These are the three social evils Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. warned would destroy America from within: Militarism, materialism, and racism. Decades later, they help explain the divisions in our country that led to the January 6 attack by protesters on the U.S. Capitol. Of the three, however, the role our recent wars have played in exacerbating these conditions is often the most overlooked.
Video produced by Khody Akhavi.
President Donald Trump told reporters Monday that “very good things” are happening in his nuclear diplomacy with Iran, adding, “I think they’re being very reasonable thus far.” His optimistic tone was echoed by Iranian diplomats and Omani mediators, with Iran’s foreign minister describing the talks this weekend as “more serious” and “more detailed” than past meetings. Yet behind the upbeat rhetoric, a more complex and challenging reality is taking shape.
While earlier rounds made progress toward limiting—though not eliminating—Iran’s nuclear enrichment, even prompting parallel technical discussions, the latest round saw a slight reversal. The setback stemmed from the U.S. insistence on the unrealistic demand that Iran abandon domestic enrichment entirely.
Shutting down Iran’s more than 20,600 centrifuges is not required to achieve Trump’s stated goal of preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon. Nonetheless, it remains a long-standing demand of hardliners such as George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Nikki Haley, Mike Pompeo, and John Bolton. Many of them understood that insisting on total Iranian capitulation was the quickest path to derailing diplomacy and laying the groundwork for war.
There are several reasons why Trump should not allow himself to be pushed into pursuing the zero-enrichment fantasy.
First, this goal has not only proven unattainable but also counterproductive, gifting Iran more time to advance its program while delaying the constraints a realistic, verification-based agreement would impose.
In 2003, Iran proposed to the U.S. a comprehensive deal aimed at resolving all major disputes, including limits on its enrichment program. At the time, Tehran had just 164 centrifuges, no stockpile of low-enriched uranium, and no capability to enrich above 3.67 percent—sufficient for civilian fuel but far below the 90 percent required for nuclear weapons.
As I describe in Treacherous Alliance, the Bush administration not only ignored the proposal but also punished the Swiss ambassador in Tehran for delivering Iran’s diplomatic overture to Washington. For Bush, nothing short of zero enrichment and regime change in Iran was acceptable.
In the absence of a deal, Iran’s nuclear program steadily expanded. By 2006, it was operating over 3,000 centrifuges. The Bush administration reluctantly agreed to support European-led talks but imposed a fatal precondition: Iran had to halt enrichment before negotiations could begin. Predictably, diplomacy stalled—and Iran’s program advanced unchecked.
By the time Barack Obama took office in 2009, Iran was operating 8,000 centrifuges and had stockpiled 1,500 kg of low-enriched uranium—enough for one nuclear weapon if further enriched. Obama’s early diplomatic efforts faltered, but by 2012, secret talks in Oman produced a breakthrough since, for the first time, the U.S. signaled it would accept enrichment in Iran in exchange for strict limits and intrusive inspections.
This breakthrough paved the way for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. By the time it was implemented, Iran had expanded its program to 19,000 centrifuges and amassed over 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium.
Over the past two decades, the persistent demand for zero enrichment—an unachievable goal—has only resulted in a larger and more advanced Iranian nuclear program by postponing realistic, enforceable limits on enrichment.
While these delays were damaging in the past, they pose an even greater risk today amid the looming crisis over potential UN snapback sanctions. This is yet another reason why Trump should avoid falling into the zero-enrichment trap.
The snapback mechanism, created as part of the JCPOA, allows any party to the nuclear deal to swiftly reimpose UN sanctions on Iran—without the risk of a veto from any permanent member of the UN Security Council. It was designed as a deterrent, offering a fast, veto-proof path to restore sanctions if Iran violated the agreement. However, this mechanism expires in October, and the European parties—France, Germany, and the UK—are inclined to trigger it before that deadline.
Tehran has made its position clear: If snapback is invoked, it will not only withdraw from the JCPOA but also exit the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and expel all IAEA inspectors, effectively turning its nuclear program into a black box. Exiting the NPT takes 90 days, during which there remains a window to reverse course. To align these timelines, the Europeans are expected to initiate the snapback process in June, ensuring that both the NPT withdrawal and the full reimposition of sanctions converge just before October—after which Europe loses the legal ability to act.
