The Russians want NATO to close its doors to Ukraine and all further expansion into Eastern Europe — this is the red line Moscow as declared. Quincy Institute senior fellow Anatol Lieven talks here about why the U.S. and NATO must decide whether denying Russia is worth the bloody conflict that it might cause. He also talks about the imperative of revisiting the Minsk II agreement, resolving the Donbas dispute, and Ukraine neutrality as a longterm solution.
He also explains why he believes negotiations should take place between the U.S. and Russia only, how Europe is divided, and the consequences of U.S. military intervention (directly or indirectly) in anticipation of, or after a Russian invasion of Ukraine.
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Taiwan's flag is lowered during a daily ceremony as China conducts "Justice Mission 2025" military drills around Taiwan, in Taipei, Taiwan, December 30, 2025. REUTERS/Ann Wang TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
On December 17, while much of the nation was watching President Donald Trump’s primetime “year-in-review” address to the nation, the State Department made a big reveal of its own: the approval of an $11 billion arms package for Taiwan.
According to the announcement, the sale will facilitate “[Taipei's] continuing efforts to modernize its armed forces and to maintain a credible defensive capability.”
The news was widely praised in Washington, by China hawks and supporters of the defense industry alike, for sending a strong deterrent signal to Beijing and a valuable message of U.S. commitment to Taiwan. The Washington Posteditorial board, for example, called the sale “a welcome change to Trump’s Taiwan policy” and “an overdue correction after months of policy changes that favored Beijing over Taipei.”
Celebrations are premature, however. As Chinese warships encircled the island this week as part of “Justice Mission 2025,” it seems that Taiwan’s position is more vulnerable than ever after the U.S. arms sale announcement, and Washington is partly to blame.
The problem is how the Trump administration, and those before it, has chosen to sell weapons to Taiwan — loudly, brashly, and publicly. As the United States looks to shift the burden of the island’s defense to Taiwan itself, it needs a different approach to supporting Taipei, one that is more subtle, emphasizes Taiwan’s indigenous production, and attends assiduously to context.
There are three problems with the December 17 sale, and they all have to do with timing.
For starters, although the U.S. State Department has approved the $11B weapons package, Taiwan’s legislature has blocked the special budget required to pay for it five times. Until Taiwan finds the money, the sale cannot be completed, and production of the promised weapons cannot begin.
As a result of this political fiasco, Taiwan now appears weak, indecisive, and unprepared to support its own defense. That Taiwan’s failure to approve the special budget drags on after the United States greenlit the weapons sale has made an already embarrassing situation worse by calling attention to Taiwan’s domestic divisions and lack of resolve.
Though Taipei bears much of the responsibility, poor U.S. planning is also at fault. The State Department could have averted much of the fallout by holding off on its sale announcement until Taiwanese funding was secured.
But considerations of Taiwan’s domestic politics are not the only reason the timing of the U.S. announcement was puzzling and counterproductive. Coming soon after Trump’s positive meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Busan and during a trade war truce between the two countries, the size and scope of the U.S. arms sale (for example, it included rocket artillery and long-range ATACMS missiles) took Chinese officials by surprise.
In Beijing, the Trump administration’s move was seen as a provocative reversal and even a betrayal of the U.S. president’s previous stance. Lingering regional tensions caused by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s confrontational statements on Taiwan in November only exacerbated Beijing’s sensitivity.
In this context, China’s extensive military drills around Taiwan this week were to be expected, even still largely unjustified.
Beyond the just-completed military exercises, there could still be further repercussions on the way for Washington, including economic retaliation or roadblocks to Trump’s planned April visit to Beijing. Progress made in stabilizing the U.S.-China relationship over recent months has almost certainly been dealt a setback.
Regardless of possible future ramifications, Taiwan’s immediate security picture has darkened, as it endured several days of intense military pressure, simulated blockade, and live fire drills just off its coast. In theory, the new weapons promised by the United States should offset any increased military coercion from China. Once again, however, there is a problem of timing.
While U.S. weapons may be sold in principle to Taiwan today (or, in the coming months if they find the financing and after U.S. Congressional approval), they won’t arrive for years, possibly well into the 2030s.
