As Turkey braces for the runoff on May 28 — which experts agree is the most consequential presidential election in recent memory — uncertainty over the future course of Turkish foreign policy persists.
The contest that many Turks saw as a choice between democracy and autocracy, secularism and Islamism, did not produce definite results on May 14, giving voters another two weeks to make their choice between President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu.
Neither Turkey’s authoritarian president Erdogan, who has ruled the country and shaped its domestic and foreign policy transformation for the last two decades, nor the self-proclaimed democrat Kilicdaroglu, who leads a coalition of opposition forces, received more than 50 percent of the votes in the first round. The grandiose rallies, debates between ordinary citizens in public squares, the chants and songs praising candidates, and the heated race between Erdogan and Kilicdaroglu have been continuing since then as the country braces for a crucial runoff.
The election in the key NATO member country was closely watched around the world, including in Washington, where some appear confident that the victory of the opposition could finally reset Turkey’s strained relations with the West. As such, the unseating of Erdogan, as the thinking goes, would bring about a change of course for a country that has drifted away from the West and turned the page on liberal democracy.
In reality, hopes for a full reset of relations under a different leadership, especially with the United States, which still considers Turkey a strategic partner and ally, are misplaced. While Kilicdaroglu has indicated that he will pursue a more constructive approach vis-a-vis Western partners, such high expectations in Washington and other Western capitals account neither for the results of the parliamentary elections that were also held on May 14 and their implications, nor Kilicdaroglu’s unstable political posture as the leader of six coalition forces.
While Erdogan did not meet the threshold for an outright victory, the People’s Alliance, led by his Justice and Development Party and which includes the ultranationalist MHP, retained the majority in the country’s Parliament. Although Turkey switched to a presidential system of government under Erdogan, a move that has allowed Turkey’s strongman to extend his rule and loosen the checks on his executive power, the win of Erdogan’s coalition in the latest parliamentary elections has important ramifications.
First, some analysts predict that the victory of the People’s Alliance may prompt more voters to support Erdogan in order to avoid the political instability and fractured governance that Kilicdaroglu’s possible win in the runoff would bring. Presidential candidate Sinan Ogan, who received roughly 5 percent of the total votes, has already announced his endorsement of Erdogan, further diminishing Kilicdaroglu’s chances.
Second, if Kilicdaroglu were to be elected as a result of the runoff election, he would be facing a hostile parliamentary majority composed of pro-Erdogan and ultranationalist forces that can be expected to do everything in their power to hinder both the newly elected president’s domestic and foreign agenda.
Moreover, it is important to remember that Kilicdaroglu was nominated as the opposition’s candidate after a long and complicated process between several parties united in the desire to unseat Erdogan. While this unity may have brought Kilicdaroglu to the center of the stage in the race, it is unclear the extent and solidity of the political support he will have if elected.
It is also unclear whether the very forces that backed Kilicdaroglu and their ideological inclinations will not prove an equal hindrance to the presidential hopeful’s change of foreign policy course. For example, Meral Aksener, the leader of the Iyi Party that backs Kilicdaroglu, was formerly a prominent member of the Nationalist Movement Party (part of Erdogan’s People’s Alliance) and broke away to pursue her own political ambitions.
More importantly, falling into the trap of the unrealistic expectation that a change of leadership will allow the United States to once again bring Turkey in line with NATO and Western allies overlooks the deeper, structural issues in the relations that have always been present. Such a hopeful view neglects the gradual but rather permanent transformation of Turkish grand strategy and foreign policy under Erdogan's rule. The extent of this transformation and its impact on American interests has in part been overshadowed by the attachment of exceptional strategic importance to Turkey, a legacy of Cold War-era thinking and policymaking in Washington.
American officials and experts have come to acknowledge that the relationship between the United States and Turkey is in a perilous state. The list of issues has been growing over the last years, especially as Erdogan has been turning the once-praised secular country into an authoritarian state. Some of the most pressing issues include Turkey’s deepening military and economic ties with Russia, American support for Kurdish forces in Syria, growing tensions between Greece and Turkey, and Turkey’s democratic backsliding.
Surprisingly, a deeper, structural understanding of how Turkish foreign policy has shifted and how this dramatic shift makes sense within the context of Turkish grand strategy is still lacking in policymaking and expert circles in Washington. Through policies independent of and sometimes in contradiction to NATO and Western decision-making, military interventions abroad, and a strategy to maximize Turkish diplomatic power projection by leveraging its relationships with the West versus Russia, Erdogan has successfully brought Turkey to the center of global politics.
Yet, to look at Erdogan’s foreign policy choices, such as the interventions in conflicts in Libya or in Nagorno-Karabakh, as ways to simply increase geopolitical power or steer attention away from domestic issues is naive. Many in Turkey's political establishment and larger populace share Erdogan’s vision, which combines elements of Turkish nationalism, neo-Ottomanism, and Islamism. As the former Prime Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoglu declared in the Congress of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in 2012, “On the march of our holy nation the AK Party signals the birth of a global power and the mission for a new world order.”
The opposition to American primacy on the world stage and an order led by the United States and the West is exactly the prism through which Turkey’s foreign policy choices must be analyzed. Erdogan’s anti-Western rhetoric and policy choices are not simply an indication of his personal distaste for Western-style liberal democracy or a desire to disassociate Turkey from the West, but a manifestation of the vision, shared by Erdogan’s domestic allies and rivals alike, for Turkey as a great power.
In fact, the anti-Western views of Turkish leaders and elites matches the public’s view of America: a 2017 survey found that 72 percent of Turks view the United States as a security threat to their country.
The paranoia of “losing” a strategic partner or ally like Turkey has blinded many, leaving them in the dark about the fact that Turkey has been “lost” a long time ago. The general election results, even with the unknown final outcome to be decided on May 28, already affirms this “loss” and the need to reckon with reality. Given Erdogan’s better-than-expected performance on May 14 and increased chances after Ogan’s recent endorsement and the fact that Turkey just elected the most conservative and nationalist parliament in its modern history, Washington should not engage in wishful thinking.
As such, the United States should reassess and adjust its policy towards Turkey regardless of the eventual outcome of the presidential election on May 28. No outcome will guarantee the kind of strategy reversal by the Turkish government as those who still adhere to the Cold War-era bloc thinking would hope for.
The policy adjustment should begin, obviously, with a sincere reckoning and acceptance of the reality that Turkey, while formally a NATO ally, is no longer a de facto ally that can be fully trusted or depended on. Adjusting the status of Turkey and reducing strategic dependence for American security and military needs is an important first step in redefining the bilateral relationship and mitigating the risks that come with the continued evolution of Turkey’s new trajectory.
The U.S. government should review the status of military bases and American deployments in Turkey and explore ways to diversify or reduce such commitments in an effort to reduce strategic dependence on Turkey. American security assistance should be cut, and new restrictions on arms sales to Turkey should be placed.
This is especially important in light of the growing Russo-Turkish defense partnership, specifically Turkey's purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems , which raises important questions about the vulnerability of American and NATO military technologies to Russian intelligence gathering. Demilitarizing the relationship with Turkey and moving forward with a realistic understanding of Turkey’s new aspirations is an indispensable step for Washington to navigate the perilous international environment and the new multipolar world where restraint and caution should be exercised more often and more carefully.
