Confirming that he has, indeed, taken a top job at Palantir, a $72 billion high-tech weapons firm and military contractor, former Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) is publicly acknowledging that he is looking to trade on his government contacts to create profits in his new role overseeing Palantir’s defense business.
In other words, he didn’t just go through the revolving door. He’s proud of it.
Gallagher, who oversaw the hawkish House Select Committee on China and led the congressional push for a bill requiring TikTok’s Chinese parent company to divest or face a ban on the app in the U.S., is directly cashing in by going to a company whose CEO, Alex Karp, told The New York Times that the U.S. will “very likely” end up in a war with China, Russia and Iran and endorses “scar[ing] the crap out of your adversaries.”
Having spent much of his time in Congress doing exactly what Karp describes — Gallagher also pushed for Taiwan to be armed “to the teeth in the cyber domain” and supported massive military aid packages for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan — Gallagher says he’s looking to enrich his new employer, Palantir, using the connections in government he formed over seven years as the representative from Wisconsin’s 8th congressional district.
In an interview published this morning by Defense One, Gallagher said::
"I've spent almost a decade now immersed in that world, from the perspective of a legislator. But a lot of my work on the [House] Armed Services Committee was focused on defense innovation, how we create an ecosystem where more companies can succeed. And so my hope is to leverage the network that I built for a decade and apply it to my work at Palantir."
Gallagher concluded the interview by emphasizing that he sees a natural progression from his work as a public servant to his new role, on the other side of the revolving door, working for a multi-billion-dollar weapons firm.
“I just look forward to working with the Defense Department to strengthen and grow the work that's already underway with Palantir,” said Gallgher. “And so it's a really exciting opportunity again, as I said at the outset, a way in my mind to continue the mission that's guided my service in the Marine Corps and in Congress.”
Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
Representative Mike Gallagher (R-WI) walks through the U.S. Capitol, in Washington, D.C., on Tuesday, February 6, 2024. (Graeme Sloan/Sipa USA) via REUTERS
Top photo credit: A supporter of Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro wears a shirt with U.S. President Donald Trump's face that reads "Yankee Go Home" during a rally to mark the anniversary of late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's initial coup attempt in 1992, in Caracas, Venezuela February 4, 2025. REUTERS/Leonardo Fernandez Viloria
For successive U.S. administrations, the big region below the American southern U.S. border was considered a bit of a backwater.
Sure, there were a few internal conflicts left outstanding, a couple of old-school leftist insurgencies still in operation, and the perpetual problem of drug trafficking. But after the Soviet Union collapsed, Latin America was never thought of as an epicenter of great power competition. The United States, frankly, didn’t have to worry about a geopolitical contender nosing into its own neighborhood.
The Trump administration, however, isn’t like any other administration before it. Trump campaigned on stopping narcotics from entering the U.S., defanging the drug cartels that have proven to be almost as powerful as the Mexican state, and dealing with irregular migration. So Latin America is now a center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio chose the region for his first trip as America’s top diplomat.
As we speak, the USS Gravely, a guided-missile destroyer, is steaming toward the Gulf of Mexico on a mission that Gen. Gregory Guillot, the commander of U.S. Northern Command, says is intended to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the U.S.
If the Trump administration’s first eight weeks tell us anything, it’s that the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, which carved out the Western Hemisphere as Washington’s exclusive sphere of influence, is again at the forefront. Whether it’s threatening unilateral U.S. military action against the Sinaloa and New Jalisco Generation Cartels in Mexico, yelling about taking back the Panama Canal, or leveraging tariffs to coerce smaller states to cater to his policy priorities, Trump is treating the entire area as his own personal piñata.
To be fair, Washington has won some short-term wins. Either out of deference to a superpower or because they don’t have other alternatives in the short-term, the region’s governments have largely acceded to Trump’s wishes. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, for instance, has been far more aggressive against the cartels than her predecessor and mentor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) ever was during his six-year presidency. Law enforcement operations, often conducted by the Mexican military, have resulted in a steep increase in arrests, the seizure of 7 tons of narcotics and the dismantling of more than 100 fentanyl labs over a 10-day period.
