OPEC+ agreed Monday to a small cut in oil production. The cartel, which is led by Russia and Saudi Arabia, justified the decision as a necessary move to slow a recent drop in global oil prices. These cuts could deepen in coming weeks as the bloc “stands ready to meet again at short notice to reduce output further if needed,” according to Bloomberg columnist Javier Blas.
The production drop — which comes just two months after President Joe Biden personally asked Saudi leaders to increase oil output — highlights the difficulties that the United States has faced in rallying Middle East partners to support Western efforts to isolate Russia.
The move could hardly come at a worse time for Biden. U.S. gas prices have finally started to return to their pre-Ukraine war levels, and Europe is expected to lean on oil to produce electricity this winter as Russia reduces the continent’s access to natural gas. In other words, an increase in oil prices could damage Biden's efforts to help Democrats hold onto Congress this fall while testing the strength of the West's united front against Russia.
More broadly, the news raises questions about how much Washington really gains from cozying up to autocratic leaders like Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman.
“Clearly, appeasement didn't work,” tweeted Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute. “Doubling down on a bad relationship is a bad idea. It's time to overhaul America's Mideast policy.”
Notably, OPEC’s decision also coincides with reports that the U.S. and Iran may manage to revive the Iran nuclear deal. If these efforts succeed, Tehran will be able to vastly increase its oil exports, which would likely help drive down prices in global markets. This latest move signals that Riyadh is still not ready to support Washington’s efforts with Iran, according to oil market analyst Tamas Varga.
“The political angle, it seems, is a Saudi message to the U.S. about the revival of the Iranian nuclear agreement,” Varga told Reuters. “It is hard to interpret the decision as anything but price supportive.”
Connor Echols is the managing editor of the Nonzero Newsletter and a former reporter for Responsible Statecraft. Echols received his bachelor’s degree from Northwestern University, where he studied journalism and Middle East and North African Studies.
Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan — two longstanding foes in the South Caucasus who fought bloody wars in the 1990s and again in 2020 — was imminent.
He credited his administration’s diplomatic efforts: “Armenia and Azerbaijan. We worked magic there and it’s pretty close — if not, it’s already done,” he declared during a dinner with Republican senators.
His remarks referenced a U.S. proposal to lease a 43-kilometer road through Armenia’s southern Syunik province to an American private company for 100 years, as revealed by U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Thomas Barrack. The plan is depicted as a creative fix for the deadlock over Baku’s demands for the so-called Zangezur corridor — a land route that runs through Armenian territory to connect with Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave and Turkey. Under U.S. management, the logic goes, all sides could use the road, moving beyond the “tribal viewpoints” that fuel the conflict.
Yet, reactions in both Armenia and Azerbaijan have so far been tepid — despite the fact that both nations currently seek to reduce Russia’s influence in the region, which should, in theory, make them more receptive to U.S. involvement.
The core sticking point remains sovereignty. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stressed that Armenia must retain control over the route. At the same time, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, speaking in Khankendi/Stepanakert (the former capital of the now-dissolved Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, with its indigenous Armenian population violently expelled from the region in 2023, insisted on unilateral access to Nakhichevan and Turkey, dismissing any foreign presence. “There will be no operators, no leases, no rentals on our territory,” he asserted — an implicit rebuke to Washington.
Given Aliyev’s past claims that Syunik is “ancient Azerbaijani land” and his threats to seize it by force, Armenia rightly sees his demands as a precursor to annexation.
Still, Aliyev praised Trump’s “vision and efforts to promote peace” after Trump shared a clip of his speech on Truth Social — in what appeared to be an attempt to flatter the U.S. president.
Complicating matters further, the proposed corridor would cut through Armenian territory bordering Iran. Tehran has fiercely opposed any extraterritorial arrangement, fearing it would sever its link with Armenia, boost Turkish-Azerbaijani influence at its own expense, and leave its trade routes Russia and Europe vulnerable to Baku’s whims. Iran even conducted military drills near Azerbaijan’s border in 2022 as a warning.
Adding to Tehran’s unease is Azerbaijan’s military cooperation with Israel, along with suspicions that Israeli drones entered Iran via Azerbaijani airspace during their 12-day war last month — a claim that Baku vehemently denies. Iran also suspects Baku and Tel Aviv of stoking separatist sentiments among its Azeri population. Notably, Brenda Shaffer from the Washington-based neoconservative Foundation for Defense of Democracies (a vocal advocate for Azerbaijani irredentism with close ties to Baku’s government) framed Armenia-Azerbaijan peace almost solely as a means to isolate Iran and create a “NATO corridor” from Turkey to Central Asia.
