I was there: Carter tried to put the human in Realpolitik

With his passing on December 30, former President Jimmy Carter made his last great gift to the nation. In the outpouring of retrospectives on both his presidency and his unmatched “post-presidency,” we are reminded of what a president both can and should be in human and personal terms, plus moral leadership basic to American society.

This is in vivid contrast to today’s poisonous politics, and — we must hope — a lesson followed by everyone who will now be running the government and the nation, from the presidency, to Congress, to the Supreme Court, and the fourth branch of government, the media. In recent times, all have been failing the country, both at home and abroad.

It did not have to be as it is today. Jimmy Carter — and his ilk at the time — proved that.

I worked on Carter’s National Security Council staff from Inauguration Day 1977 until the incoming Reagan team required us to leave the White House precincts by high noon on January 20, 1981. For two years, I was lead official on the NSC staff for Western Europe and then two years on the Middle East team — tumultuous times in both regions. Few of us who were senior officials on Carter’s foreign policy team are still around to recount those times from “up close and personal.”

First, as with Henry Kissinger before him and Brent Scowcroft afterwards, but not since, Carter charged National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to recruit the best team possible, from within and without the government, with no consideration of political allegiances or financial support for the Carter presidential campaign. Ditto at the State Department, where Secretary Cyrus Vance put together a first-rate team, again without consideration for politics.

Whether that turned out to be a good mix — Brzezinski, who “played hard-ball,” and Vance, who followed a gentleman’s approach to policymaking — will be long debated. They also had significant policy differences, of which how to deal with the Soviet Union — Brzezinski’s emphasis on confrontation versus Vance’s on diplomacy (though backed with strength) — was most significant.

Carter thus had to spend an inordinate amount of time “sorting them out” — and I was the key person trying to reduce these NSC-State tensions, across the board and not just in my formal areas of responsibility.

Second, as with Kissinger’s NSC staff and Scowcroft’s under Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, it was small – fewer than 60 professionals to deal with everything. That meant that each staffer had to develop a perspective and ability to integrate issues across regions and beyond; plus learning how to “think presidentially.” It also meant that staffers, and not just the National Security Advisor, frequently interacted directly with the president, a practice rarely followed since then.

By contrast, today’s NSC staff has swollen to about 600 people — thus making its role far less effective and at times a significant factor in foreign policy failures of recent administrations.

Third, Carter hired people who would challenge him and make him think deeply about foreign policy options. He could have a steely countenance, but he never “shot the messenger.” By contrast, in some recent administrations, notably the last two, presidents have preferred “yes people,” and America’s role in the world has suffered.

Fourth, Carter understood that the United States had to recognize that other countries, including close allies, had their own interests and would not just follow U.S. policies in lockstep. Later, after the end of the Cold War, that became an even more important factor, when too many Washington officials have assumed that the world will bend to America’s will.

Thus, especially, Carter saw the need to consider the political and security needs of allies, thereby leading to a stronger Alliance. He also was the first U.S. president to support without reservations what is now the European Union.

Fifth, Carter and his top team decided that Washington didn’t have to change everything in foreign policy that had been done by the preceding administration; continuity and bipartisanship were the default positions — as they must be in a world that does not change just because the U.S. has new leaders. Since Carter, this practice has not always been followed, even when the new president is of the same political party (notably George H.W. Bush following Reagan), thus imposing a lengthy period of learning to deal with the world as it is.

Sixth, with his enquiring mind, Carter learned rapidly on the job and put aside preconceived notions when circumstances changed. Thus, he pivoted on the Soviet Union when it invaded Afghanistan, created the Carter Doctrine for the Persian Gulf‘s security – declaring it off limits to Soviet penetration -- and boosted U.S. defense spending, for which Ronald Reagan later took credit. Under Brzezinski’s prodding, he also armed the mujahideen, including Osama bin Laden, which proved catastrophic in 2001.

Nevertheless, Carter also worked to try moving beyond the Cold War, following up on the Nixon/Ford detente policies. For instance, to promote nationalism in Soviet-dominated East Europe, he agreed to transfer back to Hungary its most important national symbol, the Crown of St. Stephen, which had come into U.S. hands at the end of World War II.

He also worked to promote strategic arms control with the Soviet Union. I was the note-taker in the Oval Office in spring 1977 when the Soviet ambassador called on Carter. In two hours, they worked out a deal on strategic arms control; unfortunately, bureaucrats walked it back and Carter never got the formal agreement he had sought. Likewise, when he dealt effectively with the Soviets’ deployment of nuclear Euromissiles, the agreement he worked out was undercut from within his administration, working with the hawks in Congress. Ironically, under Reagan the agreement was adopted unchanged.

Carter put his presidency on the line to get peace between Israel and Egypt; but to take peacemaking further, pursuant to the Camp David Accords, he also saw the need to recognize Palestinian aspirations for a homeland. His efforts, however, were sabotaged by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who recanted on his pledge to Carter to suspend Jewish settlement in the West Bank until talks on autonomy for Palestinians — in which I took part — had been completed.

Begin’s action cast a long shadow, and Israel’s continuing illegal settlement building, 45 years later, remains a critical impediment to peace.

But after doing so much to promote Israel's security, in my presence in July 1980, along with the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Richard Clark, Carter said that “If I do nothing else in my presidency, it will be to get something for the Palestinians.” No subsequent American president has shown as much commitment on that score.

Seventh, Carter had more than his share of bad luck in foreign policy. Notably, the Iranian Hostage Crisis was triggered because, after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, against his better judgment Carter acceded to intense political pressures, supposedly on humanitarian grounds, to admit the Shah to the U.S. for cancer treatment. Later, the Reagan campaign sabotaged negotiations for the release of the hostages by covertly promising Iran a better deal if they were held captive past the U.S. 1980 election (“the October surprise.”). And the catastrophic hostage rescue misson in April 1980 was a cockamamie idea thought up by Brzezinski and senior military leaders, who all wanted “a piece of the action,” and doomed the rescue mission from the start.

Eighth, Carter was also the last president to make human rights a centerpiece of his administration, including — on the European continent -— building on what Gerald Ford had done with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Ironically, Kissinger had been criticized, particularly by European allies, for inadequately supporting human rights; but the same critics, especially in Europe, then turned on Carter for emphasizing human rights too much!

Most importantly, globally, no president since President Carter has successfully related moral issues to a central requirement of most Americans: to temper realpolitik with due consideration of moral issues, a foundation stone of American society.

Thus, if for nothing else in his foreign policy, the nation needs to be thankful to Jimmy Carter for his key role in melding security and moral interests – and to hope that President Donald Trump and the Congress will take this lesson to heart.