The Atlantic “Ideas” article had all the trappings of an insightful think piece co-authored by one of the most successful former CEOs in Silicon Valley, Eric Schmidt.
Schmidt, who headed up Google from 2001 to 2011, writing alongside Robert O. Work, described by The Atlantic as “the 32nd U.S. deputy secretary of defense,” were given over 2000 words to lay out “Offset-X,” a strategy “for the U.S. to restore the technological superiority of its military over all potential adversaries.” At the heart of their strategy is the pivot by the Department of Defense to great power competition and the rapid development and deployment of artificial intelligence technologies.
But there’s a huge potential conflict of interest that the Atlantic failed to disclose to readers on Monday: Schmidt’s venture capital firm Innovation Endeavors is an enthusiastic investor in AI products for the military. Work, for his part, is chairman of the board for Sparkcognition Government Systems, a company that describes itself as the “first full-spectrum artificial intelligence company that leverages proven commercial technologies to meet the needs of the most pressing national security missions.”
In other words, the policies advocated by the two writers in the Atlantic could provide them with direct financial benefits.
And the authors are clear about their worldview that provides an unquestioning endorsement of U.S. military primacy and global hegemony, with no acknowledgement of costs to U.S. citizens who aren’t directly invested in the expensive technology both authors are invested in promoting. They write:
Our military primacy allowed us to shape the global economy — unlocking trillions of dollars for U.S. companies and citizens — and secure the free flow of commerce that enabled supply chains to function and globalization to flourish. It also allowed us to establish the global data network that powers the digital economy and international communication. Most important, our hegemony has helped protect democracy worldwide against challenges from authoritarianism.
Running up the cost of war, a cost that U.S. taxpayers are already footing with a defense budget that currently stands at $847 billion and will likely reach $1 trillion by the end of the decade, is certainly a strategy that would directly benefit two investors in AI weapons. But what’s beneficial for Schmidt and Work might have more costs than benefits for the country as a whole. The Atlantic failed to reveal that the authors had a set of financial interests that may run counter to those of the American public.
The Atlantic did not respond to a request for comment.
Eli Clifton is a senior advisor at the Quincy Institute and Investigative Journalist at Large at Responsible Statecraft. He reports on money in politics and U.S. foreign policy.
Former Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work (CNAS/Flickr/Creative Commons) and Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt (World Economic Forum/Flickr/Creative Commons)|Former Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work (U.S. Army photo) and Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt (World Economic Forum/Flickr/Creative Commons)|
Top image credit: U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee looks on during the day he visits the Western Wall, Judaism's holiest prayer site, in Jerusalem's Old City, April 18, 2025. REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun
Mike Huckabee is many things. A former Republican presidential candidate. The former governor of Arkansas. Father of the current governor of Arkansas. A Baptist minister.
He is also the current U.S. Ambassador to Israel. President Donald Trump said he chose Huckabee because, “He loves Israel and the people of Israel, and likewise, the people of Israel love him.”
Huckabee’s not loving Israel quite as much at the moment, as American evangelical Christians seeking to visit the country are having quite the time trying to get their tourist visas approved.
This has never been a problem. Huckabee’s first trip to the country, what he calls a “holy ground to Jews, Christians and Muslims” was in 1973 and he claims to have visited about a hundred times. American Christian groups have been traveling to Israel with relative legal ease for decades.
But, in a recent letter to Israel’s Interior Minister Moshe Arbel, obtained by The Times of Israel, Huckabee expressed his frustration with Israel’s, apparently new, policy of keeping American Christians out of the country and even threatened to do the same to Israelis wanting to visit the U.S. if something doesn’t change.
“It is with great distress that I write to you my profound disappointment that the meeting held in your office has not resulted in what I hoped to be a simple resolution of the issue of routine granting of visas for Christian organizations and workers, as has been practiced for decades,” Huckabee wrote.
Copies of the letter were sent by Huckabee to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Isaac Herzog, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana.
Huckabee continued, “It would be very unfortunate that our embassy would have to publicly announce throughout the United States that the State of Israel is no longer welcoming Christian organizations and their representatives and is instead engaging in harassment and negative treatment toward organizations with long-standing relationships and positive involvement toward Zionism and friendship to the Jewish people and the State of Israel.”
