The Israeli attack is over, but the outcome remains unclear. Tehran is downplaying it — even mocking it — which may be more reflective of their desire to de-escalate than a true assessment of the damage Israel inflicted on Iran.
Just as Israel kept the damage of Iran's Oct. 1 strikes secret, Iran will likely not disclose the full picture of Israel's strike, although Tehran has reported that the strikes killed two members of Iran's regular army (which is separate from the IRGC).
Indeed, another red line was crossed in this Israeli attack, lowering the cost of crossing it going forward.
Thus, while we may see some tactical de-escalation, the trajectory remains escalatory.
The Biden team, however, may draw a sigh of relief if Iran exercises restraint, as a major conflict right before the elections may be evaded.
But in the larger scheme of things, that may prove to be of little consolation if Biden wastes this pause once more by failing to use it to truly de-escalate the situation by forcing a ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon.
The U.S. has the leverage to stop Israel's slaughter, but Biden has thus far refused to exercise that leverage. How many rounds of bombings can Israel and Iran engage in before it blows up into a full-scale war that engulfs the entire region?
Trita Parsi is the co-founder and Executive Vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
Top photo credit: A general view of Tehran after several explosions were heard, in Tehran, Iran, October 26, 2024. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS
In his 1971 classic “Every War Must End,” Fred Charles Iklé painfully reminded every would-be commander and statesman of the wrenching tragedies that result from confusing military means with political ends.
Thus, from Vietnam to Afghanistan, any U.S. veteran counterinsurgent listening to President Trump’s press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Tuesday evening had to measure clearly the spoken words against such warnings and shudder.
"The U.S. will take over the Gaza Strip, and we will do a job with it, too. We'll own it and be responsible for dismantling all of the dangerous unexploded bombs and other weapons on the site. Level the site and get rid of the destroyed buildings. Level it out," the president said. "Create an economic development that will supply unlimited numbers of jobs and housing for the people of the area," he added. "Do a real job. Do something different."
These are the terms of a successful real estate developer and epoch-changing politician. They are filled with similar emotions raised by others who have also sat in the same office, especially next to a needful friend and flush with an electoral victory from which he believes he has a powerful mandate to bend the arc of history.
Yet these presidents are also not reflective of the American experience overseas. They instead represent the kind of nightmare that has awakened every American administration since Israel was recognized by President Truman in 1948.
For all its dynamism, America has long proven its structural inadequacies at this kind of security and development mission. It’s just not in its DNA, regardless of the clarity of the orders or willingness of its troops. No matter how well meaning at the outset, the United States has often failed its friends, not due to any perfidy but to lack of clear-eyed statesmanship towards Iklé’s famous ends and a repeated misreading of the unique relationship between America’s transient democracy and the sustained application of force necessary to compel an often invisible foe to submit to its will.
English philosopher John Gray recently noted that one of the positives from Trump’s election is that he was “not a war candidate” and was without “a universal mission” trying “to reshape” the world, but rather led with “a transactional realism.” Gray remarked that this realism is potentially more “morally clean” than the “negative soft power” results of both the neoconservative and liberal exercise of power (often intertwined) for 40 years since the end of the Cold War. Much of this exercise, if we haven’t yet forgotten, occurred in the killing fields of the Middle East.
Trump clearly wants to succeed where President Biden and his inept advisers clearly failed. Yet instinct must always be met by the rational, and both have practical, political, and global power ramifications that go well beyond one term of office.
On Wednesday his surrogates worked to dial his Tuesday remarks back, saying, he “doesn’t want to put any U.S. troops on the ground, and he doesn’t want to spend any U.S. dollars at all.” That would be smart, because otherwise the U.S. would be immediately involved in fighting a war that has not come to its natural political end, and likely never will. If American servicemembers touch the Gaza Strip, they are immediately in a state of war, surrounded not only by Hamas and other militant fighters and gangs, operating in a place where governing institutions now barely exist.
Strenuous rules of engagement for self-defense, which Trump bolstered during his first tenure, would mean more civilian harm and likely loss of life for our own soldiers. A carefully considered endgame here is not a choice, but a political and moral imperative.
Next, the mission has very little chance of immediate clarity or resolution. Lack of active-duty troop strength, exhaustion of weaponry in other overseas commitments like those in Ukraine, ship readiness and construction all mean that time would not be on America’s side in maintaining effective armed presence necessary to “clear, hold, and build.” Any presence in Gaza would immediately be opposed not just on all three sides facing land but also the one at the Mediterranean's edge requiring absolute naval command of the seas. The U.S. military’s history is filled with impossible odds when attempting to contain irregular adversaries with easy access to a porous border.
Much like in Iraq and Afghanistan, today’s readiness woes mean that the reserve component will be asked to do much of this work, if sustained. Although successful in many ways, America’s reserve force is still constructed from the same “total force policy” of General Creighton Abrams at the end of the Vietnam War, designed to prevent long-term commitment of overseas troops by dividing the necessary capabilities of such campaigns throughout the national guard and reserve. Consistently late and insufficient congressional budgets for defense has only increased uncertainty and added to strategic myopia.
Finally, the interplay of economic, diplomatic, and military statesmanship would require a deft coherence — and strategic honesty — that no American administration has successfully wielded since World War II. As the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction noted, “Yet over two decades — and even as Afghan provinces fell like dominoes in the summer of 2021 — I do not recall any senior official telling Congress or the American people that failure was a real possibility. … Self-serving delusion was America’s most formidable foe.”
Although the Army’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, famously written by the generals of the Iraq War clearly states that “counterinsurgency is not a substitute for strategy,” for American leaders desperately looking for any success in a strategic vacuum, it became one. And no one was ready to say it wasn’t — or to offer any viable alternative. There is no reason to believe anything is different today in terms of opportunistic careerism or strategic hubris.
What then could work to accomplish the president’s vision? This would be the first real test of President Trump’s Joint Chiefs whom he inherited from former President Biden. What will they recommend to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, someone with “dust on his boots” from two failed counterinsurgencies himself? What have they learned from America’s ignominious departure from Afghanistan, or past efforts to resupply civilians in Gaza, and how are those lessons reflected in the plans they will present?
To truly “do something different,” as the president proclaimed, the United States might start by reviewing its own past playbooks on attracting allies to accomplish well-defined political objectives instead. That is why General Colin Powell regularly referred to Ikle’s book and urged his staff to study it, especially when determining recommended courses of action to then President George H.W. Bush about the desirable ends of ejecting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.
But these are not the early unipolar salad days of 1991, but rather a much more competitive and unpredictable world. This is a solemn test of a new administration, and for those serving in uniform today, especially those in our youngest generations — those who will never allow America to fail within their temporal power. The stakes couldn't be any higher.
The Bunker appears originally at the Project on Government Oversight and is republished here with permission.
'Those who forget the past…'
The Bunker watched the Soviet Union’s Sputnik — the first human-made object to orbit the Earth — fly over his Connecticut house in 1957, and grew up witnessing the resulting “space race” (only one nation has landed people on the Moon. It wasn’t the Soviets). It also soon led to U.S. claims of a “missile gap” — Moscow supposedly had more of them than Washington — that turned out to be false. In the 1960s, The Bunker played near a shuttered missile base, built to destroy incoming Soviet bombers. That Nike system was fully abandoned as folly in the 1970s, when the U.S. military built its first missile-defense system in North Dakota. The Bunker walked the Safeguard site years later, eyeballing its strange 123-foot tall pyramid with sprinklers to wipe radiation from its four Cyclops-like radar eyes. It operated for less than a year before it became worthless against a growing Soviet missile force. Then, in 1983 — and more than $400 billion ago — The Bunker covered Ronald Reagan’s call(PDF) to build a Strategic Defense Initiative to render Soviet nuclear warheads “impotent and obsolete.” Quickly dubbed “Star Wars,” it too withered away, into the weak web of 44 ground-based interceptor missiles based in Alaska and California today capable of “defending” us against a limited attack.
