Even as the war in Gaza rages on and the death toll surpasses 35,000, the Biden administration appears set on pursuing its vision of a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal that it sees as the path to peace in the Middle East.
But, the agreement that the administration is selling as a peace agreement that will put Palestine on the path to statehood and fundamentally transform the region ultimately amounts to a U.S. war obligation for Saudi Arabia that would also give Mohammed bin Salman nuclear technology.
As the Gaza War demonstrates, the Abraham Accords — which normalized relations between Israel and other Arab states — did not help bring peace to the Middle East. But instead of pushing for a ceasefire that could end the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and limit the chances of a wider regional conflagration, Biden is pushing to continue the legacy of the Abraham Accords in a move that only increases the likelihood of American troops being sent to fight another war.
Learn more in this new video by the Quincy Institute’s Khody Akhavi:
Thanks to our readers and supporters, Responsible Statecraft has had a tremendous year. A complete website overhaul made possible in part by generous contributions to RS, along with amazing writing by staff and outside contributors, has helped to increase our monthly page views by 133%! In continuing to provide independent and sharp analysis on the major conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as the tumult of Washington politics, RS has become a go-to for readers looking for alternatives and change in the foreign policy conversation.
Blaise Malley is a former reporter for Responsible Statecraft. He is also a former associate editor at The National Interest and reporter-researcher at The New Republic. His writing has appeared in The New Republic, The American Prospect, The American Conservative, and elsewhere.
Khody Akhavi is Senior Video Producer at the Quincy Institute. Previously he was Head of Video for Al-Monitor and covered the White House for Al Jazeera English, as well as produced films for the network’s flagship investigative unit.
Earlier this week, European leaders including newly-minted EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and several prime ministers; including Greece’s Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Italy’s Georgia Meloni, and Finnish PM Petteri Orpo, met in Finland’s Lapland region for the North-South Summit on European security.
A major theme of the meeting: Bolstering Europe’s defenses to counter Russia’s “direct threat.”
"To prevent war we really need to do more on defense. We have to invest in critical capabilities," Kallas said. "Russia poses a direct threat to European security, but security comprises different elements, and they are different in east, south, north and west, but we can tackle these issues if we act together.”
Meloni likewise posited that Russia poses a holistic threat to European Union security, spanning not only defense, but ultimately vis-à-vis politics and society at large.
"We have to understand the threat [from Russia] is much wider than we imagine," Meloni explained. "It's about our democracy, it's about influencing our public opinion, it's about what happens in Africa, it's about raw materials, it's about the instrumentalization of immigration. We need to know it's a very wide idea of security.”
NATO countries “will need to spend more than 2%” of GDP on defense, Mitsotakis concurred at Lapland. “It will become clear, once we interact with the new [U.S.] president, what is the figure that we will agree on within NATO.”
Mitsotakis’ comments echo new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s recent calls for NATO alliance members to commit to Cold War levels of military spending by 2030 — a call that has been critiqued by some, including former diplomat Ian Proud, writing for RS, as undoable and unnecessary relative to the actual threat levels to the alliance today.
Kallas and friends may be doubling down on the Russia threat, however, other European leaders are starting to break ranks.
Notably, Hungarian PM Vitkor Orban emphasized last week that fellow EU leaders must fundamentally change their Ukraine strategy. Indeed, Orban said 2025 would bring about an end to the conflict; “Either it will end with peace negotiations, or one of the warring sides will be destroyed.”
Noting that incoming U.S. President Donald Trump’s re-election “has changed the state of the war,” Orban also argued in a television appearance that the over $300 billion Europe had put into the war effort could have instead bolstered its infrastructure, economy, and military capacities for them all. “European people would be living much better than today,” he charged.
Meanwhile, Slovak PM Robert Fico met with Putin last weekend to discuss the war and Russian natural gas deliveries. The move was quickly and thoroughly slammed by myriad European leaders, some of whom questioned Fico’s political allegiances outright.
“Robert Fico just kissed the ring of a mass murderer in the Kremlin,” Czech EPP MEP Danuše Nerudová wrote on X. “It is a betrayal and another immoral step that will serve Russian interests. Robert Fico is a security risk for us.”
"Leaders observed that Mr. Fico does not want to participate in the common European work on energy independence or seek replacement for Russian gas, but rather wants to assist Russia in pushing American gas and energy resources of other partners away from Europe,” Zelensky said on X. “Implying that he wants to help Putin earn money to fund the war and weaken Europe.”
“Why is this leader so dependent on Moscow? What is being paid to him, and what does he pay with?,” asked Zelensky.
Interestingly, Zelensky’s comments come amid fresh allegations from PM Fico that he’s refused a bribe from Zelensky, worth over $500 million in Russian assets, in exchange for a vote in favor of Ukraine joining NATO.
As European leaders chart paths forward, one constant appears to be discord.
Six Ukrainian drones hit a residential building in the Russian city Kazan on Saturday, with another hitting an industrial facility, according to Al Jazeera. Putin hinted at possible retaliation in a subsequent statement, saying “Whoever, and however much they try to destroy, they will face many times more destruction themselves and will regret what they are trying to do in our country.”
CNN reported that a Russian ship sunk in the Mediterranean after an apparent engine room explosion on Monday evening. Russian shipping company Oboronlogistika, in charge of Russia’s Defense Ministry cargo, claimed the vessel was bound for Vladivostok, Russia; Ukrainian officials conversely allege the ship was headed for Syria to salvage myriad military materiel following Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s ouster.
Russia launched an energy infrastructure attack against Ukraine on December 25 with over 100 strike drones and 70 ballistic and cruise missiles, according to the New York Times, leading to at least six injuries and one death. Ukrainian air defense teams reportedly intercepted or otherwise disabled many projectiles utilized in the attack, which still caused major energy outages across a war-embattled nation.
In a developing story, Ukraine says its air forces have struck a military facility in Russia’s Rostov region.
keep readingShow less
Top image credit: U.S. President Donald Trump meets with China's President Xi Jinping at the start of their bilateral meeting at the G20 leaders summit in Osaka, Japan, June 29, 2019. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque
Gaza, Haiti, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela: President-elect Donald Trump will face no shortage of foreign-policy challenges when he assumes office in January. None, however, comes close to China in scope, scale, or complexity. No other country has the capacity to resist his predictable antagonism with the same degree of strength and tenacity, and none arouses more hostility and outrage among MAGA Republicans. In short, China is guaranteed to put President Trump in a difficult bind the second time around: he can either choose to cut deals with Beijing and risk being branded an appeaser by the China hawks in his party, or he can punish and further encircle Beijing, risking a potentially violent clash and possibly even nuclear escalation. How he chooses to resolve this quandary will surely prove the most important foreign test of his second term in office.
Make no mistake: China truly is considered The Big One by those in Trump’s entourage responsible for devising foreign policy. While they imagine many international challenges to their “America First” strategy, only China, they believe, poses a true threat to the continued global dominance of this country.
“I feel strongly that the Chinese Communist Party has entered into a Cold War with the United States and is explicit in its aim to replace the liberal, Western-led world order that has been in place since World War II,” Representative Michael Waltz, Trump’s choice as national security adviser, declared at a 2023 event hosted by the Atlantic Council. “We’re in a global arms race with an adversary that, unlike any in American history, has the economic and the military capability to truly supplant and replace us.”
As Waltz and others around Trump see it, China poses a multi-dimensional threat to this country’s global supremacy. In the military domain, by building up its air force and navy, installing military bases on reclaimed islands in the South China Sea, and challenging Taiwan through increasingly aggressive air and naval maneuvers, it is challenging continued American dominance of the Western Pacific. Diplomatically, it’s now bolstering or repairing ties with key U.S. allies, including India, Indonesia, Japan, and the members of NATO. Meanwhile, it’s already close to replicating this country’s most advanced technologies, especially its ability to produce advanced microchips. And despite Washington’s efforts to diminish a U.S. reliance on vital Chinese goods, including critical minerals and pharmaceuticals, it remains a primary supplier of just such products to this country.
