of this year alone, the government dished out another £450 million in military aid to Ukraine, which included “radar systems, anti-tank mines and hundreds of thousands of drones.” By the end of this financial year, Britain will have pumped £17.3 billion in aid to Ukraine since the war started in February 2022.
Compare that to the government’s response to a parliamentary question in December 2024 about the provision of aid to evacuated children from Gaza. The government confirmed its allocation of “£1m for the Egyptian Ministry of Health and Population, to support medically evacuated Palestinians from Gaza.”
Or, the response to the April 23, 2025 question from Lord Roberts which asked about steps taken to aid children in Gaza in 2025, and especially those in need of medical assistance. The government replied, “In the last financial year, we announced £6 million for United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to support vulnerable families in Gaza.”
The truth is that the British government has been ambivalent at best and indifferent at worst, to the plight of Palestinian civilians suffering under the onslaught of Israel’s defense force. Nothing encapsulates the “let them starve” mentality of the British Parliament better than the question of November 7, 2023 from Lord Blencathra. He asked His Majesty's Government “whether they intend to put an immediate stop to all further overseas aid to Gaza until it is certain that none of it is being taken or used by Hamas.”
The only use the UK, Canada, France joint statement this week will have is to serve as a reference for future low energy government responses to Parliament. A “look, we did something” nod to the growing number of Britons enraged that the government has sat by and done nothing as children and civilians have been murdered and starved to death.
It was, I fear, a shameful and cynical exercise in praising Israel through faint damnation. Appearing to criticize while in fact condoning the basis for Israel’s actions and refusing to take action to end the wholly reprehensible slaughter of the innocent.
keep readingShow less
Top photo credit: President Cyril Ramaphosa (Photo: GCIS/Flickr) and Donald Trump (Gage Skidmore/Flickr)
Set to the background of increased diplomatic tensions between their two countries, South African president Cyril Ramaphosa will be making a much-anticipated visit to the White House today to meet Donald Trump.
Ramaphosa is reportedly eyeing the meeting as an opportunity to reset relations, both economically and diplomatically.
On the economic front, a central focus of the South African leader’s visit will be getting the ball rolling on a potential bilateral trade agreement with the United States. This is particularly important given the high level of tariffs threatened by the Trump administration over the past few months.
An economic agreement between the two countries is also important because the multilateral trade deal the United States has with sub-Saharan Africa, known as the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), is unlikely to be renewed by Congress when it expires in September.
Ramaphosa is also expected to rebut President Trump’s claim that white South Africans are suffering a genocide, and are therefore in need of refugee status in the United States.
The American president has been critical of South Africa’s new Expropriations Law, signed into force in January. The law allows for the South African government to take possession of private land without compensation to private land owners in certain cases where the land is not being used. The idea is that the land will then be transferred to black ownership, helping to make up for decades of inequitable land ownership stemming from the 1913 Natives Land Act, which limited the land ownership of (mostly black) native South Africans to only 7%. Currently, white South Africans own 70% of the country’s commercial farmland, despite being 7% of the population.
Though no evidence supports the claim, Trump has said that black South Africans are committing genocide against white Afrikaners, killing them to occupy their land.
In lieu of this, Trump signed an executive order on February 7 requiring an end to all U.S. foreign aid and assistance to the country while also promoting “the resettlement [to the United States] of Afrikaner refugees escaping government-sponsored race-based discrimination, including racially discriminatory property confiscation.” The executive order also called out South Africa for “accusing Israel, not Hamas, of genocide in the International Court of Justice, and reinvigorating its relations with Iran to develop commercial, military, and nuclear arrangements.”
Under Ramaphosa, South Africa has been an outspoken opponent of Israel’s 18-month war in Gaza. South Africa filed a case before the International Court of Justice — the United Nations body responsible for settling disputes between states under international law — accusing Israel of genocide in its current war against the Palestinians.
Meanwhile, under both the Biden and Trump administrations, the United States has been arguably the world’s leading supporter of Israel during the conflict. The United States has provided both military arms and diplomatic support for Israel’s offensive in Gaza, and has opposed numerous resolutions presented before the UN Security Council and General Assembly calling out Israel’s actions in Gaza and demanding increased access for humanitarians. Biden’s National Security Council Coordinator, John Kirby, called South Africa’s ICJ case “meritless” after it was initially filed in January 2024.
In response to South Africa’s support for Israel, members of the U.S. Congress introduced legislation questioning the bilateral relationship, and requiring a review of the United States’ close diplomatic relations with South Africa. The bipartisan measure was initially introduced in March of last year, and was reintroduced last month.
The spiraling diplomatic relations continued into March, when the Trump administration expelled the South African ambassador to the United States after video surfaced of the ambassador making harshly critical remarks of Trump administration policies. President Trump has also announced that the United States will boycott the G20 summit this year, which will be hosted in South Africa, and has banned all U.S. government agencies and departments from participating in the event.
And just last week, the Trump administration followed through on its executive order, granting refugee status to 59 Afrikaners ostensibly fleeing persecution and violence at the hands of black South Africans at home. The Afrikaners were greeted upon their arrival at Washington Dulles International Airport in Northern Virginia by multiple Trump administration officials.
Ramaphosa therefore has several diplomatic spats to try to overcome if he is to successfully thaw relations.
Smartly, Ramaphosa is looking to use Elon Musk’s ties with Trump to South Africa’s advantage in negotiations. Musk, an Afrikaner himself, serves as one of Trump’s top advisers and leads the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). The South African president is reportedly hoping to include in trade discussions the possibility of providing Musk’s Starlink satellite technology company with the opportunity to access the South African market while bypassing a national law that requires a portion of all companies operating in South Africa to be owned by disenfranchised groups.
South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment policy requires that 30% of the equity of subsidiaries based in South Africa be owned by historically disadvantaged groups, mostly black South Africans. Musk has in the past refused to comply with this rule, and has complained about being unable to do business in South Africa because he isn’t black.
By providing Musk a bypass to otherwise standard regulations — or to find a different way by which to allow Starlink to access South Africa’s market — Ramaphosa can work to shore up relations with one of the most senior Trump advisers who harbors a negative view, hardened through personal experiences and connections, with South Africa’s government.
Given how closely Trump relies on an inner circle to help him craft policy, supporting Musk’s effort to do business in South Africa could help thaw tensions between the two governments, and help Ramaphosa’s government gain credibility within Trump’s inner circle.
Part of the challenge facing Ramaphosa is the power imbalance in the relationship between the two countries — the truth is that South Africa needs the United States more than the United States needs South Africa.
The U.S. is South Africa’s second-largest trade partner and the two have maintained a close, though fluctuating, diplomatic partnership since apartheid ended in 1994. Although South Africa has a diverse array of international partners to which it has turned for economic and political engagement — such as China, which is the country’s largest trading partner — shoring up both diplomatic and, even more importantly, economic relations with the United States remains an important goal of Ramaphosa’s foreign policy, and thus of his visit to Washington.
For the United States, rekindling a close relationship with South Africa matters because of the country’s diplomatic, military, and economic importance relative to much of the rest of Africa. Forming a close partnership with a regional power allows the United States greater avenues by which to form close transregional relationships and maintain regional influence.
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.