These are the three social evils Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. warned would destroy America from within: Militarism, materialism, and racism. Decades later, they help explain the divisions in our country that led to the January 6 attack by protesters on the U.S. Capitol. Of the three, however, the role our recent wars have played in exacerbating these conditions is often the most overlooked.
Video produced by Khody Akhavi.
Between 2015 and 2018, the United States supplied Saudi Arabia with tens of millions of dollars worth of jet fuel in support for the kingdom’s bombing campaign in Yemen. Seven years later, the Saudis refuse to repay most of their debt. And they are being rewarded for it.
A Department of Defense report that was sent to Congress last October, reviewed by Responsible Statecraft, and previously unreported suggests that Pentagon officials are becoming increasingly desperate to recoup an outstanding $13.7 million in fuel costs that Saudi Arabia owes the U.S.
“DLA energy and US central command will continue to engage the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Finance through United State Military Training Mission - Saudi Arabia scheduled meetings, various MOD/MOF and DoD Key Leader Engagements, face to face meetings within the CONUS and Saudi Arabia, and through email correspondence until the SLC fuel debt is paid in full,” the report stated.
In 2018, the Pentagon realized it had made an accounting error. The Pentagon had undercharged Saudi Arabia and the UAE by $36 million for jet fuel and another $294 million in flight hours for U.S. tanker aircraft that refueled Saudi and Emirati warplanes in midair.
With Washington’s help, the arrangement allowed Saudi and Emirati jets — which, besides actual military targets, bombed hospitals, schools, marketplaces, and weddings — to stay in the air for up to three hours instead of a mere 15 minutes. But instead of the two oil-rich Gulf nations footing the bill for the aerial-refueling process, as is required by law, it was the American taxpayer.
Seven years later — while the larger flight hours bill has been paid — Saudi Arabia has yet to pay $13.7 million worth of its jet fuel debt. The UAE, which owed the U.S. around $15 million for jet fuel, has reimbursed Washington in full.
The kingdom certainly does not lack the funds. The Saudi sovereign wealth fund oversees $925 billion in assets.
Rather, Saudi Arabia appears to be pleading ignorance; the Intercept reported that Saudi officials told representatives of the Defense Logistics Agency and U.S. Central Command last year that they were “not aware of the outstanding debt and requested some additional time to investigate the issue.”
This defense is at odds with the recent Pentagon report, which maintains that Department of Defense officials are exhausting various avenues to bring up the debt, including email, virtual meetings, and in-person meetings with multiple agencies.
The report also notes that the last payment, just over $1 million, was made in 2023. The Defense Logistics Agency confirmed it submitted the report, but did not elaborate if there have been any further payments since it was submitted in October.
Annelle Sheline, a research fellow at the Quincy Institute, told RS that Saudi Arabia’s refusal to pay up speaks to the “privilege the Saudis enjoy with the U.S., as they fear zero repercussions for failing to repay a debt to American taxpayers.”
Despite groveling about an unpaid debt privately, the U.S. continues to reward Saudi Arabia. Since 2018 when the accounting error was discovered, Washington has showered the kingdom with $14 billion in major arms sales, according to a tracker from Forum on the Arms Trade. Most of those transfers took place during the presidency of Joe Biden, who memorably fist-bumped Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman after promising to make the de facto Saudi ruler “a pariah” during his 2016 campaign for office.
Trump is now reportedly eyeing Saudi Arabia as the destination for his first overseas trip next month, just as he did during his first term.
“I said I will go if you put a trillion dollars to American companies,” Trump told reporters in March. “Meaning the purchase over four years of a trillion dollars. They agreed to do that. So I am gonna be going there.”
While he’s at it, he could ask for the couple million in pocket change that Saudi Arabia owes the American taxpayer. The paltry $13.7 million sum may be small, but the foot-dragging speaks volumes.
