The head of Israel’s military intelligence agency, Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, has said that the revival of the Iran nuclear agreement would be better for Israel than if it were to be allowed to collapse entirely.
Haliva reportedly told ministers during a recent Security Cabinet meeting “that a deal in Vienna would serve Israel’s interests by providing increased certainty about the limitations on Iran's nuclear program, and it would buy more time for Israel to prepare for escalation scenarios.”
The Israeli government under former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu campaigned vigorously for Donald Trump to pull out of the deal. But now, an increasingnumber of current and former Israeli security officials are quietly coming out of the woodwork to acknowledge what a disaster that position has been for Israel — particularly now that Iran’s nuclear program has only grown since Trump’s withdrawal in 2018 — and call for the restoration of the JCPOA.
Ministers at the same meeting also agreed that Israel should not publicly attack the Biden administration should a deal to restore the nuclear agreement be reached, with Foreign Minister Yair Lapid reportedly warning “that such public attacks could seriously damage the relationship with the administration.”
Ben Armbruster is the Managing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He has more than a decade of experience working at the intersection of politics, foreign policy, and media. Ben previously held senior editorial and management positions at Media Matters, ThinkProgress, ReThink Media, and Win Without War.
Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken meets with Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, in Rome, Italy on June 27, 2021. [State Department Photo by Ron Przysucha]
Top image credit: The Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Tennessee (SSBN 734) gold crew returns to its homeport at Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, following a strategic deterrence patrol. The boat is one of five ballistic-missile submarines stationed at the base and is capable of carrying up to 20 submarine-launched ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication 2nd Class Bryan Tomforde)
These have been tough years for advocates of arms control and nuclear disarmament. The world’s two leading nuclear powers — the United States and Russia — have only one treaty left that puts limits on their nuclear weapons stockpiles and deployments, the New START Treaty. That treaty limits deployments of nuclear weapons to 1,550 on each side, and includes verification procedures to hold them to their commitments.
But in the context of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the idea of extending New START when it expires in 2026 has been all but abandoned, leaving the prospect of a brave new world in which the United States and Russia can develop their nuclear weapons programs unconstrained by any enforceable rules.
All of this comes in the context of an enormously costly Pentagon plan — currently pegged at $1.7 trillion over the next three decades — to build a new generation of nuclear-armed bombers, missiles and submarines, complete with new warheads to go with them.
Amazingly, nuclear hawks in Congress are pushing to expand this huge buildup to include things like more tactical nuclear weapons, long-range missiles armed with multiple warheads, and even, possibly, a return to above-ground nuclear testing. A new report from the Stimson Center — coauthored by Geoffrey Wilson, Christopher Preble, and Lucas Ruiz – points out just how dangerous and destabilizing these new proposals would be. They opt instead for a nuclear policy based on deterrence, narrowly defined:
“[A] strategy designed to avoid or discourage open conflict through the outward projection of capability, preparedness, and resoluteness. Properly conceived, an effective deterrent raises the potential costs of a war to such a point that no rational actor would choose to initiate one.”
Key elements of the Pentagon’s nuclear buildup are not compatible with this concept of deterrence, including the new ICBM, officially known as the Sentinel. Not only are the costs of the Sentinel spiraling out of control, with an estimated 81% cost growth for the program after just a few years of the full development phase. But as the new Stimson report notes, ICBMs are “relatively less important for deterrence than other delivery vehicles” — most notably relatively invulnerable submarines armed with long-range nuclear missiles.
The key lesson to be drawn from the Stimson analysis is that building more nuclear weapons makes us all less safe by provoking a new nuclear arms race with Russia and China. Likewise, spending more in service of a misguided definition of deterrence or in pursuit of military dominance is not only a waste of money, but it will also make us less safe by funding weapons more suited to being used versus serving as a component of a nuclear force designed to dissuade other nations from invading the United States.
One issue referenced in the Stimson report is the fact that the current nuclear force — the triad of nuclear weapons deployed on bombers, land-based missiles, and nuclear-armed submarines — is the result of interservice fight for a piece of the nuclear budget pie, not a result of careful consideration of what would make a nuclear attack on the U.S. less likely. Similarly, today, economic concerns — including push back by lawmakers from states with ICBM bases or major work on the new system — have prevented serious consideration of the cancellation of the new ICBM.
