Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s suggestion during his confirmation hearing that he would consider supporting Georgia’s membership in NATO has largely gone overlooked. Georgian media has since reported that Blinken also raised the Georgia issue in his first call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. But if the Biden administration continues to push the issue of Georgia’s potential NATO membership, it would endanger the already precarious stability of the South Caucasus and increase the likelihood of misunderstanding between Moscow and Washington.
Georgian ascension to NATO would also further damage the U.S.’s already strained relationship with Europe — where public opinion shows little support for the ongoing rivalry with Russia — thereby potentially jeopardizing European cooperation on issues ranging from the rise of China to climate change.
Russia won’t interpret any consideration of Georgia's membership charitably. Russia has already lost influence in the South Caucasus, a region Moscow viewed as its sphere of influence just a decade ago.
Just last year, Russia paid a high geopolitical price for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. While Moscow was able to negotiate a ceasefire, it had to deploy peacekeepers and accede to (NATO member-state) Turkey's influence in the South Caucasus. As Russia’s relative influence in the region wanes, any hint of support from the Biden administration for Georgia’s campaign for NATO membership could provoke a violent Russian response.
European leaders likely won’t support Georgia's membership in NATO. German Chancellor Angela Merkel — who has said that she does not foresee “Georgia's prompt accession to NATO” — is approaching the end of her long tenure in office, and nothing suggests her potential successors will be more willing to expand NATO eastward. Moreover, recent polling from the European Council on Foreign Relations suggests most Germans don’t want to take sides between Washington and Moscow. Meanwhile, the Eurasia Group Foundation found that Germans are deeply pessimistic about ties with the United States. Thus, pushing for Georgian membership without European support risks re-establishing goodwill among NATO allies, a key priority for the Biden administration.
The United States has been down this road before, and the result was disastrous. At NATO’s Bucharest Summit in April 2008, President George W. Bush pushed the idea of expanding the alliance to Georgia and Ukraine. Merkel led European opposition and warned that Russia would interpret any further eastward expansion of NATO as an existential threat. A compromise was eventually reached in the Bucharest Declaration which contained language that committed the alliance to consider Georgia's accession eventually, but on no specific timeline.
Moscow and Tblissi both almost immediately misinterpreted the Bucharest Declaration’s ambiguous intent. Just 20 minutes after NATO made it public, Russia announced it would provide support to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two break-away provinces in the north of Georgia. Just four months later, Georgian President Mikhail Sakashvilli instigated an ill-advised offensive against Ossetian militia and Russian peacekeepers in Tskinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. Russian forces quickly overran the Georgian military and won the war in 12 days. In the aftermath of the war, 20,000 ethnic Georgians were unable to return to their homes in South Ossetia.
Twelve years later, Georgia is even further away from obtaining NATO membership. Abkhazia and South Ossetia both remain de-facto independent, and rigidly aligned with Moscow. Short of a sea change in Russian politics, there is no chance of Tbilisi regaining control of South Ossetia and Abkhazia peacefully. According to NATO requirements for membership, applicants must not have ongoing territorial disputes, and it’s unlikely that Georgia would be willing to let the provinces go.
The Biden administration may understand that Georgia’s campaign to join NATO is impracticable in the short term. And it may be that publicly supporting Georgia’s ascension is simply a negotiating tool, or part of the follow-through on President Biden’s vow to “punish Russia” for a series of espionage related hacks of American computer systems reportedly conducted by Moscow. But as we’ve seen, Russia and Georgia could misinterpret such ambiguity to disastrous consequences. Indeed, Georgian media has already given Blinken’s remarks morecoverage than the Biden administration might expect.
Georgia’s membership in NATO is the wrong issue for this type of diplomatic maneuvering. Blinken suggested during his confirmation hearing that Georgia would become safer by joining NATO. While it’s unclear whether that would be the ultimate outcome in Georgia’s case, what is certain is that the application process itself would endanger Georgia, the stability of the South Caucasus, and U.S. interests in the region. Pushing this issue is a gamble with no clear payoff for the United States.
Moreover, Georgia’s ascension to NATO would add yet another Article V commitment — an issue that’s already contentious among the American public — to an ally bordering an increasingly insecure Russia.
Another consequence would be increased tensions between Russia and Georgia, if not outright war, and the further fraying of American ties to Western Europe. Forcing the issue of Georgian membership in NATO right now will stress already strained relations with allies like Germany. Restoring the transatlantic relationship was a central tenet of the Biden campaign’s foreign policy platform. Now is not the time to stress those relationships further for the sake of poking Putin in the eye.
