U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo says the Trump administration’s foreign policy is based on restraint and realism. But U.S. foreign policy actions across the world suggest a lack of understanding for what the concept means in practice. Restraint values diplomatic engagement over military coercion and domination. so don’t be fooled by Pompeo’s hollow language. The latest video from the Quincy Institute explains:
Weeks have passed since the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, endorsing a U.S.-backed plan that creates a “Board of Peace” to run Gaza for at least two years and authorizes a new International Stabilization Force (ISF) to secure the territory after a ceasefire.
Supporters call it a diplomatic breakthrough. For many Palestinians, it looks like something else: Oslo with helmets, heavy on security, light on rights, and controlled from outside.
This isn’t happening in a vacuum. In September, the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry reported that Israeli forces have committed genocide in Gaza, citing “direct evidence of genocidal intent,” and urging states to halt arms transfers and support accountability.
A UN Special Rapporteur, in a report to the General Assembly titled Gaza Genocide: A Collective Crime has likewise described the ongoing destruction as genocide sustained by the complicity of powerful states.
None of this will be easy. For decades, members of Congress who tried to place concrete conditions on U.S. policy toward Israel or on security assistance have faced concentrated pushback - from the Israeli government itself, its diplomatic outreach on the Hill, and a dense ecosystem of advocacy groups, donors, and lobbyists that track these issues closely.
Lawmakers know that even modest efforts to introduce guardrails can trigger campaigns, fundraising threats, and primary challenges. That history has produced a strong incentive structure: defer to the executive branch, avoid anything that can be framed as “pressure on Israel,” and support security-first approaches with few explicit constraints.
Recognizing those dynamics does not weaken the case for conditioning U.S. participation in implementing 2803; it clarifies how far current practice falls short of what is needed to prevent this mission from sliding into a de facto protectorate, the political doorway to a U.S.-run occupation.
If Congress moves now and addresses four key areas, they can still shape how 2803 is implemented.
First, Congress should condition U.S. participation on Palestinian co-ownership, not passive consultation. Resolution 2803 welcomes the Board of Peace as a transitional authority with sweeping control over Gaza’s reconstruction, borders, and security, and the ISF operates under that umbrella. Palestinians are promised a possible “executive committee,” but the resolution does not guarantee them any real share of power in this structure. Congress should draw a red line: no U.S. political or financial support without Palestinian co-ownership on paper and in practice.
That means Palestinians holding at least half of the voting seats on the Board of Peace, with those seats including representatives from Gaza’s municipalities, professional unions, civil society, and women’s networks, not only from the Palestinian Authority. Any Palestinian governance body under 2803 must be chosen by Palestinians, anchored in PA/PLO institutions, and include independent Gaza-based actors so it supports unified governance between the West Bank and Gaza.
Second, Congress should make the sunset real and tie any extension to Palestinian consent and a clear political horizon. Both the Board of Peace and the ISF are meant to end by 2027, for now they exist mainly on paper; their composition and mandate are still being negotiated. In practice, Resolution 2803 leaves space for renewals if “conditions” are not met, the same loophole that turned Oslo’s interim phase into decades of drift.
Congress has leverage here. It can make U.S. participation contingent on a public sunset clause for U.S. involvement, and on a rule that any extension requires explicit Palestinian consent, expressed through elections or another representative mechanism, not just a deal between Washington and a narrow leadership circle.
It can also insist on a clear political horizon, including possible U.S. recognition of a Palestinian state once agreed benchmarks are met. Congress can require timelines for governance and reforms, so benchmarks cannot be stretched indefinitely to justify prolonging the mission. If this is a transition, it needs an exit based on time, consent, and direction.
Third, Congress should tie all U.S. funding and support to genocide-prevention and accountability. Taken together, the Commission of Inquiry, the Special Rapporteur, and Human Rights Watch have urged states to halt weapons transfers and other assistance that risk enabling further genocidal acts, to support international prosecutions, and to stop contributing to what Human Rights Watch describes as the crimes against humanity of extermination in Gaza. They warn that third states risk complicity if they continue with business as usual in the face of these findings.
Congress can and should write those concerns directly into U.S. policy on 2803 by requiring the administration to certify that the U.S. role in the Board of Peace and ISF does not obstruct UN investigations, the International Court of Justice, or the International Criminal Court; that no U.S. personnel, contractors, or funds are used to shield suspects from accountability; and that any military or security assistance linked to Gaza complies with genocide-prevention obligations. If lawmakers ignore those warnings, the United States will be seen, accurately, as helping to manage the aftermath of atrocities it was warned about in advance.