The Stimson report makes three key recommendations. First, the U.S. should adopt a sole purpose deterrence strategy based primarily on submarine-based nuclear-armed missiles. Second, the U.S. should avoid the development and deployment of more tactical, short-range nuclear systems that could make nuclear use more likely. And, third, the U.S. should refrain from resuming above-ground testing.
These are all common-sense proposals, and they can be implemented unilaterally by the U.S. without reference to the positions of other nations. If implemented, they might even open the way to serious discussions with Russia on nuclear arms reductions and better crisis communication. Fruitful negotiations with China will be harder, given that its arsenal is far smaller than those of the U.S. or Russia.
The greatest contribution of the Stimson report is that it provides a reasonable, well-documented alternative to the positions taken by advocates of a costly, dangerous U.S. nuclear buildup. Hopefully its arguments will be taken seriously by executive branch policymakers and key members of Congress.
Even in an environment of extreme partisanship and political division, individuals and elected leaders across the political spectrum should be interested in an approach to nuclear policy that makes nuclear war less likely and saves untold billions of dollars.
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Top image credit: Israel Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Itamar Ben Gvir shake hands as the Israeli government approve Netanyahu's proposal to reappoint Itamar Ben-Gvir as minister of National Security, in the Knesset, Israeli parliament in Jerusaelm, March 19, 2025 REUTERS/Oren Ben Hakoon
The resumption of Israel’s assault on the Gaza Strip and collapse of the ceasefire agreement reached in January were predictable and in fact predicted at that time by Responsible Statecraft. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, driven by personal and domestic political motives, never intended to continue implementation of the agreement through to the declared goal of a permanent ceasefire.
Hamas, the other principal party to the agreement, had abided by its terms and consistently favored full implementation, which would have seen the release of all remaining Israeli hostages in addition to a full cessation of hostilities. Israel, possibly in a failed attempt to goad Hamas into doing something that would be an excuse for abandoning the agreement, committed numerous violations even before this week’s renewed assault. These included armed attacks that killed 155 Palestinians, continued occupation of areas from which Israel had promised to withdraw, and a blockade of humanitarian aid to Gaza that more than two weeks ago.
Maintaining Netanyahu’s alliance with extreme right-wingers and thus keeping his ruling coalition in power and himself in office have been a major part of the prime minister’s motivation for keeping Israel at war. One of those right-wingers, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, had been actively campaigning to resume the war ever since the January ceasefire agreement was announced. Another of the extremists, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, left the government in protest against the ceasefire but now, happy with the resumption of the assault, has rejoined it.
The initial wave of Israeli airstrikes this week killed an estimated 400 Palestinians within the first few hours. Netanyahu says the attacks so far are “just the beginning.”
There is no reason to believe that the resumed assault will have any more success in achieving the declared goal of “destroying Hamas” than the earlier 15 months of devastating attacks were. The assault will instead be another phase in Israel’s ethnic cleansing of Palestinian Arabs.
The Trump administration, despite being able to claim credit for helping to reach the January agreement, has actively encouraged Israel’s abandonment of it. The administration reportedly gave a green light to Netanyahu to resume the assault and has defended Israel’s actions before the United Nations Security Council. The same U.S. envoy who had played a role in the January accord has more recently been pushing an Israeli-favored alternative that would have Hamas surrender leverage in the form of hostages while getting nothing in return in the form of a permanent cease-fire or an Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza.
The United States is facilitating the renewed Israeli destruction of the Gaza Strip with nearly $12 billion worth of arms since the beginning of the Trump administration. The administration has executed its most recent transfer of arms to Israel on a supposedly “emergency” basis to circumvent Congress. Now more than ever, the United States shares with the Netanyahu government ownership of the ongoing human tragedy in the Gaza Strip, morally and in the eyes of the world.
While those eyes understandably are focused primarily on the Gaza disaster, one needs to consider how the disaster fits in with broader Israeli regional aggression and how this affects risks and costs for the United States.
Intensified Israeli assaults on Palestinian residents of the West Bank have made that territory subject to what some have termed “Gaza-fication.” The current intensified phase, which began about the time of the Gaza cease-fire agreement, continues with mass displacements and destruction of housing, especially around the city of Jenin. The operation reflects the influence of West Bank settlers who would prefer the complete removal of Palestinians.
