What if the chair of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the committee that oversees legislation impacting war powers, treaties, troop deployments, and military aid, was illegally acting as a foreign agent of Egypt, one of the biggest recipients of U.S. aid and military sales?
That scenario is exactly what the Department of Justice alleged last month when it accused Sen. Bob Menendez (D—NJ) of using his influence to increase U.S.-taxpayer funded aid to Egypt in exchange for gold bars, a Mercedes and stacks of cash.
The Justice Department and Menendez are making history. This is the first time a sitting U.S. senator has been accused of violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (or FARA), a law that prohibits Members of Congress from acting as an agent of a foreign principal.
The Justice Department’s FARA investigations into a high profile politician, think tank president and hip hop star sends a clear message that no one is above the law, says a new video by the Quincy Institute’s Senior Video Producer Khody Akhavi and Democratizing Foreign Policy Program Director Ben Freeman.
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Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
Top photo credit: U.S. President Donald Trump walks offstage with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau (R) at the conclusion of a joint news conference at the White House in Washington, U.S., February 13, 2017. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque
The Trudeau government faces a perfect storm of political and economic upheaval following Chrystia Freeland’s abrupt resignation and mounting anxieties over the prospect of Donald Trump’s return to power.
With Trudeau’s popularity at record lows and calls for his resignation mounting, Canada’s leadership crisis could not come at a worse time. Freeland’s departure, opposition gains, and the specter of renewed U.S. protectionism and pressure on NATO spending threaten to leave Canada unprepared to defend its national interests in a volatile international environment.
Freeland’s resignation has sent shockwaves through Ottawa and underscored growing disarray within the Liberal government. As a key figure in Trudeau’s cabinet and Canada’s chief negotiator during Trump’s renegotiation of NAFTA into the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), Freeland played a central role in managing U.S.-Canada relations at a time of considerable tension. Her ability to navigate Trump’s unpredictable leadership, while securing a deal that protected Canada’s core trade interests, earned her broad praise in Canada. (She chose to skip a recent meeting with Trudeau and Trump at Mar-a-Lago; Trump called her "behavior...totally toxic".)
Her resignation now leaves a vacuum of experience and credibility at a time when Canada may again need steady hands to manage Washington’s demands.
While official explanations cite personal reasons, many speculate that Freeland’s departure reflects her reluctance to continue propping up a government mired in declining popularity and internal dissent. Trudeau’s approval ratings are at historic lows, weighed down by inflation, rising living costs, and a growing perception of Liberal incompetence.
Within his own party, frustrations are mounting over the inability to reverse these trends, and the prospect of Pierre Poilievre’s Conservatives sweeping to power looms ever larger. Poilievre has seized on Freeland’s resignation to paint the Liberals as leaderless and adrift, resonating with Canadians eager for economic and political renewal.
This domestic instability could not come at a worse time. Donald Trump’s 2024 campaign rhetoric already signals a return to the aggressive economic nationalism of his first term. His promises to expand tariffs and bring manufacturing jobs back to the United States are a cornerstone of his appeal to his voter base, and Canada’s trade surpluses — particularly in energy, agriculture, and critical minerals — make it a convenient target. The memory of Trump’s punitive tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum under dubious “national security” justifications remains fresh.
Though the renegotiation of NAFTA brought temporary relief, Trump’s willingness to ignore trade rules and override multilateral dispute mechanisms highlights how vulnerable Canada remains to U.S. economic coercion.
Should Trump return to power, Canada could find itself once again in Washington’s crosshairs. Unlike 2017, however, Ottawa is now confronting this prospect from a position of unprecedented domestic weakness. A government collapse or prolonged political crisis would leave Canada paralyzed and unable to respond effectively. A caretaker government, constrained by electoral uncertainty, would lack the political mandate to negotiate with a Trump administration intent on imposing demands unilaterally.
The result could be a replay of the 2018 trade crisis, but with Canada even less prepared to defend its interests.
Trump’s return would also bring renewed focus on Canada’s defense spending. Throughout his first term, Trump repeatedly criticized NATO allies for failing to meet the alliance’s benchmark of spending 2% of GDP on defense, and Canada was often singled out as one of the worst offenders. Despite Trudeau’s rhetoric about supporting multilateralism and NATO solidarity, Canada’s defense spending remains well below the target, hovering at just 1.4%. While Ottawa has promised new investments —ranging from Arctic defense infrastructure to NORAD modernization and the procurement of new submarines — progress has been slow, hampered by bureaucratic inefficiency and procurement delays.
