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Young veteran: Can we end the Korean War now, please?

I served along the DMZ in South Korea 65 years after the start of that conflict, and still have friends stationed there today.

Analysis | Asia-Pacific

As an Army infantry veteran and a member of the Korean War Veterans Association (KWVA) and Korean Defense Veterans Association (KDVA), I applaud the Biden administration’s consideration of an end-of-war declaration for the Korean War. I served along the demilitarized zone in South Korea from 2014-2015 at the United Nations Command Security Battalion-Joint Security Area and have friends who are still stationed there. To those of us who have served in Korea, the prospect of renewed conflict is real. Policymakers should do everything in their power to make sure that we close that chapter of conflict responsibly. 

Ask any service member that has served at the DMZ and they will tell you how tense it is on the ground. Having stood face-to-face with North Korean soldiers myself, every move is watched by both sides. Walking through the T2 building at the Joint Security Area that bisects the border, I was constantly reminded that things could flare up at a moment’s notice. A single movement by a guard or a civilian on tour could be misconstrued as threatening and spiral out of control. Sometimes, unpredictable crises would ensue, as in November 2017 when a worm-infested North Korean defector ran across the border into South Korea. Finally, disaster could be slow-moving. With nearly a million landmines covering the DMZ, a landmine explosion could trigger a more significant conflict if one side perceives it to be the opening stage of an attack.

Given such a high degree of uncertainty, diplomatic efforts to formally end the 1950-1953 Korean War are something that every veteran and military family should support.  An Armistice Agreement stopped the fighting, but a true peace treaty has never been signed.

The KWVA appreciated the talks between former President Trump and Kim Jung Un, even though they did not lead to transformation in bilateral relations as pledged in Singapore. Tim Whitmore, an air medic stationed in South Korea in 1954 and the current National Director of KWVA, stated in 2018 that, “I personally pray for a strong and lasting peace with a reunited Korea.” And Tom Stevens, the previous president of KWVA, stated in 2018 that, “The Korean War Veterans Association, Inc. is hopeful that the recent talks between President Trump and Kim Jung Un are only the first step which ultimately results in peace on the Korean Peninsula.”

The KDVA also held peace talks in July of this year alongside the Korea-U.S. Alliance Foundation, in which one of the speakers, Markus Garlauskus, himself a KDVA member and a nonresident senior fellow at Atlantic Council, stated, “the question of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and the total end to North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, is not a question that can be resolved through force of arms at an acceptable cost.”

Indeed, ending hostilities necessitates a political solution that addresses the underlying causes of instability. The cost of another Korean War on the Peninsula would be catastrophic. A conventional war would put the 28,500 U.S. service members stationed in South Korea in harm’s way. According to the Congressional Research Service report from 2017, “an escalation of a military conflict on the peninsula could affect upwards of 25 million people on either side of the border, including at least 100,000 U.S. citizens, even if the DPRK uses only its conventional munitions.” Those conventional munitions are capable of firing 10,000 rounds per minute at Seoul according to the same report. That level of devastation should be wholly unacceptable to the Biden Administration. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman General Mark Milley recently stated, "Our intent in North Korea, or China, or Russia, we want to maintain a military capability and a diplomatic level of effort to deter war.” The key is to invest in diplomacy and to give policymakers space to make hard choices when necessary.  

Veterans of the Korean War, especially service members who have served on the Peninsula, want to see a formal end to this original “forever war.” But an end-of-war declaration is only the beginning of a long process of peacebuilding. The United States and North Korea, as well as the North and South, whose civil war continues on to this day, will need to build trust and political support for a peace declaration, peace treaty, and an eventual peace regime to institutionalize peace on the Korean Peninsula. Without it, more men and women will be sent in harm’s way, unsure if we will return home.


US soldier at a Memorial to the Military Armistice Agreement at Panmunjom in the Joint Security Area or JSA on the border with North Korea in 2015. (Eleanor Scriven/Shutterstock)
Analysis | Asia-Pacific
Trump Zelensky
Top photo credit: Joshua Sukoff / Shutterstock.com

Blob exploiting Trump's anger with Putin, risking return to Biden's war

Europe

Donald Trump’s recent outburst against Vladimir Putin — accusing the Russian leader of "throwing a pile of bullsh*t at us" and threatening devastating new sanctions — might be just another Trumpian tantrum.

The president is known for abrupt reversals. Or it could be a bargaining tactic ahead of potential Ukraine peace talks. But there’s a third, more troubling possibility: establishment Republican hawks and neoconservatives, who have been maneuvering to hijack Trump’s “America First” agenda since his return to office, may be exploiting his frustration with Putin to push for a prolonged confrontation with Russia.

Trump’s irritation is understandable. Ukraine has accepted his proposed ceasefire, but Putin has refused, making him, in Trump’s eyes, the main obstacle to ending the war.