A political bombshell in France: the long-time leader of the right-wing National Rally party (Rassemblement National) Marine Le Pen has been banned from running for political office for the next five years after a court in Paris found her guilty of embezzling the equivalent of $4 million in EU funds to pay National Rally staffers not working for the European Parliament.
She was also handed a suspended four-year prison term and ordered to pay a €100,000 fine. It remains to be seen whether the court decision means a political death sentence for her (it can be overturned if she wins an appeal), but it is certainly a devastating blow and a major shake-up of French politics.
It matters because the latest polls showed Marine Le Pen leading in the presidential race for 2027, projecting 34-37% of the votes in the first round. That would secure her a place in the run-off, where her chances would depend on the ability of all the other parties to coalesce around her would-be opponent.
At first glance, Le Pen’s disqualification could weaken the anti-war voices in France and the EU by reducing their cohesion and visibility. Her party is a founding member of the Patriots for Europe (PfE), the third largest political group in the European Parliament, where it sits with influential like-minded parties like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Fidesz, and Italian Deputy Prime Minster Matteo Salvini’s Lega. All of them have been vocal critics of the EU’s unconditional support for Ukraine, anti-Russia sanctions, and the dogmatic refusal to engage in direct diplomacy with Moscow to end the war.
To highlight the opposition to the current militarization drive in Europe, the Patriots voted against the European Parliament resolution in early March that endorsed Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen’s equivalent of $900 billion “rearm” plan. Critics dismissed that plan as unrealistic given the fiscal dire straits in which the continent finds itself and the lack of unified threat assessment throughout Europe — if you are in Portugal, for example, your perception of the Russian threat would be vastly different from Poland’s.
Opposition to the “rearm plan” was transpartisan as the Patriots were joined by the anti-war Left faction, and some dissidents from the center-left social-democratic group, such as members of the Italian Democratic Party. On the level of the member states, national interest still trumps ideological cohesion: the conservative Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni — ideologically close to Orban and Le Pen — and the Socialist Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez both reject the “rearm” concept (even though the poorly-led Socialists in the European Parliament incomprehensibly voted to back Von der Leyen’s plan).
Le Pen’s experience and networks in Europe made her a key player in ensuring the cohesiveness of these like-minded forces. Back in France, she has consistently criticized Macron’s hyper-activism on Ukraine and dismissed his idea of sending French peacekeepers to Ukraine as “sheer madness” — cognizant of the fact that, absent a Russian agreement to such a deployment (which will not be forthcoming), these forces would become targets for the Russian army.
She also firmly opposed Macron’s ideas of diluting national sovereignty on defense matters, such as his loose talk of extending the French nuclear umbrella to the rest of Europe.
Of course, this has prompted vivid speculation over the political motivations behind the French court’s decision to ban Le Pen from running. While her allies on the right predictably stand by her, leftist Yanis Varoufakis, an unlikely ally, chastised the “mind-boggling hypocrisy” of the liberal media in denouncing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s imprisonment of his main opponent, Istanbul’s mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, while rejoicing at the French courts “doing the same.”
Some also tried to draw parallels with Romania, where the winner of the first round of the presidential elections Calin Georgescu had his victory annulled, and himself banned from a re-run on apparently flimsy grounds. Like Le Pen, Georgescu ran as a torchbearer of anti-establishment sentiment, and similarly opposed a further war in Ukraine.
Yet one should not rush to hasty conclusions. The legal case against Le Pen appears to be robust. There is no evidence that the ruling of the court was politically motivated —France has a history of disqualifying misconducting politicians. In 2017, the mainstream conservative candidate Francois Fillon was disqualified for money diversion on a much smaller scale than Le Pen.
What raises questions in Le Pen’s case is not so much the veracity of the allegations against her as the immediate enforcement of the five-year ban, even before any appeal could be resolved. Crucially, that period covers the next presidential elections in 2027. That urgency has led critics to accuse the judges of violating the people’s right to freely choose their representatives, particularly given Le Pen’s popularity. However, it seems indisputable that the judges enjoyed the discretion to do so.