Meanwhile, one of the world’s least noticed military campaigns has been a sustained Israeli offensive against Syria. What had been a years-long series of Israeli airstrikes on Syria — mostly against targets associated with Iran — has, since the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime, intensified into near-daily Israeli attacks against a broader range of targets. In addition to the aerial attacks, Israel has expanded its occupation of Syrian territory well beyond the previously occupied Golan Heights.
The attacks and occupation are unprovoked. No munitions were being fired from Syria toward Israel. Missing the comfort and predictability Israel came to enjoy with the Assads, Israel is endeavoring to cripple any new Syria regime — especially one that might be more responsive to popular opinion, which certainly would be highly critical of Israel.
Israel’s attacks and seizures of land reduce whatever chance there might be for at least a modicum of stability in Syria. They also raise the possibility of future clashes with Turkey, which is comparably interventionist regarding Syria.
Next door in Lebanon, a country Israel had invaded several times earlier, Israel invaded again in October 2024. This invasion was a direct outgrowth of Israel’s assault on the Gaza Strip. It was ostensibly aimed against Hezbollah, which was not seeking a new full-scale war with Israel but fired rockets at it out of solidarity with the Palestinians of Gaza.
A cease-fire agreement was reached in November, but Israel has been violating it with almost daily attacks. As in Syria, Israel also continues to occupy territory from which it was obligated to withdraw.
And as in Gaza, although the Israeli attacks have been nominally aimed at a militant group such as Hamas or Hezbollah, much and perhaps most of the resulting suffering has been inflicted on Lebanese civilians, who already were enduring much hardship for reasons both related and unrelated to Israel.
There is an inherent contradiction in inflicting this kind of suffering on a population in the name of defeating or weakening Hezbollah. Hezbollah owed its creation and rapid growth in strength to popular resentment over earlier pain that Israel had inflicted on the Lebanese. There is no reason to expect that pattern to be different in the future, whether or not Hezbollah itself is the principal vehicle for mobilizing that resentment.
With its boundless military attacks, Israel is seeking absolute security for itself even at the price of absolute insecurity for everyone else it can reach. It rationalizes attacks with the mere possibility that someday someone might have the capability and the willingness to do something bad to Israel, while the attacks inflict immediate and certain suffering on someone else. In the case of the attacks on Syria, the Israeli objective is nothing less than the destruction of Syria’s means to defend itself and exercise full sovereignty over its internationally recognized territory.
Notwithstanding the immense human costs, none of this ever will buy absolute security for Israel, given the repeatedly demonstrated pattern of such suffering provoking violent reactions. Thus, one of the costs is that Israel itself will forever live by the sword.
The United States has tied itself closely to what is by far the most active aggressor — and biggest inflictor of suffering through military force — in the Middle East. One cost to the United States is to be a target of the inevitable anger and resentment and possible violent responses, as it has been in the past.
A further risk of the tie is for the United States to get dragged into Israel’s wars. The current U.S. campaign of airstrikes against the Houthi regime in Yemen illustrates the point. That combat is another direct outgrowth of the Israeli assault on Gaza. The Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping never would have occurred without that assault.
The Houthis, true to their word, stopped their attacks when the Gaza cease-fire began in January. They had not resumed attacks before the Trump administration began its air offensive. The Houthis had only threatened to do so if Israel did not soon reverse its blockade on humanitarian aid to Gaza.
The interference with shipping in the Red Sea is a legitimate concern, but, given the connection with the Gaza situation, the U.S. military involvement in Yemen is in effect supporting Israel’s project of ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. And the United States has gotten involved in an armed conflict with a tribal movement whose rise is rooted in local issues in which the United States has no interest.
An even bigger danger is getting dragged into a war with Iran, which the Netanyahu government has striven to trigger with both overt and clandestine attacks on Iranian interests. There can be no doubt that Netanyahu would love to get the United States involved in a war with Iran, which would be the most dramatic and forceful way of advancing the Israeli strategy of defining Middle East security solely in anti-Iran terms.
With Iran’s nuclear program the ostensible focus, any armed attack by Israel and/or the United States would be another instance of inflicting a certain harm — an act of aggression in violation of the United Nations Charter and anything that could be called a rules-based international order — to try to eliminate a mere possibility. In this case, the possible acquisition by Iran of a weapon that both would-be attackers havehad for years.