Trump’s erratic tariff threats, like slapping a 25% tax on Mexican goods destined for the U.S. market, compelled the Mexican government to deploy an additional 10,000 troops to the U.S.-Mexico border for counter-narcotics operations (although how successful this operation will be in the long-run is up for debate). And while the evidence is circumstantial, it’s likely Mexico’s decision to hand over 29 of the country’s senior cartel leaders to the U.S. Justice Department had something to do with the tariff cudgel Trump is so fond of yielding.
There is movement further south as well. Despite Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino’s vocal declarations that the Panama Canal will forever remain under Panama’s control, his government has nevertheless tried to mollify the Trump administration by cooperating with Washington’s deportation schemes, getting out of China’s Belt and Road Initiative earlier than anticipated, and announcing an audit of a Hong Kong-based company that owns two ports on either end of the strategic waterway.
The heavy-handed U.S. approach is also working to an extent with some of Washington’s few adversaries. Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro, the same man Trump tried to dethrone during his first term by recognizing his main competitor, Juan Guaidó, as Venezuela’s rightful president and instituting a maximum pressure sanctions policy on the Venezuelan economy, is now exploring whether a detente with Trump’s second administration is possible. Despite labeling Maduro’s regime an enemy of the state and alleging that it cooperates with Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua to destabilize the U.S, Maduro agreed last week to resume accepting flights of Venezuelans who were deported from the U.S., likely in an attempt to ensure Chevron can continue to operate in Venezuela.
The record at this early stage is clear: Trump can legitimately claim that his tactics have produced results.
U.S. policymakers, however, would be wrong to assume that these tactics will work over the long-term or don’t have costs attached to them. Today, Latin American countries might be wary of confronting the U.S. But that wariness is unlikely to last if the Trump administration continues to throw around the stick at the exclusion of the carrot. Even small states have pride, dignity and an aversion to getting mercilessly kicked in the teeth at every opportunity. Look no further than Iran and North Korea, two relatively weak states that continue to thumb their nose at Washington’s demands notwithstanding the economic vise the U.S. has put them in.
Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Panama aren’t Iran and North Korea, of course. Outside of tariffs, it’s hard to envision that even Trump would go so far as to lock these countries out of the U.S. financial system, station warships off their coasts without their consent or shut down their respective embassies on U.S. soil. Yet Trump doesn’t have to do any of this to cause resistance and antagonism in these countries. The U.S. already has a bad reputation throughout Latin America thanks to its Cold War-era history of interventions, coup plotting and support for right-wing authoritarian regimes, particularly in Central America, which were more adept at killing civilians than servicing the basic needs of their populations.
Even more significant, Latin America has other options. In the past, these states couldn’t do much of anything to register their disapproval to U.S. actions. Most of them relied on the U.S. market and didn’t want to jeopardize the hand that fed them. Others relied on U.S. aid to ensure their militaries were still functioning. Outside of Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, the region was America’s domain, a place where it could afford to be dismissive precisely because near-peer competitors didn’t have the capability or intent to challenge U.S. power.
But this is no longer the case. China isn’t about to displace the U.S. in Latin America but it’s by far a more palpable alternative for the region’s states today than it was at the turn of the century, when the Chinese economy was still scraping the bottom of the barrel. The statistics bear this out; between 2002 and 2022, trade between Beijing and Latin America increased from around $18 billion to over $450 billion. China provides investment and capital for major infrastructure projects in the region, from mines in Peru and ports in Ecuador to rails in Mexico and flashy soccer stadiums in El Salvador.
The Chinese aren’t doing all of this out of the goodness of their hearts—they’re doing it to undermine U.S. power in its own neighborhood.
The U.S. would be wise not to overreact. But it shouldn’t be making China’s work easier either. There’s a substantial risk that the Trump administration’s policy could be counterproductive. Hopefully Trump will recognize this sooner rather than later.
