The two wars that have engulfed much of the second half of Joe Biden’s presidency are at risk of escalating. Ukraine has taken the war into Russia in recent weeks, and Washington continues to gradually lift its restrictions on how Kyiv can use American weapons. Meanwhile, the efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza appear to be stuck, and the risks of a wider regional war remain acute.
Against this backdrop, Swedish diplomat Hans Blix published a book, “A Farewell to Wars: The Growing Restraints on the Interstate Use of Force,” that argues that a number of factors, including fear of nuclear war, growing public aversion to armed conflict, and increased economic interdependence, greatly decrease the possibility of large interstate wars in the future.
Blix gained international fame as the head of U.N. inspection mission in Iraq (UNMOVIC) from late November 2002 until just before the U.S. invasion of the country on March 20, 2003.Hundreds of U.N. inspections that scoured the country found no evidence to support U.S. claims that Iraq had possession of or was developing weapons of mass destruction.
Last month, RS interviewed Blix, now 96, about how he developed the book’s thesis and whether the events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East in the months since its publication have affected his analysis in any way.
The full conversation is below:
RS: Considering years of brutal and devastating war in Ukraine, the Hamas attack on Israel, and Israel’s destruction of Gaza, is it not provocative to write “a farewell to wars?”
BLIX: I am not, of course, closing my eyes before these bloody wars, nor to the large gruesome chapter of civil wars that is outside my field of inquiry. The Russian invasions of Ukraine are crude violations of the rules that Russia herself and all other states of the world have committed to by accepting the U.N. Charter. I support the continued large- scale assistance that is given to Ukraine. I do so not because of any fear of Russian designs against Europe, but because we need to help end or minimize the intrusion that violates the common legal order established in the U.N. Charter.
Yet, having taken a long-term view and identified growing restraints against interstate war, I do not see the Russian action as ending this evolution but as a disastrous aberration and deviation from it. What was intended, I believe, was not a war but a quick intervention to achieve regime change through a limited “special military operation,” a Crimea 2. It failed, as it was based on erroneous intelligence and lack of understanding that the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians wanted independence and continued emancipation from Russia and the Russian economic and political system.
RS: Are you confident that there will not be other “aberrations?”
BLIX: The cases of the 2003 Iraq war and 2022 Ukraine invasion should be warnings against future uncritical action on the basis of intelligence. Injured pride on the one hand and hubris on the other may be incentives to the use of force, but, as I show, strong factors of restraint have developed and give hope even at this dark period. Despite hot lines and fast communication, there remain risks that misunderstandings might spark major fires.
RS: Which are the factors and hopeful long-term trends against interstate use of armed force that you see?
BLIX: First, I see over time a great evolution in the public mind regarding war and violence. Historically, war and the conquest of land used to be viewed as glorious enterprises. The evolution, though heterogenous and not an organized movement, has gone toward less violence and more humane attitudes. Public opinion helped to abolish slavery. Humanitarian movements generated the Geneva conventions. The death penalty has been abolished in most countries and duels prohibited. There were only 20 years between the First and the Second World War, but we have had no big wars between great powers for some 80 years. And while we are aware of the limitations of the United Nations, it has remained a vital common mechanism for the handling of conflicts and for global cooperation.
Second, while competition is inherent in the relations between states as between individuals (no “farewell”), the nuclear weapons that have become available to the major powers for possible first and second strikes lead them to the well-known conclusion that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Since 1945, no nuclear weapon has been used and what is equally important: despite this quasi-taboo, the fear of use has made the great powers wary of starting or engaging in actions that risk escalation. Fear of escalation to space and A.I. warfare may have a similar effect.
Third, fear of escalation to a nuclear war leads governments to limit themselves to threats and to non-kinetic means of pressure, such as cyber actions, economic and financial warfare and subversion.
RS: Do you actually see nuclear weapons as a guarantee for peace?
BLIX: I think the number of nuclear weapons can — and should — be drastically reduced, and they will retain their restraining effect as long as a second-strike capacity remains. A world getting down to zero nuclear weapons will have developed other means of restraining itself.
RS: I wanted to ask you specifically about two potential “aberrations” to your thesis that seem to be on many people’s minds. 1) The possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan (which you mention in your book); and 2) The potential for the Israel-Gaza war expanding into a wider regional conflagration in the Middle East (which took place after the book was published).
How do you think these two sources of tension fit into long-term trends against interstate war identified in your book? Do you believe that either one of these has a significant risk of breaking out into a larger interstate war?
BLIX: Beijing’s demand for Taiwan’s integration into mainland China has its main roots in pride. China will not, like Denmark after World War II, accept the emancipation of a big island [Iceland]. Rather, Taiwan’s separate position is felt as part of the humiliation that China long suffered at the hands of the West. This is a powerful incentive to bring about reunification. Although China will insist that an action vis-à-vis Taiwan is not “interstate,” there are strong disincentives to the use of armed force. China cannot, like Putin, believe that reunion could be achieved through a limited “special military operation.” As in the case of Ukraine, it would be a matter of occupation rather than liberation. Above all, having witnessed the disastrous costs of the Russian “aberration” in Ukraine, China will hardly take the risk of an armed action that could escalate to wider war and devastation.
