Mexico and Chile’s recent referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for an investigation on crimes against civilians in Gaza during the current Israeli campaign (and the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks in Israel) is another sign of increasing support in the Global South for an international legal route against the ongoing war and siege of Gaza.
The question of whether Israeli troops are committing war crimes in a continuing and devastating war has been met with deep resistance and anger in Israel and among its supporters in the United States. As the core backer of Israel’s war, there are reputational implications for the United States here, too.
Several developing countries have explicitly come out in support of South Africa’s case (or “application”) against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in late December 2023 on the even more serious charge of genocide, while others have done so indirectly, as a part of resolutions passed by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab League.
And in November, South Africa, Bolivia, Bangladesh, Comoros, and Djibouti made their own referral to the ICC on possible crimes committed against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strip.
There is also another case making its way through the ICJ on an advisory opinion “in respect of the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.” The case is the outcome of a UN General Assembly resolution asking for such an opinion adopted on December 30, 2022. Indonesia has recently announced that the foreign minister herself, Retno Marsudi, will fly to the Hague to make oral arguments backing Palestine in this case.
Mapping the increasing recourse to international legal action by Global South states against Israel’s actions in Palestine is revealing, indicating that time does not seem to be on Israel’s side when it comes to winning friends in this space. States either leading or supporting such actions span across almost all of the Global South, including Latin America, Africa, West Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. And the actions initiated by South Africa, Mexico, and Chile, and the wide support for the UNGA resolution of December 2022, shows that this sentiment extends well beyond Arab or Muslim-majority states.
When tallied by the populations of these states, about 59% of the Global South has now led or backed international legal action against Israel. Moreover, as our mapping of the UNGA resolution of December 12 showed, a vast majority of Global South states have gone on record supporting an unconditional humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza.
Sarang Shidore is Director of the Global South Program at the Quincy Institute, and member of the adjunct faculty at George Washington University. He has published in Foreign Affairs and The New York times, among others. Sarang was previously a senior research scholar at the University of Texas at Austin and senior global analyst at the geopolitical risk firm Stratfor Inc.
Dan M. Ford is a junior research fellow at the Quincy Institute's Global South Program. Previously he served as a research and communications associate at the Global Interagency Security Forum in Washington, D.C.
Since at least 2016, foreign interference in American elections and civil society have become central to American political discourse. The issue is taken extremely seriously by the U.S. government, which has levied sanctions and called out foreign adversaries for sowing “discord and chaos” through their propaganda efforts.
But apparently Washington takes a different view when it comes to American propaganda operations in foreign countries. On Monday, the House passed HR 1157, the “Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund,” by a bipartisan 351-36 majority. This legislation authorizes more than $1.6 billion for the State Department and USAID over the next five years to, among other purposes, subsidize media and civil society sources around the world that counter Chinese “malign influence” globally.
That’s a massive spend — about twice, for example, the annual operating expenditure of CNN. If passed into law it would also represent a large increase in federal spending on international influence operations. While it’s hard to total all of the spending on U.S. influence operations across agencies, the main coordinating body for U.S. information efforts, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), has an annual budget of less than $100 million.
There is obviously no issue with the U.S. government presenting its own public view of what China is doing around the world, and doing so as forcefully as needed. But this bill goes beyond that by subsidizing “independent media and civil society” and other information operations in foreign countries. Indeed, this is already routine. The Global Engagement Center, which will likely play a strong role in implementing the bill, spends more than half its budget on such grants, and USAID, which will also play a lead role, makes grants to foreign media and civil society organizations a key part of its efforts. HR 1157 would supercharge these programs.
Crucially, HR 1157 doesn’t seem to contain any requirement that U.S. government financing to foreign media be made transparent to citizens of foreign countries (although there is a requirement to report grants to certain U.S. congressional committees). Thus, it’s possible that the program could in some cases be used to subsidize covert anti-Chinese messaging in a manner similar to the way Russia is accused of covertly funding anti-Ukrainian messaging by U.S. media influencers.
