U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo says the Trump administration’s foreign policy is based on restraint and realism. But U.S. foreign policy actions across the world suggest a lack of understanding for what the concept means in practice. Restraint values diplomatic engagement over military coercion and domination. so don’t be fooled by Pompeo’s hollow language. The latest video from the Quincy Institute explains:
The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, “a common-sense and potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American security interests,” stating that “the American people—not foreign nations nor globalist institutions—will always control their own destiny in our hemisphere,” is a key component of the National Security Strategy 2025 released last week by the Trump administration.
Putting the Western Hemisphere front and center as a U.S. foreign policy priority marks a significant shift from the “pivot to Asia” launched in President Obama’s first term.
In principle, it is difficult to object to the notion that, as it retreats from an overly ambitious global agenda, the U.S. should reprioritize its foreign policy objectives. Thus, a renewed focus on the Americas seems sensible. It is also quite a change from the first Trump administration, in which the president only set foot in Latin America once for the G20 summit in Buenos Aires in 2018.
There is also no doubt that the region — still trying to recover from the 2020 crisis when it underwent the biggest economic downturn in 120 years (-6.6%) according to the UN’s ECLAC — could greatly benefit from increased trade, investment and financial cooperation from the United States. For too long, the region has underperformed in terms of economic growth. It badly needs the sort of shot in the arm that a serious U.S. policy designed to foster its development could bring about.
As a new book by political scientist Francisco Urdinez, “Economic Displacement: China and the End of US Primacy in Latin America” shows, part of the reason China has made such significant inroads in the Americas is because of U.S. retrenchment, especially in South America. Any attempt to reverse that should be welcome.
That said, the very term “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine recalls the “Roosevelt Corollary” coined by President Theodore Roosevelt in the early 20th century to justify what came to be known as U.S. “gunboat diplomacy.” The latter led to the U.S. invasion and occupation of several Central American and Caribbean countries, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Nicaragua, among others.
As the U.S. deploys its largest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald Ford, and a significant flotilla of additional war ships off the coast of Venezuela, sinks alleged “drug boats,” kills their crew on unproven allegations of smuggling, and announces it will soon hit targets on Venezuelan land, this association with the Roosevelt Corollary becomes especially vivid.
Much of the attention on the administration’s renewed embrace of the Monroe Doctrine (one that triggers much pushback in the region, for obvious reasons) in the NSS has focused on its military dimension and it calls for “a readjustment of our military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere, especially the missions identified in this strategy.”
Yet the economic dimension should be as much of a concern. It betrays a woefully wrongheaded understanding of the nature of Latin American economies, how they interact with the rest of the world, and what needs to be done to foster the region’s development.
Nothing reflects this better than the very last sentence of the section on the Western Hemisphere, which states “we should make every effort to push out foreign companies that build infrastructure in the region.” Though the document emphasizes how significant a resilient infrastructure is for the U.S. economy, when it comes to Latin America, there is an odd guiding thread pointing in the opposite direction, seemingly determined to stop in its tracks regional infrastructure expansion if a foreign entity is building it.
In the age of a globalized and interdependent world economy, for a region that is far away from the world’s main markets, few things are as significant for its competitiveness as an adequate public infrastructure — that is, its ports, highways, tunnels, bridges and railways. Yet, as it happens, this is also one of the region’s biggest weaknesses.
Decades of underinvestment have led to a current infrastructure deficit that the Economist Intelligence Unit estimates demands an investment of $250 billion a year in 2024-2028 to close the gap. The net result is that logistics and transport costs in Latin America reach as much as between 14 and 18 percent per export unit, in contrast to as low as an 8 percent average among OECD member countries.
This makes Latin American exports, so vital for the region’s economies, less competitive than they otherwise would be, and is one reason for the region’s low growth and relative stagnation.
