The Gazan beach staging area for the future American "surge" of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians there has already been attacked, according to official reports.
According to U.S. and Israeli sources, United Nations reps who were on the beach prepping the area for the new pier came under limited mortar fire early Thursday. No one was hurt, and there was minimal damage to some engineering equipment. Early reporting from i24 News speculated that Palestinians were targeting Israeli Defense Forces in the area, but that has not been confirmed. The Pentagon did not return a request for comment from RS.
Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Thursday that he believes the risk can be mitigated, though there seems to be outstanding questions on who exactly is providing the security on the beach for this project.
“Nothing we do is risk-free,” the general said during an appearance at Georgetown University in Washington.
The U.S. Army vessels that are supposed to be marshaling the supplies and equipment to build a floating pier and causeway to surge humanitarian aid into Gaza are in place in the Mediterranean. The project, which will ostensibly allow the U.S. to facilitate aid from inspection points in Crete to the floating pier then onto a trident causeway off the beach and into Gaza, will supposedly be ready early-May, according to the DOD.
The U.N. has agreed to serve as the delivery system into the strip. The Biden Administration has insisted no American troops will be operating on the ground.
That last point is the critical one since critics say Washington is playing a dangerous game by getting so close to the battlefield of a brutal conflict. The attack this week, no matter how minimal, underscores the dangers of a spark setting off a situation in which U.S. personnel come under fire and are forced to react.
"Placing American service members in harm's way will not solve the underlying crisis in the Middle East and will continue to escalate tensions," read a statement by Concerned Veterans of America yesterday. "After decades of open-ended missions in the region, @POTUS needs to immediately reevaluate involvement in a crisis that risks American lives, now, before casualties occur."
Interestingly, the Washington Post and others are now reporting that the pier will be near Wadi Gaza, a coastal area near the corridor that the Israelis have established cutting across the Gaza strip and upon which are establishing what appears to be permanent outposts. The Post indicates this will make it easier for aid to travel north and south, but will the location of a new pier allow Israel to deliver supplies and equipment to its own military, too?
Kelley Beaucar Vlahos is the Editorial Director of Responsible Statecraft.
Palestinians on Gaza coast amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, in Deir Al-Balah, in the central Gaza Strip, on April 24, 2024. (Photo by Majdi Fathi/NurPhoto)NO USE FRANCE
Top photo credit: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy speaks during a meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Finland's President Alexander Stubb amid negotiations to end the Russian war in Ukraine, at the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., August 18, 2025. REUTERS/Al Drago
President Donald Trump met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and a host of European leaders in the White House Monday to discuss a framework for a deal to end the war. The big takeaway: that all parties appear to agree that the U.S. and Europe would provide some sort of postwar security guarantees to deter another Russian invasion.
What that might look like is still undefined. Trump also suggested an agreement would require “possible exchanges of territory” and consider the “war lines” between Ukraine and Russia, though this issue did not appear to take center stage Monday. Furthermore, Trump said there could be a future “trilateral” meeting set for the leaders of the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia, and reportedly interrupted the afternoon meeting with the European leaders to speak with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the phone.
The Trump administration’s approach to negotiations aimed at ending the war in Ukraine has been unorthodox and at times wrongheaded. But its commitment to pursuing diplomacy in the face of an obstacle-ridden path has nonetheless been commendable.
Sadly, for much of the past three and a half years, it has been difficult to say the same of Europe. Today’s meeting evinced a more constructive tone, along with a clear desire to carry forward the positive momentum from Trump’s summit with Putin in Alaska.
Yet some of the positions that European leaders were advocating for heading into the Monday meetings leave much to be desired.
For one, NATO membership for Ukraine remains unrealistic. There is a lot of talk suggesting the U.S. and European will extend some non-NATO “Article 5” guarantees but NATO’s Article 5 relies on credibility to be an effective deterrent — and any American promise to fight for Ukraine would not be credible, given that two consecutive U.S. administrations have made clear since Russia’s invasion that they will not send troops to defend Ukraine.
