The federal government and U.S. taxpayers are effectively underwriting massive returns for Lockheed Martin shareholders, returns so impressive that the weapons firm’s CEO, James Taiclet, boasted about how the company handed $11 billion over to shareholders in 2022 via share repurchases and dividend payments, creating “significant value for our shareholders.”
Taiclet, speaking on a January 24 earnings call, said that Lockheed, the world’s largest weapons firm, was “ending the year with a total shareholder return of 40 percent.”
Lockheed may be a for-profit, publicly traded, company but those stock buybacks, dividends and appreciated stock value are largely underwritten by U.S. taxpayers. The company’s 2021 annual report acknowledged that, “…71% of our $67.0 billion in net sales were from the U.S. Government.”
Weapons companies often boast about the jobs they create and how their products are vital tools for U.S. national security. But in this case Lockheed is effectively acknowledging that billions of dollars of profit, overwhelmingly driven by U.S. government contracts, are being handed over to investors. In other words, $7.8 billion of the $11 billion transferred to shareholders in 2022 was effectively funded by the U.S. government and Americans who thought their tax dollars went to providing public services and keeping the country safe.
Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
Top image credit: Israeli forces arrest a Palestinian activist during a demonstration near Bethlehem, West Bank, November 14, 2012. Editorial credit: Ryan Rodrick Beiler / Shutterstock.com
What do human rights activists in Jerusalem, humanitarian aid workers in Gaza, and college students in New York all have in common according to Israel and its influence network? They all purportedly have links to terrorism. Although such accusations are often baseless, they are frequently used to besmirch and undercut those who are unwilling to do Israel’s bidding.
Although this is a tactic very much on display today, it is one I first came across while serving with the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) in the West Bank, when a similar pattern of accusations and complaints from Israel, as documented in a report that has not been previously disclosed, threatened to wreck what was, back then in 2008, already a tenuous peace process in the West Bank.
The USSC often acts as an unofficial broker between the Israeli and Palestinian security sectors. Despite significant progress in the delivery of security on the Palestinian side, Israel was dragging its feet, claiming a lack of confidence in the Palestinian Security Forces.
The Israelis’ basic argument was that the Palestinian Authority was not taking sufficient action against individuals Israel accused of terrorism, and therefore Israel did not have the confidence to deliver its side of the negotiations — to reduce checkpoints and IDF presence in the West Bank. With the usual public relations savvy, Israel argued both privately and in the press that the Palestinian Authority security system was nothing more than a "revolving door" in that the Palestinian Authority would arrest people Israel had claimed to be terrorists or have ties to terrorists, but then quickly release them.
The Bush administration at the time was committed to the negotiations process under the Roadmap for Peace, but with Israel threatening to halt any progress on the basis of its concerns, the U.S. decided it would have to step in and address them.
As the USSC lead for Palestinian security sector governance, I was charged with leading a study of the alleged "revolving door" problem, and with colleagues including a senior UK police officer and a Canadian military officer, conducted a thorough review of the allegations, producing an official report, which was briefed to both Palestinian and Israeli officials, and to the U.S. National Security Council.
That study, officially titled, “The Jenin Revolving Door Report,” was not a victory for any of the parties involved. Although some of the context it addressed is now somewhat dated, some of its key findings remain very relevant today, given the allegations that led to the report and the parallel pattern we see today of Israel making accusations of terrorism against individuals and organizations it views as adversaries, complaining when these accusations are not acted upon in a manner that Israel finds sufficient, and then leveraging its allegations and complaints as a part of a public relations strategy.
The report has never been publicly released. Given the passage of time, but also due to its relevance and the value of transparency, the complete text may be found here (with redactions only to protect the names of the other authors).
The report found was that there were plenty of challenges for all sides to address. For instance, when it came to the Palestinian side, the report concluded that "Palestinian law on some of the critical issues is often vague, and sometimes contradictory. The Palestinian criminal justice system is both overloaded and under-resourced."
However, more germane to the broader pattern, and the one we see today, of Israeli government weakly-sourced accusations and its subsequent complaints of inaction, are the findings of the report as it relates to Israel's approach, and in particular that:
"A final element to be considered here is the method by which Israel does transfer requests for arrest, detention, or other security actions to the Palestinian Authority. The common mechanism for this is the provision by the Israeli security establishment to elements of the Palestinian security establishment, of “lists” of targets (which may be people or institutions) and ‘actions requested,’ such as arrests or closures.