In this century, and especially since 2010, Chinese construction companies have started to make a dent in this deficit, building ports, highways, railways and subways across the region. Exhibit A in this is the Peruvian port of Chancay, the most modern on South America’s West Coast, built by Chinese company COSCO at $1.3 billion and inaugurated by President Xi in November 2024.
There is little doubt that the reference cited above in the NSS is aimed at excluding Chinese companies from continuing to do so. Moreover, the NSS expands this notion beyond infrastructure by stating, “we will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets” (my emphasis). This, of course, could mean anything, from dams and power stations to key mineral resources, standing in the way of FDI from anywhere outside the Americas.
There are several problems with this approach. First, it ignores the fact that the fastest growing and most dynamic part of the world today is Asia, and that China is the world’s second largest economy. This means, by definition, that many areas of the world, including Latin America, have seen and will see increased trade and investment flows with it (China is already South America’s number one trading partner). To attempt to stop this is the equivalent of trying to stop the sun from rising.
Second, it ignores the fact that, for decades now, U.S. construction companies have refrained from participating in tendering for bids on Latin American infrastructure projects because they consider them too small, or for other reasons. This is unlikely to change because of U.S. government hectoring. A few years ago, a conservative Colombian government was keen to give the contract for building the Bogota subway project to a U.S. company. It discovered there are no U.S. companies that build subways. In 2019, it adjudicated the bid to a Chinese company instead.
The costs of European construction companies, on the other hand, are generally too high, making them often uncompetitive. Not surprisingly, Chinese companies are doing well, winning bids for many of the badly needed infrastructure projects.
One reason Latin Americans keep migrating to the United States is because of the region’s underdevelopment and the ensuing lack of economic opportunities for its people. The notion that the best way to stop these migration flows is by blocking attempts at lowering the region’s huge infrastructure deficit and thus keeping the region in a perpetual condition of underdevelopment is an unsustainable proposition.
In the new century (as opposed to in 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine was originally proclaimed) Latin American nations have diversified their international links, interact with the world, and benefit from the consequent trade, investment and financial cooperation flows from across the planet — as befits an age of interdependence. To attempt to turn the clock back by blocking investment flows from so-called “extra-Hemispheric powers” is futile. The horse has already left the barn.
Hamas and Israel are reportedly moving toward negotiating a "phase two" of the U.S.-lead ceasefire but it is clear that so many obstacles are in the way, particularly the news that Israel is already calling the "yellow line" used during the ceasefire to demarcate its remaining military occupation of the Gaza Strip the "new border."
“We have operational control over extensive parts of the Gaza Strip, and we will remain on those defence lines,” said Israeli military chief Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir on Sunday. “The yellow line is a new border line, serving as a forward defensive line for our communities and a line of operational activity.”
Israel also says it has no current plans to talk to Hamas directly. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Sunday that he will begin stage two of the ceasefire by talking to U.S. President Donald Trump at the end of the month and the first order will be to ensure that Hamas fulfills its “commitment” to the plan, which calls for demilitarization of the enclave.
Hamas said it is willing to discuss the "freezing or storing or laying down" of its arms during the negotiations of the second phase, but said it will not before forced by an international stabilization force (ISF) to do so. Israel has said it will not withdraw until Hamas disarms. A debate is also roiling among outside powers about whether an ISF will go in before or after Hamas disarms, and whether that ISF will be responsible for disarmament. All of which creates a logjam and endless uncertainty while adequate aid is still not getting into the Gaza Strip and over 347 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli military since the ceasefire was signed in October.
The situation was evoking a lot of debate, and no little pessimism at the Doha Forum in Qatar this weekend, an annual international convocation of an estimated 6,000 people, including state leaders, think tanks, NGOs, journalists, diplomats and academics. While most of the sessions were billed on other matters, Gaza was invoked in dozens of on-stage conversations and foreign ministers weighed in on what they largely see as a crisis in stasis. Some blamed Israel, others criticized "parties" without naming Israel or the U.S., others warned that as a regional community they were losing sight of the established goals.
“Now we are at the critical moment. … A ceasefire cannot be completed unless there is a full withdrawal of the Israeli forces (and) there is stability back in Gaza,” said Qatari premier and foreign minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, on Saturday.
Israel doesn't want Turkey involved in the ISF but according to its foreign minister at the Doha Forum, his country is ready to provide troops and is willing to help bring the ISF together and move quickly. “Disarmament cannot be the first stage in this process,” Hakan Fidan said. “We need to proceed in the correct order and remain realistic.” He added that the ISF’s first goal “should be to separate Palestinians from the Israelis.”
Egypt’s foreign minister, Badr Abdelatty, in his own remarks at the Forum, agreed. “We need to deploy this force as soon as possible on the ground because one side, Israel, every day is violating the ceasefire, but claims the other side is responsible so we need monitors along the yellow side in order to verify and monitor,” he said, adding that the mandate “should be peace monitoring not peace enforcement.”
The confusion over the specifics of the mission, how it should be configured, when it should be deployed, and who should be deployed is precisely why other countries are not as keen to move yet. Espen Barth Eide, Norway's foreign minister, summed it up. “The different parties can say ‘I will do my part but only when he has done its part,' so we need to get the board of peace and the ISF in place this month because it is very urgent."
But "thousands of details, questions are in place," Fidan added, acknowledging the challenges.
“We have seen this movie before,” said Manal Radwan, Minister Plenipotentiary at the Saudi Foreign Ministry, who spoke on Saturday, warning that the arguments over details were forcing partners to lose sight of the ultimate goals. “There is a war in Gaza, then there is an engagement by the international community, then there is a search for humanitarian assistance, and then political fatigue, and then we forget about it — only to see another more violent cycle of violence erupt.”
She was concerned that the issue of Palestinian statehood, which is in the framework of Trump's plan is getting sidetracked. “If we do not ensure the security and the political aspiration of Palestinians being fulfilled, then there is no plan in the world that will be able to drive us not only from one stage to the next, but also to prevent another spiral of violence,” she said.
While one observer, Ahmad Elterk, director of the London based Arab Lawyers group, told RS that he believed the Saudi minister's remarks were shared by leaders in other Arab states, and that "we cannot reach any proper agreement until we reach a final solution for the Palestinians, and to have a viable state for the Palestinians." Others said most Arab observers were waiting, ultimately, for what the Americans will do.
For their part, the few U.S. officials who did attend the Doha Forum did not come to talk about Gaza or Israel, so they lent little insight or nurtured much confidence. Tom Barrack, U.S. envoy to Turkey and Syria, made headlines when he said that in the Middle East, "we’ve never had a democracy — I don’t see a democracy anywhere — Israel can claim that it’s a democracy, but in this region, really what has worked the best, whether you like it or don’t like it, is a benevolent monarchy.” Matthew Whittaker, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, talked about what he was brought into to talk about, Europe and the Ukraine War.
On the sidelines, William Lawrence, who works at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, sensed a bit of "schizophrenia" among the crowd, in which they were "hopeful" that the Trump administration would follow through on his peace plan, but pessimistic over what seemed to be unsurmountable obstacles, and even more so, that the administration didn't have the "political will" to put in the hard work that needed to be done.
"I don't see grounded optimism, I just see 'in Trump we trust,'" said Lawrence. "They are hopeful but they're not seeing the ingredients of something more, yet."
In early November of last year, the Assad regime had a lot to look forward to. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had just joined fellow Middle Eastern leaders at a pan-Islamic summit in Saudi Arabia, marking a major step in his return to the international fold. After the event, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had spent years trying to oust Assad, told reporters that he hoped to meet with the Syrian leader and “put Turkish-Syrian relations back on track.”