Huckabee clearly sees the treatment of these Christian groups as harassment.
According to the Times, “Huckabee wrote to Arbel that at the start of 2025, the Interior Ministry launched investigations into several evangelical Christian organizations with long ties to Israel, including the Baptist Conference in Israel and the Christian Missionary Alliance.”
“Huckabee informed Arbel that these organizations were required to complete lengthy questionnaires and that they had still not received new visas for religious leaders to travel to Israel, despite submitting their applications at the beginning of the year,” the report noted.
These are harsh words from Huckabee, who as a Zionist believes that God made a covenant with the Jews of the Old Testament, which gives Israel claim to the land.
This tension also comes on the heels of Israel launching a strike on Gaza’s only Catholic church, in which three were killed and its priest, injured. Pope Leo XIV renewed his call for a ceasefire in Gaza after the incident, and has been outspokenly opposed to the killing in that region throughout his papacy. While Israel apologized for the strike, some within the Church, like Cardinal Pierrebattista Pizzaballa, have expressed doubts, hinting that it may have been intentional after Catholic leaders recently condemned Israeli settler attacks on a West Bank Christian town.
It’s unclear why Israel is singling out all Christians in these cases or whether it has to do with criticisms of its wars from the Catholic Church.
Indeed, while the Vatican has condemned the war in Gaza, Zionist Christians of Huckabee’s stripe rarely, if ever, question or criticize Israel’s government, most particularly that of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. American evangelicals even regularly fly Israeli flags along with American ones, even in Congress.
Yet here we are. One of America’s most high profile evangelical political figures is really ticked off at the Israeli government for denying American Christians the opportunity to see the country.
Huckabee wrote in the letter, “If the government of Israel continues to cause the expense and bureaucratic harassment for the granting of routine visas that for decades have been routine, I will have no other choice than to instruct our consular section to review options for reciprocal treatment of Israeli citizens seeking visas to the United States.”
The ambassador also threatened to tell American Christians that their donations to Israel are not warmly received and that maybe they should change their travel plans if they include Israel.
This is new, tense ground when it comes to the relationship between Israel and American Christians, historically some of the most avid supporters of Israel.
How big or bad or could this rift get? Who knows. But when Israel has lost Mike Huckabee …
As early as next Tuesday, Congress will vote on two bills that will make it easier for the U.S. government and U.S. arms makers to push weapons out the door to foreign clients more quickly, with less time for congressional scrutiny, and, in some cases, with Congress not even being informed that the sales are happening.
At a time when arms sales are a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy, for good or for ill, this is a misguided approach that will increase the risks that U.S. arms transfers will sow instability, fuel conflicts, and enable violations of the laws of war.
The centrality of arms sales is a result of the decline in boots-on-the-ground conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan, and a reduction in drone strikes from the peak reached in the Obama years
Major sales have ranged from transfers aimed at helping Ukraine defend itself from Russia’s invasion to billions in military aid and arms transfers that have enabled Israel’s campaign of mass slaughter in Gaza and its escalation to attacks on Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.
And while sales to these nations have drawn the vast bulk of media, congressional, and public attention, they are far from the only ones. In most years, the United States supplies weapons to over 100 nations, a third of which are categorized as “not free” by Freedom House. And a study by the Quincy Institute during the Biden administration found that 34 of 46 conflicts occurring at that time involved one or more parties armed by the United States.
In short, while some U.S. arms transfers, like supplies to Ukraine, live up to our public commitment to provide weapons to help allies defend themselves without the need to introduce U.S. troops to the conflict, many of them enable serious human rights abuses or fuel destabilizing wars.
Despite these negative impacts of increased arms sales on U.S. global security interests, the bills that Congress will consider next week (described in detail below) would, if passed, reduce vetting of future sales in the name of speeding up the process. It is a dangerous approach that will increase the risks to the security of the U.S. and its allies. This decrease in scrutiny will amount to an abdication of Congress’s responsibility to engage in careful consideration of which deals will be stabilizing and which will escalate already volatile situations in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond.