Such anti-Chinese messaging could cover a wide range of bread-and-butter political issues in foreign countries. The definition of “malign influence” in the bill is extremely broad. For example, program funds could support any effort to highlight the “negative impact” of Chinese economic and infrastructure investment in a foreign country. Or it could fund political messaging against Chinese contractors involved in building a port, road, or hospital, for example as part of Beijing’s globe-spanning Belt and Road Initiative.
Because some dimensions of U.S. information operations could be classified, it can be difficult to get a complete picture of the full range of what they look like on the ground. But a 2021 “vision document” on psychological operations and civil affairs from the First Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg gives a fascinating glimpse.
The document provides a case study (or “competition vignette”) of what an integrated effort to counter Chinese influence could look like in the fictional African country of Naruvu. In the vignette, members of a Special Forces Civil Affairs team spot a billboard with a picture of a port and Chinese characters. Quickly determining that the Chinese are investing in a new deep-water port in Naruvu, the 8th Psyop Group at Fort Bragg’s Information Warfare Center (IWC) works with local and U.S. government partners to immediately develop an influence campaign to “discredit Chinese activities.”
The influence campaign “empowered IWTF [Information Warfare Task Force], in coordination with the JIIM [local and U.S. government partners] to inflame long-standing friction between Naruvian workers and Chinese corporations. Within days, protests supported by the CFT’s ODA [Special Forces Operations Detachment Alpha], erupted around Chinese business headquarters and their embassy in Ajuba. Simultaneously, the IWC-led social media campaign illuminated the controversy.”
Faced with a combined propaganda campaign and intense labor unrest, the Chinese company is forced to back down from its planned port. (Although the vignette continues to an even more Hollywood-ready ending in which U.S. special forces break into the construction company’s offices, confiscate blueprints for the port, and discover that it is actually a Chinese plot to emplace long-range missiles in Naruvu to threaten U.S. Atlantic shipping).
This case study illustrates the extremes information warfare could reach. But of course it is fictional, and most operations funded to counter Chinese influence will be far more mundane and less cinematic. Indeed, some will probably look similar to the activities the U.S. government has bitterly condemned when foreign governments financed them in the U.S. civil society space, such as making social media buys or funding organizations sympathetic to Washington’s perspective.
But it’s still worth thinking about the consequences of such efforts. They are of course likely to make U.S. protests against similar foreign government activities look hypocritical. Beyond that, pumping a flood of potentially undisclosed U.S. government money into anti-Chinese messaging worldwide could backfire by making any organic opposition to Chinese influence appear to be covertly funded U.S. government propaganda rather than genuine expressions of local concern.
As the publics in many nations are likely to be suspicious of U.S. as well as Chinese involvement in their internal affairs, this could easily discredit genuine grassroots opposition to Chinese influence. A historical example is Washington’s funding of Russian civil society groups that criticized the integrity of Russia’s 2011 parliamentary elections. This backfired by allowing Putin to depict the opposition as tools in a U.S. plot and resulted in sharp restrictions on U.S. activity in Russia, including the expulsion of USAID.
Another problem raised by the proposed legislation is the possibility that anti-Chinese propaganda financed by this program will flow back into the American media space and influence American audiences, without any disclosure of its initial source of funding. Protections against U.S. government targeting of domestic audiences are already weak, and what protections do exist are almost impossible to enforce in a networked world where information in other countries is just a click away from U.S. audiences.
It’s easy to imagine U.S.-funded foreign media being used as evidence in domestic debates about China’s international role, or even to attack U.S. voices that advocate for a different view of China that is propagated by a hawkish U.S. government. During the Trump presidency, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC), a likely recipient of many of these funds, supported attacks on U.S. critics of Trump’s Iran policy. More recently, congressional conservatives have claimed the GEC has advocated for censorship of conservative voices who disagree with Biden’s foreign policies.
The overwhelming bipartisan majority for HR 1157 is a snapshot of a culture in Washington that seems not to see the risk to U.S. values and interests when we engage in the same covert activities that we criticize in other countries.