Putin’s calculus is clear. As Ted Snider notes in the American Conservative, Russia is winning on the battlefield. In June, it captured more Ukrainian territory and now threatens critical Kyiv’s supply lines. Moscow also seized a key lithium deposit critical to securing Trump’s support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russian missile and drone strikes have intensified.

Putin seems convinced his key demands — Ukraine’s neutrality, territorial concessions in the Donbas and Crimea, and a downsized Ukrainian military — are more achievable through war than diplomacy.

Yet his strategy empowers the transatlantic “forever war” faction: leaders in Britain, France, Germany, and the EU, along with hawks in both main U.S. parties. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz claims that diplomacy with Russia is “exhausted.” Europe’s war party, convinced a Russian victory would inevitably lead to an attack on NATO (a suicidal prospect for Moscow), is willing to fight “to the last Ukrainian.” Meanwhile, U.S. hawks, including liberal interventionist Democrats, stoke Trump’s ego, framing failure to stand up to Putin’s defiance as a sign of weakness or appeasement.

Trump long resisted this pressure. Pragmatism told him Ukraine couldn’t win, and calling it “Biden’s war” was his way of distancing himself, seeking a quick exit to refocus on China, which he has depicted as Washington’s greater foreign threat. At least as important, U.S. involvement in the war in Ukraine has been unpopular with his MAGA base.

But his June strikes on Iran may signal a hawkish shift. By touting them as a decisive blow to Iran’s nuclear program (despite Tehran’s refusal so far to abandon uranium enrichment), Trump may be embracing a new approach to dealing with recalcitrant foreign powers: offer a deal, set a deadline, then unleash overwhelming force if rejected. The optics of “success” could tempt him to try something similar with Russia.

This pivot coincides with a media campaign against restraint advocates within the administration like Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon policy chief who has prioritized China over Ukraine and also provoked the opposition of pro-Israel neoconservatives by warning against war with Iran. POLITICO quoted unnamed officials attacking Colby for wanting the U.S. to “do less in the world.” Meanwhile, the conventional Republican hawk Marco Rubio’s influence grows as he combines the jobs of both secretary of state and national security adviser.

What Can Trump Actually Do to Russia?
 

Nuclear deterrence rules out direct military action — even Biden, far more invested in Ukraine than Trump, avoided that risk. Instead, Trump ally Sen.Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), another establishment Republican hawk, is pushing a 500% tariff on nations buying Russian hydrocarbons, aiming to sever Moscow from the global economy. Trump seems supportive, although the move’s feasibility and impact are doubtful.

China and India are key buyers of Russian oil. China alone imports 12.5 million barrels daily. Russia exports seven million barrels daily. China could absorb Russia’s entire output. Beijing has bluntly stated it “cannot afford” a Russian defeat, ensuring Moscow’s economic lifeline remains open.

The U.S., meanwhile, is ill-prepared for a tariff war with China. When Trump imposed 145% tariffs, Beijing retaliated by cutting off rare earth metals exports, vital to U.S. industry and defense. Trump backed down.

At the G-7 summit in Canada last month, the EU proposed lowering price caps on Russian oil from $60 a barrel to $45 a barrel as part of its 18th sanctions package against Russia. Trump rejected the proposal at the time but may be tempted to reconsider, given his suggestion that more sanctions may be needed. Even if Washington backs the measure now, however, it is unlikely to cripple Russia’s war machine.

Another strategy may involve isolating Russia by peeling away Moscow’s traditionally friendly neighbors. Here, Western mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan isn’t about peace — if it were, pressure would target Baku, which has stalled agreements and threatened renewed war against Armenia. The real goal is to eject Russia from the South Caucasus and create a NATO-aligned energy corridor linking Turkey to Central Asia, bypassing both Russia and Iran to their detriment.

Central Asia itself is itself emerging as a new battleground. In May 2025, the EU has celebrated its first summit with Central Asian nations in Uzbekistan, with a heavy focus on developing the Middle Corridor, a route for transportation of energy and critical raw materials that would bypass Russia. In that context, the EU has committed €10 billion in support of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

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Middle East

On June 30, President Trump signed an executive order terminating the majority of U.S. sanctions on Syria. The move, which would have been unthinkable mere months ago, fulfilled a promise he made at an investment forum in Riyadh in May.“The sanctions were brutal and crippling,” he had declared to an audience of primarily Saudi businessmen. Lifting them, he said, will “give Syria a chance at greatness.”

The significance of this statement lies not solely in the relief that it will bring to the Syrian people. His remarks revealed an implicit but rarely admitted truth: sanctions — often presented as a peaceful alternative to war — have been harming the Syrian people all along.

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Asia-Pacific

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Within that framework, a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has become the scenario most often cited as the likeliest flashpoint for a military confrontation between the two superpowers.

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