Defense officials are worried that U.S. weapons transfers to Ukraine are reducing the Pentagon’s military readiness, according to the Wall Street Journal.
“It is not at the level we would like to go into combat,” a defense official said, adding that current stockpiles of artillery ammunition are “uncomfortably low.” And, given that it can take years to purchase new weapons from weapons makers, this shortfall could last well into the future.
The news shows just how dramatically American weapons stocks have fallen in recent months in order to support Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion. It also highlights the massive financial windfall that arms manufacturers will receive in the coming months and years as taxpayers fund a boost in weapons production.
The Pentagon has pledged to send nearly $13 billion in arms since the war began. Around $8 billion of those transfers have been drawn directly from DoD stockpiles, while the other weapons packages will come from new contracts with arms makers.
The discomfort at the Pentagon may help explain why DoD has shifted away from sending 155 mm artillery shells, opting instead to ship 105 mm rounds to Ukraine in a recent drawdown.
The Wall Street Journal notes that defense industry leaders have expressed concerns that defense officials are not moving fast enough if they want to quickly replenish their stocks. As the head of Lockheed Martin said in July, DoD will have to “shift gears” in order to return weapons stores to pre-war levels.
Despite their frustrations, there’s little doubt that defense giants will be the biggest winners from the billions that the United States has invested in Kyiv’s defense. And these gains could last well beyond the war in Ukraine: According to the Wall Street Journal, the Army has already asked Congress for $500 million per year in order to enhance its ammo factories.
Connor Echols is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft. He was previously an associate editor at the Nonzero Foundation, where he co-wrote a weekly foreign policy newsletter. Echols received his bachelor’s degree from Northwestern University, where he studied journalism and Middle East and North African Studies.
Soldiers assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Field Artillery, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, fire a M777 towed 155 mm Howitzer on Qayyarah West Airfield, Iraq, Aug. 10, 2019. (U.S. Army Reserve photo by Spc. DeAndre Pierce)
BEIJING, China - Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) prepares to make a speech at the start of the first ministerial meeting hosted by China with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States at Beijing's Great Hall of the People on Jan. 8, 2015, with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro clapping his hands. (Reuters)
The anti-Soviet and anti-communist hysteria that typified the Cold War period is to a certain extent alive and well today with the rise of China. This is particularly true regarding prevalent sentiment among the U.S. strategic class about Latin America.
Take for example U.S. Southern Command head Laura Richardson's testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee in March, which invoked the word “malign” no less than 24 times: "malign actor," "malign influence," "malign effort," "malign activities," "malign intent," "malign narratives," "malign conduct," "malign action," and "malign agenda."
Often, she was referring to suspected Chinese actors, and in some cases Russian ones. This echo of the Cold War brings to mind University of California San Diego scholar Peter Smith's argument about the core of the relations between the United States and Latin America: the crucial, historical factor of U.S.-Latin America politics has been the role and activity of extra-continental actors.
According to a 2022 studyby the RAND Corporation, “competition with China is qualitatively and quantitively different from competition with Russia and Iran in Latin America and the Caribbean." Moscow and Tehran may be opportunistic and provocative, but they lack the attributes to ensure an effective power projection in the area. China, however, has the resources, will, and opportunity to extend and sustain its influence. Hence, it is logical for Washington to be attentive to Beijing's messages, measures, and maneuvers.
Still, the massive size of the U.S.’s own security presence in the region — and how small China’s is in comparison — is often undiscussed in Washington. A look at the numbers suggests the idea of an imminent Chinese military threat is both exaggerated and misguided.
We could start by examining what some have called the “iron river” of arms flowing into the region. According to the latest report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on arms transfers, the ranking of the largest arms suppliers to South America between 2019 and 2023 was: France (23%), the United States (14%), and the United Kingdom (12%). During those years, Russia did not supply arms to South America.
An analysis of SIPRI data for 2000-2022 by Ryan Berg and Rubi Bledsoe of the Center for Strategic and International Studies shows that the United States is the source of 94.9% of Argentina's arms acquisitions, 93.4% of those acquired by Colombia, 90.7% of those acquired by Mexico, and 82.7% of those acquired by Brazil. This means that the four largest economies in Latin America have the United States as their main arms supplier.