Given U.S. support for Israeli strikes on Iran and its own attacks on Iranian nuclear sites, an American-run corridor near its border would only heighten Tehran’s fears of encirclement. Despite its weakened state, Iran retains enough leverage to sabotage a deal it deems a threat to its core national interests.
Aliyev, meanwhile, appeared to placate Tehran by accusing, albeit without evidence, the EU’s Armenia border mission of spying on Iran in an apparent attempt to deflect Tehran’s scrutiny over Baku’s ties with Israel. Still, his rhetoric aligned with Iran’s opposition to extraregional meddling, meaning the U.S. and EU, just as Armenia pivots toward the West.
Russia, like Iran, views the U.S. proposal as an attempt to push it out of the South Caucasus — a perception Yerevan seems to be doing its best to encourage. Yet Moscow still holds considerable leverage: it guards Armenia’s border with Iran, retains a military base in Armenia, and dominates broad sectors of its economy and infrastructure, even as Yerevan’s pro-Western pivot so far is heavier on rhetoric than on tangible actions. How would Russian border troops coexist with an American-run corridor? Would Washington deploy forces to protect it, risking a clash with Russian forces in Armenia? And does the U.S. even have the staying power and political will to enforce such a deal in a region of only marginal strategic importance to its interests?
While a U.S.-brokered peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is welcome in principle, the current proposal ignores too many regional complexities. At best, it’s a rough draft that requires intensive negotiation with all the regional players, including Iran and Russia. At worst, it’s another headline-grabbing stunt in Trump’s elusive quest for a Nobel Peace Prize.
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Top photo credit: Volodymyr Zelensky (Shutterstock/Pararazza) and Vladimir Putin (Shutterstock/miss.cabul)
President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has said that a further round of talks between Ukraine and Russia could start as early as this week, and indicated that “everything had to be done to get a ceasefire.” Yet it is far from clear that a ceasefire will be possible. And it’s likely that the war will continue into 2026.
In June, Zelensky was pressing the European Union to go further in its sanctions against Russia, including calling for a $30 per barrel cap on Russian oil shipments. Washington effectively vetoed a lowering of the oil price cap at the recent G7 Summit in Canada. However, on July 18 the European Union agreed its 18th round of Russian sanctions since war began, overcoming a blocking move by Slovakia in the process.
This imposes a cap on Russian oil shipments at 15% below market value ($47.60 at the time the package was agreed) and places further restrictions on Russia’s energy sector. But, there is scepticism that this will dent Russian revenues without the U.S. mirroring the measures, as the prior $60 per barrel G7 cap made no noticeable difference. Zelensky hailed the package as “essential and timely.”
Despite the overtures towards peace talks, economic sanctions against Russia continue to be the preferred approach for both Zelensky and for the EU. And the clock is ticking for the focus to shift back to President Trump’s proposed secondary sanctions. Having given Russia 50 days to agree a peace deal with Ukraine or face tariffs of 100% against its major trading partners, Trump has effectively set a deadline of September 2.
Between now and then, the August holiday period will kick in during which diplomats across the Western world, much of the Russian government and, even in times of war, some of the Ukrainian government will be downshifting. Of course, wars don’t stop when holidays start. But the idea that either side will have the energy or motivation to deliver a sudden and remarkable breakthrough ceasefire deal that navigates both sides’ concerns in August is, to put it mildly, ambitious.
In any case, and as I have said before, I see little to no prospect that yet another round of sanctions will influence President Putin without genuinely substantive progress towards peace between both sides.
It’s clear that a peace deal or, at the very least a meaningful ceasefire with a clearly articulated peace process, will only be possible when the presidents of Ukraine and Russia meet, which Zelensky has pressed for.
But there is a significant element of theater here. To recap on what happened at the May peace talks in Istanbul, President Putin first proposed them, following pressure from President Trump and the EU to agree to an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine. Zelensky then challenged Putin to meet in person in Istanbul. It was obvious to anyone who has studied Russia’s obsession with form over substance that Putin was never going to agree to a meeting without even the skeleton of a pre-prepared bilateral paper on the table to discuss.
And so, predictably, the Kremlin named a delegation led by the official who also led Russia’s delegation to the ill-fated Istanbul peace talks in March and April 2022. At the eleventh hour, Zelensky was himself pressured to name a Ukrainian delegation “out of respect” for President Trump and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the talks commenced a day later than planned. President Trump then said that no peace deal would be agreed until he met with Putin.
