Even as the war in Gaza rages on and the death toll surpasses 35,000, the Biden administration appears set on pursuing its vision of a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal that it sees as the path to peace in the Middle East.
But, the agreement that the administration is selling as a peace agreement that will put Palestine on the path to statehood and fundamentally transform the region ultimately amounts to a U.S. war obligation for Saudi Arabia that would also give Mohammed bin Salman nuclear technology.
As the Gaza War demonstrates, the Abraham Accords — which normalized relations between Israel and other Arab states — did not help bring peace to the Middle East. But instead of pushing for a ceasefire that could end the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and limit the chances of a wider regional conflagration, Biden is pushing to continue the legacy of the Abraham Accords in a move that only increases the likelihood of American troops being sent to fight another war.
Learn more in this new video by the Quincy Institute’s Khody Akhavi:
Blaise Malley is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft. He is a former associate editor at The National Interest and reporter-researcher at The New Republic. His writing has appeared in The New Republic, The American Prospect, The American Conservative, and elsewhere.
Khody Akhavi is Senior Video Producer at the Quincy Institute. Previously he was Head of Video for Al-Monitor and covered the White House for Al Jazeera English, as well as produced films for the network’s flagship investigative unit.
Heads of state of Mali's Assimi Goita, Niger's General Abdourahamane Tiani and Burkina Faso's Captain Ibrahim Traore attend the opening of for the first ordinary summit of heads of state and governments of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in Niamey, Niger July 6, 2024. REUTERS/ Mahamadou Hamidou
On July 6, the three junta-led countries of the western Sahel — Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso — signed a treaty to establish a security alliance between them. This announcement came during the first summit of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), a trilateral body formed by the three governments in September 2023, encompassing a total population of 72 million people.
This is in accordance with the announcement the three governments made in March that they would jointly create a task force with the goal of better integrating security operations in response to possible threats.
The military rulers created AES to formalize their alliance in a new intergovernmental body that they intend to serve as an alternative to the Economic Organization of West African States (ECOWAS), the much larger regional group focused on advancing economic integration and facilitating diplomacy among its member states.
The July 6 treaty forms a deeply interconnected confederation between the three countries that looks to facilitate dialogue on matters related to security as well as deepen their economic ties.
In a clear indication of his perspective on the role foreign governments and multilateral bodies have played in Nigerien affairs, Niger’s military leader, Abdourahamane Tiani, said in an interview during the trilateral summit that “our people have irrevocably turned their backs on ECOWAS. … It is up to us today to make the AES Confederation an alternative to any artificial regional group by building ... a community free from the control of foreign powers."
The three governments have a history of calling out foreign countries, particularly France, and external bodies for interfering in their domestic affairs and imposing strict conditions on their governance in return for good relations and aid. Part of this anger has been directed towards ECOWAS, which has sanctioned member countries that fail to maintain democratic governance.
The three military-ruled governments jointly announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2024, bringing to the forefront questions about ECOWAS’s future and its ability to resolve regional disputes. In an unsuccessful attempt to dissuade the governments from leaving, ECOWAS announced in February that it would lift sanctions on Niger that had been imposed after the coup.
But beyond dissatisfaction with ECOWAS, the three juntas have also expressed frustration with foreign powers. On Monday, July 8, the United States announced that it had completed its withdrawal of 1,000 American troops that were stationed at a military base near Niger’s capital, Niamey, and that it will continue to remove its personnel from a second military installation in the country. This comes in response to the ruling Nigerien junta ordering the United States to end its military presence in the country. From the junta’s perspective, the United States had failed to reduce insecurity and has been unable to improve the economic health of Nigeriens . Despite millions spent on the country — the United States spent $223 million in aid to Niger in 2023 alone — insurgent groups remain present in Niger while the economic health of the country remains dire.
Prior to last summer’s coup, Washington had worked with the civilian-led Nigerien government on security issues, including sharing security intelligence, conducting military training programs, and building and using multiple military bases in the country. Since seizing power, however, the junta has severed the once-strong alliance with the United States, expressing dissatisfaction with the way American officials have reportedly lectured them on the importance of democracy — something clearly not of interest to a ruling junta that acquired power through a coup. The United States has also argued that the geopolitical risks of forming new security partnerships with Russia pose a danger to human rights, another issue that likely fails to resonate with a military government whose top priority is maintaining power, rather than helping the United States compete against Russia or promote the U.S.-invented rules-based order.