Freeland’s departure raises further concerns about who will manage this critical aspect of Canada-U.S. relations. Her ability to balance Trump’s unpredictability with Canada’s strategic priorities was a key asset during the NAFTA renegotiation. Without her, Ottawa risks struggling to present a credible case to Washington, particularly if domestic instability undermines the government’s ability to commit to significant defense investments. Trump’s likely demands for Canada to “pay up” will only intensify the pressure. Failure to act decisively could strain the bilateral relationship and call Canada’s credibility as a defense partner into question.
While Ottawa struggles to respond, Canada’s provinces are stepping in to address challenges that a second Trump administration might exacerbate. Regional leaders, particularly in border provinces, are taking proactive measures to mitigate risks linked to U.S. economic disruptions, border security challenges, and rising transnational crime.
In Quebec, irregular migration remains a significant concern, particularly at unofficial border crossings like Roxham Road, which saw an influx of asylum seekers during Trump’s first term. Premier François Legault, frustrated with Ottawa’s perceived inaction, has redirected the Sûreté du Québec to assist federal border agents and accelerate the processing of asylum claims. Legault’s calls for tougher immigration measures reflect growing provincial frustrations, a sentiment Trump could exploit to pressure Canada into new border agreements.
Ontario, home to key trade corridors with Michigan and New York, has prioritized efforts to combat illegal firearms trafficking and organized crime. Premier Doug Ford has expanded Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) involvement in cross-border task forces, collaborating directly with U.S. law enforcement to address smuggling networks. Ford has criticized Ottawa for lagging on border security, suggesting provincial authorities may escalate their efforts independently if necessary.
British Columbia faces unique challenges as Canada’s gateway to trans-Pacific trade. Vancouver’s ports are critical for both legal commerce and illicit contraband, drawing scrutiny from U.S. agencies and exposing Canada to allegations of insufficient enforcement. In response, B.C. has expanded anti-smuggling operations, reallocating RCMP resources to monitor transport routes and border crossings. Discussions are underway to establish a task force focused on dismantling organized crime networks linked to cross-border activity.
In Alberta, Trump’s return is viewed with a mix of anxiety and resolve. As Canada’s energy powerhouse, Alberta has the most to lose from renewed U.S. protectionism targeting Canadian oil and gas exports. Premier Danielle Smith has made it clear that Alberta will resist federal concessions on energy policy that undermine the province’s economic interests. Alberta has also bolstered enforcement at key crossings, such as Coutts, to ensure trade security while managing smuggling risks.
Domestically, the political fallout from Freeland’s resignation and the Trudeau government’s broader crisis has emboldened Pierre Poilievre’s Conservatives. Leading in the polls, Poilievre has capitalized on frustration with Liberal leadership, inflation, and economic stagnation. Should Trudeau’s government collapse, Canada risks entering a period of paralysis that Trump could exploit to impose unilateral measures on trade, border security, and defense.
Despite these challenges, Canada can prepare. Stabilizing political leadership must be the first priority. If Trudeau cannot rally his party, a leadership transition may be necessary to project competence and unity. Ottawa must also insulate the economy from U.S. protectionism by diversifying trade with Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Meeting NATO’s 2% defense spending target will signal Canada’s seriousness as a security partner, while investments in Arctic infrastructure, NORAD modernization, and procurement are critical.
Finally, Canada must strengthen ties with U.S. stakeholders beyond Trump, including Congress and state governors, to reinforce shared interests.
How Canada navigates this moment will test its leadership, resilience, and ability to prioritize national interests. A coherent, strategic response is essential to safeguard Canada’s economic and security interests in an increasingly unpredictable world.
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Top Photo Credit: HTS (Hayaat Tahrir Al Sham) leader Ahmed Al-Shara, also known as Abu Muhammad Al-Jolani, commander in the operations department of the Syrian armed opposition praying inside the Great Umayyad Mosque after his troops declared their entry into the capital and the overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria, on December 8, 2024. Photo by Balkis Press/ABACAPRESS.COM
The rapid fall of the oppressive Assad regime after a prolonged civil war has elicited a variety of reactions. One such measured response expresses “hope that the process of power transition be carried out in a manner aligned with the aspirations of the Syrian people, paving [a] path for the establishment of an independent […] government.”
A more jubilant take argues that "the fall of a brutal dictator is rare enough that we should take the opportunity to celebrate it and pay tribute to those who brought it about."
Indicative of the bizarre parallel motives that this war has created, the Taliban issued the former statement and neoconservative Bill Kristol the latter. Kristol fails to mention that among those “who brought it about” were America's enemies during the Global War on Terror (GWOT), specifically that the new governing authority of post-Assad Syria is Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a designated terrorist organization and offshoot of Al-Qaeda.
This irony, however, has not been lost on foreign policy dissidents, most of whom have warned for years that in attempting to oust the Assad regime, the U.S. was making common cause with its enemies from the GWOT. The bifurcated domestic responses to the ouster of the Assad regime and subsequent developments are the latest example of an elite/public divide on U.S. foreign policy and competing visions for America's role in the world.