But no matter. On January 27, President Donald Trump declared the Pentagon will build “a next-generation missile defense shield” to “deter — and defend its citizens and critical infrastructure against — any foreign aerial attack on the Homeland.” The president told the Defense Department that it had 60 days to propose “The Iron Dome for America” to defend the U.S. against “ballistic, hypersonic, advanced cruise missiles, and other next-generation aerial attacks from peer, near-peer, and rogue adversaries.”
Trump’s executive order is more marketing hype than a plausible military assignment. As if there were any doubt, the Pentagon reached out to industry(PDF) four days after Trump’s announcement, seeking “to understand Industry capabilities to address Executive Order `The Iron Dome for America’” (like U.S. defense contractors are not perpetually hyping what they can do, and have been secretly hoarding missile-defense silver bullets).
It's ambitious, aspirational — and a pipe dream. Such a Mission Impossible might make more sense if the U.S. military could keep one of its helicopters from colliding with a commercial airliner just down the Potomac River from its headquarters and the White House. Keeping two aircraft from colliding is a piece of cake compared to developing and deploying space and ground-based sensors and weapons able to detect, track, and destroy multiple incoming enemy missiles launched at the same time.
“The Iron Dome for America” echoes the much more modest Iron Dome system used by Israel to fend off fewer, slower, and shorter-ranged rockets and missiles. The president’s marching orders constitute a wish list lacking logic — or the money to pay for it (nuclear expert Joe Cirincione’s back-of-the-envelope estimate for it is $2.5 trillion). The U.S. currently spends about $10 billion annually on missile defense.
Unsurprisingly, defense contractors like what they’re hearing. “We’re a major partner in Israel’s Iron Dome today,” Chris Calio, chief executive of RTX, parent of Raytheon, said the day after Trump’s order. “It's the bedrock of Raytheon” — the Pentagon’s second-biggest contractor — “and they are among the best at it…we view this as a significant opportunity for us, something right in our wheelhouse.”
And something right in the taxpayers’ poorhouse.
A new rank rank: Commander-in-Chief Petty Officer
Much of President Trump’s push for missile defense, like those of his predecessors, is designed to thwart an attack by the Russians. Yet he’s emulating them when it comes to “defacing” those who have displeased him, eerily calling to mind Josef Stalin. Such imitation among autocrats apparently is the sincerest form of battery.
The Trump administration has removed two Pentagon portraits of retired Army general Mark Milley — picked by Trump to serve as his chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 2018 — because Milley placed his allegiance to the Constitution above his loyalty to Trump. Beyond that, Trump and his minions have stripped security details and clearances from Milley and several other former top U.S. officials who didn’t toe Trump’s line. They needed protection from Iran after — who else? — Trump ordered the killing of Iranian Major General Qassim Suleimani in 2020.
Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island, the senior Democrat on the armed services committee, denounced Trump for jeopardizing Milley’s life for his own “political satisfaction.” Even Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR), a Trump acolyte and chairman of the intelligence committee, encouraged Trump to “revisit” his decision. Stripping security from Milley and others who have run afoul of Trump means they “could be targeted by Iranian assassins in public where innocent bystanders could be injured,” Cotton warned.
The Bunker turns five today…
It’s hard to believe that we launched The Bunkerfive years ago today. That’s a lifetime in Newsletter Land. The Bunker remains a proud skeptic, standing athwart all the zaniness that is U.S. national security, declaring: “Are you kidding me?”
The Bunker’s proud parents are Tim Farnsworth, vice president of communications and editorial strategy here at the Project On Government Oversight (POGO), and Mandy Smithberger, who was running POGO’s Center for Defense Information when The Bunker launched. Since then, we’ve had a capable team working behind the scenes to produce and publish The Bunker nearly every Wednesday morning (subscribe here for weekly 7 a.m. delivery via email). They include current CDI chief Greg Williams, Editorial Director Julia Delacroix, producers Jules Lemos-Maldonado and Spurthi Kontham, and ace proofreader/fact-checker Neil “Eagle Eye” Gordon. And three huzzahs to POGO chief Danielle Brian, who recently pushed to get The Bunker co-published on Responsible Statecraft’s website.