During that same timeframe, Russia was by far the largest arms supplier to Venezuela: Caracas's purchases amounted to $4.5 billion. China was the largest supplier (66.2%) of the $77 million in arms purchased by Bolivia. Just last month, President Javier Milei confirmed Argentina’s commitment to buy 24 F-16s from Denmark with authorization from Washington.
When it comes to geographic presence, the United States maintains a large military footprint in the region through the Guantanamo Naval Base in Cuba and the Soto Cano Base in Honduras. U.S. Southern Command is responsible for three “cooperative security locations” in El Salvador, Aruba, and Curacao. For decades, SOUTHCOM has regularly conducted various types of multi-nation (such as UNITAS, Tradewinds, PANAMAX, and Southern Cross) and bilateral military (for example, Southern Vanguard with Brazil and Relámpago with Colombia) exercises on land, sea, and air. Russia has occasionally conducted military exercises with Venezuela and Nicaragua. China participated in a sniper test in Venezuela in 2022, and Beijing has increased its offering of courses and educational programs for military officials from Latin America.
The United States, for its part, maintains its Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, which replaced the controversial School of the Americas that trained anti-communist military forces during the Cold War. According to a Congressional Research Service report, Security Force Assistance Brigades were established in 2018 and distributed across six commands, including the U.S. Southern Command: "the first SFAB maintains a persistent presence in Colombia, Honduras, and Panama, while also expanding episodically to Peru, Ecuador, and Uruguay."
Also, the National Guards of 18 states plus Puerto Rico and Washington D.C. have agreements with 24 nations in Latin America. Meanwhile, Washington has designated Argentina (1998), Brazil (2019), and Colombia (2022) as non-NATO allies. Nothing similar occurs with China or Russia in Latin America.
China agreed with Argentina during the center left government of Cristina Fernández (2007-2015) to establish a Deep Space Station in the province of Neuquén. The arrangement meant the construction of a facility for tracking, command, and data acquisition, facilitated by a deep space antenna. The next government of the center right Mauricio Macri completed its construction by 2017 and in 2018 it swung security relations back toward the United States, securing Southern Command financing for an Emergency Operations and Coordination Center in Neuquén. This is part of SOUTHCOM’s humanitarian assistance programs and exercises. In fact, several radar stations throughout Latin America are operated by SOUTHCOM.
Another data point is security ties through their total dollar flows. The latest Congressional Research Service report on U.S. aid to the region reveals the extent of Washington’s support for anti-drug efforts in the area over the years. Between 2000 and 2022, U.S. assistance to Plan Colombia exceeded $13 billion, while for the 2008-2021 period, aid for Mexico’s Mérida Initiative amounted to $3.5 billion.
From 2010 to 2022, funding for the Caribbean initiative totaled $832 million, while from 2008-2020, the Central American initiative received $2.9 billion. While not all of that assistance has been military in nature, out of the total U.S. assistance to Latin America for 2024, security-related funding amounts to 26.6% or $658.3 million. In no way has China shown the willingness to provide such extensive assistance on security issues, nor get involved in aiding anti-narcotics initiatives in the region.
We can also view the U.S. regional footprint through its influence on the high seas. In 2020, the U.S. Navy announced that the U.S. Fleet Forces Command would be renamed the Atlantic Fleet to focus on closer regional threats. And in 2008, the Navy re-established the 4th Fleet with a purview over the Caribbean and Central and South America. Moreover, three of the last six commanders of Southern Command have been from the Navy.
Meanwhile, since 2020, the U.S. Coast Guard has expanded its activities in Central and South America. Washington has turbocharged its naval deployment as part of efforts to combat Chinese illegal fishing. While Beijing aims to be a naval power with global reach, its presence in Latin America is limited. The U.S. strategy of denial of space and anti-access in the maritime domain shows clear signs of strength. If understood as a design to limit (denial) or prevent (anti-access) an enemy force from advancing in its operational area, the United States has boosted its position.
The total U.S. military footprint in the region is much broader and includes cooperation deals surrounding ports, aerospace, and inland rivers. No Chinese analogues to these agreements exist. What becomes clear, when looking at this portrait, is that it appears that China is highly cautious about extending its military reach in Latin America likely because it knows that could cause tensions with Washington. Instead, it has focused, to considerable success, on economic engagement in the area, with trade, investment, and finance.