Short term, the news could be a boon for Macron and his liberal allies in France and the EU. For one thing, it may be giving some breathing space to the embattled centrist government led by Macron’s pick, Francois Bayrou. National Rally and the left have enough combined clout in the French parliament to oust the government, which they already did with Bayrou’s predecessor, another centrist. Yet doing so again, while mathematically feasible, could tempt Macron to call yet another parliamentary election, from which his most formidable foe would be excluded.
Longer term impact would depend on more factors. Would Jordan Bardella, Le Pen’s 29-year-old protégé and presumed presidential candidate (in case her appeal fails) prove to be an effective leader? Currently he is the head of the Patriots for Europe in the European Parliament, which gives him visibility and a network with the like-minded parties in Europe.
His youth and inexperience could be a challenge for keeping the anti-war faction together. However, the Patriots network has other experienced representatives, such as Orban and Salvini, to lean on in this regard.
Ultimately, the appeal and the resilience of the anti-war, pro-diplomacy voices in Europe does not depend solely on personalities, but on broader trends, such as war fatigue, changes in U.S. foreign policy under President Donald Trump, the battleground situation in Ukraine, social and economic pressures stemming from the militarization drive, and the growing perception that the European publics were not really engaged by the elites in a proper democratic debate on the nature of threats facing Europe.
These currents exist, and they will find their champions, regardless of Marine Le Pen’s personal fate.
In the final days of Ramadan, before Mecca's Grand Mosque, Sudan's de facto president and army chief, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan knelt in prayer beside Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. Al-Burhan had arrived in the kingdom just two days after his troops dealt a significant blow to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), recapturing the capital Khartoum after two years of civil war. Missing from the frame was the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Gulf power that has backed al-Burhan’s rivals in Sudan’s civil war with arms, mercenaries, and political cover.
The scene captured the essence of a deepening rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE — once allies in reshaping the Arab world, now architects of competing visions for Sudan and the region.
For two years, Sudan has been enveloped in chaos. The conflict that erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed forces (SAF) and the RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo "Hemedti," has inflicted immense suffering: an estimated 150,000 killed, allegations of mass atrocities staining both sides but particularly the RSF in Darfur, 12 million displaced, and over half the population facing acute food insecurity.
Khartoum, once a symbol of confluence, bears deep scars — widespread destruction, looted homes, and streets haunted by the unburied dead. It was against this backdrop of devastation and military gains that al-Burhan made his trip across the Red Sea.
Early in the conflict, Saudi Arabia played a prominent role by facilitating the evacuation of thousands of foreigners via Port Sudan, an effort that garnered significant goodwill. Building on this, and alongside the United States, the kingdom stepped into the role of mediator hosting the Jeddah ceasefire talks in May 2023.
This mediation aligned with Riyadh’s broader strategic pivot toward de-escalation, evident in its rapprochement with Iran and its transformation from aggressor to peacemaker in Yemen. Instability across the Red Sea poses a direct threat to the kingdom’s ambitious Vision 2030 economic overhaul — particularly its crown-jewel projects like NEOM and the Red Sea tourism megaprojects along its western coastline, as well as the Yanbu Terminal expansion, which aims to diversify oil export routes away from the Strait of Hormuz. Such turmoil also risks undermining Saudi Arabia’s critical food security investments in Sudan, where vast agricultural ventures had become a linchpin of bilateral ties.
However, the Jeddah process withered and the commitments signed on paper dissolved under the reality of continued fighting. A subsequent U.S.-led effort in Geneva, pivoting to humanitarian access after the Jeddah talks collapsed, faltered when the SAF boycotted the talks entirely. By 2025, the return of President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine gutted what remained of American diplomatic capital. USAID’s funding slashes — which shuttered 77% of Sudan’s emergency food kitchens — not only deepened famine but stripped Washington of a key lever it could use to compel concessions. With the U.S. retreating inward, the vacuum proved irresistible to Saudi Arabia.