The bills in question include Rep. Mike Lawler’s (R-N.Y.) “Abraham Accords Defense Against Terror Act,” which would make it easier to rush arms to members of the Abraham Accords. Current members include Morocco, which has long illegally occupied the Western Sahara; Bahrain, which has systematically cracked down on human rights in the wake of the Arab Spring; and the UAE, which has been a destabilizing force in the region, from partnering with Saudi Arabia in its brutal war on Yemen to shipping weapons to the opposition in Sudan, a group that has been charged with widespread war crimes. Lawler’s bill also includes fast tracking arms to Israel, which many independent experts believe to be engaged in a genocide in Gaza. Claims that bringing these repressive, reckless regimes closer together will increase the chances of peace in the region are wishful thinking at best, and a devil’s bargain at worst.
Another bill will increase the threshold at which an arms sale would need to be reported to Congress. Given that transfers below the current threshold have been used to enable countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel to kill civilians with impunity, it makes no sense to raise those thresholds and make it even easier for the executive branch to keep Congress and the public in the dark about controversial sales.
For example, the Washington Post revealed that in the first few months of Israel’s war on Gaza the U.S. made an astonishing 100 arms deals with Tel Aviv that were below the threshold that would have required them to be reported. Increasing thresholds makes it easier for administrations to do an end run around Congress and the public to transfer arms to questionable regimes. It’s a bad idea, and members of Congress who want to align U.S. arms sales with legitimate U.S. security interests should unite to block it.
Given the central role of arms sales in U.S. foreign and security policies and the devastating consequences of rushing weapons to nations engaged in aggression and internal repression, Congress should be increasing its ability to block dubious deals, not hobbling its own oversight role and ability to meaningfully weigh in on pressing U.S. national security matters.
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Top photo credit: Ukrainian T-64BM tank crews conduct the Defensive Operations lane during the Strong Europe Tank Challenge (SETC) at the 7th Army Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, May 10, 2017. (7th Army Training Command/Flickr)
The Russia-Ukraine war, more than any other external challenge faced by the Trump administration, has proven to be an intractable conflict that defies straightforward solutions.
One of the main sticking points that has made a ceasefire and settlement so painful to negotiate is the stark misalignment between Russian and Ukrainian postwar security concerns.
Ukraine seeks ironclad guarantees against future Russian aggression. These can come in two general forms: outside assurances, with the most conspicuous one being the Article V protections that come with NATO membership, or the “steel porcupine” strategy whereby Ukraine builds up its own robust domestic deterrent with assistance from Western states.
Both approaches are saddled by what is known in international relations theory as the security dilemma. That is, measures taken by Ukraine to dramatically bolster its defenses as part of a war termination framework will be perceived as threatening and therefore deemed unacceptable by Moscow. This perception problem cannot be solved merely by insisting that Moscow’s concerns are unfounded, especially in the context of record low trust between Russia and the West, nor can these concerns be overridden.
Russia has the leverage, conferred by its outsized latent power, long-term battlefield advantages, and escalation dominance, to reject any settlement that it views as incompatible with its core security interests. Ukraine, for its part, cannot accept a settlement that leaves it vulnerable to a future Russian attack. Squaring this circle requires not just persistent outside mediation but creative thinking about the kinds of guarantees that can be provided without feeding into escalatory spirals with Russia.
The solution is a group of Western weapons stockpiles that would be stored outside Ukrainian territory by host countries and temporarily released to Ukraine’s armed forces in the event of future Russian aggression. These weapons, which would include but are not limited to Patriot batteries, ATACMS, HIMARS, Storm Shadow missiles, Leopard 2 and Abrams tanks, and F-16 fighter jets, would be sourced from American arms purchased by European countries as well as European donors.
To stimulate investments into the off-site stockpiles, the U.S. would agree that a portion of the spending toward these banks will be deductible from the 5% defense spending target for NATO member states.
Purchasers do not necessarily have to be hosts; for example, Sweden can procure U.S. HIMARS missiles meant for a stockpile located in Romania. Other potential host countries include Poland, Germany, Czechia, and the Baltic states. These weapons banks would be maintained by the host countries and governed by a special commission within the EU. A sufficient number of Ukrainian servicemembers, after factoring in all relevant sustainment and rotation requirements, would be trained and available at all times to use these weapons without direct Western operation. The commission would undertake logistical responsibilities of ensuring that the stockpiles are modernized and maintained.
