The United States has conducted two retaliatoryairstrikes against Iraqi militias this week after ballistic missile attacks against America’s Al Asad Air Base, the latest in a troubling tit-for-tat between the U.S. and Iran-backed militias in the region that was triggered by the Israel-Hamas conflict.
CENTCOM appears to believe that the status quo of attack and reprisal with Iraqi militias is sustainable. There’s an assumption that Washington, Iran, and Iraq’s militias understand each other’s red lines. However, this assumption comes with a lot of risks.
The potential for one-upmanship between various Shi’a militias, each trying to prove they’re more hostile toward Americans than the others, is a concerning possibility. A deadly attack on U.S. troops could prompt the Biden administration to respond more forcefully, especially in an election year. What is the administration’s plan to manage escalation and prevent a larger regional war (with heavy U.S. involvement) if this were to occur?
While the timing and scale of the war in Gaza may have been unpredictable, it was always evident that the presence of scattered U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria posed a risk of escalating the U.S. into greater conflict in such an unpredictable region. That’s why I’ve long argued for rethinking America’s military posture in Iraq, including in new research this year exploring how Washington could conduct a phased withdrawal of troops and successfully recalibrate our approach to the country and region.
It is true that the presence of U.S. military advisors in Iraq helps maintain cohesion and a working relationship between competing factions of Iraq’s military. U.S. troops also offer critical capabilities in the fight to contain ISIS. But it is time for Washington to consider whether these benefits are outweighed by the risk of malign actors using U.S. troops to provoke a wider conflict – either intentionally or inadvertently.
While the risks of keeping U.S. troops in Iraq are apparent, the overall utility of their presence is unclear (particularly in deterring attacks on themselves). With each new day comes a fresh opportunity for crisis. It’s past time Washington grappled with the true costs and benefits of our military presence.
Adam Weinstein is Deputy Director of the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute, whose current research focuses on security and rule of law in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
Photo credit: Marines disembark from a V-22 Osprey at Al Asad Air Base in Iraq in 2018 (Cpl. Jered T. Stone/ Marine Corps)
Since mid-April, Iran and the United States held numerous rounds of nuclear negotiations that have made measured progress — until Washington abruptly stated that Iran had no right to enrich uranium. Moreover, 200 members of the U.S. Congress sent president Trump a letter opposing any deal that would allow Iran to retain uranium enrichment capability.
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei called U.S. demands “excessive and outrageous” and “nonsense.” Since the beginning of the Iranian nuclear crisis in 2003, Tehran has drawn a clear red line: the peaceful right to enrich uranium under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is non-negotiable.
In my 2012 book “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis,” I revealed for the first time that during nuclear talks with the U.S. and other world powers, Khamenei had explicitly told then-chief negotiator Hassan Rouhani that if Iran were to abandon its legal and legitimate right to enrichment, either he must resign or ensure such a decision be made only after the Leader’s death. I disclosed this fact publicly so that Washington would understand: no nuclear deal that denies Iran its enrichment rights is politically or legally viable within Iran.
Eventually, the Obama administration, understanding this reality and favoring diplomacy over war, reached the historic 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA) — the most comprehensive non-proliferation deal ever signed.
The current U.S.-Iran nuclear talks will fail if Washington denies Iran’s rights for enrichment under the NPT. In fact, and somewhat paradoxically, allowing Iran to enrich uranium is not a threat to U.S. national interests — it could be an opportunity.
Balancing power in the Middle East
There is now broad bipartisan consensus in Washington that the United States must refocus its strategic posture away from regional entanglements and toward countering great powers — particularly China. To do so effectively, a new Middle Eastern order must be founded on a concept of “balance of power” rather than “hegemony.”
Any effort to grant regional dominance to regional powers including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, or Iran will only perpetuate the instability of recent decades. The White House’s Middle East strategy must be anchored in a “regional balance,” not unilateral containment.Washington’s double standard — tolerating, if not supporting, Israel’s nuclear arsenal while denying Iran’s NPT-protected right to peaceful enrichment — effectively supports Israel’s strategic supremacy in the region.
Learning from failed wars
A quarter of America's 400 wars have been in the Middle East and Africa. There is also growing bipartisan recognition that U.S. military interventions in the Middle East have failed— costing trillions of dollars, tens of thousands of American lives, and fostering terrorism and instability in the region.
Since the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, every U.S. president has tried to avoid new wars in the region. Obama regretted intervening in Libya and described it as his worst mistake. The recent U.S. war on Yemen has cost $7 billion and ultimately failed. After a month of bombings, President Trump announced an end to offensive operations saying that the Houthis promised not to target American ships. A military confrontation with Iran would far exceed the cost and chaos of Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen. Enrichment rights may be controversial — but war would be catastrophic
The logic of nuclear balance
Kenneth Waltz, the father of neorealism in international relations, argued in a 2012 Foreign Affairs essay that a nuclear-armed Iran could bring strategic stability to the Middle East by balancing Israel’s nuclear monopoly. In his view, mutual deterrence reduces the risk of war.
