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Nuclear arsenals growing as chances for diplomacy shrink: report

China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and North Korea each deployed more nuclear weapons last year, according to SIPRI.

Asia-Pacific
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Nuclear-armed states are expanding and modernizing their arsenals as tensions continue to rise between great powers, according to a new report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI estimates that militaries have deployed an additional 86 warheads over the past year, bringing the total number of active nuclear weapons to 9576. 

China added 60 warheads since the start of 2022, giving it a total arsenal of 410 nuclear weapons, according to SIPRI. Russia deployed an additional 12 nukes, with India, Pakistan, and North Korea making up the rest of the increase.

“It is increasingly difficult to square this trend with China’s declared aim of having only the minimum nuclear forces needed to maintain its national security,” argued SIPRI senior fellow Hans M. Kristensen in a press release.

The new data comes from SIPRI’s Yearbook, the organization’s annual report on global trends in weapons stockpiles and disarmament. 

Despite China’s notable increase, the United States and Russia continue to dominate all other states when it comes to nuclear stockpiles. Together, the two hold 85 percent of the world’s deployed nuclear weapons, and both plan to invest heavily in efforts to modernize their arsenals.

Chances for renewed disarmament talks have flagged following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine early last year. Washington and Moscow both took steps recently to reduce their compliance with the New START Treaty — the only agreement capping the number of warheads that each country deploys, which expires in 2026.

Notably, the United States announced earlier this month that it is ready to engage in new nuclear talks “without preconditions” with both Russia and China. But it remains unclear whether either state is interested in negotiating with Washington as geopolitical tensions continue to grow.

“This elevated nuclear competition has dramatically increased the risk that nuclear weapons might be used in anger for the first time since World War II,” SIPRI researcher Matt Korda said in a press release.

Meanwhile, some states have taken steps to reduce transparency around their nuclear stockpiles. The United States and United Kingdom “both declined to release information to the public concerning their nuclear forces in 2022, which they had done in previous years,” the report notes. The UK decision is particularly notable given its 2021 announcement that it will increase the limit on its arsenal from 225 to 260 warheads.

Data about the arsenals of other nuclear-armed states is also limited given the secrecy surrounding many countries’ nuclear programs. Israel has never admitted to possessing nuclear weapons, but SIPRI estimates that it currently has 90 warheads. North Korea, another secretive nuclear-armed state, has as many as 30 nuclear bombs, according to the report.


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Asia-Pacific
Dan Caine
Top photo credit: Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Air Force Gen. Dan Caine conduct a press briefing on Operation Epic Fury at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., March 4, 2026. (DoW photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)

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Gen. Dan Caine’s formulation of American war aims in Iran is remarkable not because it is bellicose, but because it is strategically incoherent.

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UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan receives Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the Presidential Airport in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates November 27, 2019. WAM/Handout via REUTERS

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QiOSK

On Sunday, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Mike Waltz told ABC News that Arab Gulf states may soon step up their involvement in the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. “I expect that you'll see additional diplomatic and possibly military action from them in the coming days and weeks,” Waltz said.

Then, on Monday morning, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) slammed Saudi Arabia for staying out of the war even as “Americans are dying and the U.S. is spending billions” of dollars to conduct regime change in Iran. “If you are not willing to use your military now, when are you willing to use it?” Graham asked. “Hopefully this changes soon. If not, consequences will follow.”

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Top image credit: Iranian army military personnel stand at attention under a banner featuring an image of an Iranian-made unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) during a military parade commemorating the anniversary of Army Day outside the Shrine of Iran's late leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the south of Tehran, Iran, on April 18, 2025. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto)

Why Tehran may have time on its side

QiOSK

A provocative calculus by Anusar Farrouqui (“policytensor”) has been circulating on X and in more exhaustive form on the author’s Substack. It purports to demonstrate a sobering reality: in a high-intensity U.S.-Iran conflict, the United States may be unable to suppress Iranian drone production quickly enough to prevent a strategically consequential period of regional devastation.

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