Take for example, the 82 HIMARS included in the most recent sale. Though the United States can produce about 100 HIMARS a year, this total must meet global demand, including rising purchases from Europe and the needs of the U.S. military.
In 2021, Taiwan purchased 11 HIMARS from the United States. They arrived in 2024. In 2023, Taiwan purchased 18 more HIMARS. They have not been delivered but some may be completed in 2026. At this rate, completely filling an order of 82 additional HIMARS will take at least until the end of the decade — a long time to wait for an island under threat today.
The extensive lag time between the sale announcement and weapons arrival creates another problem for Taiwan: a window of vulnerability in which Beijing can exploit Taiwan’s weaknesses and prepare its own countermeasures. Ultimately, China’s near-term actions may negate any defensive value that comes from additional U.S. arms sales to Taiwan over the longer term.
Neither challenges of timing nor Beijing’s probable retribution are reasons to stop selling arms to Taiwan entirely. But they are cause to rethink how Washington plans and executes these arms sales so that they can provide the most support to U.S. interests with the fewest costs to cross-strait stability.
First, U.S. officials should reconsider how much information about arms sales to Taiwan they make public. Members of Congress should still review and approve sales, but the timing and content of public announcements might be altered to exclude information on quantities, total value, or types of weapons.
This would not be without precedent, as the United States has previously kept classified some information on arms sales to clients like Israel and Ukraine even as they have met requirements for transparency and accountability.
More discretion would have several benefits. China’s vast intelligence network would likely learn the details of a given sale before they are made public, but without a high-profile announcement, Beijing might feel less pressure to retaliate against Taiwan or the United States directly. And to the extent information on new arms packages remains private, it would buy Taipei and Washington time.
Second, U.S. policymakers should link U.S. arms sales to Taiwan directly to Taiwan’s approved defense budget, not its planned or promised one. In practice, this would mean that Washington would not approve weapons packages for Taiwan unless necessary funding is already appropriated. This might require the use of smaller and less frequent arms packages, but it would avoid embarrassing liabilities like that at present, where sales are approved before funding exists.
Another option would be to prioritize efforts to aid Taiwan’s indigenous defense production, rather than selling American weapons. This might be accomplished by incentivizing private investment in Taiwanese companies, facilitating technology sharing, or supporting co-production and joint ventures with U.S. firms. This would have the added benefit of supporting Taiwan’s self-sufficiency and resilience.
Beijing might not welcome these moves, but they should be less antagonistic than direct sales of advanced American military hardware.
Finally, Washington should consider timing more carefully when planning its military assistance to Taiwan. U.S. officials should avoid announcing new initiatives at delicate periods, when tensions are aroused or regional disagreements unresolved. They should also prioritize the health of the U.S.-China relationship above all else, safeguarding mutual understandings over regional security issues generally and Taiwan specifically.
After all, if Washington and Beijing are at odds (or worse at war), no amount of military aid in the world can protect Taiwan from the repercussions.
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Top photo credit: Kharkiv, Ukraine, September 30, 2024 Funeral and burial of Captain Maksym Kudrin, the company commander of the 123rd separate battalion. (Shutterstock/Jose Hernandez Camera 51)
As negotiations accelerate toward a compromise settlement to end the Ukraine war, the voices of the Ukrainians living through the daily horrors have in many ways been suppressed by unending maximalist rhetoric from those far from the frontlines.
The original 28-point working draft that set out an estimation of a compromise between Russian and Ukrainian positions met a harshresponse by those who have demanded no less than a complete Ukrainian victory and a decisive Russian defeat throughout this almost four-year-long war.
The draft peace plan has since been revised with input from Kyiv and various European capitals, evolving into several separate documents focused on resolving the war, establishing security guarantees for Ukraine, and outlining an economic recovery plan. Following Sunday’s meeting in Florida between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and their respective delegations, both leaders expressed confidence that while some “thorny” issues still remain, peace is now much closer, an assessment shared by the Kremlin.
While any compromise agreement ultimately reached will satisfy neither Russian nor Ukrainian maximalist demands, the foundations for a durable peace may now be on the table and within reach.
Throughout the devastating war and resulting chaos, Ukrainians living along both sides of the frontline have organized communities of informal services to help maintain relative order across the battle-scarred regions. A number of Ukrainians agreed to speak with Responsible Statecraft to share their thoughts on and hopes for a peaceful settlement and the opportunities for Ukraine to secure its future and achieve lasting peace. Pseudonyms have been used to protect the safety of those who agreed to talk with us.