The foreign policy class has largely downplayed the moral complexities of the Syrian civil war and has narrativized these latest developments in an ahistorical vacuum. Foreign policy critics, however, and especially veterans, have viewed developments in Syria with skepticism, if not alarm.
Among them was Vice-President-elect (and Iraq War veteran) Senator J.D. Vance, who noted that "[m]any of 'the rebels' are a literal offshoot of ISIS. One can hope they've moderated. Time will tell."
This gulf in narrative understanding threatens to undermine further public confidence in American foreign policy and the institutions that implement it.
The crux of official government responses and commentators like Kristol has been to play up the liberatory outcome of Assad's ouster while downplaying the strange bedfellows and contradictory geopolitics that led to this moment. True to neoconservative form, Kristol ahistorically cast these events as an example of "the arc of the moral universe [bending] toward justice," a bastardization, of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s civil rights dictum.
Similarly, while Kristol makes no mention of the jihadist elements within the anti-Assad coalition, he internationalizes their efforts and praises "the Ukrainians and Israelis," who, in his telling, "bent that arc over the last couple of years."
Rather than view the new political reality in Syria as one fraught with dangers to be kept at arm’s length, Kristol asserts that “we have national interests at stake in Syria.” Among them, Kristol asserts, are “regional interests that would be furthered by having a peaceful, non-terror-friendly government in Syria” and the “further weakening [of] Iran and Hezbollah.”
He does not treat his readers to an argument as to how “regional interests” align with American interests. Instead, Kristol dismisses President-elect Trump’s pledge of noninvolvement as “foolishness.”
In Washington, policymakers from lame-duck President Joe Biden to members of Congress, such as Senator Tim Kaine, have signaled a willingness to work with Syria’s new jihadist government. Senator Kaine said he is “open” to the idea, but efforts have “to be based upon the performance of this group.”
While Washington officials are outwardly less sanguine than pundits like Kristol, they are nevertheless signaling no desire to remove U.S. troops currently stationed in eastern Syria and, according to Politico, engaged in “a huge scramble to see if, and how, and when [they] can delist HTS.”
Conversely, critics of American foreign policy in the region, as they did consistently throughout the Syrian Civil War, have warned that further involvement in the crisis inherently places the United States in an alliance with its opponents from the GWOT and presents a significant risk of sinking Americans into another quagmire. While think tankers and Washington politicos, detached from the costs of their preferred policies, may be eager to turn the page, thereby shifting their preferred narrative, those who bore the brunt of said policies have longer memories.
Rather than view the ouster of Assad as an event without a recent history, they see the crisis as a potential repeat of the GWOT, asserting that "Americans know too well how regime change can lead to endless wars." Concerned Veterans for America echoes an earlier consensus among the American people, one that presented little appetite for intervention in the Syrian crisis. They argued that President Biden’s comments on Assad's downfall indicated that he risked “repeating the mistakes of the past.”
Former CIA analyst and National Security Council chief of Staff Fred Fleitz similarly viewed developments in Syria through the lens of the past and cautioned restraint. Citing HTS’s ideological baggage and the region’s tangled geopolitics, he argued that it was “deeply irresponsible for Biden officials to start meddling in this crisis.”
Outside of the echo chamber of the foreign policy establishment, HTS's Al-Qaeda pedigree and dependence on foreign jihadists have received greater attention. Marine veteran and public policy advisor for Defense Priorities Dan Caldwell similarly remarked on X that "I find it bizarre (yet revealing) that there are U.S. think-tankers cheering on Al Qaeda-linked Salafists."
This turnabout reveals that the foreign policy establishment has learned nothing from many failed regime change experiments or has cynically moved on from those old conflicts to focus on a new geopolitical goal. Defeating global jihad is out; defeating Iran's regional ambitions is in. Their eagerness to pivot to new priorities in alliance with old enemies is the latest example of their detachment from the general public.
Admittedly, this is far from the first time the U.S. has teamed up with odious actors and former adversaries to achieve its foreign policy goals. During the Second World War, the United States fought alongside the Soviet Union, against whom it sent an expeditionary force to depose two decades earlier.
However, such a comparison does not hold water as the United States government was not forced into a partnership with jihadism in Syria by the material realities of geopolitics. The Assad regime, despite its numerous abuses, did not remotely pose a threat to the United States or its security interests. No Assadist armored columns rolled through Western Europe. No Assadist carrier group bombed Pearl Harbor. Regarding U.S. policy toward Syria, no existential American security concern demanded such a Faustian bargain.
If the United States government is to formulate a foreign policy for the future, it must refrain from sweeping under the rug the legacies of foreign policies past. Such is especially the case for America's recent history in the Middle East, where Americans, who have yet to forget the legacies of the Global War on Terror, are opposed to further entanglements.
