The Israeli attack is over, but the outcome remains unclear. Tehran is downplaying it — even mocking it — which may be more reflective of their desire to de-escalate than a true assessment of the damage Israel inflicted on Iran.
Just as Israel kept the damage of Iran's Oct. 1 strikes secret, Iran will likely not disclose the full picture of Israel's strike, although Tehran has reported that the strikes killed two members of Iran's regular army (which is separate from the IRGC).
Indeed, another red line was crossed in this Israeli attack, lowering the cost of crossing it going forward.
Thus, while we may see some tactical de-escalation, the trajectory remains escalatory.
The Biden team, however, may draw a sigh of relief if Iran exercises restraint, as a major conflict right before the elections may be evaded.
But in the larger scheme of things, that may prove to be of little consolation if Biden wastes this pause once more by failing to use it to truly de-escalate the situation by forcing a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon.
The U.S. has the leverage to stop Israel's slaughter, but Biden has thus far refused to exercise that leverage. How many rounds of bombings can Israel and Iran engage in before it blows up into a full-scale war that engulfs the entire region?
Trita Parsi is the co-founder and Executive Vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
Top photo credit: A general view of Tehran after several explosions were heard, in Tehran, Iran, October 26, 2024. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS
Serhii Lahovskyi, 26, hugs Ludmyla Verginska, 51, as they mourn their common friend Ihor Lytvynenko, who according to residents was killed by Russian Soldiers, after they found him beside a building's basement, following his burial at the garden of a residential building, amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine, in Bucha, Ukraine April 5, 2022. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra
Serhii Lahovskyi, 26, hugs Ludmyla Verginska, 51, as they mourn their common friend Ihor Lytvynenko, who according to residents was killed by Russian Soldiers, after they found him beside a building's basement, following his burial at the garden of a residential building, amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine, in Bucha, Ukraine April 5, 2022. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra
On Tuesday, 13 humanitarian, faith-based, and foreign policy advocacy groups sent a letter to President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin urging them to release an unclassified version of America’s strategy on Ukraine.
Sent as a response to the administration’s thus far refusal to release a declassified strategy, in compliance with Section 504 of the FY2024 National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, the group — which includes the Quincy Institute, the publisher of Responsible Statecraft — calls on the White House to “set an example of democratic accountability” by fulfilling the requirements of the law.
Tori Bateman, Advocacy Director of the Quincy Institute, said in a press release, “as the war in Ukraine persists without an end in sight, it’s clear Washington needs to put more thought into how the U.S. can best support Ukraine. We don’t want a situation where we’re engaged in a war without an achievable plan for victory. That’s not good for Ukraine or the United States.”
Ursala Knudsen-Latta, Legislative Director for Peacebuilding Policy for the Friends Committee on National Legislation, another letter signatory, says the issue is about transparency “President Biden's refusal to fulfill the congressional mandate by releasing an unclassified strategy for U.S. engagement in Ukraine hampers the public's ability to know what their government is doing and to hold their government accountable to their values," she said in the press release.
The Biden administration did release a report to three congressional committees, but it was classified, thus not fulfilling the congressional mandate or allowing the public to comment or review.
Also highlighted in the letter is the humanitarian suffering experienced by the people of Ukraine. The war has created over six million refugees. An additional 10,000 civilians have been killed. Because of the conflict with Russia, Ukraine has lost an estimated 25% of the total population due to death, displacement, and emigration. “Women and girls have been disproportionately affected by sexual violence, horrifically weaponized as a tool of terror and control,” the letter says, adding, “civilians living in occupied territory are subject to torture, execution, and the suppression of civil liberties. Mines and explosive remnants of war have killed hundreds of civilians.”
The 13 organizations called on President Biden to include “robust diplomatic engagement, clear objectives, and realistic plans” on Ukraine, while also pointing out that military aid alone will not achieve a “sovereign and prosperous future for Ukraine.”
The signatories specifically point to President Biden’s language, saying “in a conflict framed by President Biden as a ‘battle between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force’, the United States should be setting the example of democratic accountability, not obscuring information from its citizens.”
