Iran's president-elect Ebrahim Raisi adopted a tough tone on foreign policy in his first press conference today, declaring that Iran’s proxy armies and ballistic missiles are not up for negotiation, and that he won’t meet with President Biden.
But there are still few signs that his presidency will bring about any changes to Iran's current red lines in regards to JCPOA renewal. Outside these red lines, however, things will likely get tougher, with ultra-conservative Raisi’s election.
Iran has long maintained that neither its regional presence nor its ballistic missiles are up for negotiation. Nor did President Rouhani agree to meet with Barack Obama or Donald Trump. In that sense, Raisi's position is not new.
Nevertheless, Raisi's orientation will likely make U.S.-Iran diplomacy more challenging. While Iran has rejected diplomacy on its missiles, negotiations on missile proliferation have been a theoretical possibility.
The Rouhani government maintained that the JCPOA was the floor, not the ceiling of diplomacy with the United States. Under Raisi, Iran may de-prioritize diplomacy with Washington, and focus instead on an Iranian pivot-to-Asia. As such, the JCPOA may become both the floor and the ceiling under Raisi, much to the chagrin of the Biden administration who strongly believe that the JCPOA cannot endure unless it is made "longer and stronger."
But Raisi's election has not changed U.S. national interest. It is still pivotal to U.S. security that Iran's pathways to a bomb are blocked. Trump has proved that there is no alternative to the JCPOA for achieving that goal — regardless of the name of the President in Iran.
Top photo credit: George Air Force Base is a former United States Air Force base located about 75 miles northeast of Los Angeles, California. The facility was closed by the Base Realignment and Closure (or BRAC) 1992 commission at the end of the Cold War. It is now the site of Southern California Logistics Airport and a National Guard drone training facility. (Flickr/Creative Commons/slworking2)
In his search for saving taxpayers’ money, President Trump recently directed Elon Musk and the newly-created Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) to take a closer look at the Pentagon. And their search is apparently already paying off.
“They’re finding massive amounts of fraud, abuse, waste, all of these things,” Trump declared.
If the administration is truly committed to cutting waste and maximizing efficiency, it should direct the Pentagon to examine how it is using its vast real estate holdings — an estimated 26 million acres in the United States alone. And if the Department of Defense were to make such an assessment, it is likely that it would justify another round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), a process last initiated in 2005, in which an independent commission helps to select a list of bases to be realigned or closed, in consultation with affected communities.
Between 2013 and 2017, the Pentagon repeatedly requested another BRAC. The new Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, seems open to the idea. In a series of responses in advance of his confirmation, Hegseth explained, “I will work with leaders in the Department and across the Executive Branch to assess whether another BRAC round is needed. If the President were to determine a BRAC is appropriate, we will work with Congress to identify and implement process improvements.”
This is where DOGE could help move the needle. For nearly a decade, a few members of Congress have steadfastly blocked any consideration of base closure or realignment, despite the fact that a 2017 Pentagon study found that it has 19% more capacity than it needs. If many of the Pentagon’s facilities are underutilized, or even entirely unused, releasing this land to be redeveloped could generate revenue for the federal government, and benefits to the surrounding communities.
This underutilization is precisely the kind of problem that DOGE is designed to root out. According to one estimate, savings from the prior five rounds of BRAC save taxpayers $12 billion annually.
“There are strong indications DOGE wants to reduce the federal government’s real property footprint and see if there is a way to cut some savings loose from DoD’s installations and infrastructure, though it remains to be seen if it will look or smell anything like BRAC,” explained Assistant Commander for BRAC Andy Napoli during a phone call with the authors.
Without Congressional approval to formally close bases, however, the Pentagon may quietly cut personnel and operations at certain facilities across the country, and redeploy them elsewhere. Ten years ago, Anthony Principi, chairman of the last BRAC, warned against such a "stealth" BRAC. “These reductions have a serious economic impact on local communities,” Principi wrote, “who are helpless to counter the Pentagon’s decisions.”
A stealth BRAC not only harms military communities, it also decreases military readiness. Blocking BRAC, Representative Adam Smith (D-WA) explained in 2016, “has the harmful and unintended consequence of forcing the Military Departments to consider cuts at all installations, without regard to military value.”
Under such circumstances, the military, the taxpayers, and the surrounding communities, would be better off with a formal closure, which would eventually deliver the property over to redevelopment.