This note is just a helmet tip from The Bunker-in-chief to thank this crackerjack crew for a job well done. And a hearty Bravo Zulu to our valued readers. With five years now solidly behind us, The Bunker can’t wait to begin its sixth year. Finally, we’ll be able to start kindergarten.
The Chinese military would be unlikely to win a war with the U.S., according to experts from the usually hawkish RAND Corporation, quoted by David Roza in the usually hawkish Air & Space Forces Magazine January 31.
The median enlisted person in the U.S. military (average age 22) earned $115,400 in total compensation, including benefits, in 2024; median officers (average age 28) earned $184,600, the Congressional Budget Office reported January 30.
A review of posts on X by top incoming Trump Defense Department officials highlights their disdain for the status quo and a willingness to upset the Pentagon apple cart, Noah Robertson reported January 28 at Defense News.
Thanks for reviewing The Bunker this week. Consider forwarding this on to your pals so they can subscribe here.
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Top image credit: U.S President Donald Trump welcomes Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the entrance of the White House in Washington, U.S., February 4, 2025. REUTERS/Leah Millis
President Trump’s most recent pronouncement about the Gaza Strip and the people who live there brings to mind Abraham Lincoln's definition of a hypocrite as a man who murders his parents and then pleads for mercy on grounds that he is an orphan.
Trump is correct in saying that the residents of Gaza are “living in hell.” But in the same breath he supports the policies and actions of the foreign state that has turned the Gaza Strip into hell. Trump is comfortable with the United States helping Israel to “murder” the Gaza Strip — and is increasing the supply of weapons to do so — while pretending to be merciful and compassionate toward the remaining people of Gaza who so far have survived the Israeli onslaught but are suffering immensely.
The hypocrisy only adds a further gloss to what already was morally indefensible support for ethnic cleansing. As debates about whether Israel is committing genocide get bogged down in semantics as a digression from substance, it is undeniable that Israel is conducting ethnic cleansing. The words as well as actions of senior Israeli officials make clear that removing Palestinians from Palestine is Israeli policy.
The United States formerly opposed ethnic cleansing. During the wars in the 1990s that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia, the United States, after some hesitation, decisively opposed Bosnian Serbs’ ethnic cleansing of Muslims, going so far as to lead a military intervention that ended the Serbs’ deadly campaign. But now the United States is not only condoning but actively supporting Israel’s campaign of ethnic cleansing.
The moral depravity of what is happening to the Palestinians is linked to multiple negative consequences for the United States to the extent Washington associates itself with the Israeli campaign. The consequences include lessened ability to achieve goals that require the cooperation of Arab states and increased motivation of terrorists to strike the United States.
Although these consequences had already existed due to longstanding U.S. toleration of Israel’s subjugation of the Palestinians, unwilling removal of the subjugated population from Palestine altogether would amplify the emotions involved and the related ill effects on the United States. Such removal evokes painful memories of the Nakba or “catastrophe” in which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were driven from their homes in the war in 1948 that followed Israel’s declaration of independence.
Trump’s assertions that Palestinians would be “thrilled” to move out of Palestine and that other Arab states would be willing to accept them bear no resemblance to reality. The strong attachment of most Palestinians to their homeland despite the miserable conditions in Gaza has been demonstrated by the determination of internally displaced families to return to north Gaza during the current ceasefire despite awareness that many of their homes had been turned to rubble.
As for acceptance by other Arab states, when Trump last month suggested that Palestinians should go to Egypt or Jordan, both those states stronglyrejected the idea. Both have compelling reasons for their rejection involving their own internal security and domestic politics, in addition to repugnance over the injustice to the Palestinians.