Fight or Strike Bargains?
For many in the Trumpian inner circle, the only correct, patriotic response to the China challenge is to fight back hard. Both Representative Waltz, Trump’s pick as national security adviser, and Senator Marco Rubio, his choice as secretary of state, have sponsored or supported legislation to curb what they view as “malign” Chinese endeavors in the United States and abroad.
Waltz, for example, introduced the American Critical Mineral Exploration and Innovation Act of 2020, which was intended, as he explained, “to reduce America’s dependence on foreign sources of critical minerals and bring the U.S. supply chain from China back to America.” Senator Rubio has been equally combative in the legislative arena. In 2021, he authored the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which banned goods produced in forced labor encampments in Xinjiang Province from entering the United States. He also sponsored several pieces of legislation aimed at curbing Chinese access to U.S. technology. Although these, as well as similar measures introduced by Waltz, haven’t always obtained the necessary congressional approval, they have sometimes been successfully bundled into other legislation.
In short, Trump will enter office in January with a toolkit of punitive measures for fighting China ready to roll along with strong support among his appointees for making them the law of the land. But of course, we’re talking about Donald Trump, so nothing is a given. Some analysts believe that his penchant for deal-making and his professed admiration for Chinese strongman President Xi Jinping may lead him to pursue a far more transactional approach, increasing economic and military pressure on Beijing to produce concessions on, for example, curbing the export of fentanyl precursors to Mexico, but when he gets what he wants letting them lapse. Howard Lutnick, the billionaire investor from Cantor Fitzgerald whom he chose as Commerce secretary, claims that Trump actually “wants to make a deal with China,” and will use the imposition of tariffs selectively as a bargaining tool to do so.
What such a deal might look like is anyone’s guess, but it’s hard to see how Trump could win significant concessions from Beijing without abandoning some of the punitive measures advocated by the China hawks in his entourage. Count on one thing: this complicated and confusing dynamic will play out in each of the major problem areas in U.S.-China relations, forcing Trump to make critical choices between his transactional instincts and the harsh ideological bent of his advisers.
Trump, China, and Taiwan
Of all the China-related issues in his second term in office, none is likely to prove more challenging or consequential than the future status of the island of Taiwan. At issue are Taiwan’s gradual moves toward full independence and the risk that China will invade the island to prevent such an outcome, possibly triggering U.S. military intervention as well. Of all the potential crises facing Trump, this is the one that could most easily lead to a great-power conflict with nuclear undertones.
When Washington granted diplomatic recognition to China in 1979, it “acknowledged” that Taiwan and the mainland were both part of “one China” and that the two parts could eventually choose to reunite. The U.S. also agreed to cease diplomatic relations with Taiwan and terminate its military presence there. However, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Washington was also empowered to cooperate with a quasi-governmental Taiwanese diplomatic agency, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, and provide Taiwan with the weapons needed for its defense. Moreover, in what came to be known as “strategic ambiguity,” U.S. officials insisted that any effort by China to alter Taiwan’s status by force would constitute “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area” and would be viewed as a matter “of grave concern to the United States,” although not necessarily one requiring a military response.
For decades, one president after another reaffirmed the “one China” policy while also providing Taiwan with increasingly powerful weaponry. For their part, Chinese officials repeatedly declared that Taiwan was a renegade province that should be reunited with the mainland, preferably by peaceful means. The Taiwanese, however, have never expressed a desire for reunification and instead have moved steadily towards a declaration of independence, which Beijing has insisted would justify armed intervention.
As such threats became more frequent and menacing, leaders in Washington continued to debate the validity of “strategic ambiguity,” with some insisting it should be replaced by a policy of “strategic clarity” involving an ironclad commitment to assist Taiwan should it be invaded by China. President Biden seemed to embrace this view, repeatedly affirming that the U.S. was obligated to defend Taiwan under such circumstances. However, each time he said so, his aides walked back his words, insisting the U.S. was under no legal obligation to do so.
