VIDEO: Why retribution against China for COVID-19 harms US interests
The Quincy Institute's Rachel Esplin Odell explains that punitive action against Beijing right now will only undermine U.S. economic interests — after a month that saw more 22 million Americans lose their jobs.
As COVID-19 ravages America, some U.S. politicians are focusing their efforts on trying to punish the Chinese government through sanctions and other measures.
The Quincy Institute's Rachel Esplin Odell explains that punitive action against Beijing right now will only undermine U.S. economic interests — after a month that saw more 22 million Americans lose their jobs.
If U.S. officials are serious about punishing China, then the situation could quickly escalate out of control, costing untold lives and devastating the global economy. And how many countries in the world would really benefit from having to choose sides in a catastrophic Cold War between Beijing and Washington? Watch:
Khody Akhavi is Senior Video Producer at the Quincy Institute. Previously he was Head of Video for Al-Monitor and covered the White House for Al Jazeera English, as well as produced films for the network’s flagship investigative unit.
As it weighs the nomination of Tulsi Gabbard for the position of Director of National Intelligence, the United States Senate faces a fundamental choice: Should it reject those like Gabbard who challenge conventional wisdom, or should it recognize that sensibly questioning orthodox views is essential to avoid the kinds of intelligence and foreign policy failures we have experienced in such places as Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and Ukraine?
The New York Times’ recent attack on Gabbard’s religious beliefs suggests that the foreign policy establishment is much more concerned about protecting its power than about the dangers of majoritarian intolerance that prompted the Bill of Rights. But disrespect for minority views and constitutional freedoms is exactly what most plagues our Intelligence Community (IC).
In fact, a form of groupthink has driven establishment approaches to national security for many years. It is rooted in three implicit assumptions.
Consensus Judgments are Correct Judgments. “The National Security Council’s consensus view tends to be the best, most informed judgment across… the U.S. government,” proclaimed NSC staffer Alexander Vindman while testifying in President Trump’s first impeachment trial over Ukraine in 2019.
He referred explicitly to this interagency consensus almost three dozen times in the course of his testimony, condemning Trump’s departures from it. This belief, that consensus views are most likely to be correct views, underpins the IC’s approach to analysis.
Using what the IC calls “coordination” to weed out basic errors is a sound approach to fact-checking, but it is not the best way to anticipate future discontinuities or overcome confirmation bias.
In fact, history is riddled with examples of consensus analytic judgments that proved false. Iraq had destroyed its stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) well before Operation Iraqi Freedom. The so-called “Washington Consensus” on political and economic reform in 1990s-era Russiaproved disastrous. Bringing China into the World Trade Organization did not produce a liberalizing middle class. Deposing Muammar Qaddafi failed to bring democracy and stability to Libya. Given this record, should Gabbard’s controversial warning that Assad’s removal might pave the way to radical Islamic rule in Syria be considered a disqualification?
The point is not that minority judgments are usually correct. It is that in many of these past examples, those who rightly questioned majority views did so at their personal and professional peril. If the IC is to improve its analytic record, it needs to promote rather than penalize diverse thinking and employ rigorous methodology to explain instances where objective analysts might reasonably offer alternatives to mainstream opinion.
Americans Can Trust the IC to Respect Civil Liberties. In 2013, Edward Snowden, employed at the time as a contractor by the National Security Agency, leaked reams of documents exposing highly classified intelligence programs that trampled on the privacy rights of American citizens. Some were horrified by the excesses revealed by the leaks. Many were outraged that Snowden had violated the law and put our nation’s security at risk. Both sides raised valid concerns.
Snowden was undoubtedly wrong to make himself the arbiter of whether classified information should be published, and his decision to defect to Russia only fueled questions about his motives and patriotism. But at the same time, the material he published highlighted the dangers of relying on the IC to police its own compliance with constitutional law and bureaucratic regulations.
His leaks also exposed the ways that new information technologies have eroded the wall that once separated foreign intelligence collection from America’s domestic affairs. This erosion has led to increasing IC involvement in electoral politics—rendering public judgments about what U.S. presidential candidates our adversaries prefer, for example—and to a growing role as arbiter of what constitutes “disinformation” in our public discourse. This has distorted important debates over such issues as Russiagate, the Hunter Biden laptop, and the origins and treatment of COVID-19.