A future Russian invasion would trigger a short consultation period after which, if the aggression does not cease, the off-stockpiles would be unlocked and their contents surged to the Ukrainian military. These weapons would be leased to Ukraine for the duration of hostilities and returned to the host countries after the fighting ends.
These stockpiles would be spread across Europe to minimize risks for any single host country. Russia would be provided with general information about the kinds of systems that are in these stockpiles, but not with full inventorized lists, and independent verification mechanisms will be established to ensure that none of the stored weapons will be leaked to Ukraine in peacetime. As part of the agreement, Moscow will acknowledge that any attack or verified act of sabotage carried out against any off-site stockpile puts Russia in a state of war with the host country and falls squarely under NATO’s Article 5 collective defense provisions.
Countries and locations in closer proximity to Ukraine would be prioritized for most off-site stockpiles, minimizing Russia’s window to inflict damage on Ukraine prior while the deliveries are in transit. Ukraine would re-orient its force posture to emphasize fortifications, mines, drone swarms, and other defensive tools to blunt Russian advances while it waits for stockpile weapons to arrive.
This model offers a range of benefits to all the stakeholders involved.
Kyiv has long lamented the gradual, "drip, drip, drip" style in which Western aid has been transferred since 2022. The off-site stockpile model guarantees a critical mass of high-impact weapons ready to be delivered nearly immediately and all at once, with the infrastructure and sustainment needed to support them already in place. This positions Ukraine to decisively counter a future Russian assault and seize the initiative in the conflict’s opening stages, minimizing the likelihood of another protracted attrition war that plays to Russia’s inherent strengths.
Because these weapons would not be stationed on Ukrainian soil, the quantities that can be allocated to the offsite stockpiles are substantially higher than what Russia would accept as part of an Istanbul 2022-style domestic deterrent agreement.
Kyiv would, reasonably, require assurances that the weapons banks will not be held hostage to national politics or bilateral issues between Ukraine and the host countries. The decision to unlock the stockpiles would be governed by a ratified agreement between the EU and Ukraine. Unlike the Budapest Memorandum, this agreement would be binding and its execution not subject to the discretion of national parliaments or heads of state. Host countries found to be in breach of the agreement would be subjected to EU-level sanctions which will remain in place until they re-enter compliance.
Current Western defense-industrial production rates mean it would take some time for the banks to be filled, but it must be recognized that these same resource limitations already apply to weapons Ukraine is currently waiting to receive from its Western partners. It is preferable from Ukraine’s perspective to wait for the stockpiles to accrue in peacetime, as part of a ceasefire building into a larger U.S.-led settlement between Russia and the West, than to continue receiving a small fraction of what Kyiv needs to sustain the war effort in the midst of relentless and intensifying Russian attrition warfare.
The risks implicit in informing the Russians about the contents of the stockpile are minor for the reason that Russian intelligence already commands a good grasp of what the West has and is willing to send Ukraine. The provision of every new kind of weapon system has been accompanied by lengthy public debates in the West, so the train has well left the station when it comes to maintaining the element of surprise. The alternative “steel porcupine” strategy, too, does not support any real strategic ambiguity, as Russia has sufficient intelligence capabilities to keep abreast of Ukraine’s domestic buildup and future procurement plans.
The Kremlin has long maintained that it will not accept any threats to Russia from Ukrainian territory. These stockpiles do not increase Ukrainian or Western offensive power against Russia precisely because they will not be on Ukrainian soil, and they can only pose a threat if Russia commits future acts of aggression against Ukraine. They are, in that sense, a purely defensive tool.
This model is not, in itself, enough to affect war termination in Ukraine, nor is it viable without a larger framework deal that re-establishes rules of the game between Russia and the West. A panoply of other issues, including delimitation, non-bloc status and EU membership, sanctions, and ceasefire monitoring, will have to be negotiated.
But the off-site stockpile proposal is the best way to provide Ukraine with substantial guarantees without feeding into the security dilemma that has played a major role in stymying diplomatic efforts to achieve a durable peace.
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