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Protesters continue anti-government demonstrations against bad governance and economic hardship, in Lagos, Nigeria August 5, 2024. REUTERS/Francis Kokoroko
Nigeria is on edge as individuals linked to the deadly protests that recently shook the West African country are to be put on trial on charges that carry the death penalty.
Their arrest is part of a wider dragnet that has been triggered in part by the president's fears that the demonstrations are part of a Russian-inspired plot to overthrow his government.
Adaramoye Michael Lenin and nine others were arraigned on Monday Sept. 2 at the Federal High Court Abuja on charges of treason, insurrection and terrorism. They are part of over 2,000 protesters arrested in different parts of the country during the #EndBadGovernance protests that broke out last month in response to the harsh economic situation in the country.
According to reports, the initially peaceful youth-dominated protests, inspired by Kenya's Gen-Z anti-finance bill protest, degenerated into deadly clashes leading to the killing of about 22 protesters by government security forces.
The events leading to their arraignment have been nothing short of dramatic, as security agencies fearful of a foreign plot embarked on a frenetic crackdown on anyone remotely connected to the protest. The list, which is still growing, includes journalists, bloggers, prominent trade unionists, civil society actors as well as a group of visiting Polish students and a lecturer arrested for filming a protest in the historic city of Kano.
Although the Polish nationals have since been released, their ordeal demonstrates the panic mode authorities are in as growing anger over soaring food and energy prices has evoked fears of a Russian plot to overthrow the government of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, who came to power last year.
What has particularly piqued the interest of security agencies is the sudden appearance of Russian flags among some demonstrators in the northern States of the country where the worst violence occurred. Reports claim that some of the demonstrators were chanting, “Tinubu must go,” while calling for a military coup.
According to a court affidavit sworn by Elizabeth Ogochukwu, a litigation secretary at the Nigeria Police headquarters, “The suspects/defendants herein were found to have been carrying Russian flags, banners, placards and slogans agitating for a sovereign invasion of Nigerian territory to destabilize or overthrow the sovereign state of Nigeria by the Russian government.”
Soon after, the police put two men suspected of sponsoring the plot on their wanted list. They are Lucky Obinyan, a member of the country’s opposition, and Andrew Wynne, described by the police as a British national but with a Russian-sounding moniker, Andrew Povich.
No doubt, the prevailing geopolitical landscape in West Africa, where Moscow has recently made incursions across the Sahel to the detriment of Western powers, provides a probable cause for the government’s suspicion. Not only does Nigeria’s pro-Western president double as the head of the regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which the three Sahelian pro-Moscow juntas recently exited, but Nigeria is also the largest democracy within a region that has seen a rise in military coups amid waning Western influence in recent years.
On July 26, 2023, Niger became the latest country to fall under Moscow’s growing influence when General Tchiani overthrew the democratically elected government of President Mohamed Badoum in a coup. Russian military personnel and equipment are now stationed in Airbase 101, previously occupied by some of the 1,000 U.S. military personnel who have withdrawn from Niger, near the capital city of Niamey, about 600 miles from Abuja. The Tchiani junta had previously evicted French troops as well, acting on a pattern already established by pro-Moscow regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso.
Since the coup, the relationship between Abuja and Niamey has soured mainly because of sanctions imposed by ECOWAS on the Nigerien junta. But this is not the case with the people on both sides of the 1,000-mile-long border that divides both countries who share centuries-old trade and familial relations. According to the International Trade Centre (ITC), cross-border trade, mainly in petrol, tobacco, dates, cement, cattle and other agricultural products, between Niamey and traders and communities in Nigeria’s North was worth roughly $226 million in 2022.
Five of Niger's eight regions — Zinder, Tahoua, Maradi, Dosso and Diffa — all border Nigeria’s northern states of Sokoto, Kebbi, Yobe, Katsina and Jigawa. To Nigeria’s security agencies, it is hardly a coincidence that it is in these States that calls for a military coup and the display of Russian flags emerged during the protest.