Adam Pontius is a writer on international politics based in New York. His writing and research focuses on international security and transatlantic politics. Previously, Adam worked as a graduate research assistant for the Eurasia Group Foundation (EGF) in support of the Independent America project. Prior to EGF, Adam worked as a political consultant and an advocate for democratic reform for seven years. He holds an M.A. degree in International Relations from Central European University where he wrote his thesis on ontological security and Woodow Wilson's foreign policy. Adam is an alumnus of the Bard Globalization and International Affairs program and holds B.A. in political science from Elmira College.
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., with Vice President Kamala K. Harris and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, delivers remarks to State Department employees, at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., on February 4, 2021. [State Department Photo by Freddie Everett]|A soldier carries the NATO flag during German Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen's visit to German troops deployed as part of NATO enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Rukla military base, Lithuania, February 4, 2019. REUTERS/Ints Kalnins
The Defense Department has not taken adequate measures to address “significant fraud exposure,” and its timeline for fixing “pervasive weaknesses in its finances” is not likely to be met, according to a recently released government report.
The Government Accountability Office conducted the report to assist the Pentagon in meeting its timeline for a clean audit by 2028. DOD has failed every audit since it was legally required to submit to one each year beginning in 2018. In fact, the Pentagon is the only one of 24 federal agencies that has not been able to pass an unmodified financial audit since the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990.
For more than two decades, the GAO has given over 100 recommendations on how the Pentagon can fix its financial weaknesses. Most cases are still open, with no progress satisfied other than a “leadership commitment.” Additionally, many of the thousands of identified deficiencies found in its 2018 audit remain outstanding.
Indeed, the GAO found that “to achieve a department-wide clean audit opinion by December 2028, the DOD needs to accelerate the pace at which it addresses its long-standing issues.”
GAO advises DOD to implement a fraud risk management system. From 2017 to 2024, the DOD reported $10.8 billion in confirmed fraud. While that number is small compared to the Pentagon’s budget over those years, “recoveries and confirmed fraud reflect only a small fraction of DOD’s potential fraud exposure,” the GAO says.
Examples of more egregious cases of fraud and abuse at the Pentagon — like the $52,000 trash can or the $7,600 coffee maker — have been well-documented over the years. But others are a bit more granular. The new GAO report noted that the Pentagon purchased a machine gun bipod component with subpar manufacturing standards because a vendor fraudulently edited paperwork to reflect a higher manufacturing score. Luckily, engineers caught the deficiency before the bipods entered the battlefield, but the incident could have placed soldiers in harm’s way.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth promised to return a clean DOD audit by the end of Trump’s administration, an outcome the GAO report and experts say is unlikely, barring significant changes.
Despite inadequate answers to these massive financial deficiencies, President Trump has ordered the Pentagon to increase its budget to over $1 trillion, up from the around $850 billion that the Biden administration requested for FY 2025.
“Congress set an ambitious deadline for the Pentagon to achieve an unmodified audit opinion in 2028, but there's little evidence to suggest the department can meet it,” says Julia Gledhill, Research Associate at the Stimson Center. “Lawmakers would be better off lowering Pentagon spending, which would help the department mitigate the risk of contractor fraud. With more limited resources, the Pentagon would have to tackle the issue head-on."
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Top photo credit: Hatay Turkey - February, 09,2023 : Aid is distributed to earthquake victims. (Shutterstock)/ BFA-Basin Foto Ajansi)
An overwhelming majority of voting-age Americans support providing humanitarian and food aid to developing countries, but they are more divided along partisan lines on other forms of U.S. assistance to nations of the Global South, according to new poll results released by the Pew Research Center.
The findings come as the White House last week released a “skinny budget” that proposed a nearly 48% cut to total foreign aid, including a 40% reduction in humanitarian assistance, for next year and signaled its intent to rescind nearly half the current year’s aid budget appropriated by Congress but not yet spent.
If successful, the administration’s plans would amount to a roughly 84% reduction in total U.S. foreign aid. It will now be up to the GOP-dominated Congress to decide whether and how much to approve the administration’s plans.
The new poll found that large majorities of both Republicans and Democrats and independents support providing medical-related and basic human needs aid, such as food and clothing, to people in developing countries. But supporting economic development projects and pro-democracy initiatives garner far less support from Republicans or Republican-leaning Americans than their Democratic counterparts. Under the administration’s proposed budget, those programs would be largely eliminated.
Remarkably, providing weapons and related assistance to foreign militaries receives even less approval from Republicans and Republican-leaning respondents, while a slight majority of their Democratic counterparts are more supportive. Democrats have historically been more skeptical of supporting foreign militaries since World War II than Republicans.
The poll, which was carried out with the participation of 3,605 respondents during the last week of March, also found major partisan differences on the questions of how much the United should engage in problems overseas and to what extent it should take account of the interests of other countries in conducting international relations.
Two thirds of Republican or Republican-leaning respondents agreed with the proposition that “we should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here at home,” as opposed to “it’s best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs.” Sixty-two percent of Democratic or Democratic-leaning respondents chose the latter statement as best representing their views.
And more than four in Democratic or Democratic-leaning respondents (83%) said Washington should “take into account the interests of other countries, even if it means making compromises with them.” A small majority (52%) or Republicans opted for the alternative proposition: Washington should “follow its own interests even when other countries strongly disagree.”
The survey was conducted after the administration of President Donald Trump and its Department of Government Efficiency, or DOGE, announced the virtual elimination of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its transfer to the Department of State.
In early March, Secretary of State Marco Rubio followed up by canceling more than 80 percent of all USAID contracts after finding that they “did not serve (and in some cases even harmed), the core national interests of the United States.” The administration also moved to eliminate or drastically cut back other aid programs previously administered by the State Department itself, as well as some Congressionally mandated and federally financed non-governmental organizations, such as the National Endowment for Democracy. Many of these actions have been challenged in court.
Breaking down the numbers
In fiscal 2023, the last year for which statistics are fully available, U.S. foreign aid totaled $71.9 billion, or 1.2% of the total federal budget. That amount was more on average than the previous seven years, primarily due to the amount of monetary support provided to Ukraine ($16.6 billion), then in its second year of war with Russia. Of the total, military aid administered by the State Department – other U.S. military aid is channeled through the Pentagon — came to $8.2 billion, more than half of which was earmarked for Israel, Egypt, and Jordan.
Of the remainder, most of which was administered by USAID, $15.6 billion went to disaster relief and other humanitarian aid; $12.1 billion went to the battle against HIV/AIDS and other diseases; $2.3 billion was devoted to democracy and rule-of-law promotion; and $2.9 billion to “multi-sector” programs.
The latest poll results show strong support across both parties for medical and “basic needs” assistance. More than nine in ten Democrats or Democratic-leaning respondents (91%) said they supported providing medical assistance, a position shared by nearly either eight in ten Republican or Republican-leaning counterparts (77%). Taken together, 83% of respondents supported such assistance.
Providing food and clothing registered similar levels of support – 89% among Democrats and Democratic-leaning respondents; 68% on the other side of the aisle. Combined, 78% of respondents said they support aid of this kind.
Other forms of aid revealed much greater partisan differences. On the question of economic development aid, eight in ten Democratic and Democratic-leaning respondents voiced their support, while only 46% of Republicans and those leaning Republican agreed.
Overall, 63% respondents favored providing development assistance. A similar breakdown applied to aid designed to “strengthen democracy.” In that case, 77% of the Democrat side said they supported it, while it had the support of only 45% of Republicans. Under the White House plan, however, those aid categories would be largely eliminated.
On support and aid to foreign militaries, just over half of Democrats and Democratic-leaners (51%) favored such assistance despite their history, particularly beginning in the late- and post-Vietnam era of the 1970s, of promoting legislation to condition such aid on human rights and related considerations. Only three in ten of their Republican or Republican-leaning counterparts favored providing “support and weapons to militaries in other countries.” Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Republicans have generally been more skeptical of U.S. military aid to Kyiv than their colleagues across the aisle.
The poll found the least support (34% overall) for what it called support for “art and cultural activities in other countries.” While a majority of Democrats and Democratic-leaning respondents (54%) said they support such initiatives, a mere 15% of Republicans agreed.
The administration’s proposed 2026 budget would roughly cut in half total foreign-aid spending as a percentage of the total federal budget to nearly 0.6%. According to a poll of 1,160 adult respondents conducted by the University of Maryland’s Program for Public Consultation (PPC) in early February, solid majorities wanted to maintain or increase U.S. aid for humanitarian relief (56%), economic development (56%), global health (64%), education, the environment (65%), and democracy and human rights (60%) after being informed about those programs and assessing arguments both pro and con for each.
While a majority of Republicans surveyed in that poll favored cutting some programs, less than half of those supported either cutting them “somewhat,” a small percentage (11-20%) favored eliminating them.
“I would say the strongest message from the Pew survey – and the PPC survey – is that Americans of both parties are supportive of humanitarian aid and that there is no indication of a desire for a major reduction,” said Steven Kull, PPC’s long-time director who has polled American attitudes on foreign policy and related subjects for almost four decades. “Interestingly, this is the case even though Americans still grossly overestimate the amount of foreign aid the U.S. actually provides.”
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Top photo credit: Bucharest, Romania. 13th Jan, 2025: George Simion (C), the leader of the nationalist Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) lead the rally against the annulment of the presidential elections (LCV/Shutterstock)
The head of Romania’s “sovereigntist” camp, George Simion won Romania’s first round presidential race on Sunday with 41% of the vote in a field of 11 candidates.