While I disagree with Waltz on proliferation, I agree that Israel’s nuclear monopoly is neither a solution and nor sustainable. Sooner or later, the other powers in the region will inevitably seek nuclear capabilities. The only viable alternative is implementing existing U.N. resolutions that call for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
Iran's enrichment program — and Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of one — offers the U.S. a unique opportunity: to support a regional nuclear consortium under international supervision in the Persian Gulf and even the Middle East. This would remove the risk of nuclear weapons development while preserving NPT rights.However, such an achievement will only be sustainable if Israel, like all other countries in the Middle East, joins the NPT and renounces its nuclear weapons.
Upholding the NPT and the US-led global order
The post-WWII global order, built around U.S. leadership, has long rested on the NPT’s twin goals: nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Middle East’s nuclear future can be governed only by the NPT — nothing else. The decades-long U.S. double standard — tolerating Israel’s nuclear arsenal while denying Iran peaceful enrichment — has undermined global norms and fueled regional instability.
“What angers the Arabs most is the perception they have of a double-standard U.S. policy consisting of two approaches, one for Israel and another for the Arab countries” wrote Mohamed El Mansour, an influential Moroccan historian. Double standards and the inconsistency with international laws and regulations will ultimately threaten U.S. credibility and long-term strategic interests.
Economic stakes
President Trump recently boasted of securing trillions of dollars in trade deals with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. “You know, we took in $5.1 trillion in the last four days from the Middle East,” Trump said. Such agreements require long-term regional stability. A war with Iran would put every U.S. military base in the region within reach of Iranian missiles and drones. The cost of lost deals and military escalation would erase any economic gain and burden American taxpayers for decades.
Breaking the Israel-centric mold
It is no secret that current U.S. positions in nuclear talks are heavily influenced by Israeli policy — not American interests. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has lobbied Washington for a U.S.-led war against Iran during past decades and now, demands the full dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program while he knows such a demand non-negotiable for Tehran. Israel is even reportedly considering attacking Iran’s nuclear program while Trump’s negotiations are ongoing.
U.S. Middle East policy has long been aligned with Israeli preferences, but unconditional support has backfired. Today, more than two-thirds of Americans , 69%, prefer a peaceful agreement with Iran and that neither Israel and nor Iran possess nuclear weapons. Over 60% of Americans now believe Israel is playing a negative role in resolving the key challenges facing the Middle East. The International Court of Justice has accused Israel of plausible genocide. Mass protests across the West reflect growing disillusionment. As a result, Israel is one of the world’s most isolated countries. More importantly, Western silence on Israel’s conduct has discredited the very ideals of human rights, women’s rights, and international law that the U.S. once championed.
***
The U.S. cannot afford to repeat old mistakes. Instead of opposing Iran’s legitimate enrichment rights, Washington should leverage them. This is not about appeasement — it is about realism, law, and long-term American interests. A balanced, rules-based approach rooted in the NPT and regional diplomacy is the only sustainable path forward. Moreover, through a fair and mutually face-saving nuclear deal, Washington can open the path to normalize diplomatic relations with Iran based on mutual respect and non-interference, as enshrined in the U.N. Charter.
Congress is on track to finish work on the fiscal year 2025 Pentagon budget this week, and odds are that it will add $150 billion to its funding for the next few years beyond what the department even asked for. Meanwhile, President Trump has announced a goal of over $1 trillion for the Pentagon for fiscal year 2026.
With these immense sums flying out the door, it’s a good time to take a critical look at the Pentagon budget, from the rationales given to justify near record levels of spending to the impact of that spending in the real world. Here are five things you should know about the Pentagon budget and the military-industrial complex that keeps the churn going.
#1 The military-industrial complex (the MIC) is a special interest lobby on steroids.
In many ways the denizens of the MIC — the Pentagon, the uniformed military, the weapons makers, and their allies in Congress — are more concerned with lining their own pockets and deriving political benefits than they are with crafting well-considered plans for how best to defend America and its allies.
Unfortunately, since Eisenhower warned us about the military-industrial complex in his January 17, 1961 farewell address, the military-industrial complex is more powerful than ever. The companies are larger, the budget is larger, and its influence is greater, so advocates of a more affordable, effective approach to defense have even a higher hill to climb than they did six decades ago.
#2 More Pentagon Spending Doesn’t Make Us Safer
Contrary to the common misconception that when it comes to military spending, more is always better, too often overspending on the Pentagon fuels costly and dangerous arms races and enables unnecessary wars by emphasizing military solutions and neglecting smart diplomacy.