For many Ukrainians who have lost relatives and loved ones, “war is not news headlines—it is everyday life,” says Maria, who lives in frontline northeastern Ukraine, part of which is currently under Russian control.
“The recent change in the U.S. administration and President Trump has sparked hope for a possible resolution of the conflict with Russia and the signing of a peace agreement. The recently published 28-point U.S. peace plan has once again made people talk about the possibility of ending the war,” says Maria who describes herself as an “ordinary woman” living in a frontline region where security is a “key issue.” Facing the daily consequences of war, she hopes for “a ceasefire, silence, and the chance to simply live without constant fear. We want a sustainable, long-term peace — not on paper, but in reality: a peace that saves lives, allows destroyed cities to be rebuilt, and restores a sense of security, dignity, and a future.”
According to a Gallup poll from this past summer, 69% of Ukrainians favored “a negotiated end to the war as soon as possible,” whereas 24% say they “support continuing to fight until victory.” This is a significant shift from 2022, when 73% supported fighting until victory and 22% favored a negotiated resolution as soon as possible.
The most sensitive, unresolved issues concern demands by Ukraine for security guarantees and Russia for Kyiv to cede the remaining territory of the Donbas region under its control. Threading this needle has consumed much of the negotiators’ time and attention over the last several weeks, as ultimately both Moscow and Kyiv need to accept the terms of the agreement.
A December survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology showed that 72% of Ukrainians supported freezing the current front line and providing security guarantees for Ukraine. At the same time, 75% of Ukrainians oppose a proposal to cede the remainder of Donbas to Russia without solid security guarantees.
“Russia should be legally bound to pursue a policy of non-aggression toward Ukraine and Europe, while the United States and Russia should extend their agreements on nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. Ukraine, in turn, reaffirms its status as a non-nuclear state,” says Maria.
Ukrainians’ shared fears are the risk of further escalation of the conflict and the possible unleashing of nuclear weapons. “This prospect is not abstract, it’s a real and deeply personal anxiety for our children, our land, our people, and frightening in a very concrete way—the fear of losing our loved ones, our country dear to our hearts, with its rivers, forests and fields, cities and villages,” Maria says how Ukrainian mothers’ shared common goal is preserving “Ukraine for future generations.”
According to Ivan, who lives in eastern Ukraine under Moscow’s control, the proposals concerning halting further NATO enlargement “are key, as it was the expansion of NATO to the East that became the main trigger for our conflict. Without resolving this issue, it is impossible to resolve others.”
Ivan underscores the importance of the provisions from the original agreement for “promoting understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminating racism and prejudice.” He believes the “eliminating racism” phrase must be replaced with “eliminating hatred”, as this “more reflects the situation in the society on both sides of the front line.” He offers the metaphor that “issues of language and religion in Ukraine are abscessing boils, without careful ‘treatment’ of which it is impossible to heal the entire ‘body’ of the state.”
While acknowledging that such a sensitive issue of territorial control will be resolved at the negotiating table, Ivan’s sincere wish is for the voices of those living in territories not controlled by Kyiv to be heard. “Ask them if they want to be ‘liberated’, if they want to return to Ukraine. Most people will answer these questions with an unequivocal ‘no.’ And most of the time, there is no politics in this. People are very tired and brave. And they want peace.”
The proposal that Ukraine hold elections within 100 days of signing the peace agreement, Maria believes, is “necessary,” since trust in the current authorities “remains sensitive.” And holding elections could become “an important step toward renewing public trust.”
For Tatiana, “Ukrainian political elites see that they are being made to pay with Ukrainian lives for a compromise between major powers, yet they do not resist this process.” She offers a grim but accurate assessment of the realities facing ordinary Ukrainians, for whom “this is not true peace but rather a partial transformation into a permanent buffer zone. Still, it represents a halt to the conveyor belt of death, in which people on both sides are killed, and cities are destroyed into lunar landscapes — all for goals that are unclear to anyone and far removed from the daily lives of most Ukrainians.”