The Biden administration also boosted its military support for the island while increasing American air and naval patrols in the area, which only heightened the possibility of a future U.S. intervention should China invade. Some of these moves, including expedited arms transfers to Taiwan, were adopted in response to prodding from China hawks in Congress. All, however, fit with an overarching administration strategy of encircling China with a constellation of American military installations and U.S.-armed allies and partners.
From Beijing’s perspective, then, Washington is already putting extreme military and geopolitical pressure on China. The question is: Will the Trump administration increase or decrease those pressures, especially when it comes to Taiwan?
That Trump will approve increased arms sales to and military cooperation with Taiwan essentially goes without saying (as much, at least, as anything involving him does). The Chinese have experienced upticks in U.S. aid to Taiwan before and can probably live through another round of the same. But that leaves far more volatile issues up for grabs: Will he embrace “strategic clarity,” guaranteeing Washington’s automatic intervention should China invade Taiwan, and will he approve a substantial expansion of the American military presence in the region? Both moves have been advocated by some of the China hawks in Trump’s entourage, and both are certain to provoke fierce, hard-to-predict responses from Beijing.
Many of Trump’s closest advisers have, in fact, insisted on “strategic clarity” and increased military cooperation with Taiwan. Michael Waltz, for example, has asserted that the U.S. must “be clear we’ll defend Taiwan as a deterrent measure.” He has also called for an increased military presence in the Western Pacific. Similarly, last June, Robert C. O’Brien, Trump’s national security adviser from 2019 to 2021, wrote that the U.S. “should make clear” its “commitment” to “help defend” Taiwan, while expanding military cooperation with the island.
Trump himself has made no such commitments, suggesting instead a more ambivalent stance. In his typical fashion, in fact, he’s called on Taiwan to spend more on its own defense and expressed anger at the concentration of advanced chip-making on the island, claiming that the Taiwanese “did take about 100% of our chip business.” But he’s also warned of harsh economic measures were China to impose a blockade of the island, telling the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal, “I would say [to President Xi]: if you go into Taiwan, I’m sorry to do this, I’m going to tax you at 150% to 200%.” He wouldn’t need to threaten the use of force to prevent a blockade, he added, because President Xi “respects me and he knows I’m [expletive] crazy.”
Such comments reveal the bind Trump will inevitably find himself in when it comes to Taiwan this time around. He could, of course, try to persuade Beijing to throttle back its military pressure on the island in return for a reduction in U.S. tariffs — a move that would reduce the risk of war in the Pacific but leave China in a stronger economic position and disappoint many of his top advisers. If, however, he chooses to act “crazy” by embracing “strategic clarity” and stepping up military pressure on China, he would likely receive accolades from many of his supporters, while provoking a (potentially nuclear) war with China.
Trade War or Economic Coexistence?
The question of tariffs represents another way in which Trump will face a crucial choice between punitive action and transactional options in his second term — or, to be more precise, in deciding how severe to make those tariffs and other economic hardships he will try to impose on China.
In January 2018, the first Trump administration imposed tariffs of 30% on imported solar panels and 20%-50% on imported washing machines, many sourced from China. Two months later, the administration added tariffs on imported steel (25%) and aluminum (10%), again aimed above all at China. And despite his many criticisms of Trump’s foreign and economic policies, President Biden chose to retain those tariffs, even adding new ones, notably on electric cars and other high-tech products. The Biden administration has also banned the export of advanced computer chips and chip-making technology to China in a bid to slow that country’s technological progress.
Accordingly, when Trump reassumes office on January 20th, China will already be under stringent economic pressures from Washington. But he and his associates insist that those won’t be faintly enough to constrain China’s rise. The president-elect has said that, on day one of his new term, he will impose a 10% tariff on all Chinese imports and follow that with other harsh measures. Among such moves, the Trump team has announced plans to raise tariffs on Chinese imports to 60%, revoke China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations (also known as “most favored nation”) status, and ban the transshipment of Chinese imports through third countries.