"These lists, which are not displayed in this report due to their sensitive nature, but examples of which have been viewed by the reporting team, commonly lack any evidence to substantiate the validity of the targets. Indeed, Palestinian reviews of the lists have shown many of them to be inaccurate or outdated, requesting, for example, the detention of deceased persons. These lists, then[,] represent the meeting of the thin requirements of the Israeli military and intelligence establishment with the rather more weighty ones of the Palestinian criminal justice system. The P.A. cannot simply arrest and administratively detain persons because Israel wants it done; it has processes it must follow, and these processes coincide, for the most part, with international human rights and legal best practice."
The provision of a list of names does not by itself constitute hard evidence for anything and in the experience of the U.S. Security Coordinator at the time I served in it, Israel's lists were often flawed and inaccurate, as the Revolving Door Report describes. Then, Israel refused to provide any corroborating information to substantiate its accusations, claiming that its accusations derived from sensitive intelligence sources. But even then, intelligence, as any national security official will tell you, is not evidence, and is often wrong.
Raw intelligence reporting may be the standard upon which Israel conducts detention operations — or even lethal strikes — but it does not suffice for any use by a third party, unless that third party is willing to take it on trust. In my experience, even the United States, which does tend to take Israeli allegations and claims at face value, has also developed an institutional understanding over time that there is often less to these Israeli allegations than meets the eye, like when it came to Israel's justifications for a strike in Gaza in 2021 that leveled a high rise building that multiple news agencies used as their offices, or as when, in 2022, Israel accused six Palestinian human rights organizations of terrorist ties.
In addition to recommending steps to close the gap between Israeli intelligence leads and substantiated facts that could meet evidentiary standards, the Revolving Door Report recommended that "Israel should thoroughly review its [own] current arrest and detention practices … in order to bring them into accord with international law," a recommendation that, as the UK government determined last September, it does not meet to this day.
The report also suggested a certain irony in Israel's identification of targets and complaints of inaction by third parties given the exploitation of its detention system as an intelligence tool for the purposes of serving Israeli interests:
"Israel does not try every Palestinian it detains, nor, although statistics are not available at this time, does it detain for significant periods every Palestinian it arrests. Rather, arrests and detentions form a regular part of intelligence gathering activities for the Government of Israel, and are often thought to be more pre-emptive or deterrent than they are reactive to specific threats. As Israel focuses on threats to its own state and citizens, it likely prioritizes these threats above those which are directed against the Palestinian Authority. From a Palestinian perspective, therefore, it is often seen that Israel, aside from the legality of its actions in arresting and detaining Palestinians, does itself maintain a revolving door. ..."
Today, we see similar allegations used not to derail a peace process, but to undermine the credibility of those who express concern regarding, or protest against, Israel’s violence against Palestinians.
One example can be found when Israel shuttered six Palestinian human rights organizations in 2022 amid allegations that they operated as a front for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The Israeli government raided the offices of one of those organizations — Defense of Children International Palestine (DCIP) — one day after the United States informed Israel that it found DCIP’s reporting of the rape of a child in an Israeli detention facility credible. Many Western governments responded by cutting all ties with these organizations, only to quietly re-establish those ties several months later when Israel failed to produce any compelling evidence for its accusations.
More recently, in the context of its broader efforts to undercut the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Israel has again, and with much public fanfare, levied a series of allegations that 108 of UNRWA’s employees in Gaza are members of Hamas's military wing, the Izzedin al Qassam Brigades. To date, UNRWA has been unable to substantiate those accusations, and despite UNRWA’s good-faith requests as it conducts an investigation, Israel has not provided any further evidence to back up its allegations.
And now, in a continuation of this pattern which is as alarming as it is absurd, similar accusations have made their way into the U.S. legal system. In a legal filing brought in late March, Israel’s American surrogates accused the Columbia University chapter of Students for Justice in Palestine of having foreknowledge of Hamas’s October 7 attack. This accusation — which appears to be based on the single testimony of an Israeli hostage of a claim made by his captors— is bizarre given that Hamas didn’t even give its sponsor Iran tactical warning. Why would Hamas leaders alert some college students in New York? Regardless of the accusation’s merit, the reputational damage to SJP is done.