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Top image credit: Kenyan police officers disembark from a plane while arriving as part of a peace-keeping mission to tackle violence in Haiti, at the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti January 18, 2025. REUTERS/Ralph Tedy Erol
Haiti is sinking deeper into crisis as gangs tighten their stranglehold on the country, now controlling more than 85% of the capital Port-au-Prince.
More than one million people are internally displaced, sexual violence against children has increased by 1,000% and thousands struggle to receive food, water, and health and sanitation services. U.N. Independent Expert on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti William O’Neill said in a press statement last week that he saw in Haiti “the pain and despair of an entire population,” and called on the international community to intervene “without delay,” as the crisis reaches a tipping point.
Haiti has a long and fraught history of prolonged foreign interventions that have failed to secure lasting political stability, and the current crisis is no exception. Experts argue that international actors must rethink how they allocate their efforts and resources in Haiti to more effectively support the country’s path to stabilization.
Gangs in Haiti have steadily expanded their control of the country since the 2023 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, seizing the power vacuum left in his wake. The crisis deepened in April 2024 when acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry resigned, paving the way for a transitional government. But the U.S.-backed Transitional Council has since struggled to stabilize the country or move it closer to presidential elections.
In a bid to restore order to the increasingly insecure state, the U.S. and Kenya entered into a defense agreement in 2023 to deploy Kenyan troops to Port-au-Prince. But since their delayed arrival to the capital in June, the Kenyan troops’ haven’t made meaningful progress in curbing gang violence. Jake Johnston of the Center for Economic and Policy Research says the mission’s shortcomings underscore a broader issue: foreign intervention in Haiti has lacked the strategic planning necessary to address the root causes of the crisis, both in the short and long term.
One major obstacle is that the mission is operating well below its already limited capacity. The mission currently consists of approximately 800 of the pledged 1,000 Kenyan officers so far, 168 of whom arrived in February. This number has proven inadequate in the face of the estimated 200 active gangs in the country.
O’Neill said in a statement to the press that stabilizing the country would be “doable" if the force was expanded to 2,500 or 3,000 officers.
However, Johnston says that while additional personnel could help in regaining territory from gangs, a larger force won’t resolve the mission’s deeper structural flaws.
The Kenyan mission was originally intended to support the Haitian National Police (HNP) in stabilizing violence while the transitional government worked towards establishing political stability. Johnston says this plan failed to contend with the HNP’s deeper issues — the organization is deeply politicized and many underpaid officers deal directly with gang members to privately make money.
“Strengthening that through this imported security force was an incredibly fraught proposal from the very beginning,” Johnston says, adding that a more sustainable approach would have prioritized reforming the Haitian police force to address these entrenched problems.
Another critical yet overlooked driver of the conflict is the steady influx of arms into Haiti, most of which come from Florida. Cutting off the gangs’ ammunition would significantly weaken them, Johnston says, yet this is not a focus of the Kenyan mission.
These shortcomings raise the question of whether limited resources and energy from foreign actors are being directed to the right priorities. Millions of dollars have been funneled into supporting the police force, while support of other critical areas — such as anti-corruption mechanisms and governance reforms that have long plagued Haiti's government — have been neglected.
“You can’t address this phenomenon strictly through force. It’s putting all of the eggs in this one basket to the detriment of other things,” Johnston says.
International actors have a role to play in supporting Haiti’s electoral and constitutional process, which will be essential for restoring legitimacy between Haitian civil society and its leaders and establishing long term stability, says Eduardo Gamarra, an international relations professor at Florida International University who has advised security reform and democratization in Haiti. This includes rebuilding Haiti's electoral system “from scratch” by updating outdated voter registries, establishing electoral oversight mechanisms, and implementing protections against fraud.
However, such efforts demand sustained investment from the international community. The question of which country or international body would support these more meaningful reforms remains unclear, as few countries want to absorb the challenges Haiti is facing, Gamarra adds.