Policymakers ought to tread lightly lest they discover that when they attempted to export democracy abroad, they had inadvertently rekindled it at home.
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Top photo credit: NATO's new Secretary General Mark Rutte and outgoing NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg during a handover ceremony at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on October 1, 2024.(Alexandros Michailidis/Shutterstock)
Mark Rutte, the new NATO Secretary General has called for the Alliance to commit to Cold-war levels of military spending by 2030.
By doing so, he is placing in the minds of NATO citizens the idea that modern Russia offers the same level of threat as the Soviet Union. But you don’t need to look too hard at the numbers to see that this is a false and deliberately misleading comparison.
Rutte’s statement echoes a call by Donald Trump to boost NATO spending to 3%, a bandwagon the British Foreign Secretary quickly jumped aboard. The U.S. spends 3.38% of GDP on defence after all, accounting for two thirds of total NATO spending. Only three other Members — Poland, Estonia and Greece — spend above 3%, while eight Members fall short of the existing 2% target.
“During the Cold War, Europeans spent far more than three percent of their GDP on defense,” Rutte said.
However, the Cold War comparison is highly erroneous. The Soviet Union was a direct peer competitor to the United States, with its tanks and troops right on the doorstep of Western Europe. Although the Soviet economy was never comparable to America’s, it nonetheless amounted to just over half of U.S. GNP in 1984. However, the Soviets spent considerably more on defense, and a CIA report of 1982 estimated that total Soviet military expenditure had exceeded U.S. spending by a small margin by 1980.
In the 1980s the Soviet Union had a standing military of 4.3 million personnel — more than two times the size of the U.S. standing military. The Soviet population by 1990 was 288 million compared to 250 million Americans. So, across key measures, it was a comparable, if not larger, adversary.
That comparison simply doesn’t apply today. Russia is not by any economic, demographic, or conventional military measure a peer competitor either to the U.S. or to the NATO alliance writ large. The sole exception is Russia’s nuclear arsenal, which is of a frighteningly comparable size.
Russian GDP is 24.5 times smaller than the combined GDP of NATO members and 11.5 times smaller than in the U.S. Its population is seven times smaller than the combined NATO population and almost two and a half times smaller than the American population. Its much expanded total military headcount is only 45% of the size of NATO standing armies. In an attritional war with NATO, which Russia has always sought to avoid, it would not have the demographic or economic reserves to win out.
So, the Cold War comparison is deeply unhelpful and irrelevant as a frame of reference. The bigger point is that, even with defense spending at current levels, NATO is the biggest military empire the world has ever seen. According to the SIPRI database, NATO in 2023 accounted for 57% of global defense spending.
To put that into perspective, at existing levels of spending NATO spends five times more on defense than China and 10 times more than Russia. Seven times more than the whole of Asia excluding China and India, 10 times more than the Middle East, 20 times more than Latin America and 31 times more than Africa.
If NATO moved to 3% of defense spending it would be an increase of around $260 billion per year at current prices. That’s 1.8 times more than Russia plans to spend on defense in total in 2025 (around $145 billion). And, just to be clear, almost all of that money would be spent on Russia’s doorstep in Europe, as the U.S. is already above the 3% mark. The European countries of NATO already spend 3.3 times more on defense than Russia plans to in 2025.
How many times bigger than Russia does NATO have to become before it convinces itself that Russian tanks aren’t about to roll into Riga?
So where would this extravagant spending by NATO go? Rutte talked about the need to revive the “hollowed out” NATO defence industry, so rest assured, much of the money will go towards military equipment.
On average, according to NATO data, 32% of defense spending across the group goes towards equipment (for the U.S., it is 30%). So, by those figures, NATO spends roughly $472 billion each year on military equipment alone, 3.2 times more than total planned military expenditure in Russia in 2025. That doesn’t sound “hollowed out” to me. Topping 3% would add another $83.5 billion each year to that whopping figure.
Little wonder that global defense companies, of which the top five are American, are pulling in record revenues right now. The U.S. accounts for around 57% of the global defense industry by both domestic production and defense exports. So, 3% in defense spending would mean U.S. firms had a combined income that was more than twice total Russian military spending.
Ah yes, but Europe needs to spend more in case America decides one day to leave the alliance. But it is not going to pull out of NATO any time soon. If Donald Trump likes one thing, it’s to turn a profit, and the NATO alliance is a massive gravy train for U.S. contractors.
From the Russian side, they see only an enormous and — to them — threatening military alliance seeking to grow larger still. If you like, NATO is to Russia what the Soviet Union was to Western Europe forty years ago. Russia is absolutely not waging a costly war in Ukraine because it wants to invade NATO next; it is doing so to prevent NATO moving any closer to its border.
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