We can see how this has played out from some of the bases and communities included in the 2005 BRAC. Take, for example, the case of Fort Gillem in suburban Atlanta. The former Army logistics hub is now the Gillem Logistics Center, home to a 1.3 million-square-foot warehouse for the Kroger grocery chain, as well as distribution centers for global brands such as Amazon, Boeing, Cummins, and Kuehne & Nagel. The facility is valued for its close proximity to Hartfield Jackson International, one of the nation’s busiest airports, as well as major interstate highways.
Those same factors attracted BlueStar Studios which currently operates two 20,000-square-foot sound stages, with plans to eventually have fourteen. BlueStar Studio CEO Rich Goldberg announced in 2022 that "Ninety-plus percent of the jobs” at the studio would be “for local Atlantans.”
We can also look at what happened at the former Naval Air Station Brunswick in Maine. A facility that once hosted sub-hunting P-3 Orion aircraft, but was mostly off-limits to civilians, now features a wide array of businesses, including a brewery in the former small arms firing range, and a public golf course. TechPlace, a business incubator, has helped launch start-ups in critical sectors such as aerospace, advanced materials, and life sciences.
Plus, there are 1,470 housing units on former base land, including over 500 constructed since 2018. The Midcoast Regional Redevelopment Authority (MRRA), which is responsible for managing the property, reported late last year that over $272 million in “new property valuation has been added to the property tax rolls in the town of Brunswick” accounting for over $6.5 million “in new property tax revenues for FY 2025.”
Even if Congress isn’t ready to consider a BRAC, they should not block a public assessment of the military’s needs. It has been eight years since the Pentagon released a formal study on excess capacity. And, as that report noted, it did not “provide the details necessary to identify specific infrastructure for elimination.” As part of a new assessment, the Pentagon could estimate possible savings from a future BRAC round.
“Even if DOGE does not recommend a round of base closures — which I doubt they will because their reform time horizon is much faster than the multi-year BRAC process -— the effects of what DOGE does recommend or implement could potentially rekindle interest in something like a BRAC process for rationalizing missions and functions across DoD after the fact,” said Napoli. “I could imagine DOGE analysts questioning why each military department needs certain functions of its own and directing development of plans to potentially consolidate functions into fewer locations, which is actually quite similar to what aspects of the 2005 round of BRAC recommended,” he added.
If DOGE directs the consolidation of a particular functional area or the downsizing of a certain workforce and leaves the implementation details to still be worked out, members of Congress might step in and request a more formal review to ensure they and their constituents have a seat at the table. This broadens stakeholder and community involvement — and diffuses the political downsides if the axe falls hard on a particular location.
If Trump is serious about cutting waste in the Pentagon, and also committed to helping mostly rural communities that are adjacent to many military bases, a new round of BRAC might fit the bill. After all, the Pentagon’s problems of excess and underutilized capacity will exist far beyond DOGE’s expiration date of July 2026.
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Top image credit: Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian attend a documents signing ceremony in Moscow, Russia January 17, 2025. REUTERS/Evgenia Novozhenina/Pool
After Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s moderate president, entered office last August, he stressed his readiness to negotiate with the United States. Despite fierce opposition by regime hardliners, he appointed as vice president for strategic affairs former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, an architect of the 2015 nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), between Iran and the P5+1 countries — the five permanent members of the United Nations Security (UNSC) council plus Germany. The two seemed to enjoy the full support of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who, in a speech last August, declared that there was “no barrier” to negotiations.
Zarif penned two pieces, published by Foreign Affairs and the Economist, and granted an interview to CNN’s Fareed Zakaria in which he emphasized Iran’s readiness to engage the United States and the West. These public offerings would almost certainly not have happened had Khamenei not approved. In fact, the sole purpose of Zarif’s presence in the new Pezeshkian administration was to prepare for negotiations with the United States. Indeed, given the relentless attacks on Zarif by Iran’s hardliners, he could join the new administration only if Khamenei gave his blessing. Other former and current Iranian officials have also expressed strong support for negotiations.
Hopes for negotiations rose after President Donald Trump won last November’s election. He, too, said repeatedly that he wants to negotiate with Iran, although he also kept threatening it with military action.