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Top photo credit: U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to weapons squad, 1st Platoon, C Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, pose for a photo before patrolling Rusafa, Baghdad, Iraq, Defense Imagery Management Operations Center/Photo by Staff Sgt. Jason Baile
On St. Patrick’s Day, March 17, 2003, President Bush issued his final ultimatum to Saddam Hussein. Two nights later, my Iraq War started inauspiciously. I was a college student tending bar in New York City. Someone pointed to the television behind me and said: “It’s begun. They’re bombing Baghdad!” In Iraq it was already early morning of March 20.
I arrived home a few hours later to find the half-expected voice message on my answering machine: “You are ordered to report to the armory tomorrow morning no later than 0800, with all your gear.”
At the time, I served in an infantry unit of the New York Army National Guard. By mid-day, our gear loaded, most of my company headed up the Hudson River to New York’s military training site, Camp Smith. The state had activated us for a homeland security mission. As the war began, one of the biggest unknowns was whether Saddam had the resources and connections to conduct terrorist strikes in the U.S. Less than two years after September 11, 2001, many feared New York City could be struck again.
Our unit spent about a week training for various scenarios that could take place on New York City’s transit system. By night we watched news reports and evaluated our military’s progress in Iraq. Before April, we were executing a mission guarding the subways alongside the New York City Police Department. I led a four-man team securing the platform under City Hall.
By the time President Bush staged his “Mission Accomplishment” moment on May 1, I was back in class, studying international relations. I expected to graduate the following January. But the mission wasn’t quite accomplished.
In August, as I prepared to begin my final semester, my unit received a verbal warning order that we would be mobilizing to deploy to Iraq. Graduation was delayed. In October I found myself at Fort Drum, New York, training for Iraq.
It wasn’t until early March that our battalion task force, including my company, was deployed into Iraq itself. On the evening of March 17, 2004, just a few days short of the war’s first anniversary, I came under and returned fire, alongside a few dozen of my battle buddies.
At the end of October, while driving the lead HMMMV of a patrol returning to base, I received a frantic call from our Battalion Commander, advising of enemy contact and calling for reinforcement and casualty evacuation. In the patrol’s lead vehicle, I didn’t wait for orders, I simply turned around and headed toward the fight.
A complex attack by insurgents with small arms and an IED killed Segun Akintade. We got there too late. It was October 28. Segun had immigrated to New York from Nigeria a few years earlier. Nicknamed Obi Wan, he was a giant man with a larger laugh. He worked at Bear Stearns to afford school and, like me, he studied at the City University of New York. He served in my fire team during that mission securing the subway at the beginning of the war.
His death was not the first for our battalion. Officially, it was the last, but tragedy struck again a month later and a few dozen kilometers away. Several soldiers we left behind in 2003 had been reassigned to another New York unit and then mobilized for the next cycle of deployments. In late November, another IED killed two more of my friends, both New York firefighters. Men we had trained with and knew well had their lives taken too soon. Several others suffered devastating wounds but survived.
All of this happened more than two decades ago. In the intervening years, more soldiers from that deployment died in Iraq and Afghanistan. Several took their own lives back at home.
In 2010, President Obama “brought all military combat personnel” home from Iraq. There are multiple problems with that statement, but the most obvious is: The enemy gets a vote as we say. If you come under fire while serving in the military, you’re a combatant (rare exceptions like chaplains prove the rule).
On March 20, 2025, we still have American soldiers in Iraq. There are roughly 2,500 U.S. troops serving overtly in a “train and advise” mission. These American service members, like their current counterparts in Syria and the greater Middle East, are at risk. The attack on Tower 22 in Jordan last year, which killed three young American reservists, demonstrates the vulnerability of thinly stretched U.S. forces, deployed with no clearly elaborated national interest to the United States. This vulnerability will sooner or later be exploited again to the detriment of our troops.
In the 22 years since I received the news that I would be mobilized to support the war in Iraq, over 4,000 American troops have fought and died there. Some of these deaths were deeply personal. The costs to families have been tragic. With the Islamic State’s caliphate long-since defeated, the so-called logic for U.S. forces to be in Iraq is gone.
After 22 years, it’s time to put an end to our “boots on the ground” mission in Iraq, draw down our presence in the Middle East, and only risk the lives of American military men and women when there is an undeniable national interest.
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