The tipping point arrived in February 2025. As the RSF and its allies formalized their charter for a parallel administration in Nairobi, Saudi Arabia, alongside Qatar and Kuwait, issued a firm public rejection. The Saudi Foreign Ministry unequivocally stated its opposition to "any illegitimate steps taken outside Sudan’s official institutions that threaten its unity.”
Al-Burhan’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia and its timing solidified this alignment. The agreement announced by both nations during the visit to establish a “coordination council to strengthen relations” signaled long-term engagement, moving beyond the neutral arbiter role. Crucially, this meeting directly followed a high-level Saudi delegation's visit to Port Sudan days earlier, focused squarely on reconstruction.
While Riyadh actively cultivates the role of regional stabilizer, Abu Dhabi faces mounting scrutiny regarding its alleged role in fueling the RSF’s war effort.
In March 2025, Sudan filed a case at the International Court of Justice, accusing the UAE of violating the Genocide Convention through its alleged military, financial, and political support for the RSF, thereby facilitating atrocities, particularly the ethnic cleansing of the Masalit in West Darfur. While the UAE’s foreign minister dismissed the case as "feeble media maneuvers," the charges echo findings from a U.N. Panel of Experts report, which deemed evidence of UAE arms supplies (including drones and air defenses) to the RSF as "credible."
This alleged support has triggered significant political fallout in Washington. U.S. lawmakers Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) and Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) publicly confirmed in January, citing administration briefings, that the UAE was indeed arming the RSF, directly contradicting prior assurances it gave the Biden administration. Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N.Y.), ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also placed holds on arms sales to the UAE over its role in Sudan.
The UAE's actions in Sudan appear consistent with a wider regional modus operandi. Abu Dhabi’s playbook involves empowering non-state actors, often with secessionist leanings, to secure access to resources and strategic geography. We see this pattern in Libya with its backing of Khalifa Haftar, and in Yemen through its enduring support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), whose push for independence directly counters Saudi efforts to maintain Yemeni unity under the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).
Somalia offers another vivid example, where the UAE circumvented Mogadishu to directly arm and fund regional entities like Puntland (reportedly using its Bosaso base for RSF resupply), Somaliland, and Jubaland, thereby fragmenting the country while securing coastal footholds. The announcement of the RSF's parallel government in Nairobi last month seemed a direct application of these tactics. The UAE finalized a $1.5 billion loan to Kenya the same week, prompting speculation that its influence played a role in Nairobi hosting the event.
The widening gulf over Sudan, therefore, is not an isolated disagreement but symptomatic of a deeper strategic divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Where they once coordinated closely, particularly in countering the perceived threat of the Muslim Brotherhood and attempting to reshape the GCC during the Qatar blockade, their paths now diverge sharply.
Economically, they compete fiercely, with Saudi Arabia challenging Dubai's business hub status through policies requiring regional HQs in Riyadh and launching rival mega-projects. Within OPEC+, tensions have simmered between the two over production quotas, reflecting differing priorities and misaligned projections on the proximity of the decarbonized future. Even maritime borders near the Yasat Islands has become a point of contention, with Riyadh lodging complaints at the U.N. against Abu Dhabi's unilateral demarcation of the potentially oil-rich area.
This rivalry now spills into the public domain via social media. Recent online clashes saw well-known and widely followed Saudi commentators brand Emirati counterparts as "outcasts," describing them as being "hated by Arabs and Muslims." In tightly controlled media environments, such sharp exchanges often reflect official displeasure.
Ultimately, Sudan is paying the price for this fractured Gulf relationship. Saudi Arabia, driven by its Vision 2030 imperatives and a desire to reassert regional leadership through stability and state institutions, has placed its bet on the SAF. The UAE, focused on resource access and countering perceived ideological threats, continues its alleged support for the RSF despite the mounting condemnation.
As long as the rivalry persists, Sudan will remain tragically caught in the crossfire, its future held hostage by a geopolitical struggle reshaping the contours of power across the region.
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