Jordan sees a fresh mass influx of Palestinians as an existential threat. It would upset an already fragile internal situation that involves a large Palestinian population — many of them refugees from the original Nakba — living under a Bedouin-led regime. Such a displacement would be contrary to the understandings Jordan thought it had reached when signing its peace treaty with Israel in 1994. The displacement would risk collapsing a regime the United States has counted on as a reliable friend in a critical part of the Middle East.
When Trump said that some “really nice places” could be built for ethnically-cleansed Palestinians, he made it sound like moving from a crummy apartment in Queens to an attractive condo in mid-town Manhattan. Absent from his remarks was any appreciation for a sense of home and of place, especially for Palestinians who are attached to a homeland where their families have lived for centuries.
Some six million Palestinians, mostly displaced by Israel’s earlier wars, already live in other Arab countries. The conditions in which most of them live are not “really nice.” Many are refugee camps, in name, as well as in reality, with all the squalor that implies. Even with a turnover that has gone through multiple generations since 1948, the sense of being a Palestinian and being a refugee displaced from one’s homeland has, for most of these people, not been extinguished.
Moreover, as demonstrated by the massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by an Israel-backed militia during an earlier Israeli invasion of Lebanon country in 1982, even displacement to a neighboring Arab country does not mean safety from Israeli aggression. Such thoughts are probably going through the minds of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip who during the past year have been driven by Israel out of their homes only to be attacked again in what supposedly were “safe zones.”
Notwithstanding the unreality of Trump’s ideas about ethnically cleansing Palestinians out of Palestine, this does appear to constitute a major part of his administration’s policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He has now voiced the idea more than once, and it is consistent with his practice, dating back to his first term, of going all-in with the policies of the Israeli government. Thus the ill consequences of such ethnic cleansing, as summarized above, need to be a major part of policy debate going forward.
The other part of Trump’s comments following his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — about the United States “taking over” the Gaza Strip — is no less outrageous but of a different character. Even some congressional Republicans — who so far have been in lock-step support, or at least tacit acquiescence with, almost everything else Trump has done so far this term — have expressed reservations about the idea. That alone should get Trump’s attention. So will the fact that such involvement runs counter to Trump’s own declared intention to reduce U.S. costs and commitments overseas, especially ones that involve a new war.
Thus the comment about taking over Gaza cannot yet be taken as administration policy. But for the record, such a policy would be a disastrous mistake. It would mean, besides taking on a huge reconstruction burden, a costly counterinsurgency in a militarily difficult area where Hamas is still alive and kicking. In some respects, such a military operation would be worse than the U.S. war in Iraq, because the United States could not even pose as a liberator opposing an oppressive regime but instead would be acting in concert with the oppressor.
Some have suggested that the “takeover” comment was a bargaining ploy — an extreme demand designed to get Hamas and Saudi Arabia to agree to something more moderate for the future of Gaza while giving Israel a reason to extend the current ceasefire. Possibly, but that theory gives Trump credit for more complex strategic thinking than he has displayed in the past. More likely, the comment reflected a combination of Trump’s focus on an individual idea that fascinated him, his instincts about what has served him politically or generated applause lines, and what the last person in the room said to him.
Trump’s vision for Gaza replays one that his son-in-law Jared Kushner voiced almost a year ago about how the “valuable waterfront property” in Gaza could be developed as long as the people could be removed first. As a fellow real estate developer, Trump can relate to that idea. The notion of a U.S. takeover also sounds consistent with the sort of imperialist designs that Trump already had regarding Greenland and Panama.
The fact that the comment came in a joint press conference after meeting with Netanyahu is significant. Some observers expected there would be friction and disagreement in the meeting, and behind closed doors there possibly was. But Trump’s default instinct on anything involving these issues is to continue to be seen going all-in with Israel. A beaming Netanyahu, who at the press conference piled compliments onto Trump, showed that this meeting met both leaders’ need for positive optics.
Trump’s declared doctrine may be “America First,” but on anything involving the Middle East his policy is Israel First. Or more accurately, it is a policy of deference to almost anything the government of Israel, with its right-wing extremists, wants, even if those wants run counter to the long-term peace and security of the Israeli people as much as the other people of the Middle East.
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