Follow us on social

Shutterstock_1676790931-scaled

How to avoid the ‘you first’ quandary on reentering the Iran nuclear deal

A simple goodwill gesture would likely get the ball rolling.

Analysis | Middle East

After years of bludgeoning during Donald Trump’s presidency, the Iran nuclear deal, or JCPOA, the most intrusive and comprehensive nuclear inspection regime imposed on any nation, is on life support.

Although both the Iranian government and the new Biden administration are eager for the deal to survive, neither side appears willing to take the crucial first step towards ensuring its survival.

Despite the real security and economic benefits that Iran can hope to gain from the deal’s full revival, it remains, for very good reasons, unenthusiastic about taking the first steps towards compliance before U.S. sanctions are lifted.

From Iran’s vantage point, it was the United States under Trump that withdrew from the JCPOA in the first place, despite the International Atomic Energy Agency’s repeated verification of Iran’s full compliance with the deal’s provisions. This breach was then compounded when Trump illegally reimposed on Iran some of the most ferocious sanctions ever imposed on any nation.

But despite being denied the financial and diplomatic dividends it was promised under the deal, Iran would continue to show good faith by remaining in compliance for some time after Trump’s withdrawal. It only began to gradually reduce its compliance after the remaining signatories to the deal (Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia) fell in line behind Trump’s ravaging sanctions to avoid the secondary sanctions punishment for continuing to do business in Iran. Even as it reduced compliance, Iranian leaders continued to signal their readiness to return to full compliance if the other parties, chief among them the United States, returned to fulfilling its obligations under the deal.

To add insult to injury, Trump, committed to snuffing the faintest scintilla of life out of the deal, ordered the assassination of Iran’s top general Qassem Soleimani. The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, widely believed to be an Israeli hitjob, would entomb any last hope of reviving the deal under a Trump presidency.

For the last four years, the United States has been an unmitigatedly bad faith actor towards Iran. Today, the onus of proving good faith rests squarely on its shoulders, not on Iran’s. From the Iranian perspective, moving towards compliance while under sanctions is to establish a dangerous precedent: under the right amount of pressure, Iran can and will buckle.

For the American side of the equation, lifting the Trump-era sanctions will yield a palpable security benefit, since it will force Iran to scale back its nuclear program. This is not mere conjecture. Both Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif have expressed their unequivocal commitment to an immediate return to full compliance as soon as the sanctions have been lifted. Iran, whose economy, as well as its fight against COVID-19, have been severely impaired by Trump’s sanctions, does not need to be enticed or pulled into compliance with the JCPOA; a faint nudge should more than suffice.

The Biden administration’s stated interest in the JCPOA’s revival notwithstanding, it has shown reluctance to cut the first turf. Instead, it has made its return to the JCPOA conditional on Iran’s full compliance with the deal’s provisions.

But there may be a way for the Biden administration to untangle the deadlock without going against its stated position. This would entail looking beyond the security framework and, instead, using humanitarian language and action as a stepping stone for reviving the JCPOA.

President Biden has already ordered the highest levels of his administration to “promptly review existing United States and multilateral financial and economic sanctions to evaluate whether they are unduly hindering responses to the COVID-19 pandemic” and to give him recommendations “for any changes in approach.” It is hard to imagine a report wherein Iran does not occupy a prominent position.

By imposing sanctions on Iran, cutting it off from the global financial system, and preventing the International Monetary Fund from granting it an emergency loan to combat COVID-19, the Trump administration hindered Iran’s access to medical supplies and hobbled the government’s ability to shut down the economy, necessary measures for containing the pandemic.

Biden will have a unique opportunity to respond to the recommendations that will likely come before him with utmost generosity, thereby lifting some of the most crippling sanctions imposed on Iran, but under the guise of humanitarian concerns.

The lifting of some sanctions, albeit for humanitarian reasons, will make it easier for Iran to reciprocate this expression of good faith by scaling back, albeit slightly, its nuclear program. Indeed, even when U.S.-Iran relations were at their most acrimonious in the past, humanitarian considerations have succeeded in overriding the usual rules of engagement between two sides.

A notable precedent is the Bush administration’s humanitarian aid to Iran during the 2003 earthquake in Iran’s ancient city, Bam. For the first time in decades, U.S. military personnel and transport planes were allowed to enter Iranian territory to assist with aid efforts. To the Bush White House’s admission, during this time the U.S. government “work[ed] with Iranian authorities … to help the people of Iran during this challenging time.”

Given both governments’ vested interest in preserving the JCPOA, there already exists a fertile political environment for such a humanitarian gesture to trigger a reciprocal Iranian response, which can lock the involved parties in a spiral of de-escalation and ultimately salvage the JCPOA.

A rapprochement framed in humanitarian terms will allow both sides to move closer to compliance with the JCPOA without requiring them to backtrack on their stated opposition to laying the first stone. They will have participated in saving a deal they are both keen to preserve while saving face.

To traverse beyond the current impasse, the U.S. and Iranian governments may take a leaf out of Sun Tzu’s timeless wisdom: “Build your opponent a golden bridge to retreat across."

For the United States and Iran, that golden bridge is today a humanitarian one.


Image: TonelloPhotography via shutterstock.com
Analysis | Middle East
American Special Operations
Top image credit: (shutterstock/FabrikaSimf)

American cult: Why our special ops need a reset

Military Industrial Complex

This article is the latest installment in our Quincy Institute/Responsible Statecraft project series highlighting the writing and reporting of U.S. military veterans. Click here for more information.

America’s post-9/11 conflicts have left indelible imprints on our society and our military. In some cases, these changes were so gradual that few noticed the change, except as snapshots in time.

keep readingShow less
Recep Tayyip Erdogan Benjamin Netanyahu
Top photo credit: President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Shutterstock/ Mustafa Kirazli) and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Salty View/Shutterstock)
Is Turkey's big break with Israel for real?

Why Israel is now turning its sights on Turkey

Middle East

As the distribution of power shifts in the region, with Iran losing relative power and Israel and Turkey emerging on top, an intensified rivalry between Tel Aviv and Ankara is not a question of if, but how. It is not a question of whether they choose the rivalry, but how they choose to react to it: through confrontation or peaceful management.

As I describe in Treacherous Alliance, a similar situation emerged after the end of the Cold War: The collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically changed the global distribution of power, and the defeat of Saddam's Iraq in the Persian Gulf War reshuffled the regional geopolitical deck. A nascent bipolar regional structure took shape with Iran and Israel emerging as the two main powers with no effective buffer between them (since Iraq had been defeated). The Israelis acted on this first, inverting the strategy that had guided them for the previous decades: The Doctrine of the Periphery. According to this doctrine, Israel would build alliances with the non-Arab states in its periphery (Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia) to balance the Arab powers in its vicinity (Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, respectively).

keep readingShow less
Havana, Cuba
Top Image Credit: Havana, Cuba, 2019. (CLWphoto/Shutterstock)

Trump lifted sanctions on Syria. Now do Cuba.

North America

President Trump’s new National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) on Cuba, announced on June 30, reaffirms the policy of sanctions and hostility he articulated at the start of his first term in office. In fact, the new NSPM is almost identical to the old one.

The policy’s stated purpose is to “improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy” by restricting financial flows to the Cuban government. It reaffirms Trump’s support for the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which explicitly requires regime change — that Cuba become a multiparty democracy with a free market economy (among other conditions) before the U.S. embargo will be lifted.

keep readingShow less

LATEST

QIOSK

Newsletter

Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.