On its way out, the lame duck Biden administration is going for broke, maybe literally, on aid for Ukraine.
According to AP reporting and a State Department statement, the U.S. plans to send Ukraine another $725 million worth of military assistance, including HIMARs and Stinger missiles, and more anti-personnel landmines, among other munitions.
The assistance, part of over the $7 billion Congress authorized as part of an aid package in April, follows recent and controversial Biden administration decisions to allow the use of long-range missile systems inside Russia, and the use of anti-personnel landmines on the battlefield in Ukraine. The weapons will come from already depleting U.S. stockpiles.
With time ticking, Biden officials have taken to the media to make their case for arming Ukraine until the last day of the administration. “We are going to do everything in our power for these 50 days to get Ukraine all the tools we possibly can to strengthen their position on the battlefield,” White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told ABC News on Sunday.
“President Biden directed me to oversee a massive surge in the military equipment that we are delivering to Ukraine so that we have spent every dollar that Congress has appropriated to us by the time that President Biden leaves office,” Sullivan explained.
But public opinion appears to be running in the opposite direction.
According to a September Institute of Global Affairs (IGA) survey, 66% of Americans support a U.S./NATO push towards negotiation settlements in Ukraine. A recent Gallup poll found 52% of Ukrainians preferred a negotiated peace over continued fighting. And signaling a possible diplomatic shift in kind, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said Ukraine could support ceding territory to Russia — in exchange for NATO membership.
In tandem with its aid efforts, the Biden administration is simultaneously pressuring Ukraine to lower its conscription age to 18. Diplomatic hopes aside, Ukrainians will continue fighting if the outgoing administration has its way.
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Top Image Credit: President Joe Biden delivers remarks about the situation in Ukraine, Friday, February 18, 2022, in the Roosevelt Room at the White House. (Official White House Photo by Erin Scott)
Revenues at the world’s top 100 global arms and military services producing companies totaled $632 billion in 2023, a 4.2% increase over the prior year, according to new data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
The largest increases were tied to ongoing conflicts, including a 40% increase in revenues for Russian companies involved in supplying Moscow’s war on Ukraine and record sales for Israeli firms producing weapons used in that nation’s brutal war on Gaza. Revenues for Turkey’s top arms producing companies also rose sharply — by 24% — on the strength of increased domestic defense spending plus exports tied to the war in Ukraine.
The United States remains the world’s dominant arms producing nation, with $318 billion in revenues flowing to American firms in the world’s top 100 for 2023, more than half of the global total. And the five highest revenue earners globally were all based in the United States — Lockheed Martin, Raytheon (now RTX), Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General Dynamics.
China ranked second to the United States in arms industry revenues, with nine firms accounting for 16% of the revenue received by companies in the global top 100. Two of the fastest growing countries in terms of revenue growth for top companies were also in Asia, South Korea (plus 39%) and Japan (plus 35%). South Korea’s increase was tied to major export deals with Poland and Australia, while Japan’s was driven by its largest military buildup since World War II.
SIPRI’s analysis takes a “just the facts” approach, tracking sales numbers and correlating them with increases in domestic and export spending tied to specific events. It does not address the dire humanitarian circumstances that underlie the growing revenues of top arms companies, most notably Israel’s unconscionable attacks on Gaza, which have killed over 40,000 people directly and many more through indirect causes, including over 62,000 who have died from starvation. The companies and countries fueling this mass slaughter — including U.S. firms that have supplied a substantial share of the bombs, missiles, and aircraft used in Gaza — should be held to account for their actions, even as they halt the supply of weapons and services that the Israeli government is using to commit ongoing war crimes.
Another major impact of the revenue surge for top arms makers is the diversion of funding and talent from addressing urgent global problems, from climate change to poverty to outbreaks of disease. And the more companies and countries become dependent on the profits of war, the harder it will be to shift funding towards other urgent priorities. The continuing militarization of the global economy has a double cost — lives lost in conflict and devastating problems left unsolved. The situation needs to be treated as far more than a grim parade of statistics about who benefits from a world at war. It should be treated as an urgent call to action for a change in global priorities.