This time around, the Russian side has already quashed the idea of a bilateral meeting between Putin and Zelensky for the same reasons provided in May. "There is a lot of work to be done before we can talk about the possibility of some top-level meetings," said Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s long-time press spokesman.
For its part, the Ukrainian side has set three goals for Wednesday's talks: the further return of Ukrainian prisoners of war, on which there have been several encouraging exchanges since May, the return of Ukrainian children, an issue on which both sides have engaged unofficially throughout the war. The third goal is engineering a meeting between Zelensky and Putin.
Yet, this limited agenda will not be enough to satisfy the Kremlin that Ukraine is ready to negotiate and make progress towards an agreement on Russia’s so-called underlying concerns, the key concern being Ukraine’s NATO aspiration. Without the negotiations seriously getting into this and other such substantive issues as the disposition of forces and territory when the fighting stops, don’t expect a leader-level meeting any time soon.
And of course, the threat of so-called secondary sanctions as soon as September 2 means that the pressure on Russia to deliver is higher now than at the Istanbul talks in May. From Zelensky’s perspective, no peace deal in Istanbul means secondary sanctions against Russia.
This dynamic of Europe and the U.S. threatening Russia with sanctions unless progress towards peace is made, while no expectations are placed on Ukraine to make concessions, has been locked in since March of 2015. It simply will not work.
Calling on Putin to meet in Istanbul is therefore, like it was in May, an act of political theater by Zelensky. He needs to keep his Western sponsors on side and for the flow of money and arms into Ukraine to continue. He also wants to polish his image as a putative global statesman.
Meanwhile, at the most recent Contact Group of Support for Ukraine meeting, then Ukrainian Prime Minister Denis Shmyhal requested an additional $6 billion to cover this year’s deficit in defense procurement. He also urged “partners to allocate funds for Ukraine in their budget proposals for 2026, right now.”
Anyone who believes that Zelensky is really committed to accelerating moves towards peace in Ukraine may, I fear, be overly optimistic. I am increasingly convinced that war will continue into next year.
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Top image credit: A man walks with a Syrian flag, after powerful airstrikes shook Damascus on Wednesday, targeting the defense ministry, as Israel vowed to destroy Syrian government forces attacking Druze communities in southern Syria and demanded their withdrawal, in Damascus July 16, 2025. REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi
Just days before Israeli F-35s screamed over Damascus, the improbable seemed within reach. U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack, leveraging his dual role as Ambassador to Turkey and point man on Syria, was brokering painstaking back-channel talks between two historic enemies.
The Syrian government, led by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former Islamist militant turned statesman, signaled openness to a non-aggression pact with Israel. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar publicly welcomed Syria into “the peace and normalization circle in the Middle East.”
By July 12, leaks suggested a deal was drawing closer: al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, forced to move quickly in exchange for much needed security guarantees, reconstruction aid and investment, had reportedly met directly with Israeli officials in Azerbaijan. In his ongoing quest for a Nobel Peace Prize, U.S. President Donald Trump had personally met al-Sharaa in Riyadh and thereafter started dismantling decades of sanctions, betting big on Syria’s rehabilitation and regional integration.
Central to this U.S. vision was the consolidation of a stable, unitary Syrian state. Barrack is spearheading this arduous task, working to dismantle potential sources of fragmentation. Currently, his most critical, and contentious mission is the merger of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — America’s ground allies against ISIS — into the nascent Syrian national army. Barrack’s message to SDF commander Mazloum Abdi during tense Damascus meetings earlier this month was uncompromising: “One country, one army, one people.”
Barrack bluntly dismissed Kurdish demands for federalism or autonomous military structures as unworkable and destabilizing, arguing “in all of these countries what we learned is federalism doesn't work.”
This drive for a unified military command is the bedrock of U.S. strategy to prevent Syria’s balkanization and create a viable partner for regional peace, including normalization with Israel.
The eruption of violence in Syria’s Druze heartland of Suwayda on July 11 provided Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the perfect catalyst to derail this fragile progress.
When clashes broke out between Druze militias and Bedouin tribes, Syria’s government intervened to restore order — reportedly notifying Israel in advance about troop movements, clarifying that the move was not intended as a threat to its southern neighbor. According to reports, Syria’s government misread the situation, believing it had a green light from both the U.S. and Israel to deploy troops, encouraged by U.S. messaging that Syria should be governed as a centralized state, and influenced by nascent security talks with Israel. Israel, however, viewed the situation as an invitation for escalation.