Fourth, Congress should make protection of civilians central, not an afterthought to “security.” Resolution 2803 focuses on demilitarization, border control, and training Palestinian police. A stabilization plan that is only about security will be experienced by Palestinians as policing, not safety. Congress should require a protection system centered on civilians, not only an ISF focused on armed actors.
That means building in a civilian protection portfolio within the Board of Peace with real authority and resources, and creating Palestinian-led, unarmed protection teams in communities across Gaza, including women’s groups, youth networks, and civil society, to monitor violations, accompany those at risk, and feed into accessible complaint mechanisms.
Congress cannot amend Resolution 2803, but it controls the funding, oversight, and political authorization that determine how the United States is implicated in its outcome. If lawmakers use that leverage now, they can help ensure that 2803 stabilizes Gaza in a way that reduces long-term risks, prevents further atrocities, and supports a credible path toward political resolution.
That is squarely in the U.S. interest. If Congress stays passive, it will also share the costs and the consequences when the mission fails.
As a freelance writer, I know I have to produce copy that meets the expectations of editors and management. When I write opinion pieces, I know well that my arguments should closely align with the publication’s general outlook. But I’ve always believed that if my views on any particular topic diverged from an outlet I’m writing for, it was acceptable to express those viewpoints in other publications.
But I’ve recently discovered that this general rule does not apply to criticism of Israel.
In fact, it appears that publications I’ve had an ongoing relationship with up until recently have canceled me for articles I wrote in other media outlets that were critical of the Israeli government and the Israel lobby in the United States.
In recent years, I penned more than 100 columns for prominent right-leaning publications, including The Wall Street Journal, the Manhattan Institute’s City Journal, and The Daily Telegraph. I’ve covered woke corporations, illegal immigration, inflation, foreign policy, the State Department, censorship, Florida politics and a host of other issues. I never once pitched a column concerning Israel to the aforementioned publications because I know the editors and leadership at those outlets are staunch backers of unlimited U.S. aid to Israel, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and his merciless assault on Gaza, not to mention President Trump’s efforts to deport foreign critics of Israel, his administration, and other related issues.
I have never seen an opinion column in The Journal, City Journal or The Telegraph expressing compassion for Palestinian victims of Israel’s military assaults. In fact, quite the opposite. For example, Ilya Shapiro, a contributing editor and the Director of Constitutional Studies at the Manhattan Institute, said in a since deleted tweet, “Ethnic cleansing would be too kind for Gaza.” That comment isn’t an outlier. The prevailing wisdom at these publications is to excuse and defend the behavior of the Israeli government, regardless of the situation.
And so, when I wanted to express my disgust at the outrageous number of civilian casualties in Gaza — the Israeli military has killed at least 70,000 Palestinians according to the U.N., including more than 18,000 children — and lament the Trump administration’s efforts to deport people for criticizing Israel, I never considered pitching editors at those three publications.
Between November 2023 and May 2024, I published several columns, including for The Spectator and on my personal Substack, Unpopular Opinions, criticizing Israel and U.S. policy toward Israel. I think my critiques were mild — for example, I never categorized Israel’s actions as a genocide. Given Israel’s flagrant human rights violations, my commentaries were well within the boundaries of how most Americans feel about the carnage in Gaza. For example, in a column I wrote in November, 2023, I noted that:
“I was horrified by the October 7 Hamas attacks. And I was disgusted to see some self-proclaimed pro-Palestine advocates celebrating or justifying the barbaric attack act. This was a horrific act of terrorism, and there’s no excuse for it.”
But I added that I was disappointed with “how many conservative politicians and conservative media refuse to articulate any concern for thousands of innocent Palestinians killed or the more than one million rendered homeless.”
In subsequent columns, I criticized the Republican Party for its fixation on Israel and argued how hypocritical many on the right are in conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism in order to silence critics of the Jewish state.
None of my editors at The Wall Street Journal, The Daily Telegraph or City Journal ever said a word to me about what I wrote in these columns. But my relationships with these three outlets deteriorated rapidly and dramatically after I started covering the topic. Prior to being cut off by the Wall Street Journal, I published 34 opinion columns for them since 2017. My relationship with the opinion editor, James Taranto, was good enough that when he visited Tampa, where I live, in 2022, he and his wife took me out to dinner.
