As Iran and the IAEA managed to solve the few remaining continuous factors in ongoing nuclear talks and the prospect for a renewed nuclear deal began to look bright, Russia’s sudden demand for sanctions exemptions has dampened hope the a deal can be reached any time soon.
Linking its support for the deal to a guaranteed right to “free and fully-fledged trade and economic and investment cooperation and military-technical cooperation with Iran” in spite of the newly imposed sanctions on it, Iranian officials have been quick to criticize the last minute change especially after that the U.S. government has refused Russia’s demand as irrelevant. So what explains Russia’s change of heart and what does it mean for Tehran?
There are a number of explanations ranging from the effects of the deal on energy prices to the more long term prospect of Iran moving away from Moscow. To be able to avoid further deterioration of its economy and maintain its war efforts, Russia’s interest squarely lies in higher oil prices, and thus any development that could lower prices, however meagre, is to be prevented. A renewed nuclear deal with Iran would do just that. While Iranian oil will not replace that of Russia nor will it, in the short to medium term, reduce the EU’s dependency on the Russian energy, the addition of Iranian resources and Tehran’s ability to sell its oil on the global market freely will certainly reduce prices.
Equally important is Moscow’s fear of losing access to Iran’s lucrative market and the prospect of Tehran’s drifting away from its strategic orbit. Given its dire economic and military needs, Tehran is in no position to be picky about who it trades with or where it sources its needs from. Hence, and in the light of current sanctions on Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine, it is safe to speculate that Russian officials are worried that Iran can be easily dissuaded from working with Russian entities by relatively generous offers of cooperation and investment from Europe.
Added to this is Iran’s wariness of sanctions reimposition on its banking system and its companies should they engage in commercial interactions with their Russian counterparts. This, in turn, will serve a severe blow to Moscow’s attempt at carving an exclusive commercial role for itself in Iran and might even dampen Iranian enthusiasm for the signing of a long term strategic pact.
War in Ukraine, it appears, has provided Iran with an unexpected and indeed unique geopolitical opportunity to reduce its over-reliance on Moscow and accelerate its integration into the global economy by banking on increased Western appetite for isolating Russia, curbing its influence, and, perhaps most importantly, reducing their own reliance on it. Such sentiments are best evidenced in Denmark’s resumption of pipeline construction connecting Poland to Norway, the EU’s courting of Azerbaijan for increased supply of gas to Europe, and the United States’ sudden engagement with Venezuela.
To grasp this opportunity, Tehran needs to prioritize pragmatism over idealism and push for a deal with or without Russia. Surely, such undertaking will neither be cost free nor easy. Given Moscow’s direct access to key centers of power, including the Supreme Leader’s office in Tehran, its critical role as operator in chief of Iran’s nuclear facilities, and its influence as the dominant player in Syria, Russia has the means and resources to not just avert pragmatic decision making but also punish Iran for pursuing its interests in defiance of Moscow.
Also at play is Ali Khamenei’s own deeply ingrained suspicious of the West as a reliable partner. However, the point remains that Iranian elites have been presented with a random, yet unique, historical opportunity to put national interests above factional politics and ideological sentiments. Whether or not they will seize it and give up on being “a cause” remains to be seen.
Nima Khorrami is a Research Associate at The Arctic Institute. His areas of interest and expertise lie at the intersection of geopolitics, infrastructure and technology. At The Arctic Institute, his research is mainly focused on Sweden’s Arctic policy, (digital) connectivity, and potential links between China, Russia, and US’s Arctic and Middle East policies.He is an alumni of Nottingham University and the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, Sept 7, 2018 (photo via khamenei.ir).
photo : U.S. President Joe Biden attends a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as he visits Israel amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, in Tel Aviv, Israel, October 18, 2023.
A group of 60 national, state, and local organizations sent a letter to President Biden on Monday urging him to “hold Israel accountable to U.S. law [by] ending arms sales to Israel to protect U.S. interests, achieve a ceasefire, protect civilians, increase aid access in Gaza, and work towards a stable future for the region.”
The policy, humanitarian, and faith-based organizations — which include Amnesty International, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, and the Quincy Institute, publisher of Responsible Statecraft — expressed disappointment with Biden’s policy of “unconditional support of Israel paired with empty threats,” saying the policy has not yielded any meaningful results and serves to harm America’s global reputation.
Rather than curbing Israel’s actions, the signatories say the Biden administration has enabled it to bomb hospitals, schools, and residential areas, block humanitarian aid, and kill tens of thousands of civilians, journalists, and aid workers, all at the expense of the taxpayer.
The organizations say a letter sent by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to Israeli Defense Secretary Yoav Gallant asking Israel to allow humanitarian aid in Gaza “provides an opportunity to course correct U.S. policy” and enforce U.S. law which would require the United States to withhold aid until humanitarian assistance is delivered.
