No, you heard it right. Last week in a Fox News appearance, South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham said outright that the war in Ukraine is “about money.”
Namely, Graham told Fox News host Sean Hannity that the U.S. stands to financially gain from Ukraine’s vast agricultural sector and “two to seven trillion dollars’ worth” of rare earth minerals alike in a prospective wartime deal with the war-torn, albeit resource-wealthy, nation.
“This war is about money. People don’t talk much about it. But you know, the richest country in all of Europe for rare earth minerals is Ukraine. Two to seven trillion dollars’ worth of minerals that are rare earth minerals, very relevant to the 21st century,” Graham declared. “Ukraine’s ready to do a deal with us, not the Russians. So it’s in our interest to make sure that Russia doesn’t take over the place.”
“[Ukraine] is the bread basket of…the developing world,” Graham mused. “Fifty percent of all the food going to Africa comes from Ukraine.”
Graham also emphasized that the incoming Trump administration is uniquely positioned to cash out on such resources. “Donald Trump is going to do a deal to get our money back, to enrich ourselves with rare earth minerals. A good deal for Ukraine and us,” Graham said. “And he’s going to bring peace.”
Trump has suggested repeatedly that he wants to bring all sides to the table to talk in order to end the war. Graham has been consistently on the other side of the debate where he has wanted Ukraine to keep fighting at all costs.
Yet Graham insists that Ukraine will benefit from the prospective “deal” he describes. His own history of hawkish comments, where he previously said that “with American weapons and money, Ukraine will fight Russia to the last Ukrainian,” suggests Ukrainians' best interests and meaningful peace both rank low amongst his priorities.
Notably, this isn’t the first time Graham has suggested that the U.S. could benefit from access to Ukraine’s natural resources. “[Ukrainians are] sitting on a trillion dollars’ worth of minerals that could be good to our economy,” Graham said in a video clip from September, where he was standing next to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
Meanwhile, war fatalities continue to mount, with the Wall Street Journal reporting in September that over a million people have died or been wounded in the Russia-Ukraine war since its inception. To hawks like Graham, such fatalities seem to be an acceptable price to pay in an apparent bid for Ukraine’s natural resources.
Stavroula Pabst is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft.
Top image credit: U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) attends a news briefing amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine March 18, 2024. REUTERS/Gleb Garanich
As Congress returns from its summer recess, Washington’s attention is turning towards a possible government shutdown.
While much of the focus will be on a showdown between Senate Democrats and Donald Trump, a subplot is brewing as the House and Senate, led by Republicans but supported by far too many Democrats, fight over how big the Pentagon’s budget should be. The House voted to give Trump his requested trillion dollar budget, while the Senate is demanding $22 billion more.
To justify this historic largesse, both Trump and Congress give the same reason: peace through strength. Harkening back to Ronald Reagan’s Cold War military spending spree, today its invocation often boils down to one simple idea: give the Pentagon more money. But, since Reagan’s famed buildup actually cost much less, it's worth asking if the problem really is a lack of funds
Four decades ago, the newest aircraft carrier in the fleet was the USS Theodore Roosevelt. It was a remarkable acquisition project coming in a full 16 months early and more than $80 million under budget. Today, the latest carrier, the USS Gerald Ford, was billions of dollars over budget and years behind schedule. And even after adjusting for inflation, the Ford class carriers are also much more expensive than the Nimitz class they are replacing, and costs may keep going up. And those costs come before even asking if the ships are actually matched to the military’s current needs, let alone for the decades ahead they’ll be in use.
Sadly, this cost explosion and questionable alignment with modern warfare are far from unique to carriers. A quick google search for the F-35, Littoral Combat Ship, Sentinel ICBM or any number of otherrecentboondoggles tells the same story. Today, nearly every Pentagon acquisition program is a mess, coming in late, over budget, and significantly more expensive than the weapons and platforms being replaced.
This collapse into dysfunction of the Pentagon’s procurement system cannot be ascribed to a lack of funding. Despite a genuine drop in spending following the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon is now nearly two and a half decades into an unprecedented era of massive budgets. More money hasn’t solved this problem, and there’s zero reason to think even more will do anything but make it worse.