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Top photo credit: 11/28/24. An anti-government protester holds the European flag in front of a makeshift barricade on fire during the demonstration in Tibilisi, Georgia. Following a controversial election last month, ruling party "Georgian Dream" Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced earlier today that they will no longer pursue a European future until the end of 2028. (Jay Kogler / SOPA Images via Reuters Connect)
Events have taken an astonishing turn in the Republic of Georgia. On Thursday, newly re-appointed Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidzeannounced that Georgia would not “put the issue of opening negotiations with the European Union on the agenda until the end of 2028,” and not accept budget support from the EU until then, either.
In the three-decade history of EU enlargement into Eastern Europe and Eurasia, where the promise of membership and the capricious integration process have roiled societies, felled governments, raised and dashed hopes like no other political variable, this is unheard of. So is the treatment Georgia has received at the hands of the West.
Kobakhidze’s announcement triggered the latest flare-up of a chronic crisis described in a recent brief for the Quincy Institute. Its origins lie in the “geopolitization” of Georgia’s domestic political arrangement. Although both the government and opposition have long pursued robust integration with the West, key Western leaders nevertheless favored the current opposition and tried to limit or indeed end the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party’s hold on power.
The resulting alienation between the Georgian government and the West was exacerbated when, after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Georgia came under intense pressure to join Western sanctions and give much of its heavy weaponry to Ukraine. Fearing for their small, vulnerable country’s security and economic survival, GD declined.
GD has resisted what it views as slow-motion regime change, for example by passing controversial measures this year that would oblige foreign-funded NGOs to disclose their financial records. Those steps further widened the gulf between GD and the West, triggering large-scale protests by pro-EU Georgians in 2023 and 2024. The most recent crest of protests, coming after GD declared victory in an election that the opposition claims (but has been unable to prove) was marred by fraud, had only just petered out days ago.
Within hours of Kobakhidze’s announcement, crowds gathered for protests in Tbilisi and other cities, conspicuously angrier andmore violent than usual, drawing a greater crackdown from the police as well. Georgia’s human rights ombudsmen have criticized not only the police violence against individuals but, critically, their attempts to disperse the entire protest.
Pro-opposition president Salome Zourabichvili, whose term in office expires this month, has declared she intends to remain in office and gather opposition forces in a council to prepare for taking power from a government she denounced as illegitimate. Several Georgian ambassadors have resigned, while hundreds of staff at government agencies have signed letters of protest. A former minister has called for the army to defend the people. This latest flare up of Georgia’s chronic crisis already feels more seismic than previous ones.
EU accession is an arcane process, so it’s important to clarify what actually happened and what didn’t. After eight years as an EU associated country (a sort of half-way house for Europe’s periphery), during which GD adopted a raft of EU regulations at a faster clip than its peers, Georgia was allowed to apply for full EU-membership in March 2022.
The EU presented a list of broadly formulated “priorities” —conditions Georgia had to fulfill to obtain candidate status. There were poison pills in the small print: GD would have to share power with the opposition, let EU-appointed foreign experts vet senior judicial appointments, allow NGOs agitating to get the government sanctioned and deposed to participate in law- and policy-making, and more. Another priority — “de-oligarchization” — turned out to violate the EU’s own civil rights norms. After an unresolved tug of war over these priorities, Georgia was granted candidate status in December 2023.
In recent years, EU accession has morphed from a technocratic-managerial process into an extended obstacle course, in which at every stage arbitrary new demands may be introduced. Georgia may have won candidate status, but accession “negotiations” (a misnomer for supervised adoption of the EU’s entire body of law) do not follow automatically. The government must still accept those same old priorities that GD considers incompatible with the country’s sovereignty.
Kobakhidze took great care to affirm that Georgia would continue to adopt reforms already agreed with the EU. The next day, he walked things back even further, saying that if the EU offered to launch accession negotiations, he would sign the same day.
