Yemen’s President-in-exile Abd Rabo Mansur Hadi announced on Thursday that he has transferred his authority to an eight member group called the Presidential Leadership Council. The move represents one of the most significant political developments in Yemen’s civil war in years. 

Hadi’s announcement reflects the outcome of talks convened by the Saudis in Riyadh between various anti-Houthi militias, political leaders, and parties in Yemen. The Houthis had been invited to the talks, but declined to attend on the basis of Saudi Arabia’s role as a belligerent in Yemen’s civil war. With the formation of the Presidential Leadership Council — effectively an anti-Houthi coalition — it becomes clear why the Saudis preferred the Houthis not attend.

The formation of the Council reflects Saudi and possibly American frustration with President Hadi, whose lack of popularity, corruption, and determination to hang on to power had stymied efforts to establish a new political framework for Yemen. By insisting on maintaining power, Hadi had effectively empowered the Houthi rebels and others who opposed his rule. By stepping aside, Hadi has enabled a breakthrough that could lead to progress in resolving Yemen’s intractable conflict.

Why now, after years of intransigence? The timing likely partly reflects recent announcements from Congress that members would reintroduce a War Powers Resolution ending U.S. support for Saudi-led military actions in Yemen. Rather than face the humiliating prospect of losing their ability to operate their own air force without the assistance of U.S. military contractors, the Saudis prefer to pressure their proxies in Yemen to move towards resolving the conflict.

However, both the recent Ramadan ceasefire agreement and the formation of the Presidential Leadership Council may give the false impression that Yemen’s civil war is nearing resolution. Instead, these recent developments could incentivize an escalation in violence from both the anti-Houthi coalition and the Houthis themselves.

The Presidential Leadership Council includes all the major parties opposed to the Houthi rebels. Some are backed by the UAE, including the head of the Southern Transitional Council, a southern secessionist group; the Commander of the Giants Brigades that in January successfully pushed the Houthis out of territory in the provinces of Shabwa and al-Bayda; and the nephew of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.

However, the inclusion of members of Yemen’s main Islamist party, Islah, which the UAE views with suspicion, demonstrates that the UAE did not monopolize the make-up of the Council. One Islah member is the governor of Marib, the oil-rich province the Houthis have tried to take for years; another was a close ally of President Hadi. The Council also includes the governor of Hadramawt, a large and oil-rich province that has largely been spared by the civil war’s violence, as well as a sheikh from Saada, the Houthis’ home province, and a member of the General People’s Congress, the former ruling party.

The head of the council, Rashad al-Alimi, is also a member of the GPC and a former Minister of the Interior; he hails from Taiz, which the Houthis have blockaded since 2015.

These individuals only agree on one thing: their opposition to the Houthis. Houthi representatives condemned the creation of the Council. On Twitter, spokesman Mohammed Abdu Salam called it “a desperate attempt to rearrange the ranks of the mercenaries.” It is not yet clear if the Houthis will respond by breaking the two-month ceasefire and returning to the battlefield as soon as possible, or will conclude that they should come to the negotiating table now, before this newly formed coalition threatens their current hold on territory.

Likewise, with their newfound unity, the members of the Council may prefer to re-engage militarily to try to weaken the Houthis’ territorial control and reduce their influence at any future negotiations. Therefore, while the formation of the Council at least reflects some degree of political movement since the Saudis first intervened to back President Hadi seven years ago, it may portend an increase in violence, when the Yemeni population is already so devastated by war and hunger.

The U.S. role is crucial. The Biden administration should make clear to the Saudis, who oversaw the creation of the Council, that they must continue to adhere to the terms of the Ramadan ceasefire, including by allowing flights into Sanaa airport, which have not yet resumed, and fuel ships to reach Hodeidah. This could help to convince the Houthis that negotiating offers a more productive path forward than violence.

The United States also needs to make clear to the Saudis and the newly formed Council that Congress intends to pass a Yemen War Powers Resolution, which would end all U.S. military support for the Saudis. This, more than any other factor, may help incentivize the Saudis and the Council to uphold the ceasefire and push for negotiations rather than a resumption of fighting.