This would create a 90-day window for high-stakes negotiations, but one Trump should avoid for several reasons. First, the starting point would be far worse than the current talks, given the escalation caused by snapback sanctions and an NPT exit. Second, it would force the Europeans back into the process, complicating matters unnecessarily. Finally, with slim chances of success, the talks would likely shift toward renegotiating the snapback deadline to prevent a complete collapse and avoid military confrontation.
As a result, valuable time that should be spent securing restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities would instead be consumed by negotiations over a new UNSC resolution to extend the snapback deadline. These talks would face the added difficulty of aligning the interests of the Europeans, Russia, and China, all while dealing with other geopolitical conflicts (e.g., Ukraine). In essence, a tough negotiation with Iran would be swapped for a nearly impossible one with Russia and the EU.
All of these paths eventually lead to the worst-case scenario: The collapse of diplomacy and the likely shift toward military action.
Trump is wise to be skeptical of war with Iran. Contrary to the narrative pushed by Israel and its neoconservative allies, Iran’s regional setbacks do not leave it defenseless or incapable of striking U.S. bases and personnel in the event of conflict. While the weakening of Hezbollah and the loss of Syria are significant, they haven’t affected Iran’s missile program, which remains its primary means of retaliation.
Over the past year, the U.S. military has learned that Iran’s missile capabilities are far more advanced and dangerous than previously believed. Iran’s October 2024 missile retaliation against Israel was, contrary to mainstream accounts, highly effective, breaching Israel’s air defenses—from the Iron Dome to the Arrow, David's Sling, and Patriots. In response to this failure, the Netanyahu government requested that President Joe Biden deploy America’s most advanced missile defense system, the THAAD, to Israel. Biden obliged.
Privately, the success of the attack stunned Israeli officials and prompted the Pentagon to revise its casualty estimates for a potential war with Iran. Those estimates were likely adjusted again after a single Houthi missile breached both the THAAD system and Israel’s air defenses, striking Ben Gurion Airport last week. Unlike the Iranian missile barrages, in which large numbers of missiles were launched to overwhelm the defenses, the Houthis fired only one missile—and still managed to bypass both the THAAD and Israel’s own systems.
Consequently, war with Iran will not only fail to destroy its nuclear program—Israel’s proposed bombing campaign would only delay it by a year, after which the US and Israel would have to bomb it again and again—it will likely also leave scores of Americans dead and destroy Trump’s presidency, just as the Iraq war destroyed Bush’s.
All these worst-case scenarios can be avoided. Trump has a better shot at striking a strong deal with Iran than any previous president—if he avoids the mistakes of the past and the illusion of zero enrichment. While Steve Witkoff and Marco Rubio have publicly insisted on zero enrichment as the only solution, Trump has wisely been more ambiguous. In the end, it’s his word—and only his—that matters.
This article was republished with permission by The American Conservative magazine
Early this week, popular Twitch streamer and YouTube podcaster Hasan Piker was detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents for two hours at Chicago O’ Hare International Airport. There, he said he was questioned about his work and on his political views, especially those related to Israel’s war in Gaza and foreign policy.
Piker, who is an American citizen and was returning home from a family trip to France, spoke with RS about his experience being detained, First Amendment rights, and U.S. foreign policy in the Trump era. He said he was not arrested, but was clearly singled out for his interviews and online commentary. He told RS that he thinks the feds are likely worried about blowback and “bad branding” now that this case has gotten widespread attention and is generally seen as an attempt to put a chill on Constitutionally protected speech challenging the administration’s policies.
In a X post this week, the Department of Homeland Security suggested Piker was "lying for likes."
"Our officers are following the law, not agendas," posted DHS Assistant Secretary Tricia McLaughlin, adding that Piker was "promptly released" after a "routine" inspection.
The following interview has been edited for length and clarity
Stavroula Pabst: Now that you've had some time to reflect on the experience [of being detained], and maybe you've been able to speak with other journalists and lawyers about it…do you have anything more to say about the situation than what your initial reaction to it was. Has maybe your analysis of the episode changed at all over the last few days?
Hasan Piker: Not necessarily. I guess the only thing that was really interesting was the Department of Homeland Security's spokesperson's response to it all, which was to claim that this was like ‘lying for likes,’ and that it was a routine part of the process, a routine investigation that was, was not conducted on the basis, or was not started on the basis, of like political dissidents. And that they released me after, you know, asking these questions. I find that interesting, because, on the one hand, I think that they're still lying. I don't think that they're being truthful when they say it's not targeting due to political opinions.