Less than a month later, Assad fled the country in a Russian plane as Turkish-backed opposition forces began their final approach to Damascus. Most observers were taken aback by this development. But long-time Middle East analyst Neil Partrick was less surprised. As Partrick details in his new book, “State Failure in the Middle East,” the seemingly resurgent Assad regime had by that point been reduced to a hollowed-out state apparatus, propped up by foreign backers. When those backers pulled out, Assad was left with little choice but to flee.
On the first anniversary of the fall of Assad, RS spoke with Partrick to better understand how a 50-year dynasty collapsed in a few short weeks. The conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
RS: What did so many outside observers miss about the weakness of the Assad regime in the leadup to its collapse?
Partrick: The way in which the regime was surviving was quite precarious. Whilst this was understood, I don't think it was factored in enough in terms of just how brittle the regime and, to some extent, the state was.
This included running what remained of the Syrian state armed forces as largely a family fiefdom — as much focused on criminal activity as it was on defending the country. In fact, arguably more the former than the latter. [And it included] the increasing reliance on semi-state militias, also involved in criminal activity as much as security work, and the reliance upon neighboring militias, primarily in terms of Hezbollah from Lebanon, and [the reliance on] the assistance provided by Iran and Russia.
If you put all those elements together, plus the residual Turkish interest in promoting an alternative regime, then you had a very insecure situation — Bashar, in office but not really in power, relying on an increasingly narrow network [of allies]. It's easy to be wise after the event, of course. I certainly didn't predict it was going to collapse so quickly. But it was extremely brittle before it happened.
RS: Can you talk more about these non-state militias that were slowly taking over the role of the army in Syria?
Partrick: It had been a long process through the years of the civil war, starting in 2011, when the regime was at its most vulnerable. Pre-existing militias became reconfigured. [These were] the so-called “Shabiha” — local groups that had been strongly associated before the civil war with criminal activities and [regime patronage]. They then coalesced into defenders of local areas against the, some would say, genuinely democratic opposition forces that emerged in 2011, [which] subsequently got taken over by more militant Islamist jihadi elements from outside.
In many ways, the state's national integrity was franchised out many years before the state collapsed in the form of these security networks that were semi-state, semi-independent, involved in criminal and then local militia activity. Some of them, of course, were connected to foreign actors, whether it was the Iranians or others. But as was put to me, and I use this quote in the book, these were bodies that were made up of local people who were the most reliable to defend their local area. So that national esprit de corps was already very, very weak before the state collapsed.
RS: You made reference to the fact that Syria had become shot through with these different foreign influences. One thing that stood out in the book was the former Syrian ambassador’s comment about how Assad was trying to triangulate and maybe even reduce Iranian presence in Syria during the war in Gaza. Can you talk a little bit about the balancing act that Assad was attempting?
Partrick: There were elements of a traditional Assad policy that his father did more skillfully in terms of trying to balance between internal [elements] and a wide range of contradictory, external elements. But Bashar, the son, was less skillful and less adept at statecraft. He was using very different and contradictory actors to prop up his regime — primarily Russian and Iranian forces who cooperated but had rather different agendas.
For Iran, it was a matter of its national survival and regional outreach. For Russia, it was a complicated mix of reasons, but less nationally vital for it. And of course, there was the Turkish element. Turkey had an ongoing occupation in parts of the north of Syria, and would coalesce to some extent with the Russians on elements of border security, whilst the Iranians saw their role as much broader, [spread] throughout a much wider swathe of the country through their own forces and through the role of Lebanese Hezbollah and other Shia elements from the region.
It was a very delicate balancing act. Because of the emergence of the regional war following the events of October, 2023, it was hoped to some extent, certainly by Hezbollah and Iran, that Syria could be part of this conflict. And whilst part of its territory was part of the conflict, the Syrian leadership didn't want to stay within it and saw this as an opportunity to send signals ultimately to the Americans, primarily through the Gulf Arab states, as a chance to leverage and say, “Here I am being responsible. I'm seeking to keep my country out of this emerging regional war.”