Before going further, it’s worth examining two of the most common justifications for why costs have skyrocketed: technology and personnel.
There’s a decent chance you’re reading this on a smartphone like the iPhone, a remarkable encapsulation of just how dramatically technology has increased in power and decreased in costs over the past 40 years. In 1985, the CRAY-2 was the world’s most powerful super computer. It cost between $35-50 million (adjusted for inflation) and weighed nearly 3 tons. Instead, that iPhone in your hand weighs a few ounces, costs around $1,000, and is thousands of times more powerful. Oh, and it also makes phone calls, plays music, takes photos and videos, lets you surf the internet, and much more.
Put another way, you have far more computing power in your pocket than the entire U.S. military did four decades ago, and you didn’t even need a multi-billion-dollar spending spree to get it. Yet somehow, every time someone tries to explain why the Pentagon needs a trillion dollars today, the inevitable answer is the role of advanced technology in today’s military. Is technology more ubiquitous and more complex? Unquestionably. It is also outrageously more powerful and cheaper today than it was 40 years ago. Reagan’s military wasn’t sailing tall ships and using an abacus. They bought most of those supercomputers and utilized some of the most sophisticated technology of the time.
Yet somehow, while the rest of us have cheap supercomputers in our pocket, the Pentagon’s spending more than ever.
Of course, the Pentagon doesn’t just buy things; it is the largest employer in the United States, and, so the justification for more money goes, those people cost more today than they used to. Let’s start with acknowledging two facts: military personnel have seen real and meaningful increases in their pay and benefits over the past 40 years; and also their compensation, particularly among the lower ranks, remains woefully low and should be raised further.
But what’s also true is that the size of the armed forces under Trump is significantly smaller than those under Reagan. In 1985, there were 2.15 million active-duty personnel with another 1.1 million civilians supporting them. Today, those numbers are more than one third smaller. So, while one can justify some budget pressure by the increasing costs per person due to better pay and benefits, any honest math would have to also account for significant cost savings of a smaller workforce both in and out of uniform. Today, we’re simply paying more for a far smaller military and civilian workforce than 40 years ago. Since in Washington, “more” is never enough, we’re left to wonder what happened to the savings of a smaller workforce utilizing ever cheaper technology?
It’s worth adding into the equation what the military is actually doing. There is no doubt that a wartime military costs more than one at peace. At the center of today’s calls for a larger budget is thus, the so-called “return of great power competition,” with the U.S.-China rivalry at its core. Add in a resurgent and aggressive Russia, ongoing crises in the Middle East, and other challenges like North Korea, and the Pentagon’s boosters say the threat environment is simply far more complex and involved than 40 years ago.
Accepting that logic, however, requires one to dramatically downplay the complexity of the Cold War, which of course was only “cold” if you leave out conflicts like Afghanistan, Central America, and the Iraq-Iran War. There was also U.S. support for brutal dictators like Mobutu, Pinochet, and Suharto and their armed forces. Today’s threat environment is no doubt complex, but Reagan hardly oversaw a time of cheap, global peace.
Trump’s trillion-dollar budget is also coming in far larger than those of the recent past when the U.S. was actively fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with as many as 200,000 uniformed personnel deployed in theater simultaneously. While the U.S. undoubtedly maintains a not-insignificant operational tempo across the Middle East and North Africa today, it is a far cry from those peak war years.
One has to wonder how on Earth the Pentagon needs more money to not fight wars than it did to fight two of them at the same time.
When you put it all together, Washington has some tough questions to ask about the Pentagon’s budget, and one of those questions should not be, “can we add $22 billion more?” How will more money fix a completely broken acquisition process? What happened to savings from cheaper technology and a smaller military? And why exactly are the military’s missions of the future so much more expensive than the past? Ultimately, if we want our nation to experience either peace or strength, it's going to take answering those, and other, questions, not just an ever larger fortune for the Pentagon.
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Top image credit: Funeral in Sana a for senior Houthi officials killed in Israeli strikes Honor guard hold up a portraits of Houthi government s the Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi and other officials killed in Israeli airstrikes on Thursday, during a funeral ceremony at the Shaab Mosque in Sanaa, Yemen, 01 September 2025. IMAGO/ via REUTERS
“The war has entered a new phase,” declared Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a senior official in Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement, after Israeli jets streaked across the Arabian Peninsula to kill the group’s prime minister and a swathe of his cabinet in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
The senior official from Ansar Allah, the movement commonly known as the Houthis, was not wrong. The strike, which Israel’s Defense Minister Israel Katz promised was “just the beginning,” signaled a fundamental shift in the cartography of a two-year war of attrition between the region’s most technologically advanced military and its most resilient guerrilla force.
The retaliation was swift, if militarily ineffective: missiles launched towards Israel disintegrated over Saudi Arabia. Internally, a paranoid crackdown ensued on perceived spies. Houthi security forces stormed the offices of the World Food Programme and UNICEF, detaining at least 11 U.N. personnel in a sweep immediately condemned by the U.N. Secretary General.
The catalyst for this confrontation was the war in Gaza, unleashed by Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel, which provided the Houthis with the ideological fuel and political opportunity to transform themselves. Seizing the mantle of Palestinian solidarity — a cause their leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, frames as a “sacrifice in the cause of God Almighty ” — they graduated from a menacing regional actor into a global disruptor, launching missiles toward Israel just weeks after Hamas’s attacks and holding one of the world’s most vital shipping lanes hostage.
The chessboard was dangerously rearranged in May, when the Trump administration, eager for an off-ramp from a costly and ineffective air campaign, brokered a surprise truce with the Houthis. Mediated by Oman, the deal was simple: the U.S. would stop bombing Houthi targets, and the Houthis would stop attacking American ships. President Trump, in his characteristic style, claimed the Houthis had “capitulated” while also praising their “bravery.”
The deal was, in reality, a propaganda victory for the Houthis, allowing them to claim they had faced down a superpower and emerged unshaken. For the U.S., it was a transactional exit that prioritized halting expenditure over achieving the previously stated goal of “annihilating” the group. Crucially, the deal was cut without consulting Israel or the internationally recognized Yemeni government, leaving both parties exposed.
For Israel, the unilateral American move meant that it was left to face the Houthi threat alone. For Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the fractured entity that constitutes the internationally recognized government, it was a devastating blow. Yemeni Vice Foreign Minister Mustapha Noman captured the government's surprise and despair, telling PBS he came to Washington in May with questions and was "leaving with more of them.”
The American withdrawal from direct conflict did not bring peace by any measure. Instead, it created a permissive environment for escalation between the Houthis and Israel, transforming a distant problem for Washington into an open-ended strategic challenge for its closest regional ally.
The strike on the Houthi cabinet meeting in late August was a demonstration of Israel’s formidable intelligence reach, but the significance of the targets is a matter of debate. The slain prime minister, Ahmed al-Rahawi, was largely a political figurehead — the Houthi government’s civilian "décor," as one analyst termed it — and not a member of the secretive ideological and military command that constitutes the movement's true center of gravity.
Nonetheless, the assassinations represent a serious escalation, one that not only sees Israeli strikes systematically target the country’s already crippled infrastructure — from ports to power stations, deepening the humanitarian crisis with every salvo — but also one that forces Israel to contend with a distant, resilient foe that has a high tolerance for casualties and a proven ability to adapt. Unlike the contained battlefields of Gaza or southern Lebanon, Yemen is a vast, mountainous country where the Houthis have perfected the art of concealment and asymmetric warfare.
An air campaign alone is unlikely to defeat them, a lesson etched in the wreckage of a seven-year Saudi-led intervention. Launched in 2015 to reverse the Houthi takeover of Sana’a, the capital, and restore Yemen's internationally recognized government, the coalition's campaign devolved into a brutal war of attrition. It failed to achieve its strategic objectives and ended with a Saudi-led and UAE-supported truce with the Houthis in 2022.