If Europe were a serious “geopolitical actor,” it would have recognized this fact long ago and sought more realistic security guarantees for Ukraine, rather than continue down the dead end of continually advocating for Kyiv’s right to pursue NATO membership — something its leaders were still doing as recently as this weekend.
History and geography ensure that Ukraine will always matter more to Russia than it does to the United States. If Kyiv were offered NATO membership, Russia would very likely test the West’s commitment to Ukraine’s security in short order. NATO members could then either choose not to retaliate, thereby severely undermining the credibility of Article 5 more generally, or they could respond militarily and risk a tit-for-tat escalation that could culminate in a nuclear exchange.
European Atlanticists, who presumably care deeply about the security of NATO members, should have concluded long ago that Ukraine cannot be one such member. While NATO expansion was certainly not the only cause of Russia’s invasion, it was strategic folly to insist repeatedly that Moscow could have no say over the security orientation of a large state on its border — even worse, to have done so in part because, as a matter of principle, Russia as a non-NATO member could not be seen to retain a veto over NATO decision making.
Europe’s position that a ceasefire should precede any discussion of substantive issues — reiterated by French President Macron and German Chancellor Merz in their meeting with Trump today — is also bound to go nowhere. European leaders were only belatedly brought around to the idea that there should be a ceasefire at all, preferring up until Trump’s inauguration to support Ukraine’s failing war effort for as long as it takes.
Trump has focused on reaching a ceasefire for the past several months likely due to his desire to notch a quick win. But he has correctly come around to the conclusion that a comprehensive settlement offers the only viable path forward. European leaders, for their part, only backed Trump’s calls for a ceasefire to keep him onside and, by doing so, delay having to make difficult political compromises with Moscow.
Putin launched this war of aggression to achieve certain political aims, including settling the question of Ukraine’s military alignment and creating a European security order in which Russia’s interests are treated seriously. His main leverage to get the West to entertain these goals is to press on with a military campaign that he appears to be winning. Simply put, Putin is not going to agree to an unconditional ceasefire in exchange for nothing.
It is particularly shocking that EU leaders — who are meant to be the embodiment par excellence of a peace project — have pushed for an unstable ceasefire rather than a comprehensive peace deal. Far too many characterize a peace deal as a “win” for Putin when in fact it is in the interest of allparties.
A comprehensive settlement that provides long-term stability offers the best chance at securing the private-sector investment necessary to rebuild Ukraine’s economy. It can also strengthen the country’s demographic base, which has shrunk nearly by half since the collapse of the Soviet Union, by encouraging the return of Ukrainians who have fled the country. Without the reconstruction that a settlement can facilitate, Ukraine has little chance of ever joining the EU. And the U.S. cannot responsibly draw down its forces in Europe and adjust its grand strategy to the realities of a multipolar world if it continues to be dragged back into a region beset by the threat of recurring conflict.
Can we trust Putin not to invade Ukraine again, even after a peace deal? The question is moot, since there has not been much trust between Russia and the West for years. The United States has also been prone to withdrawing from agreements that previous administrations had signed onto, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (under George W. Bush) and the Iran nuclear deal (under Trump).
There is no guarantee of perpetual peace in this world. Getting all sides to stick to their end of the bargain will require a mixture of inducements and penalties, deterrence and reassurance. It will require ending Ukraine’s position as a “grayzone” state whose security status is unclear and providing it with sufficient guarantees of its future security that all sides can live with.
Above all, it will require an ongoing commitment to robust diplomatic dialogue and a concerted effort to craft a more inclusive continental security order, without which neither Russia, Ukraine nor the West will enjoy any security.
For Europeans who have long sung from the hymnbook of peacebuilding and “political solutions” when other countries’ conflicts are concerned, only to insist that the “war will be won on the battlefield” when their own interests are at stake, a long period of reflection is warranted.