I knew where Taranto stood on Israel, having once called Rachel Corrie, an American citizen who was killed by an Israeli bulldozer while protesting Israel’s settlement policy, a “dopey…advocate for terror.” Prior to writing critically of Israel, my success rate in pitching columns to Taranto was roughly 30-40% positive. Since then, he has rejected 12 consecutive pitches, all on topics unrelated to the Middle East. Previously, he would send a generic one-liner when he rejected an idea. “I won't be able to use this, but thanks for letting me see it.” Lately, my pitches don’t even merit a formal rejection. I went from being a regular contributor and on friendly enough terms to socialize after-hours, to being ghosted.
My apparent dismissal at City Journal, where I contributed 62 columns from 2020-2024, took longer and my editor there, Paul Beston, was kinder, but the result was the same. Rather than ignoring me, Beston would apologetically respond to my pitches weeks or even months later once the idea was too late to publish. He also stopped asking me to write columns for the website. Around the same time, the Manhattan Institute, which produces City Journal, fired prominent conservative economist Glenn Loury for being too critical of Israel, so perhaps there was a purge of Israel critics afoot. At least one other Manhattan Institute fellow who was critical of Israel, Christopher Brunet, was also fired last year.
My seeming dismissal at the rabidly pro-Israel Daily Telegraph, where I contributed 30 columns from 2023-2024, was similar to the City Journal experience. My editor there, Lewis Page, was cordial enough, but he, too, started to ignore my emails and stopped asking me to write for his publication. In one case, he asked me to write a column but then never published it.
Is it a coincidence that these three prominent, pro-Israel publications all stopped publishing me last year as I started to criticize Israel in other outlets? It’s conceivable, but quite unlikely given the zero tolerance for dissent on Israel that now permeates much of conservative media.
RS asked Taranto whether the Journal had stopped publishing me because of my views on Israel. Wall Street Journal editorial page editor Paul Gigot — whom I did not work with — responded that Taranto had passed on our inquiry and said, “I don't recall ever reading a piece by Mr. Seminara on Israel or Gaza, so I have no idea what his views on those subjects are.”
Lewis Page at the Telegraph said my version of this story is “false” and that neither he nor anyone else at his publication knew that I had been critical of Israel. He added that the paper has not “consciously stopped using” my copy.
A spokesperson I do not know and never worked with at City Journal said that they are unaware of my position on Israel. Of course, I don’t expect any of these publications to say, “We stopped commissioning you because we don’t agree with your position on Israel.”
The bottom line is that my views on Israel and U.S. policy toward Israel are in line with those of the majority of Americans and even of a majority of American Jews. According to a Washington Post poll conducted in October, 69% of American Jews think Israel has committed war crimes in Gaza and 39% believe it is guilty of genocide. A Pew Research poll released around the same time revealed that 59% of Americans have a negative opinion of the Israeli government. And in a September New York Times/Sienna poll, 35% of Americans said they sympathize with Israel, while 36% said they side with Palestinians.
I am not sorry for criticizing Israel even though it has cost me professionally. In fact, I was probably too cautious and diplomatic in my critiques. But I think it’s a very sad statement on conservative media when news outlets that many Republicans trust have so little tolerance for dissent on a critical issue that undermines American national interests and damages our credibility around the world.
During the crazy, cultural revolution days of 2020, when statues were being toppled and progressives were claiming scalps on a weekly basis, I thought it was just the left that embraced cancel culture and silenced enemies through intimidation. Now I know better.
The “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, “a common-sense and potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American security interests,” stating that “the American people—not foreign nations nor globalist institutions—will always control their own destiny in our hemisphere,” is a key component of the National Security Strategy 2025 released last week by the Trump administration.
Putting the Western Hemisphere front and center as a U.S. foreign policy priority marks a significant shift from the “pivot to Asia” launched in President Obama’s first term.
In principle, it is difficult to object to the notion that, as it retreats from an overly ambitious global agenda, the U.S. should reprioritize its foreign policy objectives. Thus, a renewed focus on the Americas seems sensible. It is also quite a change from the first Trump administration, in which the president only set foot in Latin America once for the G20 summit in Buenos Aires in 2018.
There is also no doubt that the region — still trying to recover from the 2020 crisis when it underwent the biggest economic downturn in 120 years (-6.6%) according to the UN’s ECLAC — could greatly benefit from increased trade, investment and financial cooperation from the United States. For too long, the region has underperformed in terms of economic growth. It badly needs the sort of shot in the arm that a serious U.S. policy designed to foster its development could bring about.
As a new book by political scientist Francisco Urdinez, “Economic Displacement: China and the End of US Primacy in Latin America” shows, part of the reason China has made such significant inroads in the Americas is because of U.S. retrenchment, especially in South America. Any attempt to reverse that should be welcome.