As the work conducted in the Revolving Door Report demonstrates when it comes to Israeli allegations of terrorism, there is often less than meets the eye. Going forward, organizations and individuals facing thinly-sourced Israeli allegations of ties to terrorism should demand substantive evidence. If Israel cannot or will not provide such evidence, it should be ignored.
Is the trade war launched by Donald Trump the act of a madman or a mad genius?
To the extent Trump’s tariffs are a “negotiating strategy,” as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has claimed, are critics missing that they are simply part of the “art of the deal” that will enable America to gain coercive leverage over other states? According to the madman theory of international politics, it is possible Trump’s gambit has a strategic logic. However, there is a crucial flaw with this strategy that will likely cause it to fail.
The madman theory was developed in the nuclear weapons era by the scholars Daniel Ellsberg(the leaker of the Pentagon Papers) and Thomas Schelling (who won the Nobel Prize in economics). Its logic is that some threats, such as launching a nuclear attack against a nuclear-armed opponent, inherently lack credibility because carrying them out would be irrational in that it would cause both the target state and the threatening state great pain. However, if the leader making the threat is perceived as irrational or crazy, then the threat may actually be believable, and the target could decide that backing down to avoid punishment is the prudent option.
As Richard Nixon said in a private oval office discussion with his chief of staff in 1968:
“I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe that I’ve reached the point that I might do anything to stop the war. We’ll just slip the word to them that ‘for God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can’t restrain him when he is angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button’—and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.”
Trump’s tariff strategy may follow a similar logic. According to the Yale Budget Lab, Trump’s tariffs could increase prices for the average American household by almost $5,000 just this year. Given the mutual costs Trump’s tariffs involve, his threats may lack credibility on their face, just as many nuclear threats do.
However, to the extent Trump is perceived of as at least somewhat crazy, his threats may be more believable than if he was viewed as rational. In fact, like Nixon, Trump is a self-professed fan of the madman strategy. For example, in a discussion with top cabinet officials regarding the U.S.-South Korea trade deal in 2017, Trump reportedly told Robert Lighthizer, the U.S. Trade Representative:
“You’ve got 30 days, and if you don’t get concessions then I’m pulling out.” “Ok, well I’ll tell the Koreans they’ve got 30 days,” Lighthizer replied. “No, no, no,” Trump interjected. “That’s not how you negotiate. You don’t tell them they’ve got 30 days. You tell them, this guy’s so crazy he could pull out any minute…You tell them if they don’t give the concessions now, this crazy guy will pull out of the deal.”
Trump’s plan to end the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement in his first term was ultimately foiled by Gary Cohn, his chief economic advisor, who reportedly stole from Trump’s desk a letter that would have made the withdrawal official after Trump signed it. However, with a team of more loyal and pliant advisors installed in his second term, Trump has been able to follow through on his trade war strategy based on the madman theory.
Trump also seems to believe that this strategy is having the intended effect: “I am telling you, these countries are calling us up, kissing my ass. They are dying to make a deal…‘Please, sir, make a deal. I’ll do anything. I’ll do anything sir.’” Indeed, the European Union and countries like Vietnam and Israel have offered to lower trade barriers on American goods in return for the removal of Trump’s tariffs. The U.S. and Britain also just struck a trade deal that ostensibly involves some real, even if limited, concessions by the United Kingdom.
Despite some advantages, however, the madman strategy is far from a panacea and entails significant drawbacks that will likely limit what Trump is able to achieve. One major issue (for which I provided evidence in a peer-reviewed study that conducted surveys of the American public) is that a leader who is perceived as mad is likely to face increasing levels of disapproval among their own domestic public. This can then undermine their bargaining leverage with foreign leaders.
The madman strategy is generally unpopular domestically because the public values competence in leaders, and thus is unlikely to look kindly on a leader it perceives of as actually or potentially crazy. Alexander Hamilton made this argument about John Adams, a member of his own Federalist Party, when discussing the “great and intrinsic defects in his character, which unfit him for the office of Chief Magistrate.”
Richard Nixon said much the same in a private Oval Office conversation in 1973, when he said, “We are never going to have a madman as president, in this office…Ours [system] throws them out…about every four years, if a guy shows that he’s [unclear phrase], out!” That is one key reason why Nixon kept his own attempt to use the madman strategy to convince the Soviets and Vietnamese he was crazy and might use nuclear weapons to win the Vietnam War secret from the American public.