Beijing’s regional economic engagement has not stopped Washington from sounding the alarm about supposed Chinese malefic military projection. It is no secret that doing so bolsters the justification for Washington’s own military spending. Indeed, SOUTHCOM has requested a near 50% budget increase for 2025. In a Latin America awash with sky-high homicide rates and firearms among the leading causes of death, rightsizing the Chinese military presence leaves us with a provocative question: what good is U.S. arms racing with a nowhere-near-peer competitor doing for the region?
In short, the military preeminence of the United States in Latin America is undeniable. In practice, in defense and security matters, Washington has been reaffirming and strengthening its presence in the area. China's pragmatic projection of economic power has made undeniable progress. But the preponderance of the United States in the military realm has not weakened nor is it close to being replaced.
What is evident is that the notion of an imminent Chinese military threat is exaggerated and misguided, especially when the material projection of the United States in the region is less significant and more rhetorical. By now it is obvious that the U.S has militarily outcompeted China in Latin America and Beijing is very far from displacing Washington on regional defense and security matters.
keep readingShow less
President Joe Biden and Democratic Party donor Haim Saban via Reuters and OogImages / Shutterstock.com
A New York Times poll released this week found that 13% of voters defecting from President Joe Biden, those who voted for him in 2020 but will not do so in November, cite his handling of foreign policy and Israel’s war in Gaza as the reason for pulling their support. But an investigation by Responsible Statecraft finds that those same policies likely benefit the president’s re-election campaign in a different way: his biggest funders happen to support them.
A review of campaign contributions, philanthropy, and public statements reveals that over one third of the president’s top tier funders — those giving in excess of $900,000 to the Biden Victory Fund — appear to see little nuance in the conflict and show overwhelming sympathy for Israel, at times verging into outright hostility to Palestinians and anti-Muslim bigotry.
That’s in sharp contrast with 13% of defecting 2020 Biden voters who say they won’t vote for the president’s reelection - a group that could tip the scales this November toward Donald Trump - only 17% of whom sympathize with Israel over the Palestinians.
“I think many Victory Fund members are in a bubble and out of touch with political reality but they also seem indifferent to the suffering of over 1 million children in Gaza whose lives are treated by Netanyahu and Biden as worth far less than those of Israeli children,” said Amed Khan, a former Victory Fund donor who resigned in November over Biden’s handling of the war. “The American people see these policies as morally repugnant.”
Thus, Biden likely isn’t hearing those voices opposing Israel’s brutal war in Gaza at fundraisers with his top donors.
Take for example, billionaire Haim Saban, who contributed $929,599 to the Victory Fund. Saban also serves on the board of Friends of the Israel Defense Forces and contributed $1 million to the United Democracy Project, the independent expenditure arm of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, that runs ads supporting pro-Israel candidates and ads criticizing candidates deemed insufficiently supportive of Israel.
Last week, in an email to Biden apparently forwarded by an intermediary, Saban slammed the president’s decision to hold a weapons shipment to Israel, warning, “Let’s not forget that there are more Jewish voters, who care about Israel, than Muslims [sic] voters that care about Hamas,” suggesting that putting conditions on U.S. weapons transfers to Israel is akin to supporting Hamas.
Saban made his priorities clear in a 2004 New York Times interview, saying, "I'm a one-issue guy and my issue is Israel.”
Saban’s wife, Cheryl Saban, also donated $929,600 to the Victory Fund, gave $2.18 million to Friends of the Israel Defense Forces in 2022 (a gift made alongside her husband), and cheered on pro-Israel provocateur Ben Shapiro’s statement that, “If Israel put down its guns tomorrow there would be a second holocaust. If the Palestinians put down their arms tomorrow there would be a Palestinian state.” “Bravo,” said Cheryl Saban last November.
Mobile gaming pioneer Mark Pincus offered even more blunt statements. Pincus, who contributed $929,600 to the Victory Fund, is outspoken on Israel on social media.
“Why do we only see pro palestinians [sic] in acts of violence? Why has this become an accepted form of protest,” he asked in a March 8 post on X.
“[T]heres [sic] no mention by nyt of baby beheading or Biden speech about it. [B]ut continued coverage of destruction in Gaza and Israeli military failures. [T]hey should rename as ‘the new hamas times,’” wrote Pincus in an October 11 post, referencing the claim, walked back by the White House on October 12 that Biden had seen photographic evidence of babies beheaded by Hamas on October 7.