It was a delicate attempt to keep [Assad’s] family-led regime in place that ultimately failed. He thought he could play all these elements at the same time. He thought they needed him. At the same time, [he was] keeping in with the Iranians, whilst putting pressure on the Iranian presence as a way of appeasing or appealing to the West — an almost impossible situation to try and balance. [It] ultimately proved to be his downfall.
RS: You mentioned Israel played a role there. Can you speak a little bit more about that?
Partrick: In the course of the civil war from 2011, there had been signs of a movement away from Israel's apparent acceptance of an Assad regime as a force of relative stability to a situation where Israel started to see a regime weakening and seemed to be looking to [other] options inside the country. Once the scenario of being brittle then looked like the possibility of actual regime collapse, the Israelis adjusted their position.
They'd already periodically been conducting a number of strikes inside Syria, but they were largely focused on what they saw as Iranian-linked targets. In the leadup to the events of November 2024, they were also more willing to focus on Syrian targets themselves. The Israelis, I don't think with a desire to bring down the regime, had been stepping up their military attacks inside Syria, including taking in Syrian national targets — a shift from just targeting Iranian-linked targets. And of course, Hezbollah from Lebanon were increasingly focused on events at home, and had moved their forces back to Lebanon, because that itself was under Israeli attack.
Israel was one of a number of actors that was playing a decisive role. But I don't know whether anybody actually believed that they could bring down the regime so easily, or whether the Israelis had really decided it was time to do so.
RS: Another influential foreign power in all of this is Russia. You talk in the book about how Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing war there contributed to the fall of the Assad regime. Can you speak a little bit to that?
Partrick: [Russia had been] vital in terms of the role of its air forces in particular, in a devastating use of military power against Syrian opposition forces. Air power by a foreign country is not really a way of building the integrity of a leadership, let alone a state. But it might be a way of keeping a leader in place for a while. That had been vital to the very survival of the Assad-led regime in Syria.
But then it had become something of a problem in terms of Russia's continued capacity to maintain a key role there. [Moscow] began to reduce its presence in the south and to some extent in the rest of the country as its commitments in Ukraine increased in the course of its stepped up military occupation of that country. The Russian reduction played a role in the increasing brittleness that played out a year ago. Ultimately, even the capacity that was there — the Russian capacity that was there, the Iranian capacity that was there — was not one that either country was prepared to use.
And ultimately the Russian leadership and [President Vladimir] Putin in particular, as several sources told me, essentially said to Bashar, “this ain't gonna work.” Indeed the Russians were quite key to his own exodus and to that of a number of other key regime figures fleeing the country.
Bashar, seeing his own power delusionally as almost synonymous with Syria itself, was not even prepared to try and share power with key family members who had a role, most notably his brother. That ultimately played a key role in the collapse. It was several actors ultimately deciding that this is not worth the candle, whether it was the Iranians or the Russians. And in that context, the Turks [saw] a wonderful opportunity from their point of view.
RS: It has now been a year since the overthrow of Assad. I'm curious about your view of the extent to which the new president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, has succeeded in building a certain amount of state capacity and reversing the weakness of the former regime.
Partrick: We're in a situation [with what] has to be regarded as greater state capacity than when the regime collapsed, because in many senses, as I argue in the book, the state collapsed [last year] too. What remnants there were of national integrity and capacity were already incredibly weak and then simply melted away.
We now have a president in place and the remnants of some of the old armed forces professing a degree of loyalty to him, [which] means we have a degree of state capacity. But it seems in many ways that the militia system Bashar used has been replicated in the Syria of today, albeit with different individuals heading them. You don't have wholly capable state forces. You have a range of powerful semi-state militias who have a loose allegiance to that state.
That's the environment in which President al-Sharaa is operating. He doesn't yet have, to use the cliched model of a state's existence, the monopoly of violence in his own country in a clear and integrated fashion. So he remains a weak leader, depending upon a loose grouping of militias and the remnants of the old state forces to defend borders as far as he can.
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