That said, the very term “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine recalls the “Roosevelt Corollary” coined by President Theodore Roosevelt in the early 20th century to justify what came to be known as U.S. “gunboat diplomacy.” The latter led to the U.S. invasion and occupation of several Central American and Caribbean countries, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Nicaragua, among others.
As the U.S. deploys its largest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald Ford, and a significant flotilla of additional war ships off the coast of Venezuela, sinks alleged “drug boats,” kills their crew on unproven allegations of smuggling, and announces it will soon hit targets on Venezuelan land, this association with the Roosevelt Corollary becomes especially vivid.
Much of the attention on the administration’s renewed embrace of the Monroe Doctrine (one that triggers much pushback in the region, for obvious reasons) in the NSS has focused on its military dimension and it calls for “a readjustment of our military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere, especially the missions identified in this strategy.”
Yet the economic dimension should be as much of a concern. It betrays a woefully wrongheaded understanding of the nature of Latin American economies, how they interact with the rest of the world, and what needs to be done to foster the region’s development.
Nothing reflects this better than the very last sentence of the section on the Western Hemisphere, which states “we should make every effort to push out foreign companies that build infrastructure in the region.” Though the document emphasizes how significant a resilient infrastructure is for the U.S. economy, when it comes to Latin America, there is an odd guiding thread pointing in the opposite direction, seemingly determined to stop in its tracks regional infrastructure expansion if a foreign entity is building it.
In the age of a globalized and interdependent world economy, for a region that is far away from the world’s main markets, few things are as significant for its competitiveness as an adequate public infrastructure — that is, its ports, highways, tunnels, bridges and railways. Yet, as it happens, this is also one of the region’s biggest weaknesses.
Decades of underinvestment have led to a current infrastructure deficit that the Economist Intelligence Unit estimates demands an investment of $250 billion a year in 2024-2028 to close the gap. The net result is that logistics and transport costs in Latin America reach as much as between 14 and 18 percent per export unit, in contrast to as low as an 8 percent average among OECD member countries.
This makes Latin American exports, so vital for the region’s economies, less competitive than they otherwise would be, and is one reason for the region’s low growth and relative stagnation.
In this century, and especially since 2010, Chinese construction companies have started to make a dent in this deficit, building ports, highways, railways and subways across the region. Exhibit A in this is the Peruvian port of Chancay, the most modern on South America’s West Coast, built by Chinese company COSCO at $1.3 billion and inaugurated by President Xi in November 2024.
There is little doubt that the reference cited above in the NSS is aimed at excluding Chinese companies from continuing to do so. Moreover, the NSS expands this notion beyond infrastructure by stating, “we will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets” (my emphasis). This, of course, could mean anything, from dams and power stations to key mineral resources, standing in the way of FDI from anywhere outside the Americas.
There are several problems with this approach. First, it ignores the fact that the fastest growing and most dynamic part of the world today is Asia, and that China is the world’s second largest economy. This means, by definition, that many areas of the world, including Latin America, have seen and will see increased trade and investment flows with it (China is already South America’s number one trading partner). To attempt to stop this is the equivalent of trying to stop the sun from rising.
Second, it ignores the fact that, for decades now, U.S. construction companies have refrained from participating in tendering for bids on Latin American infrastructure projects because they consider them too small, or for other reasons. This is unlikely to change because of U.S. government hectoring. A few years ago, a conservative Colombian government was keen to give the contract for building the Bogota subway project to a U.S. company. It discovered there are no U.S. companies that build subways. In 2019, it adjudicated the bid to a Chinese company instead.
The costs of European construction companies, on the other hand, are generally too high, making them often uncompetitive. Not surprisingly, Chinese companies are doing well, winning bids for many of the badly needed infrastructure projects.
One reason Latin Americans keep migrating to the United States is because of the region’s underdevelopment and the ensuing lack of economic opportunities for its people. The notion that the best way to stop these migration flows is by blocking attempts at lowering the region’s huge infrastructure deficit and thus keeping the region in a perpetual condition of underdevelopment is an unsustainable proposition.
In the new century (as opposed to in 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine was originally proclaimed) Latin American nations have diversified their international links, interact with the world, and benefit from the consequent trade, investment and financial cooperation flows from across the planet — as befits an age of interdependence. To attempt to turn the clock back by blocking investment flows from so-called “extra-Hemispheric powers” is futile. The horse has already left the barn.
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