Safeguarding democracy requires striking a reasonable balance on the spectrum between absolute security and absolute freedom. Left to its own devices, the IC will naturally prioritize security, because that is its primary responsibility.
That means that new intelligence collection technology must be carefully constrained within law and overseen by elected representatives of the people in both Congress and the executive branch. It also means that we need IC leaders who, like Gabbard, are sensitive to the dangers of IC overreach in its collection programs and public activities.
Empathizing With Rivals is Wrong. In the messy political scrum over acquiring and exercising power over foreign policy, Americans have too often confused analytic empathy with sympathy for the views and agendas of foreign adversaries. Hence the potency of Hillary Clinton’s accusation that Gabbard is a Russian “favorite” and the buzz from her skeptics that she harbors a disqualifying fondness for autocrats.
In fact, one of the most fundamental duties of any analyst of foreign affairs is to be able to walk in the shoes of adversaries and view U.S. actions from their perspective. That is not because their views are typically accurate and justified. Rather, it is because an inability to understand their perceptions and misperceptions greatly increases the likelihood of intelligence and policy failures.
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson cited Washington’s misunderstanding of Japan’s perceptions as a central reason for the surprise over its attack on Pearl Harbor. Similarly, the WMD Commission highlighted a failure to grasp Saddam Hussein’s threat perceptions as a factor that led analysts to doubt he had destroyed Iraq’s stockpiles of WMD.
Securing a place for analytic empathy in the Intelligence Community is no easy task. In considering Gabbard, senators should ask themselves what combination of insight and political courage would have been required to dent the consensus views of the Iraq War and the intelligence used to justify it. They have a real-life example in the late Brent Scowcroft, whose warnings about the dangers of invading led to his expulsion from President Bush’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
A string of intelligence and foreign policy failures over the past several decades has undermined the trust of American people in the wisdom of Washington’s foreign policy establishment. In turn, its intrusive involvement in electoral politics has undermined the trust of Donald Trump and helped to elect him to a second term.
It is time to rebuild that trust. An establishment that zealously punishes dissenters and strictly polices public discourse is an establishment that is increasingly out of touch with the American people. And it is an establishment that is setting itself up for even more failures.
Top image credit: U.S. President Donald Trump makes a special address remotely during the 55th annual World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in Davos, Switzerland, January 23, 2025. REUTERS/Yves Herman
Throughout his time in public life, Donald Trump has been nothing if not unpredictable. His public statements can be all over the map, and predicting which of them will be followed up with decisive action has been a losing proposition.
This time it may be different. In his first days in office he has released a torrent of executive orders designed to advance his stated agenda, from mass deportations to cleansing government programs of anything involving even a whiff of the so-called “woke agenda.”
But some promises are harder to keep than others. So it is with Trump’s recent, remarkable remarks at Davos about seeking global “denuclearization” in light of the costs and devastating capabilities of nuclear weapons.
There was no indication that Trump intended to talk about nuclear weapons in Davos. His formal remarks were focused on Biden bashing and self-congratulatory rhetoric about his first batch of executive orders, along with the usual demand that NATO allies spend a higher share of their GDP for military purposes.
Later in his address, he immodestly claimed that “we’ve done more in four days … than other administrations have accomplished in four years.”
But once the bragging stopped and the Q&A began, Trump said the following in response to a question about U.S. relations with China:
“Tremendous amounts of money are being spent on nuclear, and the destructive capacity is something we don’t even want to talk about today, because you don’t want to hear it.”
Trump went on to say, “I want to see if we can denuclearize, and I think that’s very possible,” suggesting that there be talks on the issue involving the U.S., Russia, and China.
Words and deeds often diverge, and an answer in a Q&A session is not the same as a sustained diplomatic initiative. But as with his excoriation of “warmongers” and “war profiteers” on the campaign trail, Trump’s call for denuclearization indicates his belief that there is a market for such a policy among members of his political base, which, in the most optimistic scenario, could open the way to a strange bedfellows pressure campaign to reverse the nuclear arms race and reduce the enormous sums the United States is currently spending to build a new generation of nuclear weapons.
But Trump’s record on nuclear issues during his first term suggests that a note of caution is required in speculating on whether his Davos remarks represent an enduring commitment or offhand rhetoric that will be quickly tossed into the ash bin of history.