Washington was merely the latest to relearn this lesson during its own brief and ultimately futile aerial war. With air power proven futile and a ground invasion logistically and politically unthinkable, Israel is left with no viable military path to victory.
Furthermore, engaging the Houthis directly drains resources and focus from Israel’s primary obsessions: Hamas in Gaza as well as Iran and its nuclear program. The Houthis understand this; they are waging a war of economic and psychological attrition, knowing that even symbolic strikes, like the missile that reached the outskirts of Ben Gurion Airport close to Tel Aviv, have negligible military effects but deliver immense political dividends. It allows them to unite Yemenis under a popular cause, project an image of heroic resistance to the wider Arab audience, and crucially, distract from their own governance failures.
For Israel's current leadership, this is no longer a war of containment but a grander crusade, a mission to dismantle “the axis [of resistance] brick by brick” as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu put it. The strategy behind Israel's intensification of its war with the Houthis was made explicit when, just a day after killing the Houthi prime minister in Sana’a, an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City killed Abu Obeida, the masked spokesman for Hamas.
For Israeli policymakers, the back-to-back assassinations were a demonstration of a long-held strategic conviction that they are fighting on multiple fronts, but the same enemy. This view was articulated by Netanyahu as far back as 2014, when he warned of "militant Islamists" driven by a "master faith" vying for regional supremacy. After two years of war in Gaza and a direct 12-day clash with Tehran, the Houthi front is becoming an increasingly integral part of this existential, multi-front campaign.
But the consequences of this strategy are profound and are already shattering Yemen's fragile political landscape. The direct entry of Israel into the conflict has rendered the official Yemeni peace process effectively obsolete. The U.N.-backed roadmap, a framework designed to coax Ansar Allah into a nationwide ceasefire and an “inclusive political process” with other Yemeni factions was already on life support. It is now a historical document, its terms irrelevant to the post-October 7 reality of a fully regionalized war.
The Yemeni civil war’s center of gravity is no longer the internal power struggle but the growing showdown between the Houthis and Israel. This shift has been catastrophic for the anti-Houthi coalition. Indeed, the PLC, established in Riyadh in 2022 to unify disparate factions and serve as the executive leadership of the internationally recognized government, is collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions.
Recent months have seen public spats and demands for a rotating presidency, reflecting a deep power struggle between its Saudi-backed chairman, Rashad al-Alimi, and a UAE-backed bloc that includes the secessionist Southern Transitional Council leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi and military commander Tareq Saleh. This paralysis prevents any coherent political or military strategy against the Houthis, leaving them unchallenged as the de facto authority in northern Yemen.
The result is a strategic dead end from which there is no clear exit. With the political path rendered irrelevant and the military path foreclosed by the anti-Houthi coalition’s own fractures, the internal logic of the Yemeni conflict has become fully subsumed by regional animosities.
In this vacuum, Israel finds itself tied to a conflict it cannot win, the U.S. has carved for itself a narrow peace at the cost of broader instability, and the factions of Yemen’s shattered state are left to fight over the scraps. The escalating confrontation with Israel has only served to entrench the dominance of Ansar Allah, the sole beneficiary of this new, chaotic order.
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Top photo credit: President Trump (shutterstock/Maxim Elramsisy) and Georgian president Mikheil Kavelashvili (President of Azerbaijan)
For economic reasons but also for self-preservation, Georgia does not want to be dragged into picking sides in its relations with larger powers. Its president’s open letter to Donald Trump may be an effort to balance growing Chinese influence.
President Mikheil Kavelashvili’s letter to Trump urges a restoration of strategic ties with Washington. It struck the tone of a forsaken friend, talking about the lack of U.S. focus, raising “doubts and questions among the Georgian people about how free and sincere your administration’s actions are in terms of strengthening peace in the region.” He even bemoans Trump’s reinstatement of relations with President Putin.