Ultimately, the creation of this new alliance and the recent news of the creation of a confederacy is yet a further sign of how far these three countries have drifted from the West.
Gone are the days when the United States and France maintained close ties with these countries on the grounds that they were working to advance mutual security interests in a regional fight against terrorism. Now, they’re openly antagonistic to Western powers while gladly working with Russian forces whose security support helps them meet their self-interest.
keep readingShow less
National Conservatism conference, Washington, D.C., July 9, 2024. (Kelley Vlahos)
The National Conservatism Conference, which professes to represent a new conservatism to “understand that the past and future of conservatism are inextricably tied to the idea of the nation, to the principle of national independence, and to the revival of the unique national traditions that alone have the power to bind a people together and bring about their flourishing,” has a foreign policy problem.
On the one hand the organizers and proponents rail against a globalism dominated by supranational neo-liberal institutions, and progressive litmus tests and ideas, but on the other they want borderless solidarity with other like minded nationalists across the globe. And for some reason this precludes them from talking too much about the biggest U.S. foreign policy issue in years, the Ukraine war, for which there is no panel scheduled over the course of the event, Monday through today.
It also means talking about Israel from a predominantly Israeli nationalist perspective. And talking about the Gaza war purely in the frame of Islamic extremism and the “mullocracy” of Iran. In other words, this is only an American interest insofar as, according to the speakers on Tuesday, U.S. presidents are accused of going too easy on Iran, which in part led to the Oct. 7 attacks on Israel. And now Washington has to help fix it.
Moreover, American political elites have allowed the “Islamosupremacists” to influence college campuses and Democratic administrations and turn Americans (in this case, Democrats) against not just Israel, but all Jews.
As Ben Weingarten charged in the one Israel panel — “Islam, Israel & the West” — the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas have had a grip on Washington since the George W. Bush administration, where the then-president had the temerity to declare that “Islam is peace.”
If that sounds familiar it is because the same people in the room today, 20 years older and graying at the ears, said the same exact thing after 9/11. But the difference here is that Israel is fighting its own war and making it an American war on terrorism and Islam is not going to work this time. What this national conservatism conference was missing was a true conversation about what is in America’s interest as it pursues policies with Israel, Iran, and the greater Middle East.
Instead we got old chestnuts from Weingarten, an “investigative reporter” for the Federalist, talking about “the troubling views held by large percentages of American Muslims (who) are or subscribe to the same worldview as Islamic supremacists who seek to impose… a theopolitical, Sharia-based ideology on America, wholly antithetical to our constitutional republic; while leftists and Islamic supremacists are in some ways polar opposites, traditional patriotic Americans are the chief stumbling block to each side achieving its objectives.”
To him, American protests against Israel’s military operations in Gaza, which have resulted in at 38,000 (or more) dead, the vast majority of the population displaced and hungry, most of the Strip’s civilian infrastructure (homes, electricity, hospitals, schools) damaged if not destroyed by American-made bombs, is merely the “the predictable consequence of an unholy alliance between progressives and Islamic supremacists that has for several years been fundamentally transforming not only the Democratic Party but America.”
Eugene Kontorovich, an Israeli legal scholar who now teaches at George Mason University's Anton Scalia Law School, spent his time on the panel railing against international institutions including the United Nations, which he said were dominated by anti-Jewish, pro-Islamist ideologues that were in essence working for Hamas. This conveniently renders, at least to his mind, International Criminal Court charges against Israel, including the deliberate starvation of the Palestinian population, absolutely meaningless (plus, as he has suggested, the U.S. military does it too, a favorite justification among Israeli military apologists since Oct. 7).
Instead he calls the Israel operation in Gaza "clearly the most restrained war in modern times, with the lowest proportion of civilian casualties of any war in modern times." Again, no conversation about whether the current U.S.-backed strategy will actually protect Israel in the long-term or destroy it from within, or whether it is in America’s interest to push it along.
