Stop treating Georgia as a creature of the US and the West

The standard Western account of contemporary Georgian politics portrays the government of the “Georgian Dream” party as under the sway of Russia and opposed by “democratic” parties. The truth is much more complex.

Rather than a desire to follow Moscow, Georgian policy in fact reflects what CIA Director William Burns has called the “hedging middle,” subservient neither to Russia nor the West, and determined by the official view of what constitutes Georgian national interests.

This in turn reflects globalizing developments that have long since escaped from the control of the West. On the road to the Georgian border, I passed a huge new bridge being built by China. Despite great unhappiness in Washington, the Georgian government has also signed a contract with Beijing to build a new port on the Black Sea.

It is urgently necessary that Western policymakers should grasp Georgian reality, because it can be confidently predicted that at the end of October, Georgia will be plunged into a severe political crisis in which the U.S. and the EU will be deeply involved.

Parliamentary elections are due in Georgia on October 26, and the universal opinion among Georgians with whom I have spoken is that if the government wins, the opposition, backed by pro-Western NGOs, will allege that the results were falsified, and will launch a mass protest movement in an effort to topple the Georgian Dream government.

Judging by recent statements, most Western establishments will automatically take the side of the opposition. This narrative is already well underway, with lines like “Government vs. the People in Georgia” and “a crisis that has pitted the government against its people.” This suggests that Georgia is a dictatorship in which “the people” have no say except through street protests.

In fact, Georgian Dream has won three generally free national elections.

This is not of course to exclude the possibility of rigging in October. Western officials and commentators should remember that the opposition also alleged that the 2020 parliamentary elections were rigged, although Western observers certified that the elections were free (if flawed) and that Georgian Dream won by a very large majority. Today, according to opinion polls, Georgian Dream has far more support than any single opposition party. If the entire opposition can combine, they might be able to win a majority, but bitter divisions among its various parties are making this very difficult.

Western governments and commentators should also recognize that the NGOS on which they rely for much of their information about Georgia are in most cases deeply entwined with the Georgian opposition, as well as being overwhelmingly funded by the West.

Already in 2023, the Georgian government alleged that the U.S. was laying the groundwork for regime change in Georgia by funding training of Georgians by Serbian activists whose previous organization had played an important part in toppling the government of President Slobodan Milosevic. Their present group, Belgrade-based Canvas, “advocates for the use of nonviolent resistance in the promotion of human rights and democracy.”

During the Cold War, U.S. administrations frequently helped overthrow democratically elected governments that differed with Washington. Americans should ask themselves if this is really a tradition they wish to continue.

The new law requiring NGOs with foreign funding to register as “agents of foreign influence” (which led to large opposition-led protests in May) was introduced partly in response to this perceived threat, and is intended to weaken this source of opposition internal and external strength.

In response to the law, the EU has frozen Georgia’s accession process and cut off much of its aid, while the U.S. imposed sanctions on Georgian government officials. The EU’s ambassador in Tbilisi has publicly stated that if Georgian Dream is re-elected, this will end Georgian hopes of joining the EU.

While the Georgian government remains committed in principle to seek membership in both NATO and the EU, the NATO member on Georgia’s western border is not Poland or France, but rather Turkey, and Turkey has pursued a policy of determined neutrality towards the war in Ukraine, including a refusal to join in Western sanctions against Russia.

The Georgian government believes that, while in the foreseeable future Russia will not help Georgia reunify with the separatist ethnic territories that broke away with Moscow’s help in the 1990s, the Kremlin has no desire to launch a new war against Georgia. “Why should they? They’ve got everything they wanted,” I was told.

Like Turkey, the Georgian Dream’s policy of avoiding increased tension with Russia is based partly on economics. As a Georgian friend remarked sardonically, “Very few Georgians have any affection for Russia or Russians; but a great many Georgians want to make money off them.”

Georgia has profited handsomely from its government’s refusal to join in Western sanctions against Russia. Although Georgia has no formal diplomatic relations with Russia, trucks going to Russia from the Persian Gulf and elsewhere are backed up for miles at the border. Russia remains a vital market for Georgian agricultural produce,. Georgia receives numerous tourists from Russia. Due above all to the war in Ukraine, Georgian GDP grew by 11. percent in 2022 and 7.5 percent in 2023.

Georgian government propaganda against the opposition is largely concentrated on the allegation that it will drag Georgia into a new war with Russia, as part of a U.S.-directed “global party of war.” This warning resonates deeply with many Georgians but seems greatly exaggerated.

Feeling among opposition supporters with whom I have spoken is overwhelmingly against war. At most, a new Georgian government might encourage more Georgian volunteers to fight in Ukraine. A far more plausible warning is that the price of Western support for opposition victory would be full Georgian adoption of Western economic sanctions against Russia, a move that would inflict serious damage on the Georgian economy.

If Georgian policy towards Russia is therefore solidly grounded in pragmatism, it is also true that a certain distrust of the West has grown over the years. Although both the Georgian government and most ordinary Georgians remain committed in principle to seeking NATO membership, nobody with whom I spoke during my last visit expressed confidence that NATO would in fact fight for Georgia in the event of war.

This skepticism dates back to the Georgian-Russian War of 2008. The Bush administration had offered future NATO membership to Georgia, and U.S. officials and politicians had spoken of Georgia as a U.S. ally. Yet in the event, the US did nothing to help Georgia.

Attitudes to the EU are much more positive, both because of the hoped-for economic and migration benefits of membership and because the idea of belonging to “Europe” is deeply embedded in Georgian culture (though according to strict geographical classification, Georgia is in fact in Asia). Nonetheless, doubts about the EU have also been growing in the Georgian establishment.

This is partly due to skepticism as to whether Georgia will ever in fact be admitted to EU membership. As I was frequently reminded in Tbilisi, Georgia’s neighbor Turkey has been waiting for admission for many decades. Of course, this is largely due to reasons specific to Turkey; but in the case of Georgia, doubt is increased by a feeling that Georgia will never be admitted to the EU before Ukraine, and that Ukrainian admission to full membership is probably impossible.

These doubts about Western commitment have been increased by domestic political developments in both Europe and America indicating increased public opposition to further NATO and EU enlargement.

In their attitudes to the EU, supporters of the Georgian government can also be said to behave like supporters of right-wing parties within the EU, in terms of resentment at perceived dictation by Brussels, including in policies towards gender that are seen as alien to core Georgian traditions.

In the Georgian mountain resort town of Gudauri, near the Russian border, stands a signpost. It reads, among other destinations: Ankara, 1,200 km; Moscow 1,591 km; Beijing, 5,834 km; and Washington D.C. 9,209 km. Since I first visited Georgia in 1990, Georgians have told me of their regret that their country is situated in the southern Caucasus, and not southern Europe. This may indeed be regrettable. It is also a fact.