“The longer the U.S. allows its power and global standing to be undermined by this conflict, the more cost the United States will bear in reputation, taxpayer dollars, and possibly servicemember and citizens’ lives,” they write. “In your final months in office, we urge you to do everything in your power to end U.S. military aid to Israel to stop Israel’s assaults on civilians and maintain regional stability.”
President-elect Trump has named New York GOP Rep. Elise Stefanik as his choice for ambassador to the United Nations.
The nomination is one of the first major appointments Trump has made since winning the election last week. Stefanik has been a staunch Trump loyalist going back to his first term in office, and she has been one of the most vocal supporters of the war in Gaza over the last year.
Different factions in the Republican Party have been competing over the direction of Trump’s foreign policy, and the choice of Stefanik appears to be a clear win for hardline hawks. Putting Stefanik at the UN seems to be Trump’s signal to the world that he doesn’t necessarily care how isolated the U.S. and Israel have become because of the wars in Gaza and Lebanon.
First elected in 2014, Rep. Stefanik, 40, has been considered a rising star in the Republican Party. Before being elected to Congress, she worked at the hardline Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank, and she worked at the extremely hawkish Foreign Policy Initiative that was co-founded by Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan.
Then she gained national notice when she defended Trump during his first impeachment, after which she became one of his most reliable supporters. Trump’s decision to send her to the UN is clearly a reward for her years of loyalty. Stefanik has no background in international relations or diplomacy that would prepare her for representing the United States at the international body, but then the point of sending her is probably to pick fights with other states rather than trying to resolve them.
Republican presidents have appointed hostile ambassadors to the United Nations before. Reagan gave the job to Jeane Kirkpatrick, George W. Bush chose John Bolton (but had to settle for making him a recess appointment), and Trump appointed Nikki Haley in his first term. If confirmed, Stefanik would likely follow her Republican predecessors in their dislike for the institution.
Unlike Haley, however, Stefanik is not going to try running her own parallel foreign policy from New York. Stefanik will face few hurdles in being confirmed by the Senate. Republicans will control the chamber, and she is unlikely to face the sort of organized opposition that Bolton faced almost twenty years ago.
As a member of Congress, Stefanik has been a harsh critic of the United Nations, smearing the institution as antisemitic whenever it has afforded Palestinians an opportunity to express their grievances or to bring pressure to bear against Israel in the General Assembly. She has denounced the Biden administration for its supposed failure to combat antisemitism at the UN.
Stefanik was a leader of the campaign to smear antiwar college campus protesters as antisemitic, and she played a role in pressuring the presidents of Ivy League universities to crack down on the protests at their schools. She has also supported the cutoff of funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the agency that is essential to providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinian civilians in Gaza.
Stefanik has distinguished herself as one of the most extremely anti-Palestinian members of Congress.
Like Trump, Stefanik has been an opponent of the nuclear deal with Iran from its inception. She recently joined her Republican leadership colleagues in calling for a “return to a maximum pressure campaign against Iran.” She repeated the call for maximum pressure again this week. Ambassadors to the U.N. typically have little influence in shaping policy, but the choice of Stefanik is consistent with reporting that Trump plans to pursue a more aggressive Iran policy in the new term.
The Stefanik nomination puts a damper on the news that Mike Pompeo and Nikki Haley won’t be part of the new administration. Trump may not be bringing back all of his old appointees, but he continues to surround himself with hardliners. To the extent that personnel is policy, that bodes ill for the new administration’s foreign policy.
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Top photo credit: Sailors lift ammunition during an on-load aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS William P. Lawrence (DDG 110). William P. Lawrence is underway on its first operational deployment to the western Pacific region as part of the Nimitz Strike Group Surface Action Group. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Carla Ocampo) File# 130126-N-ZQ631-628
Regardless of the merits or demerits of the Biden administration’s policies on the wars in Ukraine and Gaza and the wider Middle East, it has become clear that the United States has been using and giving away its missiles faster than it can produce them.
It is also clear that from the perspective of missile inventories and production, the United States is far from prepared to engage confidently in a sustained direct conflict with a peer competitor like China.
This is demonstrated by the fact that U.S. missile and artillery shell reserves are currently inadequate to provide Ukraine with what it needs to keep its missile defense systems supplied with interceptors. Indeed, the inability of the United States and its NATO allies to provide enough air defense missiles — a.k.a. interceptors — has made it easier for Russia to attack and destroy key military targets, as well as cripple Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.
This missile deficit parallels the well-documented lack of U.S. artillery shell production that has enabled Russia to increase the rate at which it’s taking control over territories in Ukraine today.
While the United States is not going to run out of missiles tomorrow, its missile inventory, both offensive and defensive, is dwindling. Further, although the U.S. government has not disclosed how many interceptor missiles have been given to Ukraine to supply the billions of dollars’ worth of NASAM, Hawk, and Patriot air defense systems Washington sent there, we do know that it has not been enough.