Most of Trump’s advisers have espoused such measures strongly. “Trump Is Right: We Should Raise Tariffs on China,” Marco Rubio wrote last May. “China’s anticompetitive tactics,” he argued, “give Chinese companies an unfair cost advantage over American companies… Tariffs that respond to these tactics prevent or reverse offshoring, preserving America’s economic might and promoting domestic investment.”
But Trump will also face possible pushback from other advisers who are warning of severe economic perturbations if such measures were to be enacted. China, they suggest, has tools of its own to use in any trade war with the U.S., including tariffs on American imports and restrictions on American firms doing business in China, including Elon Musk’s Tesla, which produces half of its cars there. For these and other reasons, the U.S.-China Business Council has warned that additional tariffs and other trade restrictions could prove disastrous, inviting “retaliatory measures from China, causing additional U.S. jobs and output losses.”
As in the case of Taiwan, Trump will face some genuinely daunting decisions when it comes to economic relations with China. If, in fact, he follows the advice of the ideologues in his circle and pursues a strategy of maximum pressure on Beijing, specifically designed to hobble China’s growth and curb its geopolitical ambitions, he could precipitate nothing short of a global economic meltdown that would negatively affect the lives of so many of his supporters, while significantly diminishing America’s own geopolitical clout. He might therefore follow the inclinations of certain of his key economic advisers like transition leader Howard Lutnick, who favor a more pragmatic, businesslike relationship with China. How Trump chooses to address this issue will likely determine whether the future involves increasing economic tumult and uncertainty or relative stability. And it’s always important to remember that a decision to play hardball with China on the economic front could also increase the risk of a military confrontation leading to full-scale war, even to World War III.
And while Taiwan and trade are undoubtedly the most obvious and challenging issues Trump will face in managing (mismanaging?) U.S.-China relations in the years ahead, they are by no means the only ones. He will also have to decide how to deal with increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, continued Chinese economic and military-technological support for Russia in its war against Ukraine, and growing Chinese investments in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere.
In these, and other aspects of the U.S.-China rivalry, Trump will be pulled toward both increased militancy and combativeness and a more pragmatic, transactional approach. During the campaign, he backed each approach, sometimes in the very same verbal outburst. Once in power, however, he will have to choose between them — and his decisions will have a profound impact on this country, China, and everyone living on this planet.
This article was originally published at Tom Dispatch.
keep readingShow less
Top image credit: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz welcomes French President Emmanuel Macron before a meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden at the Chancellery in Berlin, Germany, October 18, 2024. REUTERS/Lisi Niesner
Anti-establishment parties of populist right, and occasionally of the populist left, made inroads across Europe in elections of 2024, reflecting in part the waning confidence across societies that NATO’s aims for the war in Ukraine can be realized.
While continuing in general to support Ukraine, a growing share of the public has come to accept the case for a negotiated settlement. The idea of a united Europe independently taking on the full responsibility for funding and arming Ukraine seems highly improbable.
We have seen the inexorable decline in support for established parties of Europe’s center-right and, even more acutely, of its center-left. Nevertheless, these mainstream parties have tended to be able to hold onto power by forming coalitions embracing center-right and center-left, and sometimes accommodating some of the insurgent populists’ arguments, for example on immigration. However, by jointly taking responsibility for governing, mainstream parties demonstrate their fundamental convergence on most areas of policy and risk further defections of voters frustrated with the unsatisfactory status quo.
Effect of the realignment on support for Ukraine
The elections of 2024 that seem most evidently to challenge the consensus on Ukraine’s war aims and its eventual NATO membership are France’s parliamentary elections of June 2024, the German elections in three eastern states in September, and the June 2024European Parliament elections. All three of these contests marked breakthroughs for anti-establishment parties of the right and left. In each case, the mainstream parties have held onto power but have not contained the populists’ growing influence.
Contested elections: Georgia and Romania
In Central and Eastern European countries, candidates and parties expressing reservations about support for Ukraine are accused of benefiting from covert Russian influence operations. This applies to the two cases in Europe where election results favoring antiwar candidates or parties have been challenged — Georgia and Romania.