Nonetheless, the allegation of a Russian plot appears at best circumstantial. For instance, one of the protesters, Adaramoye Michael, was arrested only because his nom de guerre is Lenin, the name of the 20th-century Russian revolutionary, Vladimir Ilich. Likewise, Wynne, who runs a bookshop at the Abuja office of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), is better known in the country’s trade union and activist circles as Drew Povey — and not the Russian variant contrived by the police to bolster the allegation of a Russian plot.
Moscow has been linked to a number of undemocratic changes of government in the Sahel and for nurturing an extensive disinformation network across the region. But Nigeria’s friends in the West should not allow the state to cynically manipulate national security concerns to violently put down legitimate dissent at home. The ultimate consequence of this would be the further discrediting of the democratic values that the West wants to rebuild in order to regain influence in the region.
As it is now, Nigeria’s status as Africa’s most populous country, its largest economy, and a symbol of enduring democracy brings a lot of benefit to Washington’s agenda of regional security and stability in the Sahel. The oil-producing country is also the West’s most enduring partner in the fight against terrorism and cross-border crimes that plague the region.
As Gen. Michael Langley, Commander of the US-Africa Command (AFRICOM) noted during a visit to Nigeria earlier in January, "Cooperation and training between the U.S. and Nigerian militaries is vital in addressing the evolving security landscape in West Africa and advancing common interests.” Therefore, the maintenance of proper democratic virtues and respect for human rights and civil liberties in the country are of great importance as much as countering any threat to peace and security.
Suffice it to say, the Nigerian state’s continuous show of force, instead of dialogue with protesting groups inside the country, may backfire. African governments should define a more civil framework for managing protests and unrest — something which has become more frequent as Africa’s huge public debt crisis continues to cut into the abilities of the continent’s governments to provide basic services to the poorest and more vulnerable sectors of their societies.
If the state is allowed to utilize measures that erode civil liberties to counter a perceived Russian threat, it would be doing exactly what pro-Moscow juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso are doing to their own citizens. In that sense, the West would have lost the fight for influence over the region to Vladimir Putin.
The past year has witnessed a growing chorus of alarm in Washington regarding the military utility of space. From the proliferation of space debris to the hastened tempo of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons development by China and Russia, there is a fear that U.S. space assets are held in peril by the threat of direct attack and the destruction of orbital usability. In November of last year, Chief of Space Operations General Chance Saltzman went as far as to designate China’s adoption of ASATs in 2007 as a key moment of inflection in the militarization of space.
These worries have a legitimate basis — scientists have posited that space debris has the potential to render certain orbital clouds such as low earth orbit (LEO) unusable through cascading collisions. ASATs only compound this risk, as even individual tests can generate thousands of pieces of debris. Further, LEO and other orbits are a vital terrain for U.S. military satellites, whose uses range from communication to positioning systems and intelligence collection. This led the Biden administration to adopt a unilateral moratorium on ASAT testing in 2022.
While limiting testing is necessary and prudent, it has done little dissuade testing or proliferation of ASATs. For one thing, in the short termism of contemporary armed conflict, the ability to eliminate space-based command and control architecture and other systems, particularly those of an adversary operating far from their shores, confers a powerful rationale in favor of ASAT use in war. Because of this, there is little to motivate Chinese and Russian action towards disuse absent a wider, multi-national negotiation.
This contention is well documented and understood in Washington, as well as in Beijing and Moscow. What American national security planners seem to understand less well is that the current trajectory of ASAT proliferation does not start abroad but at home.
In the hubris of the unipolar moment, when much of the multilateralism that undergirded the official if imperfect and uneasy peace between the U.S. and USSR was traded in favor of muscular interventionism, the root cause reemerged. Indeed, insofar as the current ASAT problem can be understood as an arms race, it is a second iteration of the old Cold War problem of competing logics of deterrence and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology.