But I think it's also interesting that they are worried about that being branded with the, that being associated with the administration. Like they're worried that could be an angle of attack, or an angle of criticism that could galvanize a lot of people against the administration.
So it's interesting — what they chose to defend and what they chose to omit. And what they chose to omit, of course, is the line of questioning, because I think that's what most people are understandably disturbed by: you know, my political affiliations, my opinions on American foreign policy, my opinions on Israel and numerous non-state actors that are in the region. All of that is constitutionally protected speech for an American citizen such as myself. And yet this was, these were questions that were asked almost to feed a line of inquiry that could potentially create some kind of actionable situation, you know, in an effort to, like, trip you up in that conversation. To try to see if you could say something that could justify further investigation into whether or not you are doing something illegal, like material support for any number of these different groups.
And so that, in and of itself, was a frustrating, frustrating thing to contend with, that the administration is trying to do this. But I guess, like I said, the silver lining is that they are still worried about the bad branding, the bad attention that this brings upon the Department of Homeland Security. So those are my thoughts since the detention.
SP: I understand in that same [DHS] comment, I believe it's Tricia McLaughlin, she had said that what had happened to you was legal. What do you make of that?
HP: I think it's definitely very strange, if this is now considered legal and routine. Because not only did she say it's legal, but she also said it was a routine investigation. And I don't know if it's actually routine, or if it should be routine, to ask American travelers entering the country what their opinion on the President is. Would it have been fine if, I don't know, Rush Limbaugh was apprehended during the Bill Clinton administration at the border? I mean, I don't even know if Tucker Carlson was questioned or investigated by the Department of Homeland Security, or any other agency under the Biden administration, when he went and talked to Vladimir Putin, the leader of a foreign adversary.
So, I don't think this is routine at all. I mean, it's routine if you are Muslim, living in the post 9-11 War on Terror era where you're traveling and all. And I have seen some of that impact as well, like you know, getting the quadruple “S” stamp on my boarding pass, like, I've experienced that before, right, for additional security clearances and things of that nature.
But this was unique in the sense that I've never been taken to a detention center, and like, been investigated this thoroughly with questions that revolve around things that they're not even supposed to technically ask you when you're entering the country. Your opinion on the president is not pertinent to entering the country as an American citizen. It is unconstitutional for them to bar me entry into my own country on the basis of my first amendment-protected speech.
SP: In light of this event, it's my understanding that you've accused the U.S. government of "causing a chilling effect" and an "environment of fear" through these detainments, not just yours, but as well as others in an effort to silence critics. Why do you think the U.S. government might view your speech or your political activity as dangerous to its prerogatives, and perhaps especially in regards to its foreign policy goals and objectives?
HP: Because it's deeply unpopular. It's that simple. Our agenda in the Middle East, our grand design for the region, revolves around Israel dominating every other country in its immediate vicinity with American munitions. And the atrocities are so severe that it has actually changed the political calculation in the way that people view Israel no longer as the most reliable and most valuable ally in the Middle East... This has created a major fissure between what the American public's demands are, which I believe are very reasonable and just, which is to put an end to this bloodshed and to also bring about war criminals that are responsible for this genocide to justice, right?
And the American politicians on the other hand, the American government, on the other hand, has a very different attitude on this, a very different attitude that revolves around letting Israel continue doing what it wants to do. And for this reason, I think, and this happened, this accelerated under Biden administration, as well, something I was very critical about even then, the government's response to this has been to basically try and punish people for not liking what Israel is doing, rather than address the elephant in the room: the idea that this can continue forever is ridiculous, and that's where we're at now. That's why we are seeing [this] first from an immigration enforcement side, which is, I think, also delivery, because that was Trump's most popular policy. In his mind, at least.
So we're seeing the immigrant enforcement mechanism target student protesters and even green card holders for no crimes whatsoever, but simply for their First Amendment protective speech in an effort to, I think, open the door to a complete erosion of the First Amendment and maybe even possibly another unconstitutional precedent to set on, on a distinction being made in terms of constitutional protections between citizens and non-citizens. Because right now, there is no distinction.