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Top photo credit: Handout - Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, left, speaks with U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Ukraine, Ret. General Keith Kellogg prior to their meeting, August 18, 2025 in Washington, D.C. Zelenskyy met with Kellogg before the planned meeting with President Donald Trump later in the day. Photo by Ukrainian Presidential Press Office via ABACAPRESS.COM
If Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky cannot agree in principle with the contours of a peace deal mapped out by President Trump, then the war will continue into 2026. I’d encourage him to take the deal, even if it may cause him to lose power.
The stakes couldn’t be higher ahead of the showdown in the Oval Office today between President Donald Trump and President Zelensky, supported by EU leaders and the Secretary General of NATO.
Following the Alaska Summit, President Trump has articulated the contours of a peace plan that he discussed with President Vladimir Putin. At stake, a long-overdue and much needed end to the blood-letting that has killed or injured one and a half million people so far across both sides.
Can the president get it over the line?
A reported key U.S. concession, hinted at by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, involves “game-changing” security guarantees for Ukraine that would have the effect of Article 5 coverage without membership of NATO. Zelensky has welcomed this concession and the European “coalition of the willing” issued a statement which “commended” President Trump’s concession on U.S. support.
But other aspects of the U.S. position will cause concern among the coalition and their transatlantic partners. Ahead of today’s meeting, President Trump has indicated that Ukraine won’t get back Crimea and won’t go into NATO. While the president’s pronouncements on the war have ebbed and flowed, on these two points he has remained consistent. He argued earlier this year that Ukraine should be prepared to recognize Russian occupation of Crimea. Right from the get go, the Trump administration has suggested that Ukraine’s NATO path is unrealistic.
What is different today is that the president has drawn this red line having eyeballed President Putin in Alaska and judged that the Russian position is not going to change. While those European leaders supporting President Zelensky at today’s meeting might press for a softening of this line, it seems, at this late stage, that Trump’s mind is made up.
In some ways the Crimea issue is the least problematic, as the draft Istanbul agreement of spring 2022 allowed for a dialogue about the future status of the peninsula. It also, of course, provided for Ukrainian neutrality and non-membership of NATO. However, after Boris Johnson and others encouraged Zelensky to keep fighting rather than accept the deal, Western leaders have dug in fixed positions on Ukraine’s supposed right to join the military alliance.
When it comes down to it, this war has always been a battle of wills between Russia on one side and the West about the continued eastern expansion of NATO.
If President Trump persuades Zelensky and European leaders into a deal that takes NATO off the table, even if security guarantees are included, it will represent a crushing embarrassment for the Western military alliance that accounts for 55% of global military spending. This will have long term political consequences for mainstream political parties in Europe who have pushed the NATO line to the hilt, and signed up to vast increases in military spending, at the expense of domestic spending priorities.
But I judge, in any case, that NATO is not the most contentious issue to be discussed today.
The biggest sticking point will undoubtedly be the suggestion that Ukraine give up its remaining foothold in Donetsk oblast in return for Russia vacating its much smaller footholds in Kharkiv and Sumy. On the surface, that does not appear a fair trade. Zelensky has flatly refused to concede territory. Ceding unconquered lands in the Donbas that the Ukrainian Army has defended valiantly and at great cost would represent an act of political suicide on his part.
At the start of this year, Zelensky’s election prospects hung in the balance, a commentator at the Kyiv School of Economics remarking that success was contingent upon “the exact terms of the ceasefire, namely, the public perception of them as a ‘victory,’ ‘honorable draw' or 'defeat.'"
Since then, more Ukrainian towns have been swallowed up by Russia’s advance. Few people would be able to see the loss of what is left as anything other than dishonorable defeat. Facing an already slim prospect of re-election as and when a post-war presidential plebiscite is held in Ukraine, this would almost certainly doom Zelensky to lose power.
The flip side, of course, is that one more year of war would take Russia much closer to the complete occupation of Donetsk oblast anyway. The only difference being that possibly hundreds of thousands of additional Ukrainian and Russian troops would die in the intervening period of bloody, attritional warfare.