This reasoning helps explain why Trump’s trade war is unpopular domestically. Moreover, well-known psychological biases make average citizens more averse to losses than they are attracted to gains. In the case of a trade war, this means the public is likely to be wary of paying higher prices than they were previously in return for the theoretical promise of greater domestic production in the future. This is especially the case given that Trump’s promises to tame inflation was one of his campaign’s most effective selling points in winning the presidency last fall.
The domestic unpopularity of the madman strategy can undermine a leader’s leverage in negotiations with other states, as foreigners may doubt the leader will have the political capital to enact or maintain the threatened policies in the short, medium, or long term. This is what appears to be happening in the case of Trump’s tariffs, as the strongly negative reaction among the U.S. public and business community—the fact that that, in Trump’s words, “they were getting a little bit yippy, a little bit afraid”—forced the president to dramatically reverse course and pause the tariffs for 90 days before even a single deal was struck, undermining his bargaining leverage.
Some foreign governments may now question whether Trump will be willing to reimpose the tariffs even if his terms are not met. As a New York Times article put it, “[Chinese leader] Xi [Jinping] learned that his adversary has a pain point.” Just this weekend, the U.S. agreed to temporarily lower tariffs on China from 145% to 30% without yet receiving any specific, substantive concessions in return. By backing down, Trump may also have revealed that he is less crazy than he would like adversaries to believe, which was also the fatal flaw of Nixon’s attempt to use the madman strategy to win the Vietnam War.
In sum, while critics who claim the madman theory has zero utility are somewhat overstating the case, it does have crucial flaws that will severely undermine what Trump will likely be able to achieve in the realm of international trade. Moreover, the harsh economic costs of this strategy and its blatant inconsistency with long-held American values championed since World War II make it a clearly unwise course to pursue moving forward.
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Top photo credit: US Marines aboard a LAV-25 Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) keep a sharp watch around their vehicle after their patrol was stopped by supporters of GEN. Manuel Noriega on the road leading into the town, 10/31/1989. ( J. Alan Elliott, USN/public domain)
This is the first in a new Quincy Institute/Responsible Statecraft project series highlighting the writing and reporting of U.S. military veterans. Click here for more information.
When the red tracers of an AC130 gunship’s minigun slashed through the warm, dry night skies above Panama City at 12:41 AM on December 20, 1989, few guessed that it would mark an opening stanza in America’s expansive unipolar moment.
In the hours that followed, more than 20,000 U.S. troops conducted a swift and violent invasion of a sovereign state to remove the inconvenient and venal regime of General Manuel Antonio Noriega, who had embarrassed and bedeviled U.S. policymakers for years.
Now nearly forgotten, this invasion — bequeathed with the trite and even cynical name of “Operation JUST CAUSE” — marked a tentative but crucial first step toward the “forever wars” of today. Freed from the frightening, but disciplining, constraints of the Cold War, American leaders were now unchecked by rival powers, and the very perception of success for Operation JUST CAUSE would help shape their decisions going forward.
Conceived as the illegitimate child of America’s late 19th and early 20th century flirtation with regional imperialism and the naval theories of U.S. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, Panama and its canal have long exerted significant pull over U.S. strategy and domestic politics. A more fulsome account of the U.S.-Panamanian relationship is beyond the scope of this essay, but the hypocrisy and bad faith on both sides in this tragicomic saga has few equals, even in the annals of U.S. hemispheric policy.
The 1977 Panama Canal Treaty was ratified against fierce Republican opposition, and it provided for a 22-year turnover transition during which time there would be a hybrid administration of the Canal Zone. By 1989, this resulted in a dizzying checkerboard of U.S. and Panama Defense Force (PDF) military installations interspersed next to and co-located with each other across the isthmus. The U.S. reserved the treaty right to intervene militarily to protect the canal.
The agreement, however, was predicated upon the assumption of good relations between the signatories, a dubious proposition even under the nationalist but pragmatic Panamanian regime of Omar Torrijos. When the cartoonishly duplicitous Manuel Noriega assumed de facto power in Panama after Torrijos’ death in 1981, he initially leveraged support for Reagan’s policies in Central America to mask his growing ties with drug cartels and other adversaries. This awkward fling ended, when Noriega’s 1987 indictment on federal drug charges ushered in a hostile turn in relations.