No doubt, the discussion appealed to the paranoia among this retro crowd that Islamists have more power than they actually have in Washington (which is why Netanyahu is getting a red carpet on Capitol Hill this month, weapons and money slushing to Tel Aviv, and votes sailing through Congress cutting off aid to Palestinians and the very institutions Kontorovich abhors?).
But the National Conservatism conference, founded by the Edmund Burke Foundation under the tutelage of Israeli nationalist Yoram Hazony, should not be confused with the America First foreign policy now being debated in conservative circles today. After three days of programming, that much is clear.
There were a few counterbalances — a thoughtful discussion about the future of NATO, which included realist Sumantra Maitra, and remarks from Elbridge Colby, a self-described conservative realist. During a plenary speech, he said U.S. foreign policy must be rooted in the goals of preserving fundamental American interests of freedom, security, and prosperity, and cast in the lens of prioritization and power balancing. While North Korea, Russia, and Iran pose threats, he contended, they are regional threats to traditional U.S. allies and partners but not existential threats to those aforementioned American core interests. Therefore, he said, they are not foreign policy or security priorities for which the U.S. needs to militarize.
He does suggest, however, that China is a threat to the U.S. economy and the security of our allies in the region, and that requires priority. “Strategy and conservative realism would call for balance of manifest strength in Asia, but also openness to a modus vivendi in China. We must be laser focused on the rightful conservative goal here, to preserve peace, if at all possible, but decent peace, one that ensures Americans are safe, free, and prosperous, and most high necessity prevents China from dominating Asians.”
While not all realists and restrainers agree with Colby’s China perspective here, his brief against the primacist foreign policy of the last 70 years sits well with a growing faction of conservative foreign policy (American interest-focused) today, much to the contrast of the Israel panel dominated by the throw-back ideological rhetoric of the past.
keep readingShow less
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg reacts after the ceremonial first pitch throw to celebrate "NATO day" before the start of the game between the Washington Nationals and the St. Louis Cardinals at Nationals Park in Washington, U.S., July 8, 2024. REUTERS/Yves Herman
The heads of state and government of all 32 NATO allies will meet at a summit in Washington, July 9-11, to celebrate the Alliance’s 75th birthday. It was scheduled more than a year ago, but, as the date has approached, it increasingly seems like a bad idea.
Of course, nobody could have foreseen current concerns in the American media and political class of President Joe Biden’s travails stemming from his poor debate performance with Donald Trump on June 27. Unfortunately, that story risks squeezing the summit’s achievements off page one.
In public, the 31 non-U.S. NATO leaders will demonstrate their confidence in Mr. Biden’s leadership, vision, and personal staying power for a second term. But in private, some allied leaders will quietly whisper misgivings into the prying ears of the hordes of media hovering at the fringes of the official meetings. This is to be expected, although, faced with a choice, there is overwhelming preference among allied leaders for Mr. Biden as president next year rather than Trump, who has at times been viewed as less than committed to a strong NATO.
Holding a NATO summit now is also unfortunate for a reason directly related to alliance business. Dominating the agenda is the continuing war in Ukraine. There is much to be considered, especially the quantity and quality of allies‘ support for Ukraine’s war effort against Russia’s aggression. Led by the United States, the allies must continue making careful calculations about the nature of military support for Ukraine, especially the capacity to strike targets in Russia — although at the summit, these discussions will likely occur “off line” rather than in plenary sessions.
Discussion of the Ukraine War will be constrained by several factors, one is that not all the Western allies are convinced that they should put their own security on the line for Ukraine, especially if this means an increased possibility of a direct Russian attack on an allied state — or threats such as cyber attack, which have already begun. At the extreme, Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, spent the past few days meeting with Vladimir Putin, thus appearing to thumb his nose at NATO’s support for Kyiv. Some allies even worry about Putin’s threat to escalate to nuclear use, even though this is most unlikely, given that it would mean Russia’s risking mutual suicide.
Further, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has regularly declared that his country’s goal is “victory” which he has defined as regaining on the battlefield not just lands Russia occupied since its 2022 invasion, but also territories, including Crimea, that it seized in 2014. No serious person believes that this is possible. But it is impolitic to say so while Ukraine is fighting for its life. It will be hard for the allies at the Washington summit not to endorse Ukraine’s goal of victory, however ill-defined.
