It is hard to overstate the sense of shock that hung over Moscow in the first week of the war.
For months, state-controlled TV and pro-Kremlin newspapers had mocked Western “hysteria” about the possibility of an invasion. Even independent voices within Russia tended, with a few exceptions, to dismiss war as a serious prospect. Then, in the space of a few days, the atmosphere changed. TV news became dominated by the prospect of a Ukrainian attack on the Donetsk Peoples Republic and the Luhansk Peoples Republic, the Russian-backed separatist regions in the Donbass, along with claims of a planned Ukrainian genocide against the ethnic Russians living there.
On February 21, after a long, rambling speech, President Putin announced Russian recognition of the DNR and LNR as independent states. Three days later, Russians woke up to find their country at war.
It is worth emphasizing that, while popular support for the war in Ukraine is real, it is a byproduct of war rather than a cause of it. The decision to go to war in Ukraine was the result of neuroses in Putin’s inner circle, not of some surge of nationalist revanchism among the general public.
In the war’s early days, a good deal of Western media attention was devoted to opposition and protest inside Russia. When the protest movement petered out — thanks to swift and effective repression by the Russian authorities — interest declined dramatically. Yet opposition persists, as does support for the war, and, if Western governments seek to bring this conflict to an end, it is essential to understand where public opinion stands and why.
Measuring public opinion is never straightforward and, in an autocracy such as modern Russia, it is especially problematic. With draconian security laws introduced in March threatening up to 15 years in prison for those who “disparage the armed forces,” some have questioned how open respondents are likely to be with pollsters.
Levada, one of Russia’s few remaining independent pollsters, claims it was able to increase candor by switching from telephone interviews to in-person visits. Its work over the last few months provides a few clear insights:
— Supporters of the war outnumber opponents, probably by a ratio of around 2:1.
— Vastly more Russians blame the United States, NATO and Ukraine for the destruction than blame the Kremlin.
— Support for the war is segmented by age, with older Russians more supportive than the young.
— Most Russians believe Russia will defeat Ukraine.
We can be reasonably confident in these findings as they closely track with other key indicators such as President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings — up from 69 percent in February to 83 percent in May. Similarly, the percentage of Russians who believe their country is heading in the right direction rose from 52 percent to 69 percent in the month following the start of the invasion.
So why do so many Russians seem to support this war? Part of it is certainly the “rally round the flag” effect which is far from unique to Russia or dictatorships. It’s worth remembering that polls showed three quarters of Americans backing the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
But beyond this, some of the government’s justifications for war have genuinely resonated with the Russian public. I have heard the claim that Zelensky planned to introduce nuclear weapons to Ukraine repeated countless times, including by people who oppose the war. Like many of the Kremlin's propaganda lines, this theme is spun out of a small kernel of truth. Zelensky did complain in his speech to the Munich Security Conference in February that the Budapest Memorandum had left his country without the security it was promised in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons in 1994, and suggested that the whole agreement was in doubt if Ukraine remained under threat.
This clip was featured extensively in state-controlled media, accompanied by breathless analysis of what a nuclear-armed Ukraine would mean for Russia. Other, even more far-fetched claims, such as when Vasily Nebenzya, the Russian representative to the UN, alleged that Ukraine planned to use migratory birds to spread biological weapons, have been widely mocked, but the government’s strategy of throwing as many justifications as possible at the wall to see what sticks remains remarkably effective.
Another basis for continuing popular support for the war is the perceived ineffectiveness of Western sanctions against the Russian economy. Though the Russian armed forces have performed below expectations in Ukraine, so far the Russian economy seems to have weathered sanctions better than many feared. The official exchange rate of the ruble against the dollar, which ordinary Russians often treat as their main barometer of economic health, crashed at the start of the war but has now climbed to a four-year high. Surging energy prices and Europe’s continued reliance on Russian gas have seen revenue from fossil fuel exports increase despite the conflict in Ukraine.
This seems to have resulted in a more optimistic mood among the public. According to Lavada, between March and May the proportion of Russians very or quite concerned about the effects of sanctions fell from 46 percent to 38 percent, while the share of respondents who said sanctions had caused them or their families serious problems fell from 29 percent to 16 percent. Only 19 percent of respondents believed the government should make concessions in order to get sanctions lifted. It's important not to overstate this; rising prices are causing real hardship, and certain industries, including airlines, advertising and car manufacturing have been particularly hard hit. It is possible that in the long run this may tilt public opinion against the war, but there’s little sign of this yet.
Meanwhile, it’s certainly not difficult to find pro-war sentiment. A fairly typical conversation was one I recently had with Maria, a retired accountant from Moscow, who, like the great majority of pensioners, supports the invasion. She views the war as entirely defensive: “For eight years, NATO planned to attack us through Ukraine,” she told me. “… Russians never start wars, we finish them.”
She also repeated the theory, which had been making the rounds on state TV’s ubiquitous debate shows, that Poland is planning to annex western Ukraine, and Russia must therefore rescue the eastern part of the country from the same fate. Like most supporters of the war, she insists that Russia is not against the Ukrainian people but only “Nazis” who seek to carry out a genocide. “It is a war for peace” she concluded, apparently without irony.
Yet one group the authorities are struggling to convince are their own employees in the state-controlled media. A recent survey conducted for RBC found 54 percent of those employed in media or advertising opposed the war, second only to scientists in their dissent. Often young, multilingual, and well-traveled, these are people with plenty to lose from the war and accompanying sanctions. They are also familiar with the lies and manipulation that pervade Russian reporting on the conflict.
One producer at a state-owned news agency was happy to make his views clear in private. The war “is one of the greatest mistakes [of] the Russian government,” he said. “… [I]t is unreasonable, it is criminal and it is simply wrong.” But when I asked why he continues working for state media despite his misgivings, I received a more pragmatic response: “For three months I’ve been looking for a [different] job in Russia as well as abroad. But because I have my bills to pay, I stay.” There has been a steady trickle of resignations and defections, but the fear of unemployment is at least as important as the fear of arrest in keeping the majority in post.
Active opposition continues in the form of brave but doomed solo protests, and in graffiti on walls. Most of the potential leadership of an anti-war movement are either in prison or in exile, and much of the rank and file see emigration as their only chance for a better future.
It would thus be foolish for Western powers to place their hopes for ending this war in some sort of popular revolt in Russia. In the short to medium term, this deus ex machina seems extremely unlikely. Popular support for the government’s actions, though not especially deep, remains widespread, and state repression has been an effective means of stamping out most open opposition.
Even if a mass protest movement does emerge as the war drags on, the example of the Belarus protests of summer 2020 provide a sobering reminder that people power in the street isn’t likely to translate into political power if the authorities hold their ground and the security forces remain loyal. Western political leaders should be aware of the magnitude of the commitment they are making in Ukraine and that, without some dramatic deterioration in Russia’s military or economic position, popular opposition is likely to remain a marginal annoyance to Putin.