According to the official count, Georgia’s governing party, Georgian Dream, won 53% of the vote on elections held October 26. International observers reported numerous violations, but it is difficult to establish that these invalidate the result. The incumbent Georgian Dream’s appeal to voters featured the familiar mix of nativism, religious traditionalism, and sensitivity to the plight of provincial and rural voters (have-nots) that characterizes programs of the populist right across Europe. They also relied on a good record of economic performance. Their stance on foreign policy — avoiding open conflict with Russia — has generated mass protests by the liberal, pro-EU opposition, with political stability hanging in the balance.
A nationalist right-wing candidate, Calin Georgescu, finished first with 23% in the first round of Romania’s presidential election on November 24, but the Constitutional Court invalidated this election in early December, citing alleged Russian funding of his campaign, including wildly popular TikTok posts. The election is to be re-run early next year, and Georgescu is likely to be disqualified.
Georgescu’s “breakthrough” can also be related to the indigenous historical roots of the nationalist right in Romania, which has occasionally had relatively strong showings in elections since 1989. Georgescu’s outsider status and insurgent campaign also drew upon popular frustration with the weak economy and official corruption, particularly among religious traditionalist voters in small towns and rural areas. It is unlikely that disqualifying Georgescu will affect the root causes of support by some voters for populist-nationalism.
Anti-populist alliances of the shrinking center
Austria’s mainstream parties across the left-right spectrum are working to form a governing coalition to exclude from power the populist-nationalist Freedom Party (FPO) which finished first in September elections. Freedom Party leader Herbert Kickl campaigned on opposition to supporting Ukraine. The other major parties favor continued humanitarian and diplomatic support.
France and Germany are the principal exemplars of the “firewall” strategy of quarantining populist challengers. This has so far not curbed the growth of support for these parties. The populist right and left blocs in the French parliament are unwilling to fall in line behind a government of the weakened center in France. Germany’s elections on February 23 are likely to produce a coalition of center-right and center-left, which risks building more popular support for the populist right and left, both of which oppose continued arming of Ukraine.
Populist right in government
In several cases, the populist right has been admitted to broad governing coalitions and has not evidently destabilized the status quo. This applies to the Netherlands, where the Freedom Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders surged to win the most seats of any party in the elections of November 2023, but has not significantly affected policy within the coalition government it has joined. Bulgaria, which has had repeated inconclusive elections, has allowed the populist right into coalitions, which have proved unstable and short-lived. Sweden and Finland have also been governed by coalitions where the populist right has been included. These cases brought greater resistance to immigration but have not had any effect on steadfast support for Ukraine.
Prime Minister Georgia Meloni, whose populist right Brothers of Italy party leads Italy’s government, has won favor in Brussels and in Washington by fully supporting NATO aims in Ukraine. This is so far the sole example of a full conversion of a populist party to the geopolitical mainstream. The other two right populists who hold power in Europe — Hungary’s Orban and Slovakia’s Fico — openly oppose the mainstream consensus on Ukraine.
What lies ahead?
The principal tests in the coming year for the mainstream parties’ effort to curb, co-opt or accommodate the populist challenge will be the German elections of February, the September presidential election in Poland, and possible new parliamentary elections in France by next fall.
Slow economic growth and tight fiscal constraints obviously make for a restive and disgruntled electorate. Moreover, Europe’s turbulent external environment is not conducive to curbing the momentum of anti-establishment parties. Europe is in the crosshairs of new U.S. tariffs, which would deepen the economic slump and could challenge some EU member countries’ commitment to the union itself. Fracturing of the EU would harm Europe’s ability to mount a credible conventional deterrent to counter any renewed Russian challenge to follow the war in Ukraine.
The significance of the crises in France and Germany is hard to exaggerate. Together, these two countries account for almost 40% of the GDP of the EU as a whole, and they are the two largest net contributors to the EU budget. This hard reality limits the scope of attempts by Poland, the Nordics, and Baltics to form an alternative bloc for European leadership. However, as Poland prepares to take on the rotating presidency of the EU in January, it stands to play a prominent role in a crucial period for diplomatic efforts to end the war in Ukraine.
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.