The constitution protects citizens and non citizens alike as long as they're on U.S. soil, which means that they're still also protected by the First Amendment. I think that that's what they're trying to tackle right now. And I fear that they're using Israel, which has a tremendously sophisticated and and very expansive, and also expensive, lobbying and and influence peddling operation in the United States of America and the the cynical shield that this influence peddling operation uses is antisemitism, that that this administration is using antisemitism as a way to open up the flood gates of eroding civil liberties, and they're doing this in a very cynical and very transparent manner.
SP: If our ability to speak out as civilians in this capacity is being jeopardized, what should we try to be doing right now to prevent that? What is our action in terms of where we go from here, now that [U.S. citizens' right to free speech is] to possibly be the target?
HP: I mean, I think we just keep pushing. There's nothing else to do in this situation. You can change targets as the government changes its priorities or engages in ridiculous enforcement and further encroachments on civil liberties.
But before that happens, as long as there are legal avenues that you can exhaust, I think we should exhaust all avenues, and all options, and engage in civil disobedience and continue to speak truth to power and exercise our first amendment rights, especially as American citizens.
I have immense privilege as an American citizen, an American citizen that is relatively wealthy and as an American citizen with a public persona. And I try to use that privilege every single day to speak out for those who can't speak out for themselves, to give voice to the voiceless. And I'm going to continue doing that, regardless of whether or not the government doesn't like it, or whether or not the government wants to prosecute me over these sorts of things, when previously, it would have been seen as unimaginable to prosecute an American citizen over their constitutionally protected speech.
SP: I have a more specific question regarding the detainment. Have you heard of the Zionist organization called Betar?
HP: Yeah.
SP: For reference, it says it shared a list of names of “hundreds of terror supporters” with the Trump administration. Do you think that there's a chance that you've been the target of this group, considering your views on Israel-Gaza?
HP: Potentially. But it's not — we don't have to look that far.
I mean, I've been almost declared the number one antisemite of the year by stopantisemitism.org. I've been targeted by the ADL [Anti-Defamation League] on numerous occasions. So there are much more prominent advocacy institutions, not even Stop Antisemitism, but ADL being like, probably the most, the largest and the most influential one with institutional muscle, coming after me with regular frequency and with vicious smears of antisemitism when I have been a massive combatant of antisemitism in perpetuity. It's just that I am also an anti-Zionist, and that is very frustrating for a lot of these organizations that simply care about Israel and not necessarily about antisemitism at all.
So there's a number of different groups that could have put me in the crosshairs of this administration. There's also obviously alongside this, like sophisticated influence peddling operation. There are papers that will routinely write hit pieces at times when I'm getting any sort of media coverage that's somewhat positive. You got the ‘Free Presses’ of the world that very obviously, are just doing propaganda for Israel with regular frequency. You have the ‘New York Posts’ of the world, like these right wing newspapers. Sometimes Fox News will even entertain writing counter-messaging.
This happened after my New York Times article came out. There was, in the Sunday Style section, they wrote about the appeal that I have, I guess, for young men. And this was viral among right-wing circles. And very quickly, as it happens over and over again, all of these are institutions that I was talking about, all these, like right wing papers that I was talking about, started immediately writing counter articles being like, ‘This guy's a terrorist supporter. He loves terrorism.’ And you know, broadly, in the eyes of the broader public, that kind of stuff doesn't work anymore. Like, no one really cares about it that much. Everyone's like, ‘oh, here we go. Another person who is pro-Palestine is being branded as an antisemite again.’ And I feel like that has kind of softened the impact. But it's obvious to me that the government certainly takes note of these things, right? That's something to consider.
SP: You had said that you told the CBP agent that you were upset that Trump hasn't ended the wars, and obviously that's definitely true in relation to Israel-Gaza.
Now, Trump has made certain efforts to try to move to end the war in Ukraine. And he's also made certain efforts to negotiate with Iran, as well as Yemen's Houthis. What do you think about Trump's efforts in these other realms? Do you support some of his other foreign policy efforts?
HP: Yeah, I actually mentioned the Houthis specifically in my interrogation as well, where I said, look, there are certain things that Trump does that I think are considered unorthodox from a, you know, foreign policy perspective, in comparison with the previous administrations, that I actually appreciate.
And the one that immediately came to mind was the talks that took place in Oman over a cessation of hostilities between the Ansar Allah movement and the Trump administration. And I think that that was productive. Stopping the bombing of [unclear], other numerous points in Yemen, and killing a bunch of civilians was not only costly. I believe what the total number is like, $15 billion of munitions that have been used so far in Yemen? It's more so than the War on Terror. As a matter of fact, it's, like, totally ridiculous. I guess you could say it's irresponsible statecraft. And I said that I actually appreciated that he did that. So there are certain things that he does that I agree with.