It will also be impolitic for the NATO summit to discuss possible negotiations with Russia on the war. That will have to be done at another venue at another time. Then, there will be debate about the “when and how” to enter into negotiations to try to end the war — for Ukraine, on terms that it can accept; but, like it or not, the “whether” of negotiations with Russia at some point is unavoidable.
Otherwise, the war will just continue, with massive killing and physical destruction, to no apparent end. But this issue will not be touched at the summit, lest there appear to be any breaking of ranks with Kyiv. An added complication is that, while negotiations to end the war could not take place without Ukraine’s involvement, any outcome would need to be agreed and underwritten by the only powers that ultimately count, the United States and Russia.
Discussion of the Ukraine War will be further complicated at the summit by a strategic mistake NATO made at its 2008 Bucharest summit, when it proclaimed that Ukraine (and Georgia) ”will become members of NATO.” That seemed harmless enough, but not to Russia. It would be as though the West were to accept that Ukraine would become a Kremlin satrapy. But instead of recognizing its mistake, NATO, under U.S. prodding, has continued ritually to repeat the formulation and will no doubt do so again at the Washington summit, as fealty to Ukrainian desires.
Yet in addition to flying in the face of geopolitical reality — that Ukraine, while a Western-oriented democracy, is a natural buffer state — the commitment to its eventual NATO membership plays into the hands of Mr. Putin, who has his own constituency to answer to, particularly in light of horrendous Russian as well as Ukrainian battlefield losses.
Further, the commitment is quite useless. Not only does it provide no immediate and practical benefit to Ukraine, but it would never be honored. It is virtually inconceivable that, at any point, all 32 NATO allies would join the consensus required for any country to enter the Alliance, with the commitment that “an armed attack against one or more [allies]… shall be considered an attack against them all.”
The summit’s Ukraine agenda also involves NATO’s overall military and related capabilities. Here, there is good news for the Alliance’s requirements. Most important are the last few year’s enormous advances in allied military efforts, organization, deployments, and preparedness for potential conflict. Efforts for the future are also on track and the summit will review them in detail.
Further, the Alliance is making progress on the target agreed at its 2014 summit that each ally should spend at least two percent of its gross domestic product on defense. That target was only roughly a measure of military capacity, however — indeed, the raw number is about inputs (money) rather than outputs (effectiveness), a more relevant measure. And the intended audience for that target was as much the U.S. Congress with its inveterate demand that the European allies assume more of common burdens — as Congress is again doing over the Ukraine War — as it was Russia, which had just taken Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine.
Indeed, NATO has recently announced that 23 of the 32 allies have now met the two percent target (though what Congress will make of the nine laggards is not yet clear). In one bright spot for American bipartisanship, both Mr. Biden and Mr. Trump have taken credit for the increase in the number of allies that are now meeting the target.
A last “untouchable” issue for the summit is what to do about Russia in the future. Geopolitical facts are what they are: Russia will not be destroyed, it remains a looming presence whoever is in power in the Kremlin, and at some point the West will need to try configuring overall European security with Russia as active participant.
As of now, despite his rhetoric, Mr. Putin is unlikely to be interested in serious negotiations, either on Ukraine or on broader European security. Thus at the summit, allied leaders will steer clear of this matter, too, although it is of critical importance (despite many American commentators’ having already proclaimed “Cold War II” with Russia).
Ironically, the aspiration of including Russia in European security arrangements, as a geopolitical necessity, was formulated by President George H. W. Bush in May 1989 and followed by President Bill Clinton: to try creating a “Europe whole and free” and at peace. In the 1990s, there were efforts to work effectively with Russia, notably the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. But by the early 2000s, cooperation went off the rails. This was due in part to Mr. Putin’s ambition to regain at least some of the lost Soviet territories.
But it also resulted from the view of a succession of U.S. policymakers that Russia would remain a second-rate power whose interests could be largely ignored — a miscalculation of historical proportions. With the ongoing war in Ukraine, this underlying and unavoidable strategic concern will be postponed to some indefinite future time.