We also know that between Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, some 740 Patriot PAC-2/PAC-3 missiles per year will be made in 2025, with production theoretically ramping up to roughly 1,100 missiles by 2027. That sounds like a lot, but since February 22, 2022, Ukraine has faced attacks from thousands of drones and missiles.
Moreover, while our proxy war on Russia has strained our resources, an outbreak of hostilities with China could easily increase the burn rate of our ship-based missiles by an order of magnitude over what we have been seeing in the Middle East. And speaking of our supply of ship-based missiles, as of Feb 1, 2024, the U.S. Navy had used at least 100 of its standard series class missiles in the Red Sea.
A July 2024 report reveals that the Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier strike group expended 155 multi-million-dollar standard series missiles, 135 multi-million-dollar Tomahawk cruise missiles, 60 multi-million dollar air-to-air missiles, and an additional 420 air-to-surface munitions with a cumulative cost likely in the hundreds of millions of dollars And this missile expenditure does not include the missiles used by warships not attached to that strike group during this period.
Naturally, since July, the Navy has continued to use overpriced, ridiculously expensive missiles to shoot down cheap Houthis drones and missiles. Adding to our Navy’s missile burn rate, on at least two occasions, April and October of this year, our warships used SM-2 and SM-3 missiles to protect Israel from Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. Additionally, since the beginning of the year, the U.S. Navy has been using the much more expensive SM-6 missiles, along with SM-2s, in its Red Sea operations.
We don’t really know how many missiles have been used to date, but what has been publicly disclosed should be viewed as a very conservative estimate. In addition, we don’t know the exact inventory levels of critical weapons, as such information could be of great use to our enemies. However, according to a report by the Heritage Foundation, up through 2023, the Pentagon had procured roughly 12,000 Standard Missile-2s (SM-2), 400 Standard Missile-3s (SM-3), 1,500 Standard Missile-6s (SM-6), and 9,000 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM). During this same period, the U.S. Navy has expended at least 2,800 Standard Missiles and 2,900 TLAMs. And these figures do not include the previously mentioned expenditures of the last year or so.
Shedding more light on roughly what our current reserves of missiles looks like, the Wall Street Journal estimates that when training exercises and the retirement of older weapons are taken into account, only about 4,000 TLAM remained as of 2020 and since then the U.S. has only produced another 250 or so TLAMs. Consequently, with large numbers of TLAMS, SM-2 and other SM-type missiles having been expended in 2023 and 2024, our nation’s missile stockpile continues to be depleted.
Put another way, the entirety of our Navy’s warships, not including quad packs of shorter-ranged air defense missiles, can carry about 10,000 missiles in their vertical launch systems that can be used for wide-area defense or long-range attacks. So, as things stand, once we expend the full complement of our VLS launched missiles, we are roughly 3,000 missiles short of being able to fully replenish our ships.
Yet another aspect of how much stress could potentially be placed on our missile inventories is that, while we do have a relatively large number of SM-2 missiles, we only have some 400 SM-3 class missiles, the defense system most capable of destroying powerful ballistic missiles before they can threaten population centers or military targets.
And in April of this year, two of our Arleigh Burke guided missile destroyers used four to seven of these scarce SM-3 missiles to attempt the interception of ballistic missiles fired by Iran. Each of the SM-3s, depending on the model, costs between $13 and $28 million. Hence, that one engagement cost U.S. taxpayers in the neighborhood of $52M to $196M.
Of course, U.S. supplementation of Israel’s defenses has not been limited to expending shipborne missiles. On October 21, Israel received one of the United States’ seven THAAD air defense systems. Each of these systems costs over a billion dollars, and each THAAD interceptor missile costs $13 million. Given that the full load for the THAAD system we sent to Israel is 48 missiles, it is safe to assume Israel has received a minimum of $600 million dollars’ worth of interceptors.
For reference, as of December of 2023, the U.S. had built some 800 of these interceptors. This means if Israel ends up receiving a few reloads, we could easily see 25 percent of our THAAD interceptors inventory consumed at a replacement cost of $2.5 billion.
What’s more, as of 2023, Iran is believed to have over 3,000 ballistic missiles and many thousands of drones. Consequently, Iran could launch even larger attacks in the near future, necessitating the deployment of additional U.S. systems to supplement Israel’s strained air defenses to an even greater extent.
However, all of the above would amount to chump change should the United States become embroiled in a war with China. If such a disaster were to occur, Washington could easily find itself blowing through its missile stocks in a matter of months or even weeks. Indeed, a Center for Strategic and International Studies report found that, in order to counter China, the United States could end up expending 5,000 long-range missiles in just 3 weeks.
Consequently, with our defense industrial base already strained, it seems obvious that we should be doing everything we can to prevent escalation of the ongoing conflicts and instead be working to achieve a genuine, sustainable peace in the Middle East, as well as working towards a peace in the Ukraine war.
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