Even so, it is hard not to read this decision by the Georgian government as an act of defiance, as calling the EU’s bluff. It turns the tables on a relationship in which the EU normally holds all the cards. The Georgian government’s halting of EU accession may be a symbolic act without material consequences, but symbolism matters greatly in the relations between the West and countries like Georgia.
Kobakhidze described Georgia’s predicament as being “blackmailed” by the EU: making the start of accession negotiations and budget support contingent on Georgia’s relinquishing essential elements of its sovereignty. As if to illustrate his point, that same day the European Parliament adopted its latest resolution on Georgia, calling for a re-run of the election with monitoring led not by the OSCE but the EU, as well as sanctioning and asset-freezing of a long list of Georgian officials and judges.
The European Parliament’s new standing rapporteur on Georgia went further still, demanding new elections organized by the international community, reminiscent of occupied Afghanistan or Iraq.
In contrast, the EU’s new High Representative for Foreign Policy together with the Commissioner for Enlargement released a carefully worded statement, avoiding judgment on the election and emphasizing that the door remains open for EU talks. Meanwhile, the State Department suspended the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership, following earlier threats.
One regional analyst characterized Georgia’s actions as “geopolitical backsliding.” That might have been a Freudian slip. Or it might have been in earnest, normalizing the conflation of geopolitics with democracy that defines the West’s approach to Europe’s periphery.
This approach — demanding ever-greater inroads into sovereign politics and governance, asking vulnerable countries the impossible, arm-twisting and worse — will not restore the constructive partnership we once had with Georgia and continue to fan the country’s crisis.
Last week, people who fear a third world war got more reasons to worry. Ukraine, with permission from the White House, struck Russian territory with long-range missiles supplied by the United States. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long warned that such an attack would mean that NATO and Russia “are at war,” and he has raised the specter of nuclear retaliation. Granted, these threats could be bluffs, but last week Putin gave them some credibility by (a) loosening the conditions for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, (b) firing a multiple-warhead, nuclear-capable missile at Ukraine for the first time in the war, and (c) declaring, in a speech after the strike, that Russia would be entitled to attack any nations that aid Ukraine’s strikes into Russian territory.
While Putin’s caution during previous crises suggests he’s not about to reach for the nuclear button just yet, his dramatic response has complicated any path to a peace deal. Meanwhile, some liberal voices have predicted that Trump’s looming presidency, far from hastening an end to the conflict as Trump has promised to do, will prolong it. If Trump were to cut off arms to Ukraine, he’d remove an important incentive for Putin to call it quits, according to Ben Rhodes, a former White House official under Barack Obama. Among conservatives who advocate foreign policy restraint, there is worry that Trump’s hawkish cabinet nominees portend a departure from the peace agenda he campaigned on. As for hawkish critics of Trump on both left and right, many believe that he may end the war by just giving away the farm to Putin.
These concerns are valid. But Trump has good reasons to try proving the doubters wrong. He understands that foreign policy debacles can crater a president’s approval ratings, and he has staked his reputation on being able to end a conflict that started and continues to escalate on President Joe Biden’s watch. “I’m the only one who can get the war stopped,” he told Newsweek this September. Brokering a respectable peace would be a boon to his legacy and an embarrassment for his political opponents—and Trump loves splattering egg on the faces of his detractors. So there is room for optimism alongside the worry. Trump may well manage not only to stop the war but also to get Ukraine the best deal it could realistically hope for.
Some say Trump’s Ukraine promises are hollow since he hasn’t outlined a viable peace deal. But Trump maintains, plausibly enough, that he can’t reveal details of a plan without boxing himself in. It would be better, he says, to hammer out a deal with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky behind closed doors, which means keeping mum on specifics for now. Despite Trump’s reticence, there are signs of the kind of deal he’d push for—and signs that both Putin and Zelensky would go for it.
This fall, J.D. Vance, Trump’s running mate and now vice president-elect, laid out a likely settlement: The current battle lines become a “heavily fortified” demilitarized zone to prevent future Russian aggression; Kyiv retains its sovereign independence; and Russia gets assurances that Ukraine won’t join NATO. Moscow would presumably also get to keep the lands in eastern and southern Ukraine that it now holds.