Simion leads the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) party, the leading opposition force in parliament. Simion — who as president would have substantial powers in the realm of foreign and security policy — supports Romania’s NATO commitments, but is not an enthusiastic supporter of sending further military aid to Ukraine. His victory could strengthen the dissident camp on this issue within the EU.
This first round result seems to be a decisive rebuke by the electorate of the cancellation of the first-round contest of last November, after the surprise first-place finish of Calin Georgescu, another nationalist-populist candidate. Georgescu, an AUR member until 2022, endorsed Simion, and the two men appeared together throughout the campaign.
Simion seems to have succeeded in winning support from those angered by Georgescu’s disqualification. (The combined tally of votes in November for Georgescu and Simion, who finished fourth, was 37%). Georgescu was barred from running, because his November campaign allegedly benefited from covert financing from Russia, including effective TikTok advertisements.
Simeon’s AUR was founded in 2019 initially advocating linguistic and cultural rights of ethnic Romanians in Moldova and Ukraine, but has broadened its appeal by espousing nationalist-populism and criticism of the EU. Ukraine barred him from entering the country on grounds that he was fomenting discontent within the ethnic Romanian minority (numbering about 150,000) in Ukraine.
In the runoff to be held on May 18, Simeon will face popular Bucharest mayor Nicosur Dan, a pro-EU anti-corruption campaigner who received just under 21% of the first round vote, slightly ahead of the pro-establishment standard-bearer Crin Antonescu. Dan founded the liberal reformist Union for the Salvation of Romania (USR) party which is represented in parliament, but he ran as an independent.
The May election rerun was conducted under stricter controls of campaign financing and monitoring of social media for inauthentic posts. Echoing some of Simion’s campaign rhetoric, Social Democrat Victor Ponta also ran a “Romania First” campaign, winning 13% of the vote. Those voters could give Simion an easy path to victory in the runoff. Simion’s AUR party is in the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) bloc in the European parliament, with the party of Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni and the Polish Law and Justice Party. Simion has called Meloni his political hero.
Romania’s mainstream center right National Liberals and center left Social Democrats govern together in coalition, and are held responsible by much of the electorate for steady population decline, emigration of much of the workforce, lackluster economic performance, and corruption. Simion won 60% of the Romanian diaspora vote. Many rural and traditionalist voters are clearly disaffected and keen to see dramatic change.
Sovereigntists vs Europhiles
The self-described sovereigntist Simion clearly aligned himself with the Trump administration, alleging that Romanian independence and dignity needed to be reasserted. Simeon clearly sought to emulate the model of Trump — and perhaps also Meloni — in his appeal to voters. Nationalist-populist parties in Italy, France and Poland celebrated Simion’s victory.
On May 2, Simion posted on X that the election was not about any one candidate but was instead about “every Romanian who has been lied to, ignored, humiliated, and still has strength to believe and defend our identity and rights.”
Dan has made fighting official corruption the centerpiece of his political career. His success represents a liberal rebuke of the political establishment and in particular the ruling coalition of the center right and center left (National Liberals and Socialists).
NATO and Ukraine
Simion is somewhat more sympathetic toward Ukraine than Georgescu, although unlikely to favor providing further financial or military support. Romania is important to sustaining the economy and war effort in Ukraine. A large share of Ukrainian wheat exports is shipped from Romanian ports, and NATO conducts operations from bases in Romania.
Simion favors following Trump’s lead on Ukraine and not that of those Europeans who vow to support Ukraine’s war effort even as the U.S. reduces or potentially halts its support. For better or worse, Simion has staked his campaign on the popularity of Trump’s administration. He sees continued U.S. support for NATO as essential to the defense of Europe, but recently expressed doubt that Russia poses a threat to Romania or NATO.
Prospects for May 18 runoff
Simion’s performance suggests that the populist right anti-establishment movement has a strong base of domestic support, as do similar parties across Europe, and is not an artifact of foreign meddling. The EU’s leadership likely dreads a Simion victory, which could reinforce the dissident stance of Hungary and Slovakia on the Ukraine war and the resolute stance against Russia. Simion will no doubt play up his affiliation with the slightly more acceptable faces of European populism, such as Meloni and former Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki.
After the cancellation of last November’s election, the EU gave Romania its long-sought membership in the Schengen group, facilitating free movement within the EU. Rather than foregrounding attitudes toward Russia, the election contest in its first and second rounds pits Trump’s America against the European Union, sovereigntists vs. Europhiles.
Simion goes into the runoff with a strong advantage, especially as Dan, a critic of the status quo, may not get wholehearted support from the mainstream parties. Although inspired by a wave of structural popular discontent, Simion’s continued success depends to some extent on the attractiveness of the U.S. under President Trump to Romania’s nationalist minded voters.
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