The only scenarios in which that didn’t happen would be the involvement of European troops on the battlefield, the sudden implosion of Russia’s economy or a change of power in Moscow. While much discussed, none of these have ever looked remotely likely. So, the statesmanlike thing for Zelensky to do would be to look into the future, decide that the best interests in Ukraine lay in cutting his losses, and settle with peace based on concessions that may come at a heavy personal cost.
Having invested so much in supporting Zelensky, European leaders won’t want to see him fail. And yet there are costs to them too, in supporting him holding out for another year of war the outcome of which is increasingly predictable. As I have pointed out several times before, Europe cannot afford to keep funding the Ukrainian war effort.
If President Trump can align Europe around the need to bring this dreadful war to a close it will represent a monumental achievement on his part. The cold truth is that no one is winning here, not Russia, NATO and most definitely, not Ukraine.
Securing the peace is often tougher than prosecuting a war. In the best interests of his magnificent country, I would encourage Zelensky to take the deal.
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Top image credit: FILE PHOTO: U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a meeting with Democratic Republic of the Congo's Foreign Minister Therese Kayikwamba Wagner and Rwanda's Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe in the Oval Office at the White House in Washington D.C., June 27, 2025. REUTERS/Ken Cedeno/File Photo
On June 27, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington, brokered by the United States. About a month later, on August 1, they agreed to a Regional Economic Integration Framework — another U.S.-brokered initiative linking the peace process to cross-border economic cooperation.
All of this has been heralded as a “historic turning point” that could end years of conflict in eastern Congo between the M23 rebel movement, backed by Rwanda, and the Congolese state.
But anyone who has followed the conflict in recent years knows this promise should be approached with great caution. Since the outbreak of the latest round in this decades-old conflict in November 2021, several peace initiatives have already been launched — all of which failed. They were accompanied by ambitious declarations, but also by structural mistrust, poor implementation, and military developments that outpaced diplomacy. The current peace agreement repeats a formula used in previous peace agreements: Rwanda is asked to withdraw its troops, while the DRC must take action against the FDLR rebels (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, heirs of the genocide perpetrators in Rwanda), a group Kigali sees as an existential threat.
A built-in stalemate?
A core flaw in the Washington deal is that many FDLR forces are located in M23-controlled territory. Neutralizing them would require — at least substantial — withdrawal from that territory by the M23, an act that would be political suicide for a Rwanda-backed group. Without credible incentives to give up hard-won ground, the M23 will not budge. For its part, Rwanda can refuse to withdraw its forces until the FDLR are eliminated, locking the process into a stalemate: Kinshasa cannot reach the FDLR without first dislodging M23, which refuses to move.
That leaves two politically impossible scenarios: M23 dismantles itself, or Kinshasa accepts permanent M23 control over part of its territory — an outcome equally unacceptable to the Congolese government.
Follow the money
If the political framework is shaky, the economic underpinnings are equally fraught. For Washington, the peace deal offers a gateway to Congo’s vast reserves of “critical minerals” essential for the global energy transition and high-tech industries — coltan, cobalt, copper, and lithium. It also offers a way to counter China’s dominance in the DRC’s mining sector.
For Kinshasa, the hope is that U.S. backing will bring investment and political support. Projects in the economic package include the Ruzizi III hydroelectric dam, shared with Rwanda and Burundi, and a $700 million investment to build a methane gas-to-electricity plant on Lake Kivu — led by U.S. firm Symbion Power. But the conflict has stalled the latter, and no construction has begun.
U.S. companies have already moved to secure stakes. Soon after the Washington deal was sealed, KoBold Metals — backed by Jeff Bezos and Bill Gates — signed an exploration pact with the Congolese government, allowing the company to apply for exploration permits in Congo covering more than 1,600 square kilometers, and to develop (part) of a lithium mine in Manono. But KoBold has been tied up in international arbitration with an Australian company, AVZ, since 2023, with AVZ arguing that the U.S. deal violates an international arbitration order.
These moves reveal the deeper reality: Congolese minerals are more than ever a geopolitical battleground, and the U.S. is leveraging the peace process to advance its strategic interests.
Will investment bring peace?