What lies in the future? Hopefully continued restraint by all and time during which China has continued fruitful economic relations with Taiwan and feels increasingly respected as one of the world’s great powers without any need to be glued to past humiliations.
Could the Gaza conflict, through some “aberration,” explode into a wide conflagration? The mix of contradictory strivings in the region is certainly explosive, but, without major powers directly participating and clashing, a major conflagration is unlikely. In the civil war in Syria, we saw how the U.S. and Russia took great care to avoid any direct clashing in the air. During the Gaza war, it has been remarkable that all three major powers — indeed the whole world except Israel – seem to have rediscovered the two-state solution. Although Netanyahu may wish to highlight the tensions with Iran and prevent any easing of U.S. economic sanctions and other pressures on Iran, he may not want to provoke a full and direct war. The U.S. -under Biden has been actively seeking to prevent such a war, and both China and Russia would be likely to exert influence to prevent its eruption. One of several big questions looming, however, is how to make the broadly supported two-state solution operative with huge numbers of Israeli settlements on occupied Palestinian land.
RS: Your book makes a compelling case for the importance of diplomacy and detente in addition to military deterrence as a restraint in the use of global force? How do you assess the state of diplomacy between great powers, namely the U.S., Russia, and China today?
BLIX: In the current tense situation between the U.S. and the West on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, communication seems to be regrettably and dangerously sparse and to take place to a large extent through public channels (newspapers, TV). This mode of communication carries the risk of accentuating differences. Even worse is when diplomatic, cultural and scientific contacts are limited or shut off. Much nuanced understanding and opportunities for openings to mutual accommodation are lost. In my view, the three governments should make more use of diplomats and special emissaries with keen hearing and the capability of communicating and detecting openings for accommodation.
Most differences between states are solved routinely between competent civilian authorities, including foreign offices and diplomatic missions. To forestall potential armed conflicts, states use diplomacy aiming at détente, but shows of military force – deterrence -- are generally regarded as the most important way of averting war and hostile attacks. At present, accelerated arms races, military maneuvers and annual global military costs exceeding two trillion dollars testify to states’ – in particular China’s, Russia’s and the U.S.’ -- heavy reliance on deterrence and readiness to run the risk of sparks and fires. We do not know how much low-visibility diplomacy is actually going on and we realize that there may be issues on which there is no room for diplomacy. But we must note that not so few long-lasting and gruesome armed conflicts end in negotiations and diplomacy with the sorry postscript that they had no military solution. This makes us wonder if diplomacy could not have been used earlier.
In my view, diplomacy is dangerously underused today, and efforts to seek accommodation and détente seem often unfairly scorned. We should be more aware of the costs and risks of military deterrence and properly weigh them against costs and risks of restraint and accommodation. Even staunch advocates of red lines and deterrence sometimes favor limiting the role of weapons by accepting specific areas as demilitarized or free from nuclear weapons or from the stationing of foreign forces. Indeed, the nuclear weapons-free zones that cover the larger parts of the world are measures of restraint preferred to measures of deterrence. Until recently, my own country, Sweden, sought to help reduce tensions in the Baltic area by not hosting foreign forces and not joining NATO. It was only after its hope of détente had been shattered by the Russian aggression in Ukraine that Sweden came to prefer being inside NATO’s red lines and join a common system of defense. Deterrence may thereby have been strengthened -- at the cost of higher tension in the Baltic region.
A last thought — outside the box: In national legal systems, a process of attempted conciliation may be compulsory for couples requesting divorce. We know that the efforts to promote the peaceful settlement of international disputes by inducing states to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice have had limited success. And compulsory processes of conciliation between conflicting states is an unlikely proposition. But could – besides the Secretary-General’s quiet diplomacy — a UN mediation mechanism be established for use when requested by parties, by the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Secretary General? Mediators can with less difficulty than parties to disputes explore what steps of accommodation or conciliation may be plausible to help prevent or stop a conflict .
Blix is an international lawyer with a Ph.D. from Cambridge (UK) and an Ll.D. from Stockholm. He represented Sweden at some 20 sessions of the U.N. General Assembly. He helped to bring about the 1970 unanimous declaration on the interpretation of key parts of the U.N. Charter. For several years in the 1960s he assisted Alva Myrdal at the Geneva Disarmament Conference and he was one of the key negotiators at the 1972 conference that updated the Geneva conventions and adopted a convention against particularly inhumane weapons. He was Swedish Foreign Minister in 1978 and Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1981-1997. After the Iraq war 2003, he wrote “Disarming Iraq.”