As soon as the missile age dawned with the launch of Sputnik aboard a Soviet R-7 rocket, methods for countering ballistic missiles entered development. While many of these early programs like Nike Zeus were fraught with technical limitations, a fear emerged that successful ABMs would undermine classical nuclear deterrence and promote preemptive nuclear use should one power or the other gain a protective ABM curtain. These fears eventually lead to the U.S. and USSR ratifying the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972, under which each country was limited to one ABM site per country.
To understand why this is the case it is first necessary to understand where the overlap between ABM and ASAT weapons systems exists. Not all ABMs can be used in an ASAT role. This is particularly true of point-defense ABM systems intended to intercept missiles in their terminal phase or those used to intercept shorter range missiles where less of the flight takes the missile outside the atmosphere. However, some other ABMs are capable of striking missiles in their midcourse phase in space. For these weapons, minor adjustments can be made to be used in an ASAT role and vice versa. Consider the U.S. Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), which has successfully engaged both missiles and satellites in kinetic testing.
Because of this overlap, the development of direct-ascent ASATs that overlap with ABMs have been governed by the same regulations as ABMs. Direct ascent ASAT development largely fell by the wayside following the ABM Treaty’s ratification, and other systems like directed energy weapons were technically infeasible.
Despite this, a coalition of hawkish anti-communists working in defense policy and academia mounted concerted opposition to the ABM treaty. Much of the opposition coalesced in think tanks like the Hudson Institute and Heritage Foundation, whose members helped serve as the intellectual primogenitors of the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). While technologically fantastical at its time, the enduring legacy of SDI proved more ideological than material, as the rejection of deterrence in favor of active defense gained ground as a cornerstone of neoconservative national security policy in the 1980s and 1990s.
These voices would go on to exploit U.S. preeminence following the end of the Cold War to land a fatal blow to the ABM Treaty. Following concerted efforts from these same think tanks and others, including the Project for a New American Century and the Center for Security Policy, in 2002 the Bush administration finally withdrew from the ABM treaty, which coincided with a dramatic expansion of ballistic missile defense (BMD) architecture in the U.S. military and amongst foreign powers.
It is no mistake that the contemporary problem of ASAT proliferation followed in the years immediately following the end of the ABM treaty. Much like ABMs, development of ASATs stalled during the Cold War due to technical limitations. However, with the dubious legal basis of ASATs as ABM-adjacent weapons eroded, U.S. development of ASAT capabilities quickly escalated, culminating in the Burnt Frost test in 2008.
That other countries would follow this trajectory is hardly escalatory on their part, but U.S. concern stems from the fact that ASATs necessarily privilege belligerents for whom space based command and control is less essential. Considering that most of the global hot points for renewed great power competition are far flung from American shores, U.S. defense planners are now left to reckon with a hell of their own making, or perhaps more accurately a hell of their predecessors’ making. In a quest for preeminence, the U.S. unwittingly created a threat environment that advantages those it considers current or potential near peer adversaries. The shadow of the ABM Treaty withdrawal, as with much of U.S. policy misadventure, is an unforced error that now holds in peril significant military and civilian space-based infrastructure.
Laudable as U.S. efforts to minimize the impact of its own ASAT testing is, the heightened tensions between the world’s major powers invalidate unilateralism as a solution. Instead, to minimize the risk of ASATs, both to U.S. security and to the globalized world that relies on the peaceful employment of space, diplomacy remains the only path to success.
Mutual risk mitigation necessitates compromise; Russia and China are unlikely to cede the wartime advantage of ASATs absent a framework that preserves stasis for all involved. Perhaps here there is a silver lining to the demise of the ABM Treaty: the hope that in the void it leaves, a more permanent, global settlement can be reached before the threat reaches the levels of nuclear proliferation. As more powers push to acquire ASATs, the strategic imperative for their adoption grows, and with it the risk. The only hope to curb this state of affairs before it crosses a threshold of unacceptable destabilization is a lasting framework for disuse, one that can only come from negotiation, compromise, and cooperation.
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