The theory underlying the Washington deal is that big-ticket investments will drive local development and, in turn, promote peace. In practice, the risks are high in the DRC: weak governance, poor infrastructure, insecurity in mining zones, and the long timelines from contract to production. U.S. firms also face costly environmental and governance requirements. Even in the best-case scenario, major projects are unlikely to deliver tangible benefits before 2028 — the presumed expiration of the current terms held by President Donald Trump’s and his Congolese counterpart, Felix Tshisekedi.
In the meantime, the June 27 deal looks less like a genuine peace accord and more like a stability pact — a diplomatic cooling mechanism to secure access to resources. It risks leaving the structural drivers of conflict untouched while legitimizing a status quo of fragmented control.
M23 and its incentives
A critical flaw of the Washington deal is that it sidelines M23 — the rebel group that has gained control of much of eastern Congo and that is central to any durable peace. While Rwanda denies supporting the group, U.N. reports repeatedly document that M23’s military gains have relied on Rwandan Defense Forces. Yet the June 27 agreement focuses almost exclusively on Rwanda withdrawing troops and Kinshasa neutralizing the FDLR, leaving M23’s cooperation largely unaddressed.
Separately, negotiations have been ongoing between the Kinshasa government and M23 — which was not involved in the U.S. peace deal. On July 19, Kinshasa and the M23/AFC signed a declaration of principles that began with a ceasefire pledge. Direct talks were expected to begin no later than August 8, accompanied by a number of confidence-building measures, including the release of prisoners.
Neither the Washington deal nor the Qatari agreement between the M23 and Kinshasa have had much effect on the ground. Directly after the signing of the U.S. peace deal, the M23 spokesperson clearly said it wasn’t going anywhere. The group since has repeatedly asserted that it wants to transform the Congolese state into a federal system, in which it would govern its territories autonomously. Moreover, M23 forces have continued killing civilians: the U.N. human rights office has documented how the rebel group, aided by members of the Rwandan army, killed at least 319 civilians between July 9 and 21 in the North Kivu region — most of these local farmers camping in their fields during the planting season. In the last week, fighting between government-affiliated militias — the “Wazalendo” — and M23 intensified.
Political breathing room for Tshisekedi
For now, the deal has already eased political pressure on Congolese President Tshisekedi. A new government has been formed, but, despite promises of inclusivity, no major opposition figures have joined. Many demanded a national dialogue mediated by Congo’s Catholic and Protestant churches — a demand that has been ignored.
Kinshasa has yet to approve the peace deal in parliament. Civil society has been shut out entirely, reinforcing the perception that the process is an elite bargain between political and military actors from which the Congolese public has been excluded. This lack of inclusivity raises a more fundamental concern: even if the ink on the agreement is fresh, the underlying drivers of the conflict remain largely untouched.
The regional wild card
The deal also skirts the interests of other regional players that profit from Congo’s instability. Uganda, for example, was not part of the negotiations but controls territory in eastern DRC. In 2024, estimates from Uganda’s central bank show how the country exported nearly $3.5 billion worth of gold, much of it believed to have been illicitly sourced from Congo. Rwanda’s own gold exports, estimated at $1.5 billion in 2024, are similarly linked to smuggling from the DRC. For both countries, the spoils of war may outweigh the uncertain benefits of U.S.-brokered economic projects.
A fragile deal in service of bigger agendas
The Congo-Rwanda agreement has been packaged as a breakthrough, but its design raises a number of questions. It hinges on conditions that are hard to reach for both sides, and it leans on economic incentives that may take years to materialize.
Still, it is the most substantive initiative currently on the table — and in a conflict as entrenched as this one, even a flawed process is better than none. It deserves support, if only because it keeps channels open and tempers the risk of wider escalation.
That support must go beyond resource-driven projects. The U.S. administration should be willing to invest not only in economic incentives but also in sustained political engagement — putting its weight behind the Doha process with M23 and committing diplomatic bandwidth to ensure the June 27 agreement is implemented and monitored. Without that, the deal risks drifting into irrelevance, leaving the people of eastern Congo once again waiting for a peace that never arrives.
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