But the problem is, that didn't come about exclusively because Trump is a peaceful dove. That came about because the Houthis were punishing the American Navy tremendously with the very little that they have, right? It's the poorest nation on the planet, and yet, they were able to take down 22 Reaper drones, that are, what? $20 million a pop almost, or even more expensive than that, if I'm not mistaken. Four F-18 fighter jets were destroyed in the process, one under the Biden administration in the month of December, and then three, including the last one, being destroyed the day of the ceasefire. I mean, those are $70 million a pop. That's a crazy amount of cost and, if you believe the New York Times reporting on this, they were claiming, or at least, like, sources were claiming, that they even, the Houthis were almost able to take down an F-16 and an F-35 seriously putting pilot lives at risk and really changing the calculation for the Trump administration.
So it's not necessarily that Trump was a peaceful dove, but at least he was reasonable enough to recognize that these guys are not going to stop, and at the very least it's better to continue engaging in a defensive posture for Israel. But, you know, let them do whatever they're doing to Israel, but also create this situation where there's no longer any sort of back-and-forth between the American Navy and the region and the Houthis.
SP: What [do] you see amongst your own streamers, or the people that follow your work. Do they feel their foreign policy views are being represented? What are their frustrations and how do we move forward with that?
HP: No, I don't think the broader American foreign policy perspective is being represented. But I think that is also by design, kind of, where Americans have the capacity to feel as though they want peace all the time. But that's only because a lot of our imperialist efforts are sheltered from the public, whether it be the damaging impact to the local populations, or even migration patterns that end up out of all of the displacement, the migration patterns that end up causing destabilization in certain places, like Europe. Those issues never come all the way back to the United States of America and create political trouble in the United States of America. We are sheltered from the impact of our actions.
And I think that the media, broadly, also keeps people desensitized, and either desensitized or utterly oblivious to American foreign policy, which is precisely the reason why both parties can engage in like full blown war hawk behavior all around the world, and even Trump can present himself as a peaceful dove, as an ender of wars. Even though he also, when in charge, will greatly accelerate America's most damaging and most violent policies on the global stage.
So I guess the point I'm trying to make is that like, Americans fancy themselves to be peaceful, or want to feel peaceful, and want to vote for a guy who says he's going to end the wars. But both parties are not really invested in that at all.
At least Trump is lying about it when he's running for office, which I think is also still instructive to understand, like what the public position is on this. But neither, neither party actually represents it, and it's really damaging. We're completely servile to the interests of the military industrial complex in this country, our politicians are.
SP: Thank you, anything more you'd like to say?
HP: No, thank you, keep up the good work.
WARSAW, POLAND — Although there are surprisingly few candidate banners in the streets of Warsaw these days, Poland finds itself in the throes of a presidential election, which will take place on Sunday.
If, as expected, no candidate receives more than 50% of the vote, a second round between the two leading candidates will take place in two weeks time.
In the Polish political system, the president is not the head of government but carries influence over foreign and defense policy and can veto parliamentary legislation unless the veto is overcome by three-fifths of the parliamentarians. No matter who wins the election contest, either the conservative-liberal Rafał Trzaskowski of the ruling Civic Coalition of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, or the right-wing Karol Nawrocki, supported by the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party, Poland is likely to continue with its plans to devote 5% of its GDP to defense spending.
Of note, Poland was long on its way to 5% before Trump asserted that this should be the target for NATO countries. The presidential election will actually be more consequential for the internal balance of power in the country. A Trzaskowski win would greatly facilitate the work of the Tusk-led government, which does not enjoy a three-fifths majority and has often clashed with President Andrzej Duda, supported by PiS.
Bartosz Rydliński, a lecturer at the Political Science Institute of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw (UKSW), explains that after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, "Poland began to mirror the fate of Ukraine and Ukrainians. For this reason, there was almost complete political consensus on record-high military spending."
Despite the recent increase in anti-Ukrainian sentiments against the one million Ukrainian refugees living in Poland, there is also a broad political consensus, including both Trzaskowski and Nawrocki, behind supporting Ukraine's military effort against Russia even if the U.S. reduces its share of aid for the embattled country.