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Top photo credit: Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attends a meeting with South Africa's Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, August 23, 2023. Russian Foreign Ministry/Handout via REUTERS
Russia is touting the recently opened BRICS summit as the largest foreign policy event ever held in Russia and the key event for Russia’s presidency of BRICS in 2024.
On Tuesday, Vladimir Putin welcomed leaders from 24 countries and delegations from a total of 32 nations. The 16th BRICS summit, running from October 22-24, is the first under the BRICS+ format and includes representatives from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.
On the first day, the original BRICS members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) officially welcomed Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) into the group. With this expansion, BRICS+ now represents over 40% of the global population, potentially positioning itself as a viable counterweight to the Western-dominated global system.
While the main objectives of the gathering will focus on strengthening multilateralism, equitable global development, and security, attendees will also explore ways to deepen cooperation between BRICS nations and countries from the Global South.
Specific issues discussed among BRICS will include a new BRICS payment system, de-dollarization, a BRICS digital currency, an alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a proposal for a new trade platform for grain.
The chosen themes and issues accentuate and exacerbate the growing rift between the West’s existing global order and the Global South. BRICS, especially Russia, clearly intend to use the forum to display their vision of a multipolar economic and geopolitical architecture that starkly contrasts with the Western, primarily United States led, “rules-based” financial, economic, and political order.
Prior to the summit, Russian State Duma Speaker Vyachaslav Volodin publicly underscored these sentiments on Telegram: “Today, BRICS unites 10 countries and 45% of the world's population. More than thirty states are showing interest in participating in it... The time of Washington and Brussels hegemony is passing."
While BRICS+ countries are meeting in Kazan, the “rules-based order” and U.S. hegemony continue to be severely undermined by Israel’s ongoing Washington-backed military actions in Gaza and Lebanon. Israel has continued to exhibit an unwavering disrespect for United Nations resolutions, has attacked peacekeepers (referred to as UNIFIL in Lebanon), and even declared U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres persona nongrata. Notably, Guterres is expected to attend in Kazan.
Among these increasing Middle East tensions, Iran President Masoud Pezeshkian said that Tehran expects to complete the process of formalizing an agreement with Russia on strategic cooperation during the BRICS summit in Kazan. In mid-September, the Russian government reported the practical completion of the procedures necessary for signing a new interstate agreement on comprehensive strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
However, it appears that Russia may want to delay the official signing date due to increased tensions between Iran and Israel and Russian apprehension of being drawn in too strongly on Iran’s side. Instead, Russia has sought to use the BRICS gathering as a forum to discuss the war in Gaza and Lebanon. For example, UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed arrived in Moscow on Sunday to much fanfare for an official visit that included high-level talks centered on bilateral cooperation and the situation in the Middle East.
Beyond geopolitics, one of the more prominent issues to be raised during the summit is Russia’s proposal for a BRICS payment system, BRICS Pay. According to Bloomberg, “Russia is proposing changes to cross-border payments conducted among BRICS countries aimed at circumventing the global financial system, as the heavily penalized country seeks to sanctions-proof its own economy.”
Russia has recently experienced delays in international transactions with its trading partners, including BRICS member countries, as banks in these countries fear punitive actions from Western regulators.
The proposal includes plans to create a network of commercial banks that would allow participating countries to process transactions in local currencies as well as establish direct links between central banks. Additionally, Russia is proposing a model based on digital ledger technology that would allow the use of tokens for settlement. The plan also included the creation of centers for mutual trade in commodities such as grain.
Not surprisingly, this idea correlates with a Russian export trade plan introduced in September during the “Made in Russia” forum. Then, Russian government representatives spoke about the growth of the share of “friendly countries” in trade, about stimulating the export of medium and high value-added products, and about the need to supply more expensive agricultural products to foreign markets.
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin said that the share of national currencies in settlements with partners from “friendly countries” — defined as China, Turkey, India, and Egypt — currently amounts to 90%. Such exports in August were already estimated at 86% of the total export volume.