Defense Minister Israel Katz framed devastating airstrikes on Syrian tanks and later in Damascus itself as a moral imperative: protecting a persecuted Druze minority, a group with a substantial and visible presence in Israel, including in the Israeli military. “The regime [Syrian government] sent troops south of Damascus...and began slaughtering the Druze,” Netanyahu declared a day after Israeli bombs tore into the General Command Headquarters of the Syrian Army.
Israel’s actions — encroaching into Syrian territory and conducting hundreds of airstrikes since the fall of Assad and now bombing Damascus during sensitive negotiations — directly undermine U.S. policy by preventing the consolidation of a sovereign and unified Syria capable of reclaiming its south and becoming a viable partner for the U.S. vision.
Crucially, the very Druze community Netanyahu claims to protect largely rejects this imposed patronage. Two out of the three spiritual leaders of the Druze community in Syria — Sheikhs Hamoud al-Hanawi and Youssef Jarbouh — emphasize their Syrian identity and demand protection from the Syrian state, not external powers. Sheikh Jarbouh, on the back of recent events in Suweida, insisted solutions must come from within Syria, also sending a message to Israel that “any attack on the Syrian state is an attack on us…we are part of Syria.”
Among Syria's Druze leadership, only Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri champions Israel’s intervention, labeling the government “terrorist criminal gangs” — a view rejected by many within his community. This isolation was articulated by Laith al-Balous, leader of the influential “Rijal al Karama” (Men of Dignity) militia. Formed during Syria's civil war to defend the Druze against both the deposed Assad regime and extremists, al-Balous forcefully countered al-Hijri on Al Jazeera: “there is one of the leaders who took the sect to another direction. We, as the people of the Suwayda Governorate, reject it and do not accept it,” adding that we must “stand with our Syrian people.”
Israel’s inability to act as sole guarantor of the Druze community’s security in Syria was laid bare on Friday when — just days after bombing Syria’s Defense Ministry and presidential palace — an Israeli official tacitly admitted Damascus alone could stabilize the crisis. "In light of ongoing instability," the unnamed official told Reuters, Israel would now "allow limited entry of Syrian internal security forces into Sweida district for the next 48 hours."
This reversal implicitly acknowledged that the Syrian government — whose troops and command structure Israel had targeted — remain the indispensable actor needed to restore order and act as a buffer between the warring Bedouin tribes and Druze militias. Indeed, these localized clashes were the underlying trigger which drew in Syrian government forces, whose intervention then became Israel’s pretext for bombing.
The U.S. administration, blindsided by Israel's bombings, scrambled to contain the fallout. Officials revealed they explicitly “told the Israelis to stand down and take a breath,” urging direct talks with Damascus instead of bombs. Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly framed the strikes as a dangerous impediment to building a “peaceful and stable Syria,” undermining months of U.S. political capital invested in al-Sharaa’s government. State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce pointedly clarified that “the United States did not support recent Israeli strikes.”
Most recently, Special Envoy Barrack went a step further, siding explicitly with Syria and noting that the government “has conducted themselves as best they can…to bring a diverse society together,” adding that Israel’s air assault “came at a very bad time."
Israel’s strikes expose a cynical pattern that echoes its sabotage of nuclear talks between the U.S. and Iran. Just as Netanyahu lobbied relentlessly against U.S.-Iran diplomacy — creating conditions for Israel’s unilateral strikes that later succeeded in luring Washington into conflict — he now undermines U.S.-Syrian rapprochement. The contradiction here is particularly glaring: Israel has spent the last few weeks publicly urging Syria to join the Abraham Accords; yet it also actively attacks the very government forces it claims to want as partners.
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar — who previously dismissed al-Sharaa’s government as a “bunch of jihadists — openly championed Syria’s federalization in February 2025, insisting on dividing the country along sectarian lines to ensure respect for “different ways of life.” This vision, which included lobbying Washington to allowRussia to retain its bases on Syria’s Mediterranean coast to counter Turkey’s influence and keep Syria decentralized, stands in direct opposition to the unified, stable state that the Syrians, neighboring states, and the Trump administration are working to build.
Israel's escalation in Syria, which awkwardly coincides with U.S. efforts to lift sanctions and establish unified military control over Syrian territory, places the Trump administration in a tight corner. Through its recent maneuvers, Israel has signaled its intent to control Syria's destiny, regardless of the damage to U.S. strategy.
With each bomb dropped on Damascus, Israel isn’t just attacking Syrian infrastructure. It is dismantling the very pillars of a potential regional order of sovereign states based on stability and integration, revealing a fundamental divergence that is becoming increasingly costly for Washington, and for the wider region.
The ultimate test for the Trump administration is whether it can restrain Israel's aggressive approach and allow its own vision for a unified, stable Syria to take root.
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