This contrasts with a poll in late 2024, which registered for the first time that a majority of Poles believe the war in Ukraine should end even if this implies Kyiv giving up part of its territory or sovereignty. Correspondingly, only 31% believe it is better to keep fighting without making concessions to Russia. Even so, and despite security and military factors becoming increasingly important in these elections, Trzaskowski and Nawrocki are expected to move comfortably to the second round.
As of now, Poland is already spending 4.12% of its GDP on defense, leading the next NATO countries Estonia (3.43%) and the United States (3.38%) by a considerable distance. It is countries like Poland that have led to what the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) recently decried as an "unprecedented rise” in global military expenditures.
Others look at these same figures as a net positive. U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, in Warsaw on February 2025 on his first trip abroad, noted that, "we see Poland as the model ally on the continent, willing to invest not just in their defense, but in our shared defense, and the defense of the continent."
To understand Poland's high level of military expenditure, the importance of the country's geographical location, bordering on the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus, cannot be over-emphasized. The Suwałki Gap, a 100-kilometer (62-mile) stretch of land connecting Poland to Lithuania and the rest of the Baltics, is considered by many to be one of the weakest points for NATO in the event of a confrontation with Russia.
It is also an area where Poland and Lithuania have been recently expanding their military infrastructure.
Still, Poland's military spending spree has historical roots that go deeper than the country's geographical reality after the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Ukraine War. Here, it might be useful to resort to the concept of "nervous sovereignty" used by Jarosław Kuisz, the editor-in-chief of the Polish political weekly Kultura Liberalna.
According to Kuisz, due to historical reasons, Poland is a perfect example of a country always alert to a potential loss of sovereignty. After the three partitions of Poland in the late 18th century, Poland disappeared from the map of Europe until the end of the First World War, only to be occupied by Nazi Germany and then become a Communist state connected to the Soviet Union.
Kuisz's thesis about "nervous sovereignty" appears to be supported by a recent poll, which shows that 63% of Poles believe Poland is threatened by other countries. The percentage, seven points higher than last year, contrasts with only 26% of citizens saying no.
Rydliński notes that "to this day, wedding rings are worn on the right hand in Poland as a mournful reminder of the lost national uprising of 1863. This is perhaps the most striking example of how the trauma of enslavement is present in Polish identity and social consciousness."
Although Poland's increase in military spending might be understood from the perspective of a country that feels insecure and does want to put a price tag on security, it is doubtful that increased funding will contribute to strengthening the national economy. For all the renewed popularity of "military Keynesianism" in Europe (and the well-founded corresponding doubts on whether military expenditure can lead to inclusive growth), Poland's weapons industry cannot even absorb the new spending levels.
Polish armament companies have proved uncompetitive, being ignored by EU-sponsored efforts to re-arm the European continent. In March 2024, for instance, the EU allocated money to 31 companies to increase European ammunition production, with the only Polish contractor on the list receiving less than 0.5% of the total funds.
The Polish weapons industry is dominated by the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ), a state-controlled conglomerate made up of 50 different companies. The company struggles even with basic orders such as producing boots and helmets. PGZ has had ten different bosses since 2013, when it was created during Tusk's previous period as prime minister.
PGZ's goal of producing 150,000 shells every year has been delayed by three years to 2028. One of the few successful Polish weapons exports is the Piorun man-portable air defense systems, which have proven successful in the Ukraine War.
Poland's economic growth was close to 3% of its GDP in 2024, significantly outperforming the EU's average, set below 1%. And yet, the Polish government cannot do away with political tradeoffs on its way to record-high military spending.
Rydliński believes the effect of high defense expenditure can already be seen, as the new volumes of expenditure, in combination with a fairly neoliberal tax and contribution system, are "affecting the condition of public services. This includes the crisis in healthcare, low wage increases in the public sector, and low spending on research and development. Poles are already paying the price for high defense spending at the expense of selective and non-complementary social policies."
The troubles faced by Poland to meet its increased defense expenditure through domestic production, together with the painful policy choices that would come with it, offer some food for thought to countries such as Germany, which are now flouting the possibility of raising defense expenditure to 5% of the GDP.
In Poland, despite the swing in public opinion in favor of ending the Ukraine War, the voters are expected to elect a status quo president that will keep on the path of increased military expenditure and support for Ukraine.
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