Those hopes were, however, dashed when Trump signed an executive order last month to bring back the “maximum pressure” policy of his first term — essentially the plan by his former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former national security adviser John Bolton to either force Iran to “capitulate” or to attack Iran militarily.
While negotiations between Iran and the United States should take place, no self-respecting nation, let alone Iran, a proud nation with 7,000 years of written history, will agree to negotiate if it is asked to capitulate. Khamenei’s reaction was no different: In a speech only a week after he had again signaled his support for negotiations, he angrily denounced the idea, saying, “You should not negotiate with such a government, it is unwise, it is not intelligent, it is not honorable to negotiate.”
After Khamenei’s denunciation, Zarif was forced out of the government by hardliners and returned to his teaching at the University of Tehran, since there was no purpose for him to remain in the government.
Trump told Fox Business Sunday that he had sent a letter to Khamenei. “I hope you’re going to negotiate,” he said, “because if we have to go in militarily it’s going to be a terrible thing for them.”
Despite the threat, the fact that he sent the letter is positive. But to bear fruit, it must be backed up by action. The president should suspend imposing the “maximum pressure” policy until negotiations take place and their outcome becomes clear.
Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had already said as much, “We will not enter any direct negotiations with the U.S. so long as they continue their maximum pressure policy and their threats, but it doesn’t mean that, regarding our nuclear program, we will not negotiate with other parties; we are talking with the three European countries, we are negotiating with Russia and China…”
Trump has said that he needs guarantees that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons. Iranian officials point to Khamenei’s Fatwa [religious edict] banning production of weapons of mass destruction, as that guarantee. This may not be reassurance enough for the West, but there is already a strong guarantee of the sort that Trump seeks.
On January 17, Iran and Russia signed an agreement for strategic cooperation. The agreement came about despite the Rand Corporation’s prediction in 2023 that, “The transactional quality of Russian-Iran relationship inhibits the development of a boarder strategic partnership.” Dana Stroul of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy had also declared that “although Russia played a helpful role in past international efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its reliance on Iranian military support will erode its willingness to enforce global nuclear nonproliferation norms.”
While immediate assessments of the new agreement by mainstream U.S. media as well as the major Washington major think tanks on which the media rely, either claimed that it revolved around the Russia-Ukraine conflict or that it was of limited significance, a closer look indicates its potential importance and relevance to nuclear policy. Article 10 of the agreement states that,
“The Contracting Parties shall cooperate closely on arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, and international security issues within the framework of the relevant international treaties and international organizations to which they are parties, and hold consultations regularly on these matters…”
If we accord the conventional meaning of the words, the key phrase, “non-proliferation… within the framework of the relevant international treaties” must refer to adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT). In addition, recall that, prior to the JCPOA, Russia did not hesitate to join other U.N. Security Council permanent members in imposing crippling sanctions against Iran whenever it determined that Tehran had violated its international obligations; it did not veto even one out of the six UNSC resolutions that imposed sanctions on Iran.
Iran complied fully with the JCPOA and restricted its uranium enrichment to the level it specified for a full year after the first Trump administration withdrew from the deal in 2018. The fact that Iran has agreed to uphold the NPT’s major requirement of peaceful nuclear activities under a binding bilateral agreement with a major world power is legal affirmation of its religiously declared position on prohibition of nuclear arms.
If Iran elects to pursue the nuclear arms path, the economic ramifications of any violation, including the loss of financial benefits promised in the agreement, will be severe enough for it to think again, let alone putting itself at the risk of having its nuclear facilities bombed by the U.S. and Israel.
It is in this context that Russia, Iran’s main partner in building nuclear reactors and related facilities, has undertaken a commitment, in accordance with Article 23 of the agreement, to continue and expand partnership with Iran in the future. It provides,
“The Contracting Parties shall promote the development of long-term and mutually beneficial relations for the purpose of implementing joint projects in the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the construction of nuclear energy facilities.”
Thus, the agreement provides more incentive for Iran to abide by its international obligations, including not violating the NPT. Given that it is not in Russia’s strategic interest for Iran to be armed with nuclear weapons, that Iran needs Russia at this critical juncture, and that Trump seemingly enjoys good relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, the agreement’s Articles 10 and 23 provide strong guarantees for a non-nuclear Iran.
If, however, such guarantees are ignored, and the United States and/or Israel attack Iran, all bets will be off.