Putin said BRICS countries should focus on the use of national currencies, new financial instruments, and the creation of an analogue of SWIFT. He called for a “cautious approach in creating a new reserve currency due to differences in the structure and quality of the economies of the BRICS member states.”
Prior to the BRICS summit, however, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said that India has no plan to target the U.S. dollar, an announcement that placed the country directly at odds with China and Russia.
Despite objections from some BRICS+ members, it seems as though de-dollarization is slowly moving towards an economic reality. According to the Jerusalem Post, China has already unveiled plans to use a gold-backed yuan and Russia is trading in currencies tied to gold. Together with the significant gold accumulation by BRICS countries, these actions suggest a world shifting away from dollar reliance. For example, the divergence between treasuries and gold as safe havens has signaled investors’ heightened uncertainty given skyrocketing government debt and their preference for physical assets. Over the last 10 years, central bank purchases of gold have significantly outpaced purchases of U.S. Treasuries.
The Kazan BRICS summit has demonstrated a considerably impressive level of ambition, no doubt fueled by Russia’s chairmanship and the many underlying financial and economic issues with which it is currently wrestling. Although Russian interests obviously are driving the current agenda, it is evident that the issues presented resonate strongly among a variety of countries, from global powers like China to nations throughout the Global South. They all share a common interest in navigating the emerging challenges presented by a rapidly developing multipolar architecture.
Although BRICS 2024 is unlikely to implement immediate solutions to its economic and finance proposals, it has already successfully generated enthusiasm for alternative approaches to the post-World War II order. After several decades of war and harmful sanctions, BRICS+ nations are increasingly distrustful of the United States led “rules-based order” that favors the few at the expense of many. Western nations should take notice that while BRICS will not immediately bring down the existing global architecture, it is a looming threat to the unrivaled dominance of its institutions, which no longer maintain the trust or confidence of a growing majority of the world’s inhabitants.
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Top Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin meets Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of a cultural forum dedicated to the 300th anniversary of the birth of the Turkmen poet and philosopher Magtymguly Fragi, in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan October 11, 2024. (Sputnik/Alexander Scherbak/Pool via REUTERS)
On October 11, a rare high-level international forum took place in Ashgabat, the capital of the Central Asian nation of Turkmenistan.
Leveraging its permanently neutral status, enshrined in its constitution, Turkmenistan provided a suitable platform for Eurasian dialogue which brought together the presidents of Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, and Armenia, as well as high-level officials from China, Turkey, UAE, Oman, Bahrain, Iraq, among others.
While these connections have their intrinsic value, the central stage was occupied by the meeting of the Russian and Iranian presidents, Vladimir Putin and Massoud Pezeshkian.
There was a certain intrigue about it as it was their first meeting after the reformist Pezeshkian’s election in July following the death in an air accident of his hardline predecessor Ebrahim Raisi. As Russia’s relations with the West grow more hostile, Moscow tends to resent Iranian reformists’ attempts to diplomatically engage with the West.
Although both sides were noticeably tight-lipped about what was discussed at the meeting, the situation in the Middle East, as Iran braces for Israel’s strike in retaliation for Iran’s October 1 barrage of missiles on Israel (themselves part of escalating exchange of blows between Iran and Israel), was certainly one of the main items. A few days later, Russia’s deputy foreign minister Sergey Ryabkov issued a stern warning to Israel “to not even consider attacking Iranian nuclear facilities.” In his words, “this would be a catastrophic development and a complete negation of all existing principles in the area of ensuring nuclear safety.”
Politically, such statements vindicate Iranian hardliners’ view that the outreach to the West promoted by the reformist administration is both futile and foolhardy, whereas relations with Moscow is where Tehran ought to invest its diplomatic capital.
When the foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, took to X (formerly Twitter) to inform about his exchanges with EU‘s High Representative on Foreign Policy Josep Borrell on the nature of Iran’s military-technical cooperation with Russia, the conservative journalist Fereshteh Sadeghi sniped that Aragchi should have instead told Borrell that Iran’s relations with Russia were none of the West’s business.