Haiti’s current vulnerability is further exacerbated by its reliance on foreign aid, the majority of which comes from the U.S. and has now been abruptly pulled back after the Trump administration issued a 90-day pause on foreign aid last month. More than $300 million in aid to Haiti has now been halted, much of which was allocated for humanitarian assistance. The consequences are already being felt on the ground, as shortages of food and critical health supplies worsen.
“The money wasn’t much, but its impact was huge given Haiti’s current reality,” Gamarra says.
For now, U.S. support of the Kenyan mission will continue. In a February press conference, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that the Trump administration was committed to continuing to work with the Kenyan forces, and that its numbers need to increase to restore stability to the country. Rubio also approved exemptions in the funding pause for $40.7 million in foreign aid for the mission. However, Johnston says it is unlikely that the Trump administration will follow through with the Biden administration’s plans to transform the mission into a U.N. peacekeeping operation, which would allow for funding for the mission to come from member nations.
While reducing Haiti’s reliance on foreign aid should remain a long-term goal, Johnston emphasizes that an abrupt loss of international support presents immediate and significant challenges to the country’s stability.
This reality becomes even more critical when considering that current international efforts on the ground, meant to quell the severity of the situation, are failing to address Haiti’s most urgent security needs.
“Foreign intervention is a daily reality in everything that's happening in Haiti. Even if it's not direct, the situation has been defined by that in the past and as a result of those past interventions,” Johnston says. “You can't disentangle these things. So, the key is to change the modality of intervention.”
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Top photo credit: Donald Trump (White House photo) and Vladimir Putin (Office of the Russian Federation President)
If the diplomatic overtures of the past several months were seen by some as opaque, then today’s phone call between President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot be taken as anything but proof positive that the rubber has hit the road on serious, substantive U.S.-Russia negotiations over a Ukraine peace deal.
The White House has been pushing for an all-encompassing ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine as the first step on the long road to a durable settlement. There is an obvious military rationale for doing so: the major battlefield indicators favor Russia, which is slowly overpowering Ukraine in a war of attrition and has just effectively ended the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ (AFU) high-stakes incursion into the Kursk region.
An immediate cessation of hostilities would thus prevent Ukraine’s bargaining position from further deteriorating as talks unfold. But, and precisely for this reason, Putin seeks to shape the terms of a ceasefire in Russia’s favor with stipulations that the agreement must include "the complete cessation of foreign military assistance and provision of intelligence information to Kyiv.”
The partial ceasefire on energy and infrastructure attacks, apparently agreed to by both the Russian and American sides, is a preliminary way to cut the Gordian knot as talks over a full ceasefire proceed in coming days and weeks. The energy-infrastructure truce represents substantial progress, negotiated under what is militarily a difficult situation for Ukraine, in slowly shifting from war onto a de-escalatory trajectory.
Not unimportantly, it is also a source of real succor for Ukraine’s civilian population over three years into what has been the most destructive war on the European continent since 1945.
It should not be lost on anyone that this undeniably positive momentum has been made possible by the White House’s ability — as recommend in a brief authored by me and my colleagues George Beebe and Anatol Lieven — to avoid the trap of treating this as a narrow deconfliction problem and instead demonstrating a willingness to engage Russia in a broader bilateral diplomatic track.
The Trump-Putin discussion extended far beyond Ukraine, touching on a wide spectrum of issues including cooperation in the Middle East, opportunities for economic normalization, nuclear arms control, and even a U.S.-Russia hockey series. This strategy of extending the negotiating table is not only a critical source of confidence-building to ensure compliance with any potential peace deal but gives Washington the leverage needed to mellow some of Russia’s maximalist conditions for ending the war.
Where do we go from here? Much will depend on the coming diplomatic tit-for-tat, but two things can be ascertained at the outset. It is of course crucial to maintain Ukrainian and European buy-in over the course of this process, itself no small task which will require sustained coordination with all the relevant stakeholders.
Secondly, whilst a full ceasefire remains a worthy short-term objective, the overall priority should be to engage Russia in frank, pragmatic dialogue on what the outlines of a final peace settlement can look like. Indeed, Moscow is unlikely to accept the former without a workable roadmap to the latter.
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