Our current, “cover the globe” strategy calls for the U.S. military to be able to intervene anywhere in the world on short notice. It calls for an immense, costly global military footprint that includes over 750 military bases and counterterror operations in 85 countries. It is a recipe for endless war. And when we’re not intervening directly, we’re often providing the weapons for other countries to fight wars, as is happening, with tragic effect, in the billions of dollars in arms the United States has supplied in support of Israel’s campaign of mass slaughter in Gaza.
If we want to defend ourselves, we should figure out what we need to defend ourselves, rather than just piling one weapon on another weapon on another weapon and hope that it all works out.
#3 The Military-Industrial Complex is a Terrible Jobs Program
The economy is getting weaker and debt exploding, so there is a premium on spending our tax dollars in ways that can counter, and hopefully reverse, that trend.
Jobs should be front and center in our national priorities. If you can’t make money, if you can’t feed your family, that’s a threat to your security, and, if enough people are in that category, it’s a threat to national security writ large.
Unfortunately, pumping up the Pentagon is not a solution to these adverse economic trends. As Heidi Peltier of the Costs of War Project has demonstrated, investing in alternatives like infrastructure, green energy, education and health care can generate anywhere from 9 percent to 250 percent more jobs for the same amount spent as giving the same amount of money to the Pentagon and the arms industry.
Even worse, there is evidence to suggest that Pentagon spending will be an even poorer job creator going forward. According to the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), the arms industry’s largest trade association, direct jobs in the arms manufacturing sector have dropped by almost two-thirds since the 1980s, from 3 million jobs then to 1.1 million jobs now.
And a defense industrial base focused on software-based emerging tech weapons that utilize AI to produce pilotless aircraft, ships and armored vehicles will likely create even fewer jobs per amount spent than current military outlays.
#4 The majority of the Pentagon budget goes to contractors.
While Pentagon budget boosters always argue that higher military spending is good for the troops, analyst Stephen Semler has determined that more than half of the department’s budget goes to contractors. And at the same time these firms are reaping hundreds of billions of dollars of our taxes each year, there are military families who need food stamps to make ends meet, and sharp cuts in veterans benefits in the offing based on budget proposals for this year and next.
Meanwhile, the arms makers are producing dysfunctional weapons systems that don’t work as advertised, cost billions more than originally projected, and spend more time in the hangar than being ready to use. To add insult to injury, much of the new funding they have received in recent years has gone to $20 million CEO salaries, or billions in spending to bid up their own stock prices – none of this spending does anything to defend us, but it does enrich the weapons makers, their executives, and their shareholders.
Really taking care of the troops would require spending more to take care of them by providing affordable housing and health care; better, more realistic training before sending them into combat; weapons that work as advertised and don’t spend half the time being repaired instead of being ready for combat; and a more realistic strategy that doesn’t put them in impossible situations and unwinnable wars.
And it would mean spending the $45 million-plus allocated for a military parade into directly investing in the needs of our veterans, and telling and honoring their stories rather than putting the focus on ostentatious displays of weaponry.
#5 It doesn't have to be this way
Promoters of ever higher Pentagon spending claim that pushing for more diplomacy, or having allies do more in their own defense is naive, because it’s a harsh world out there and it is necessary to have force and the threat of force as the leading elements of our foreign policy. Actually, if you want to defend the country, don’t overspend on the military, and don’t let special interests shape our foreign policy for their own financial gain. Don’t just assume that every solution has to be military. A military-first approach to foreign policy is not only naive, it is incredibly dangerous.
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Top image credit: A Sudanese army soldier stands next to a destroyed combat vehicle as Sudan's army retakes ground and some displaced residents return to ravaged capital in the state of Khartoum Sudan March 26, 2025. REUTERS/El Tayeb Siddig
Recent weeks events have dramatically cast the Sudanese civil war back into the international spotlight, drawing renewed scrutiny to the role of external actors, particularly the United Arab Emirates.
This shift has been driven by Sudan's accusations at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the UAE concerning violations of the Genocide Convention, alongside drone strikes on Port Sudan that Khartoum vociferously attributes to direct Emirati participation. Concurrently, Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly reaffirmed the UAE's deep entanglement in the conflict at a Senate hearing last week.
From Washington, another significant and sudden development also surfaced last week: the imposition of U.S. sanctions on the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for alleged chemical weapons use. This dramatic accusation was met by an immediate denial from Sudan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which vehemently dismissed the claims as "unfounded" and criticized the U.S. for bypassing the proper international mechanisms, specifically the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, despite Sudan's active membership on its Executive Council. Despite the gravity of such an accusation, corroboration for the use of chemical agents in Sudan’s war remains conspicuously absent from public debate or reporting, save for a January 2025 New York Times article citing unnamed U.S. officials. That report itself contained a curious disclaimer: "Officials briefed on the intelligence said the information did not come from the United Arab Emirates, an American ally that is also a staunch supporter of the R.S.F."