LinkedIn co-founder and venture capitalist Reid Hoffman also has a history of praising elite IDF units. At the 2022 Aspen Security Forum, Hoffman said the U.S. needed a “digital ROTC” and used the Israeli 8200 signal intelligence unit as an example of what was necessary. (As it turned out, the 8200 unit was not active on October 7 because it doesn’t operate on nights and weekends.)
Hoffman currently funds a “1-year full scholarship executive excellence program” that is “specially tailored for outstanding alumni of IDF Elite Units,” via the Hoffman Kofman Foundation.
Attorney and political pundit George Conway, who also contributed $929,600 to the Victory Fund, regularlyposts pro-Israel commentary on X while expressing little concern for Palestinians and expresses skepticism about the organizing behind college protests against Israel’s actions.
Other donors were less vocal but their recent philanthropy and political giving suggests a strong pro-Israel bent in their foreign policy views.
Real estate and casino magante Neil Bluhm contributed $929,600 to the Victory Fund, $200,000 to the United Democracy Project, and $225,000 to the American Israel Education Foundation — the fundraising arms of AIPAC that arranges for congressional junkets to Israel, among other activities — via his family’s charitable foundation in 2022.
Entertainment and sports mogul Casey Wasserman donated $929,600 to the Victory Fund and $25,000 in 2022 to Israel Emergency Alliance (also known as Stand With Us), a pro-Israel group that works to oppose boycotts against Israel. Stand With Us, earlier this month in a press release, called for the resignation of Northwestern University president Michael Schill after he “announced a set of concessions to [student encampment protester] organizers Monday that included pledging to implement full-ride scholarships for Palestinian students and faculty positions for Palestinian academics.”
Pete Lowy, son of Australian-Israeli billionaire Frank Lowy, contributed $929,600 to the Victory Fund and maintains close ties to hawkish pro-Israel groups.
“Retail industry tycoon Peter Lowy inspired and delighted over 100 IAC Supporters at a donor reception toasting Israel’s 70th Independence Day on Tuesday, April 24,” read a 2018 press release from the Israeli-American Council, a group that describes itself as “wholeheartedly support[ing] the State of Israel.”
Another Biden Victory Fund supporter, developer Eli Reinhard, who is listed as giving $1.84 million, also contributed $300,000 to WINEP and $50,000 to Friends of the IDF via his foundation in 2022.
In total, nine out of the 25 donors who gave more than $900,000 to the Biden Victory Fund had either contributed funds to staunchly pro-Israel groups or made statements that showed a strong pro-Israel bias. Other donors were largely silent on the Israel-Gaza war or, like film director Steven Spielberg, have responded to the conflict by denouncing both anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim views.
The New York Times warned that, “yearning for change and discontent over the economy and the war in Gaza among young, Black and Hispanic voters threaten to unravel the president’s Democratic coalition.” But Biden’s most important campaign funders appear to offer a very different coalition than those in the broader electorate: donors with a one-sided support for Israel even as it wages a brutal war in Gaza that’s incurring a steep political cost on Biden’s reelection effort.
The Sabans, Pincus, Hoffman, Conway, Bluhm, Wasserman, Lowy and Reinhard did not respond to requests for comment.
keep readingShow less
Israeli soldiers watch as Palestinian men wait at the Bethlehem checkpoint on the final Friday of Ramadan, West Bank, August 17, 2012 (Photo Ryan Rodrick Beiler via shutterstock.com)
From almost the first days of the Second Palestine War, U.S. officials have with increasing — if nonetheless ineffective stridency — called upon Israel to establish an acceptable plan for “the day after.”
Led by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Washington wants a roadmap of what Israel intends to do with the Gaza Strip and its two plus million inhabitants, the vast majority now homeless in a spit of Palestine made all but inhabitable by the war.
Washington has declared its own nominal preferences – a return of the hapless PLO to Gaza, no forced expulsion of Palestinians, and no Israeli military occupation.
Americans like plans, even though their own plans for the conduct of recent wars and their aftermath – from Vietnam to Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan – are nothing to be proud of. Yet this has not stopped the Biden administration from offering aspirational advice to the government of Benjamin Netanyahu – on issues ranging from the necessary levels of humanitarian aid to the deployment of the warfighting plan for Rafah, the need to empower a reformed PLO, and the tactics of the IDF in Gaza.