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Top photo credit: Mahmoud Khalil speaks to members of media at Columbia University during the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas in Gaza, in New York City, U.S., June 1, 2024. REUTERS/Jeenah Moon
Vice President JD Vance stunned Europe at the Munich Security Conference in February by calling the continent out for serious backsliding on core democratic principles.
He cited annulled elections when the wrong candidate appeared slated to win, digital censorship of opinions that run afoul of the majority or established perspective, and the policing of silent thought (prayer) as exhibits A, B, and C. “In Britain, and across Europe, free speech, I fear, is in retreat.”
After acknowledging similar trends in President Biden’s America, Vance boasted that, “In Washington, there is a new sheriff in town. And under Donald Trump’s leadership, we may disagree with your views, but we will fight to defend your right to offer it in the public square, agree or disagree.”
Unless you are a green card holder talking about Israel.
At an Oval Office memo signing/media spray the day of Vance’s Munich speech, the New Sheriff said he completely agreed with Vance’s assessment about the importance of free speech. Less than a month later, though, President Trump dispatched Department of Homeland Security immigration agents to arrest and abduct Mahmoud Khalil, a permanent and lawful resident of the United States, married to an American citizen, when he and his wife returned home from dinner.
His “crime”: participating in the non-violent demonstrations at Columbia University that inspired students across the country to stand up and demand that the U.S. government stop aiding and abetting mass killing in Gaza, including of tens of thousands of women and children.
While anti-war demonstrations have almost always been viewed as — and are — squarely protected by the First Amendment’s free speech and right of assembly guarantees, Trump is painting demonstrations against the Gaza war as “pro-terrorist, anti-semitic, anti-American activity.”
The pro-Israel Free Press quoted an unnamed White House official as acknowledging that “the allegation here is not that he was breaking the law,” but that Khalil “is a threat to the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States.”
This was echoed in remarks by White House spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt, who said Tuesday in an answer to a question about the administration's basis for deporting Khalil that, "under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of State has the right to revoke a green card or a visa for individuals who … are adversarial to the foreign policy and the national security interests of the United States of America.” She added then that Khalil “sided with terrorists” by organizing protests that disrupted classes and harassed Jewish-American students and made them “feel unsafe.” She also accused protesters of handing out fliers “with the logo of Hamas.”
Jewish groups were among those protesting in New York City against Khalil’s pending deportation on Tuesday. Reports dating back to last year indicate that Khalil was not an organizer, but had served as a negotiator on behalf of students who had erected an encampment on campus.
Quite the opposite of strengthening free speech and our democracy, Trump appears to be leading us into a new McCarthyism. The president blasted out on his Truth Social account that, “this is the first of more [arrests and deportations] to come…We know there are more students at Columbia and other Universities across the Country…We will find, apprehend, and deport these terrorist sympathizers from our country — never to return again.”
Leavitt also ominously foreshadowed a looming clash on Columbia’s campus, saying that university officials are refusing to help DHS identify a list of other individuals on campus the administration has identified — reportedly through a search of students’ social media accounts. “[A]s the president said very strongly in his statement yesterday, he is not going to tolerate that.”
Meanwhile, Khalil was whisked far away from his wife in New York, who is eight months pregnant, to the LaSalle Detention Facility in Jena, Louisiana, a private prison, according to reports. He would likely have been deported already if not for a fast-acting federal judge in New York who blocked his removal from the United States until after a hearing, expressly forbidding deportation without approval by the court. The initial hearing is slated for Wednesday. Critics worry the administration “shopped” for a judge more sympathetic to its case.
We still do not know what he has been charged with, if anything, or any of the evidence against him.
The prohibition of free speech by student visa holders and permanent citizen green card holders in the United States is a clear and fundamental assault on our democracy — an effort to squelch and chill freedom of speech. It sends the same signal to the rest of the world that Vance and Trump accused Europe of sending: weakness and fear. If peaceful protest by students against a policy poses such a threat to our “national security,” how strong can we really be?
Back at the Munich Security Conference, Vance said: “the good news is that I happen to think your democracies are substantially less brittle than many people apparently fear, and I really do believe that allowing our citizens to speak their mind will make them stronger still.” The Vice President was right. And now is the time for vehement and loud assertion that free speech is not in retreat in America.
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