For its part, the UAE, heavily implicated by media reports and conflict investigators in backing the RSF, has mounted a vigorous defense. On May 5, the ICJ dismissed Sudan’s genocide case against the UAE. While the dismissal was on jurisdictional grounds — the court determined it "manifestly lacks jurisdiction" to entertain the application due to a reservation in the UAE’s accession to the Genocide Convention — the UAE immediately reframed this procedural ruling as an absolution.
As the ICJ delivered its decision, Port Sudan, Sudan’s wartime capital, was enduring the second day of a relentless six-day drone barrage. This assault, marking the first time the strategic city had been targeted, brought Sudan's deeply ingrained, if reluctant, reliance on the UAE to a dramatic breaking point. Despite Khartoum's prior investment in maintaining some semblance of ties with Abu Dhabi for sanction avoidance and gold exports, its patience — after explicitly accusing the UAE of orchestrating these precision strikes — snapped.
On May 6, this culminated in Khartoum severing diplomatic relations with the UAE, explicitly branding it an “aggressor state.”
Speaking at the United Nations after a Security Council session on May 20, Sudan’s ambassador to the U.N., Al-Harith Idris, doubled down on the accusation that the attacks on Port Sudan were launched from a “UAE military base strategically located along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden." Idris characterized these strikes as "reprisal" for an SAF attack on a cargo plane in Nyala a day earlier, which had allegedly been delivering military hardware to the RSF.
Multiple reports indicate that several Emirati military officers were present and possibly killed in the bombing; Kenyan and South Sudanese news outlets also detailed the deaths of their citizens in the incident.
Despite the mounting scrutiny, the Trump administration’s engagement with the UAE has been overwhelmingly warm. President Trump's recent Gulf tour, which included Abu Dhabi as a stop, was touted as a success, highlighted by over $200 billion in announced deals, with a strong focus on AI technology. These agreements built upon a previously revealed $1.4 trillion commitment from the UAE to invest in the U.S. economy over the next decade, a pledge made months earlier during a visit by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE's national security adviser.
The intense concentration on high-stakes economic diplomacy seemingly overshadowed the growing instability in Sudan and Abu Dhabi’s role in fueling it. As President Trump himself told UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, in a move that signals “teflon status” for those who deliver on deals: "we're going to treat you, as you should be — magnificently, and you're a magnificent man."
Rubio, during his Senate hearing last week, however painted a different picture, when he explicitly identified the war in Sudan and the UAE’s role in fueling it, stating that "we have expressed, not just to the UAE, but to other countries that they are turning it [Sudan’s civil war] into a proxy war.. that it's destabilizing the region."
While external peace efforts are significantly handicapped, the conflict's internal dynamics ensure its continuation. Capitalizing on intense public animosity toward the RSF, the SAF has framed the war as an existential struggle for "dignity" and sovereignty. This narrative, in addition to helping mobilize volunteer fighters, makes overt negotiation with the RSF — determined by the Biden administration in 2023 to have committed genocide and ethnic cleansing — politically untenable. For its part, the RSF is intent on securing a political future for itself and is pressing on with the formation of a parallel government, while characterizing the SAF as an illegitimate, Islamist-controlled army and regime.
The deeply entrenched fighting positions of the warring parties, coupled with the lack of a coherent U.S. strategy and diplomatic infrastructure, including an understaffedAfrica Bureau and an unappointed special envoy, leaves Washington poorly positioned to coordinate the external pressure needed to break the conflict's stalemate.
Though Sudan’s military-led government has explicitly reserved its right to self-defense, a conventional military attack on the UAE is practically impossible; Sudan’s army, embroiled in its internal war against the RSF, lacks the necessary power projection capabilities for such a feat. Moreover, a direct assault on the UAE would invite swift, punishing retaliation from the well-connected petroleum exporting giant.
Beyond its devastating humanitarian toll, the civil war’s continuation increasingly imperils regional security, pushing Sudan and its neighbors into dangerous corners where miscalculation could spark international conflict. Indeed, a more immediate risk than a direct Sudan-UAE military clash is Khartoum acting on an explicit threat to strike Chad or South Sudan, accusing them both of complicity with the RSF and of facilitating Abu Dhabi's alleged weapon flows into Darfur — threats both nations have condemned and vowed to meet with force.
Though, for now, no conventional front will open between Sudan and the UAE. The battle will continue to unfold in the halls of multilateral institutions, where Sudan's accusations will test, but likely not break, Abu Dhabi's entrenched influence.
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