The Netanyahu government, with minor exceptions, has either rejected or ignored this American advice. Israel and its generals are willing to humor Washington as it dispenses operational insights gained from its misadventures in Afghanistan, Syria’s al Jazira and beyond, or the dubious advantages of “strengthening Abu Mazen.” It is watching with careful if bemused attention to the creation of an almost $320 million maritime humanitarian pipeline into Gaza, the administration of which is whetting the appetites of prospective private contractors.
But, like the “pier” now about to open on the Gaza beach, Washington’s remedies for Gaza in 2024 are so far removed from the challenges and opportunities as Israel sees them as to be all but irrelevant to the reconstruction of Gaza’s security and humanitarian environment, which remain all but exclusively in Israeli hands.
Indeed, this disconnect has been a central feature of Washington’s approach to Israel’s occupation writ large since June 1967. And Washington’s current effort promises to be no more successful than the almost half century of stillborn U.S. plans for addressing Israel’s enduring intention to prevent the creation of Palestinian sovereignty anywhere west of the Jordan River.
Consider for a moment the American, and indeed the international demand for an Israeli “plan” to solve the crisis in Gaza. Such a concept may be popular in western capitals, but it is an all but alien notion to Israeli policy makers today, just as it was to the generation of Israeli leaders who oversaw the West Bank and Gaza after Israel’s June 1967 victory.
The policy that now defines Israel’s actions in Gaza today has nothing whatsoever to do with U.S. experiences in Fallujah or Helmand. Nor would Israel be wise to see them as examples to be followed or even to learn from. Israeli policy today evolved in the aftermath of the 1967 war and was best described by its architect, Moshe Dayan. The challenge for Israel and the international community, he explained in 1977, was not to arrive at a “solution” to Israel’s occupation, but rather to learn to live without one (solution). Only in this way could Israel retain the freedom of action to ensure its strategic security — no Arab sovereignty west of the Jordan — and nationalist settlement objectives.
The West Bank settler population at that time was less than 15,000. Throughout the decades since 1967, and in Gaza today, Israel, eschewing master plans for achieving its overriding objectives, has exhibited a maddeningly opportunistic approach to its rule over the West Bank, which among other achievements now boasts more than one half million settlers.
Israel, in contrast to U.S. warnings, has a far more varied and arguably successful experience in how to plan for “the day after” in Palestine than has Washington, which busies itself with making security plans that have no security anchor and enjoining understandably reluctant Arab partners to join in the administration of and responsibility for Gaza’s boundless maladies.
In the Gaza Strip, war cabinet minister Benny Gantz explains that Israel will insist on 100% security authority but zero percent responsibility for civilian concerns. This policy is at odds with Washington’s call for a postwar retreat, but is consistent with Israel’s Occupation 101 playbook.
Washington hangs on to the prospect of the PLO’s resurrection in Gaza, a policy Israel has actively undermined for at least two decades. An Israeli television commentator recently marveled at Washington’s focus on the PLO and a two-state solution, for which, she declared, Israelis “hardly give a thought.”
In that vein, Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon recently explained that, “If the PLO wants to quit, Israel will look for international or local forces to take charge of the PA, and if they can’t find them and the PA collapses, that will not be the end of the world for Israel.” (In fact, defense minister Yoav Gallant issued his own "plan" for the "day after" on Wednesday, which includes, as he told columnist David Ignatius, "local Palestinian actors backed by international actors.”)
Israel today is waging three intimately related wars. The first is the actual battlefield war itself, now in its eighth month. The second war is the war about the war — that is, the international battle for public opinion from The Hague to American college campuses that has been unleashed by the war itself. This battle promises to define Israel’s place in the international community for a generation, and attests to the price we all pay for the enduring failure of diplomacy and politicians to establish a viable reconciliation of Israeli and Palestinian demands.
The third is the war after the war — that is, the ongoing military campaign led by Hamas against Israel’s intention to remain in security control of the entire Gaza Strip. Gaza is no stranger to such Palestinian insurgencies, whether in the early 1970s, during the first Intifada in 1988, or during the Oslo decade.
The Biden White House is ever so ready to pronounce the prospect of such conflict as evidence of a failure of Israeli plans for Gaza. Blinken has warned that unless Israel takes unspecified actions “they will be left holding the bag on an enduring insurgency.”
Blinken may be undone by such a prospect, but neither Netanyahu nor Sinwar are deterred. For each, the battle is understood as the price one must be prepared to pay to prevail in a war that began not on October 7, but in 1948.