There’s reason to think the Ukrainians would accept such a deal. While American commentators complain that Vance’s plan “sounds a lot like Putin’s,” Kyiv is less dismissive. In a remarkable change of tone compared to previous statements, Zelensky recently declared that Ukraine “must do everything to ensure that the war ends next year through diplomatic means.” Most Ukrainians agree. A recent Gallup survey found that, for the first time, more than 50 percent of Ukrainians want their government to negotiate a settlement “as soon as possible.” Among respondents who favored a swift settlement, 52 percent said Kyiv should be open to making territorial concessions. Following Trump’s election victory, Ukrainian officials have warmed to the idea of ceding territory to end the war.
Putin, for his part, may also be prepared to accept a deal along Vance’s lines. Although battlefield momentum is now on Moscow’s side, Russia’s military gains have come at a tremendous cost. The rate of Russian military casualties appears to be at its highest point since the war began. If the war continues well into 2025, Putin may be forced to order another round of mobilization and risk sparking discontent within Russia.
Of course, neither Putin nor Zelensky will pursue a peace deal without some prodding, but Trump seems to know what pressures to apply to each man. During a Fox News interview in July, Trump explained: “I would tell Zelensky, no more [military aid]. You got to make a deal. I would tell Putin, if you don’t make a deal, we’re going to give [Zelensky] a lot.” Such an approach, however duplicitous, would be a marked improvement over Biden’s unconditional support for Ukraine, a policy that has failed to convert American assistance into diplomatic leverage. Trump’s dual threats would be credible. Ukraine’s backers are already worried that he’ll suspend military aid. And Trump, as one Republican foreign policy expert told Politico, “can snap his fingers” and congressional Republicans “will vote for more security assistance to Ukraine.”
If the sides were to get close to a deal, the thorniest remaining problem would be that of post-war security guarantees for Ukraine. Kyiv desires immediate accession to NATO, a move that Moscow will wage further war to prevent. But Trump’s transition team has discussed a 20-year moratorium on Ukrainian membership, suggesting he may float a compromise that lets both Zelensky and Putin save face. The Trump administration could also engineer a workaround by getting Ukraine admitted instead into the European Union, which has a collective defense agreement of its own. During peace talks early in the war, Russian negotiators reportedly were prepared to greenlight EU membership for Ukraine—a striking reversal given the Kremlin’s previous opposition to Kyiv signing a mere association agreement with the bloc. MAGA Republicans want Europe to take responsibility for the Ukraine crisis, and EU membership for Kyiv would go a long way toward that end.
Awkwardly for Trump’s pro-restraint supporters, the hardliners who will fill his cabinet have tended, throughout their careers, to favor militarism over diplomacy. But these nominees—notably, Senator Marco Rubio as secretary of state and Representative Michael Waltz as national security adviser—share something else in common: In accommodating themselves to Trump, they havemodulated their Russia hawkism. Trump’s nominees are also proven loyalists, and if they do try to thwart his agenda, Trump can ignore or fire them, as he did to their predecessors in his first administration.
The president-elect likely sees a chance to gain leverage in talks by surrounding himself with bona fide hardliners. As one official explained to Axios in 2019, Trump liked having uber-hawk John Bolton on his team because he believed that “Bolton’s bellicosity and eagerness to kill people is a bargaining chip when he’s sitting down with foreign leaders.”
Of course, there’s no guarantee that Trump, a wild card who tends to trust his turbulent instincts, will make the moves required to end the Ukraine war rather than widen it. Nor is it guaranteed that such moves exist, given the political difficulties that both Putin and Zelensky would face in agreeing to a peace deal. Donald Trump’s campaign promise to settle the war “in one day, 24 hours” had already received a lukewarm reception in both Moscow and Kyiv, and that was before Biden’s dangerous escalation last week. But Biden, it is clear, is not going to push the parties toward peace, and no other country in the world appears to have the leverage and motivation to make anything happen. That leaves an imperfect leader with a record of surprises. Like it or not, Ukraine’s best hope for peace looks a lot like Donald Trump.
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