“In the end, every side speaks of peace, but means something different by it: the United States seeks a managed exit, the European Union seeks its own security, and Ukraine seeks survival and the right not to be cannon fodder in someone else’s game,” says Tatiana.
For Ivan, the involvement of “representatives of civil society from both sides and experts on specific issues” is critical in addressing the concerns of citizens.
Maxim, who fully supports the 28 points of the Peace Agreement, is deeply committed to peace on his land. He underscores his support for “not only a ceasefire, but also humanitarian issues aimed at protecting and supporting the civilian population on both sides of the conflict.”
Maria agrees with the establishing of “a humanitarian committee to address unresolved issues, including the exchange of prisoners of war and the return of detained civilians.” The underlying concern among all Ukrainians is how the war has divided families; from those living in territories not controlled by the Ukrainian government, to those relocated to western regions where there’s less shelling, and still others who have fled to neighboring countries.
“We need to reunite our families, to have physical access to our loved ones, and to see our husbands, brothers, and fathers return from the frontlines alive and unharmed. We want to focus on rebuilding cities and villages — the restoration of human ties is essential for societal healing,” Maria says.
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Top photo credit: US President Donald Trump speaks during a meeting ahead of peace signing ceremony with Democratic Republic of the Congo Foreign Minister Therese Kayikwamba Wagner (R) and Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe (2nd-L) in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC, USA on June 27, 2025. (Reuters)
On a roll: Trump to host 5 African leaders this week
President Trump’s policy towards the African continent in 2025 was loaded with personal disagreements, peace negotiations, and efforts to improve economic exchange.
Through the ups and downs of Trump’s Africa policy, it became increasingly clear as the year wore on that contrary to observers’ early expectations, Trump’s team is indeed prioritizing Africa.
Here’s a review of the top five stories that defined Trump’s policy towards Africa in 2025.
Diplomatic Scuffle with South Africa
The president’s term began with a proverbial shot across the bow. Just days into his administration, the president accused the South African government of failing to halt a genocide he claimed was being perpetrated by the country’s native black population against white farmers part of the Afrikaner ethnic group.
He then signed an executive order on February 7, accusing Pretoria of expropriating the land of white South Africans without fair compensation, and giving that land to the country’s black population. Trump ordered the U.S. to “not provide any aid or assistance to South Africa,” and also to “promote the resettlement of Afrikaner refugees escaping government-sponsored race-based discrimination, including racially discriminatory property confiscation.”
The rift culminated in an extraordinary argument in the Oval Office on May 21 between South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Trump. During the encounter, Trump continued his attacks on the South African government with his counterpart sitting beside him.
At one point, Trump ordered the lights to be dimmed and drew attention to a television screen, which played clips of leaders from a South African minority political party calling for attacks against the country’s white population. Trump then held up printed copies of news articles he claimed discussed the death of white South Africans.
The relationship never mended. Under Trump’s demand, the United States government boycotted the Group of 20 (G20) summit in late November hosted by South Africa in Johannesburg, and disinvited South Africa from next year’s G20 summit, which is to be hosted by the United States in south Florida.
Massad Boulos' role as Senior Africa Advisor
Among the early signs that Trump would prioritize Africa as part of his administration’s broader foreign policy came on April 1, when Massad Boulos was announced as Trump’s Senior Advisor for Africa.
Although Boulos, the father-in-law to Trump’s daughter Tiffany, had no previous experience in diplomatic affairs on the continent, he has a close relationship with the Trump family, and has proven himself to be the president’s right-hand man on Africa policy.
Without Boulos, Trump’s policy towards the continent would have likely been muddled in layers of State Department bureaucracy.
Peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda
President Trump has spoken extensively over the course of his second term of his desire to be seen as a peacemaker who ends lengthy international conflicts. In Africa, this desire has manifested itself most fully in the administration’s effort to end the decades-long war between the DRC and Rwanda. Boulos’ first task as senior advisor was to work with the Qataris to mediate a permanent ceasefire in the war between the DRC and Rwanda.
Among the major reasons the Trump administration spotlighted this conflict as its first peace initiative on the continent was a desire to tap into the region’s vast mineral wealth. The DRC and surrounding countries are home to some of the world’s largest reserves of critical minerals, important for a vast number of technologies used in products such as electric vehicles, smartphones, and batteries.