The message appears aimed in part at the Georgian people, as it was issued in Georgian on President Kavelashvili’s social media account. But if President Trump really is susceptible to flattery, then the letter’s even-handed tone might not helpfully serve to reinvigorate American ties with the plucky South Caucasus nation.
Nevertheless, the context of the letter is the Biden administration’s decision in December 2024 to cancel the 2009 U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership.
Biden cancelling the Charter followed the hotly contested October 2024 parliamentary election in Georgia that saw widespread protests in Tblisi. There has never been conclusive evidence that the plebiscite was rigged, rather than won by the only political party in Georgia that has national reach and deep financial pockets to fund its campaign. That hasn’t stopped some U.S. politicians from continuing to press for sanctions against the ruling Georgia Dream Party, and apply pressure to hold new parliamentary elections.
Yet it has never been clear what purpose sanctioning Georgia would serve, beyond pushing that country towards closer alignment with China. Georgia is a small state with a population of less than 4 million and an economy of $142 billion in terms of Purchasing Power Parity. U.S. trade with Georgia is small, at $2.9 billion in 2024, which heavily favors American exporters, although U.S. trade with neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan is lower still.
Since the onset of war in Ukraine, Georgia has consistently held out from following Europe’s lead in imposing sanctions against Russia. But that does not reflect any particular love for Russia, rather than pragmatism. Georgia has consistently spoken out against the war and last week reaffirmed its solidarity with Ukraine on Ukraine’s independence day.
Georgia’s relations with Russia remain deeply strained over recent moves by Moscow to deepen ties with the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
So, it's intellectually lazy to call the Georgian government pro-Kremlin, simply because it wants to avoid being dragged into another costly war with Russia, which at the very least would render it an economically failed state like Ukraine. I got a palpable sense from my contacts in Tblisi of real sensitivity among policymakers there of being branded as pro-Kremlin, and a desire not to say anything that would give that impression.
It is absolutely clear that the Georgia Dream government is pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy, which includes deepening ties with China. Georgia agreed to a strategic partnership with China in 2023 in which, among other things, it supported the principle of a united China, code for Chinese reunification with Taiwan. Both sides agreed on a Free Trade Agreement and a visa-free arrangement.
China is upping its investment in Georgia as part of wider plans for a middle corridor to ease trade with Europe by bypassing both Russia and the Suez Canal. At a conference I attended in Tblisi in June, the only foreign diplomat to speak was the Chinese ambassador. That should be of greater consequence to the U.S. than purported Russia links.
Georgia clearly wants to chart its own course. That includes pursuing its national interest first and then addressing what the current government considers to have been attempts at regime change by western governments. President Kavelashvili argues in his letter to Trump that the U.S. “deep state” remains as active as ever, despite President Trump’s decision to cut foreign aid, which has had a significant impact on support for media outlets connected to NGOs.
Georgia remains ostracized by the European elites partly out of unresolved irritation that attempts to maintain former French diplomat Salome Zourabichvili as president failed in December. Georgia’s path to EU membership remains on ice, despite signs that the government is still committed to this path, albeit on its terms.
So, President Kavelashvili’s letter may have been a slightly awkward diplomatic attempt to get relations with the United States on a better footing. President Trump’s lack of engagement thus far with Georgia may largely be a matter of bandwidth. Ukraine, the Middle East, and China have soaked up much of the U.S. foreign policy oxygen, and he has already helped to broker an historic peace deal in the South Caucasus between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
President Aliyev of Azerbaijan signed an MoU with President Trump to work towards the establishment of a Charter on Strategic Partnership, and one already exists between the U.S. and Armenia. If these documents serve any purpose, it is to put in place the institutional framework to elevate day-to-day bilateral cooperation, particularly in the sphere of trade, investment and people-to-people links. The Georgian government is likely keen, perhaps not unsurprisingly, to reinstate its Strategic Partnership Charter with the U.S. on similar terms to those of its neighbors in the South Caucasus.
With the U.S. still lagging behind China in engaging Georgia, it’s difficult to see the downsides to America doing so, even if President Kavelashvili’s letter slightly falls flat.
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