Noriega quickly became a political detriment to the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations. Anti-Noriega candidates decisively won elections in May 1989, only for regime militias to violently overturn the results. Performative U.S. sanctions caused considerable damage to the populace, but did little to dislodge Noriega, who also saw off two coup attempts in 1988 and 1989.
During the latter attempt, with Noriega in the custody of the golpistas, American forces sealed two of the three routes leading to PDF Headquarters (“La Comandancia”) in Panama City, but failed to put in a third roadblock allowing loyalist forces to defeat the coup, rescue Noriega, and inflict a humiliating defeat on the Bush administration.
As tensions skyrocketed, U.S. military preparations accelerated and evolved from a special forces “snatch” operation personally targeting Noriega into a massive strike designed to destroy the PDF and uproot the regime in its entirety.
When PDF troops killed a U.S. Marine at a checkpoint in Panama City and detained and brutalized another U.S. family, Bush acted. Thousands of U.S. troops conducted a crushing and aggressive night attack, achieving complete surprise and effectively destroying the PDF by daybreak. After hiding for several days, Noriega was forced to flee, seeking refuge at the Papal Nunciature. Resistance quickly faded, and Noriega was extradited to the U.S. after several days of negotiations.
The denied victors in the May election assumed the reins of power. In the following weeks, most U.S. troops returned home, although units in Panama battled a massive crime wave and rooted out pockets of Noriega supporters. Twenty-three U.S. troops were killed. Panamanian casualty estimates are mired in controversy, with SOUTHCOM estimating that 314 PDF troops had died, along 202 civilians, and leftist sources citing higher civilian tolls.
For the U.S., JUST CAUSE was at the time a clear success. A quick, decisive, low-cost military operation had laid to rest a humiliating years-long array of diplomatic and policy failures. The invasion was an important proof of concept as one of the first skirmishes fought after passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act which provided for new unified “Regional Commands.”
It also marked a tactical inflection point: for over 200 years, U.S. ground forces had followed a distinctly “solar powered” pattern of operating in the day and digging in at night. In Panama, U.S. troops emerged as lethal and effective night fighters. The All-Volunteer Force — whose performance in the 1970s and early 80s had been shaky at best — finally seemed to deliver the capabilities that its early boosters had envisioned.
Strategically, however, the invasion of Panama has not aged as well. In hindsight, it seems policymakers drew a series of suboptimal initial lessons from this venture, which were then amplified by the much larger 1991 Gulf War.
First, U.S. leaders were seduced by the low casualties, domestic popularity, and quick success achieved first in Panama, and then repeated in DESERT STORM. These two operations enabled a strategic recalculation of the perceived costs and benefits of military action and elevated the relative attractiveness of military options. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the greater policymaker demand for “kinetic” solutions throughout the 1990s led to a dramatic spike in military activity.
Second, the invasion of Panama was clearly a “false positive” for the efficacy of regime change operations. The quick and politically antiseptic removal of a hostile government, and the ease with which the U.S. installed a new one, incentivized policymakers toward maximalist demands, incrementally undermining the messy and emotionally unsatisfying drudgery of diplomacy.
Bu the “Cliffs Notes” version of the operation that the policy community took on generally dismissed the unique advantages the U.S. military enjoyed in Panama, such the solid intelligence picture gleaned from an eighty-year presence, Noriega’s overwhelming unpopularity among Panamanians, and the existence of a legitimate alternate government.
Finally, the rapid success of the invasion and the ease with which it lanced an ugly and embarrassing political boil for the United States (Noriega) encouraged policy planning that underestimated or even obviated the need to plan for messy post-conflict political engagement. This is not surprising: military success is clean and popular; diplomacy is hard and draining. We retroactively devalued having a viable, legitimate, indigenous political option in Panama.
By contrast, when we went into Afghanistan and later Iraq, swift military success was followed by a policy vacuum and then by chaos and violence.
Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates once said that “success is a lousy teacher. It seduces people into thinking they can’t lose.” This was certainly the case for Operation JUST CAUSE. As we look back on decades of perpetual conflict and consider the path that brought us here, it is hard to look at the invasion of Panama as anything other than an early success that subsequently helped teach policymakers a slew of very dubious lessons.
And as any pre-GPS traveler remembers, it is hard to recover from an early wrong turn, especially when the mistakes only become clear miles down the road.
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