Hardline lawmakers like Kamran Ghazanfari, meanwhile, are pushing for Pezeshkian’s impeachment based on alleged illegalities regarding the appointment of one of Iran’s chief proponents of dialogue with the West, former foreign minister Javad Zarif’s as vice president for strategic affairs.
Meanwhile, the West is not helping matters. With the U.S. presidential elections a mere two weeks away, the two candidates are competing over who will out-hawk whom on Iran. The Democratic candidate, Vice President Kamala Harris, bizarrely claimed that Iran is America’s “greatest adversary”, blithely ignoring the olive branch Pezeshkian extended during his speech at the UN General Assembly in New York last month.
The Republican contender and former president, Donald Trump, meanwhile, alternates messages suggesting openness to a more constructive relationship with Tehran, notably saying that he won’t seek regime change in Iran, with advising Israel to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. His real track record on Iran in office, however, squarely puts him in the hardline camp: it was Trump who recklessly withdrew from the nuclear deal with Iran in 2018 and brought the U.S. and Iran to the brink of war with the assassination of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Al-Qods commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani.
The EU doesn’t seem any more eager to explore diplomatic opportunities with Iran than the U.S. While Borrell and the deputy secretary general of the European External Action Service he leads, Enrique Mora, are still engaged in dialogue with Araghchi, the EU last week imposed fresh sanctions on Iran for an alleged transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia. The hawkish president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, threatened more sanctions. Borrell is on his way out, to be replaced in a few weeks by the former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas who is likely to look for more ways to punish Iran for its role in Russia’s war in Ukraine. The EU also pushed for more aggressive language on Iran’s regional ambitions at this week’s first EU summit with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – it is only thanks to the GCC countries’ own delicate diplomacy that, despite its past animosity, the importance of the “diplomatic engagement with Iran to pursue regional de-escalation” was finally agreed in the joint statement.
That context inevitably pushes Tehran ever closer to Moscow and may even blunt the domestic political opposition to these ties. While hardliners welcome the EU’s hostility as a further evidence of the wisdom of their favored “Turn East” policy, reformists may reluctantly conclude that, in the absence of any Western interest in responding positively to their overtures, the concerns about regime survival leave Tehran with few realistic options other than to throw its lot with Moscow, at least for the foreseeable future.
Where the reformists are on a surer footing is in being clear-eyed about Moscow’s real capabilities and limitations in helping Iran. One of the areas where Moscow and Tehran stepped up their cooperation is reportedly in the intelligence realm, particularly in regards to Israel – in parallel, with Moscow’s own deteriorating relationship with Jerusalem. However, being aware of Israel’s vulnerabilities is not the same as having sufficient capabilities to exploit them to a decisive effect. Iran can certainly step up its game, but the results, if any, will only be felt over a longer period of time.
As to Iran’s immediate needs, Russia’s Su-35 fighters and S-400 missile systems could certainly boost its air defenses, but Russia still hesitates in delivering those despite years of speculations over the matter, and that is because it is careful not to antagonize its key partners in the Persian Gulf, like Saudi Arabia and UAE – notably, both pushed back at the EU’s insistence to align the EU and GCC positions on Russia, particularly on the EU’s criticisms of their role in circumventing Brussels’ Russia sanctions. Of note, neither Tehran nor Moscow are disclosing whether the ambitious strategic cooperation document they plan to sign in the near future will contain any security commitments.
Russian expert on Iran Nikita Smagin went further and suggested that Moscow might even secretly be pleased with Israel’s strikes on Iran’s oil infrastructure, as it would remove a key competitor for Russian oil on the Chinese market, and thus provide a significant boost for Russia’s budget.
The best Iran could hope for would be that the dust somehow settles after an exchange of blows with Israel, and a new administration is elected in Washington that is willing to pursue diplomacy with Tehran and restrain Israel’s excesses. That would widen Iran’s options while lessening incentives to support destructive forces in the Middle East and one-sided alignment with Russia. On current trajectory, however, there is preciously little hope that that would be happening. That sets Iran for what could at best be described as a deeply imperfect alignment with Russia, in the hope that it would accrue Tehran at least some benefits as Moscow juggles its own interests in the Middle East and beyond.
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