Trump I featured his overture to North Korea’s Kim Jong Un for discussions on nuclear reductions. He was (wrongly) criticized for even seeking to talk to the North Korean leader. And the effort collapsed due to lack of preparation and the pull of other issues. Trump the conciliator became Trump the trash talker, threatening to rain “fire and fury” down on North Korea. The about face on nuclear arms reductions was sudden and unexplained.
Three-way talks among the U.S., Russia, and China will be even more challenging than his short-lived effort with North Korea, and there are real questions about whether the Trump team can hang in there long enough to make real progress.
But for the moment the most productive move is to encourage the president to take concrete steps in pursuit of his anti-nuclear rhetoric. Even if he doesn’t ultimately follow through, we have a moment where the public’s attention will be more focused on nuclear issues that it has in quite some time. We need to take advantage of it, and remind people that it is far more dangerous to spend obscene amounts of money building a new generation of nuclear weapons than it is to reduce and regulate these potentially world ending weapons.
keep readingShow less
Top image credit: Brian G. Rhodes / Shutterstock.com
The CEO of the world’s largest weapons company, Lockheed Martin, and the manufacturer of the U.S. military’s most expensive weapon system, the F-35 stealth fighter jet, told investors on Tuesday that Israel’s attack on Iran’s air defenses last October helped to "demonstrate [the F-35’s] value here, through the Israel experience.”
Taiclet’s boasts to investors about the program were quickly tempered by real world events the same day when video circulated of an out of control Air Force F-35 tumbling to a fiery crash in Alaska, after its pilot ejected. An “inflight malfunction” led to the crash, said Col. Paul Townsend, commander of the 354th Fight Wing, at a news conference. Townsend promised “a thorough investigation in hopes to minimize the chances of such occurrences from happening again.”
Even aside from the doubts raised by the crash, Tuesday's claim by Lockheed CEO James Taiclet, doesn’t hold up to scrutiny and actually highlights the serious problems with the F-35 program that is estimated to saddle U.S. taxpayers with a $1.7 trillion bill over the project’s lifetime.
Dan Grazier, a senior fellow and program director at the Stimson Center, flagged that Taiclet may be engaged in sleight of hand by touting the effectiveness of the Israeli variant of the F-35, known as the Adir, and the American variant used everywhere else in the world, in his earnings call claims.
“I don’t know that it’s even a valid comparison between the F-35 Adir and an American F-35s. They’re different platforms,” said Grazier. “The Israelis got a special dispensation that no other partner or customer in the program has. The Israelis worked out some arrangement where they have control over the key data rights in the aircraft so they can modify the F-35 in ways that no one else can. It's different from everyone else's F-35.”
Grazier also added that uncertainty about the use of F-35s in the attack on Iran’s air defenses calls into question Lockheed’s assertions.
“If the Israelis were able to destroy Iranian air defence systems but they did it with standoff munitions, then it raises the questions: Did it have to be done with an F-35?,” asked Grazier. “I’d be much more impressed if they said the F-35s flew directly over Iran and destroyed their targets at close range but if they destroyed air defense targets from a standoff range, then I want to know why they needed a stealth aircraft.”
A central critique of the F-35 program is that despite its cost the planes have an extremely low readiness rate. In April, officials acknowledged that the U.S. F-35s are only “mission capable” 55.7% of the time. Grazier says that lack of readiness was on full display in April when the U.S. military played a central role in combating a massive Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel but didn’t send F-35s.
“During that big attack by Iran on Israel, the U.S. didn’t send any F-35s. We sent F-15s. Why didn’t we use F-35s to defend against the Iranian attack?” he asked.
Taiclet assured investors that Lockheed “look[s] forward to a very productive working relationship with President Trump, his team, and the new Congress to strengthen our national defense” and said he is “focused on delivering the best mission-critical defense technology in the world and at the greatest value to the American taxpayer.” He also boasted about how F-35s give Israel the tools to start a new war in the Middle East.
The success of Israel’s F-35s in taking out Iran’s air defences help “clear the way for fourth-gen aircraft, drones to come in and devastate that country if the Israelis decided to do so,” said Taiclet, proudly telling investors that his company had provided Israel the independence and the weapons to start a war with Iran that the U.S. would likely get dragged into.
Were Israeli F-35s to complete this mission, Lockheed would certainly play a crucial role in thwarting Trump’s frequently touted track record of “no new wars” under his watch.
Subscribe now to our weekly round-up and don't miss a beat with your favorite RS contributors and reporters, as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news promoting a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy.