Quincy Institute's co-founder and executive vice president of programs Trita Parsi debated Richard Goldberg of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies today on CSPAN's Washington Journal program.
The two sparred a bit over today's presidential elections in Iran, the nuclear deal and U.S. sanctions on Tehran. They also took call-in questions. Watch below:
On February 13th, 2025, President Trump said something few expected to hear. He said, “There's no reason for us to be building brand-new nuclear weapons. We already have so many. . . You could destroy the world 50 times over, 100 times over. And here we are building new nuclear weapons . . . We’re all spending a lot of money that we could be spending on other things that are actually, hopefully, much more productive.”
I could not agree more with that statement. But with today’s expiration of the New START Treaty, we face the very real possibility of a new nuclear arms race — something that, to my knowledge, neither the President, Vice President, nor any other senior U.S. official has meaningfully discussed.
The decision to start a nuclear war can be made by a single individual—the President of the United States—with no requirement that he first consult with anyone. A nuclear war could also be started at any moment by Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, or any other leader of a nuclear weapon state. Or, it could be triggered by mistake.
A single use of a tactical nuclear weapon, either by accident or design, could trigger a flurry of escalating responses with far more powerful strategic weapons that would cause incalculable loss of life, widespread radiation poisoning, and destruction on a scale unlike anything seen in human history. We all — regardless of political affiliation — must reaffirm what Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev said 40 years ago: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
For the past eighty years, the probability of mutually assured destruction has deterred the use of nuclear weapons. But in today’s increasingly dangerous and unpredictable world, with mercurial leaders like Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un, we cannot rely on deterrence alone. Existing nuclear arms control treaties are either no longer adhered to by Russia or the United States, or, as in the case of New START, have expired.
That represents a colossal failure of leadership by both the United States and Russia. There is no greater threat to humanity than a nuclear war, yet there are no negotiations underway to replace the treaty, nor are there discussions to consider a new generation of limits on nuclear weapons.
My colleague from Massachusetts, Senator Ed Markey, and several others in Congress, as well as the arms control community, have sought to counter this complacency. But the danger of a new nuclear arms race has received far too little attention from Congress and the Administration, and with today’s expiration of the New START Treaty, it is staring us in the face.
The United States, and our allies, must urgently seek to reinvigorate negotiations on a verifiable replacement for New START, with more effective mechanisms to prevent the development, proliferation, and use of nuclear weapons. Until then, we and the Russians should agree to continue abiding by the limits under New START. Despite our stark differences with the Russians, they have as much interest in preventing an unwinnable nuclear war as we do.
We must also invigorate discussions with China, which has some 600 nuclear weapons. That number is expected to more than double in fewer than ten years.
If the U.S. and Russia fail to replace New START despite it being in both countries’ national security interest, there are other steps that we, Russia, and China should take—short of negotiating a new treaty—to help reduce the risk of a nuclear war, whether due to a false alarm, error, or other misperception.
For example:
Since the 1980s, thanks to negotiators in both countries, the United States and Russia curtailed an unrestrained nuclear arms race that had led to the deployment of staggering numbers of increasingly destructive weapons that could not rationally be justified for deterrence or any other purpose. The START Treaty and New START were historic achievements.
Twelve months ago, President Trump spoke of the need for the U.S., Russia, and China to stop building more nuclear weapons. Yet while his National Security Strategy calls for “the world’s most robust, credible, and modern nuclear deterrent,” it says nothing about preventing another nuclear arms race. With respect to New START, he reportedly said, “If it expires, it expires.”
As the New START Treaty fades into history, one commentator has suggested that “one likely successor to nuclear weapons’ sole dominance on the strategic value ladder could be AI technology. . . Either AI technology itself will become the primary strategic weapon—or it will enable the rapid creation of alternatives that render nuclear arsenals increasingly irrelevant to real-world outcomes.”
It is only a matter of time—and probably far less time than we think—before the application of AI technology to warfare creates a whole new impetus for global instability. But even as AI becomes more versatile as a disruptive and destructive force, nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war are not going to disappear.
So, I urge President Trump to elevate nuclear arms control to the top of his national security agenda. Even the modest steps I’ve outlined to reduce the chance of a catastrophic mistake or miscalculation resulting in the use of nuclear weapons should be among our highest national security priorities.
This Friday, the latest chapter in the long, fraught history of U.S.-Iran negotiations will take place in Oman. Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi and President Trump’s Special Envoy Steve Witkoff will meet in an effort to stave off a war between the U.S. and Iran.
The negotiations were originally planned as a multilateral forum in Istanbul, with an array of regional Arab and Muslim countries present, apart from the U.S. and Iran — Turkey, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.
Iran insisted — and won — a shift to a bilateral format with the U.S. in Oman, focused exclusively on the nuclear file. Washington initially refused, only to be persuaded by Turkey and Gulf allies, who fear the regional fallout of what a war may bring.
The fact that Washington agreed to hold talks after their cancellation in Istanbul speaks to the leverage countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have on Washington. The U.S. may dismiss Iranian threats of regional retaliation in the case of an attack, but its own partners are more directly threatened by the consequences — a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, retaliatory strikes on their own soil hosting U.S. bases and personnel, and the general fallout from Iran’s disintegration as a result of a prolonged war. Mindful of these dynamics, Tehran has adroitly leveraged its neighbors’ fears to win another chance to avoid a war it does not want, at a moment of an increased external pressure and domestic turmoil.
Yet, the regional leverage is finite. It can persuade Trump to get to the table, but it cannot force Washington and Tehran for a deal either side does not want or cannot accept.
Iran’s very insistence on controlling the venue, format, and agenda signals a critical reality: even under an immense external and domestic pressure, Tehran is not coming to capitulate, but to negotiate from a position of resistance.
This sets the stage for a fundamental clash. Trump, after boasting of having amassed “an armada” in the Persian Gulf, has painted himself into a corner: he now needs a loud, quick victory — military or diplomatic — or risk losing face. Iran is not offering the unconditional surrender that could be presented as such a win. A military action, however, would be highly risky, unpredictable, prolonged and likely involving U.S. casualties. In other words, it would be nothing like a flashy Venezuela operation to kidnap that nation’s president Nicolas Maduro.
This is a crisis of Trump’s own making, however. The administration keeps insisting that Iran can have no nuclear weapon — Vice-President JD Vance repeated the theme in a recent interview. But if that is indeed a real red line, then Washington is forcing down an open door. Iranian officials have consistently signaled that they are not interested in weaponization. Araghchi and Witkoff were negotiating on this basis in the first half of 2025, until Israel attacked Iran, and then the U.S. joined.
Remarkably, even after the U.S.-Israeli attack, Tehran still wants to negotiate, and Araghchi is fully authorized to represent its position. It is true that Iran keeps insisting on the right to domestic enrichment of uranium, but even Iranian officials admit that no such enrichment is taking place since the U.S. strike on Fordow and Natanz in June 2025.
If Washington’s goal is to codify this endgame — “no enrichment” as opposed to “no weaponization” — it has to offer Tehran an immediate and implementable sanctions relief, including removing both primary and secondary sanctions on trade and investment. Such a proposal would put a stark choice in front of the leaders in Tehran: accept economic relief at a time of an unprecedented internal upheaval in exchange for giving up what is now a largely theoretical enrichment right.
Since Tehran insists it seeks no nuclear weapons, what purpose does the accumulated highly enriched uranium (up to 60% which is close to weapons grade) — under the rubble in Fordow — serve anyway, other than perpetuating the crippling sanctions regime? If Washington were to make such a proposal, chances are it would at least spark some internal debate within the Iranian system between those who seek normalization and stabilization on the one hand, and hardline maximalists on the other. A compromise solution could be found, such as a regional consortium with the participation of Saudi Arabia to manage civilian nuclear fuel, providing strict guarantees to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S.
The problem is not the absence of a technical solution; it is the rejection of its political premise. If the nuclear issue is technically solvable, why are we on the brink? Because for key U.S. ally, Israel, the Iran issue is not about its nuclear problem, and much less about “freeing” Iranians from theocracy. Many in Israel and in Washington are pushing Trump to go for regime change.
Israel is also concerned about Iran's ballistic missiles because it’s the last real deterrence Iran has against a total Israeli domination in the region and Iran’s own transformation into a new Syria — a state so hollowed out that it can be bombed at will. For Iran, missiles are not bargaining chips; they are the non-negotiable pillars of its national defense.
Does that mean that Tehran should resist at all costs talking about the missiles with Washington? No. Talking is not the same as making unacceptable concessions. At a minimum, talks could provide a platform for Tehran to convey its strategic outlook and concerns directly to the Americans.
Trump obviously wants to solve the “Iran issue” for good. His non-ideological transactionalism could in fact play in Tehran’s favor. Trump does not appear to be buying the argument, advanced by both Republican and Democratic hawks, that talking to Tehran would legitimize the regime that just killed thousands of its own people.
Yet Trump is also not interested in drawn-out negotiations. But the kind of a strategic realignment of Iran from an enemy to at least a neutral that he could claim as a major win is not in the cards for as long as Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is in charge. He sees “resistance” to the “Great Satan” as an ideologically non-negotiable pillar of the Islamic Republic, safeguarding which is his main priority, even to the detriment of Iran’s national interest.
Khamenei’s thoughtless taunting of Trump on social media doesn’t help either. But even putting the ideological rigidity aside, the main reason why Tehran seeks to limit talks to the nuclear issue alone is a profound lack of trust in Washington, and, on the face of Trump’s own track record — withdrawal from the JCPOA, bombing of Iran in the midst of negotiations, acquiescence to nearly every Israeli wish — it is difficult to fault Iranians for that.
If the talks in Oman are to avert a disastrous regional war, putting Americans in harm's way and shattering the global economy, Trump should quit listening to the Israeli government and instead heed the advice of Qataris, Omanis, Saudis, Turks and Egyptians, all of whom urge him to engage in real diplomacy with Iran, and not use it as a mere prelude to war.
The end of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last treaty between the U.S. and Russia placing limits on their respective nuclear arsenals, may not make an arms race inevitable. There is still potential for pragmatic diplomacy.
Both sides can adhere to the basic limits even as they modernize their arsenals. They can bring back some of the risk-reduction measures that stabilized their relationship for years. And they can reengage diplomatically with each other to craft new agreements. The alternative — unconstrained nuclear competition — is dangerous, expensive, and deeply unpopular with most Americans.
With New START gone as of February 5, the world has lost the last legal check on the U.S. and Russia’s nuclear arsenals. These two countries together hold about 90 percent of all nuclear weapons.
For 15 years, New START has capped those arsenals: no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems each. The treaty forced both sides to share information and allow inspections. These measures provided predictability and reduced the risk of miscalculation.
Even as relations between the U.S. and Russia soured, both countries largely stuck to the treaty’s limits. According to a 2024 State Department report, Russia may have briefly exceeded the deployed warhead limit by a small amount, but overall, both sides played by the rules. Now, that restraint is a choice, not an obligation.
But the end of New START doesn’t have to mean that an arms race must follow. The size of future arsenals will still depend on politics, budgets, industrial capacity, and threat perceptions. And even though inspections stopped a while ago, first because of COVID in 2020, then after Russia suspended its participation in 2023, those limits still influenced both sides’ planning.
As I wrote in my new brief for the Quincy Institute, "Strategic Prudence and Extending New START," there are strong reasons for both countries to show restraint, even without a treaty forcing their hands. Nuclear weapons are expensive to build and maintain.
The Congressional Budget Office estimated in 2025 that keeping and upgrading the U.S. nuclear arsenal will cost $946 billion in the next decade. The new Sentinel ICBM program alone is already 81 percent over budget. The National Nuclear Security Administration is juggling seven modernization programs at once. Adding a numerical arms race on top of this modernization effort would be financially devastating.
Nuclear deterrence isn’t just about who has the most bombs. A more effective, modernized force protects America better than just adding more warheads. Every extra dollar spent chasing parity with Russia is a dollar not spent on conventional military priorities like new ships, drones, or other tech.
Meanwhile, Russia has structural advantages in this competition that Americans should not dismiss. Russian factories can crank out ammo, rockets, and tanks much faster than the U.S. or other NATO countries.
In America, defense contractors chase shareholder returns instead of building capacity. Lobbyists and donors pressure Congress into pouring money into the Pentagon, while diverting profits to stock buybacks rather than investing in the industrial base America needs.
A numerical arms race would play to Russian strengths, not American ones. The question is whether American policymakers see this and choose modernization and pragmatic diplomacy, or if they give in to worst-case fears and start ramping up the arms build-up.
Americans understand the risks of a reckless arms race. A January 2026 poll found that 91 percent of Americans believe the U.S. should negotiate a new agreement with Russia to keep or reduce nuclear limits. This is not a partisan issue: 85 percent of Trump voters said the president should accept Russia’s offer to stick to New START’s limits for at least another year.
Nearly three-quarters of all voters, including 61 percent of Republicans, believe removing all nuclear limits would make America less secure.
Despite sharp disagreements over Ukraine and other issues, there are several options for the U.S. and Russia to support strategic stability.
Presidents Trump and Putin could both make a public promise to stick to New START’s main limits for a fixed period while they work out something more lasting. Such a pledge wouldn’t bring inspections back overnight, but it would send a clear message that both sides do not want to start an arms race.
Washington and Moscow should urgently bring back some basic transparency and risk-reduction steps. This means notifying each other before major nuclear drills or missile tests, sharing data on strategic forces, and keeping crisis hotlines open between their militaries. Virtual verification technologies developed during the COVID pandemic could supplement on-site inspections if political obstacles prevent their immediate resumption. None of this relies on trust. It’s just common sense: nobody wants an accidental disaster.
The U.S. should start talks for a new agreement focused initially on deployed strategic warheads and launchers. This new deal could cover emerging technologies, like hypersonic weapons and advanced missile defenses. If they can agree to put a lid on the most dangerous systems, it will make future negotiations (maybe even with other nuclear-armed states) a whole lot easier than just leaving things up in the air.
President Trump has wisely recognized that “tremendous amounts of money are being spent on nuclear” and that “the destructive capability is something that we don't even want to talk about.” He is right. The question now is whether his administration will translate that sentiment into policy action.
Please join Devyatkin, along with nuclear weapons experts Ariel Petrovics, Tom Countryman, and Quincy Institute Director of Studies Marcus Stanley, in a special online discussion of the New START Treaty's future, on February 5, 12 p.m. Link here.
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.