The conflict between the DRC and Rwanda is complicated by the mix of rebel groups involved. M23 is the primary Rwanda-supported rebel force opposing the DRC and its many militias, known collectively as the Wazalendo. The governments of the DRC and Rwanda have themselves been fiercely antagonistic to one another, making a lasting peace deal all the less likely to take root.
Yet, to the administration’s credit, it achieved a preliminary peace agreement that was signed by the foreign ministers of both countries in a ceremony overseen by President Trump in the Oval Office on June 27. Then, on December 4, the presidents of both countries met in Washington in a very rare face-to-face encounter to sign the second phase of the agreement, which included American access to mineral wealth.
Although fighting has continued sporadically since June’s peace agreement, Trump’s emphasis on ending the conflict has at the very least created a framework for what a lasting peace could look like.
Effort to end the war in Sudan
Boulos has also been leading the president’s effort to secure peace in the intractable civil war in Sudan between the country’s Sudanese Armed Force (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Boulos, who said Sudan would become his top priority after the DRC-Rwanda deal was signed in June, has joined forces with counterparts in the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia — known collectively as the Quad — to try to negotiate an end to the war.
But the Quad has failed to substantially move the peace process forward. Just one day after the group met for negotiations in Washington in late October, the RSF succeeded in their 18-month siege of El-Fasher, overrunningSAF forces to take over the capital of North Darfur province. El-Fasher’s fall has solidified the geographic splitting of the country, with the RSF controlling the southwest and the SAF ruling much of the rest of Sudan.
And yet, Trump’s team continues its effort to resolve the conflict. In mid-December, Boulos met with SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Riyadh as part of mediation discussions. The effort to end this war will likely be among the administration’s top priorities for Africa in 2026.
Economic engagement with Africa
Beyond the efforts to end wars on the continent, Trump has also set his sights on advancing American economic engagement with Africa. As part of this, the U.S. government promoted the U.S.-Africa Business Summit in late June in Luanda, Angola. The event secured a record $2.5 billion in business deals between American and African partners in a range of industries, including digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, energy, and hospitality.
This event followed through on the State Department’s launch of a commercial diplomacy strategy for the continent in May. In a speech launching the strategy, Senior Africa Bureau Official Troy Fitrell said that Africa “is the world’s largest untapped market,” and that officials in this administration “no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner.”
In line with the desire to increase America’s economic connectivity to the continent, the administration has continued investing in the construction of the Lobito Corridor, a collection of rail and feeder roads connecting inland mining sites and cities to the Lobito Port on Angola’s Atlantic coast, from where finished and unfinished goods can access the world. On December 17, the administration announced a $553 million loan through the Development Finance Corporation to support the corridor’s construction.
Trump has also signaled support for the extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a preferential trade deal that lapsed this past September. The agreement provides duty-free access to over 1,800 goods from Africa to the United States, increasing the accessibility of the American market to African sellers who would otherwise struggle to compete with the low price of goods coming from other regions.
But, in typical Trump fashion, his AGOA support suffers from a contradiction. The sweeping global tariffs that he implemented in an effort to force what he considers to be improved trade relations with the United States included a 15% tariff rate on 13 AGOA-eligible countries, as well as a 30% tariff for AGOA-eligible South Africa, effectively eliminating AGOA benefits for these countries.
The U.S. bombs Nigeria
On Christmas, the United States launched an airstrike that killed members of the Islamic State in northwest Nigeria. In a post on his Truth Social account, the president said these terrorists "have been targeting and viciously killing, primarily, innocent Christians." In an interview on local television after the attack, Nigeria's Foreign Minister Yussuf Tuggar said that his country's government had coordinated with the United States on the attacks, which had been planned for weeks.
This strike comes after the American president had ordered Nigeria to be placed on a "watch list" in late October for violence the president claims has been committed by non-Christian armed groups against the country's Christian population. In an October 31 post on Truth Social, Trump said, "Christianity is facing an existential threat in Nigeria. Thousands of Christians are being killed. Radical Islamists are responsible for this mass slaughter. I am hereby making Nigeria a ‘COUNTRY OF PARTICULAR CONCERN’.” Days after the post, Nigerian government leaders denied Trump's claim that armed groups in the country target people because of their religious affiliation.
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