On its way out, the lame duck Biden administration is going for broke, maybe literally, on aid for Ukraine.
According to AP reporting and a State Department statement, the U.S. plans to send Ukraine another $725 million worth of military assistance, including HIMARs and Stinger missiles, and more anti-personnel landmines, among other munitions.
The assistance, part of over the $7 billion Congress authorized as part of an aid package in April, follows recent and controversial Biden administration decisions to allow the use of long-range missile systems inside Russia, and the use of anti-personnel landmines on the battlefield in Ukraine. The weapons will come from already depleting U.S. stockpiles.
With time ticking, Biden officials have taken to the media to make their case for arming Ukraine until the last day of the administration. “We are going to do everything in our power for these 50 days to get Ukraine all the tools we possibly can to strengthen their position on the battlefield,” White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told ABC News on Sunday.
“President Biden directed me to oversee a massive surge in the military equipment that we are delivering to Ukraine so that we have spent every dollar that Congress has appropriated to us by the time that President Biden leaves office,” Sullivan explained.
But public opinion appears to be running in the opposite direction.
According to a September Institute of Global Affairs (IGA) survey, 66% of Americans support a U.S./NATO push towards negotiation settlements in Ukraine. A recent Gallup poll found 52% of Ukrainians preferred a negotiated peace over continued fighting. And signaling a possible diplomatic shift in kind, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said Ukraine could support ceding territory to Russia — in exchange for NATO membership.
In tandem with its aid efforts, the Biden administration is simultaneously pressuring Ukraine to lower its conscription age to 18. Diplomatic hopes aside, Ukrainians will continue fighting if the outgoing administration has its way.
Stavroula Pabst is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft.
Top Image Credit: President Joe Biden delivers remarks about the situation in Ukraine, Friday, February 18, 2022, in the Roosevelt Room at the White House. (Official White House Photo by Erin Scott)
Top Photo: U.S. House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-LA) and Senate Foreign Relations Chair, Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), listen as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses a joint meeting of Congress at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, U.S., July 24, 2024. REUTERS/Craig Hudson
The upcoming House of Representatives Rules Committee Package is sure to include a section requiring the consideration of a bill that would sanction the International Criminal Court (ICC), therefore shielding Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu from arrest.
The ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu, as well as former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and Hamas leader Ibrahim Al-Masri in November 2024 for their actions in Gaza, alleging war crimes and crimes against humanity. ICC judges said that the Gaza blockade "created conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the civilian population in Gaza, which resulted in the death of civilians, including children, due to malnutrition and dehydration.”
A House Resolution introduced by over a dozen House Republicans, titled the”‘Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act” is meant “to impose sanctions with respect to the International Criminal Court engaged in any effort to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute any protected person of the United States and its allies.”
The bill found that “The United States and Israel are not parties to the Rome Statute or members of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and therefore the ICC has no legitimacy or jurisdiction over the United States or Israel.” Because of the lack of jurisdiction, the co-sponsors assert, “The ICC’s actions against Israel, including the preliminary examination and investigation of Israel and issuance of arrest warrants against Israeli officials, are illegitimate and baseless and create a damaging precedent that threatens the United States, Israel, and all United States partners who have not consented to the ICC’s jurisdiction.”
The bill further states that “if the International Criminal Court is engaging in any attempt to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute any protected person,” the President shall then impose sanctions. These sanctions can be placed on any “foreign person” who directly aided or engaged in efforts to assist the ICC in investigating, arresting, detaining, or prosecuting a protected person. This could include financial or material assistance.
Despite calling the arrest warrant for Netanyahu “outrageous,” President Biden had previously opposed sanctioning the ICC for seeking arrest warrants against Benjamin Netanyahu. However, President Trump notably approved sanctions in September 2020 on members of the ICC who were “involved in the ICC’s efforts to investigate US personnel.”
The ICC has no actual enforcement authorities, leaving detention and arrest to the 125 members countries that are party to the Rome convention. But it is fully voluntary. It appears, according to the text, that the bill is authorizing Congress to impose sanctions on any foreign actor (who could be from a partner or allied country) and their families if they helped to detain Netanayhu on behalf of a member state. What this would look like in practice is unclear. Ireland and the Netherlands (a NATO alliance member) have both indicated that the Israeli prime minister would be arrested if he set foot on their soil.
The decision to include H.R. 23 in the Rules package is not without its opponents. Congressman Thomas Massie (R-Ky) dissented on X: “The United States is a sovereign country, so I don’t assign any credibility to decisions of the International Criminal Court. But how did a bill to protect Netanyahu make it into the House rules package to be voted on immediately after the Speaker vote? Where are our priorities?!” His office declined to comment further when RS inquired.
It is important to note that the package cannot be voted on until House leadership appoints the committee, which may come with additional challenges, as previous speaker Kevin McCarthy was forced to appoint three Freedom Caucus members to the last Rules Committee, and these three members regularly joined Democrats to vote down legislation submitted by Republican leadership.
Reports indicate that the appointments will likely happen by this Friday.
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Top image credit: Frederic Legrand - COMEO / Shutterstock.com
As the incoming Trump administration prepares to launch negotiations aimed at ending the current phase of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine, the question of security guarantees is certain to feature prominently in talks.
Talk of security guarantees is nothing new — indeed, it has underscored much of the drama that has unfolded since Russia’s initial military buildup in 2021. Moscow insisted that the United States and NATO undertake legally binding obligations in its two “draft treaties,” published on the eve of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, aimed at guaranteeing Ukraine’s neutrality and rolling back NATO forces in Central and Eastern Europe to where they were prior to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Kyiv, for its part, naturally wants ironclad measures that can ensure it will not fall victim to another war of aggression in the years ahead.
To some extent, however, this is all déjà vu. Thirty years ago last month, the Budapest Memorandum was signed.
Aimed at providing security assurances to Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in exchange for their entry into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Budapest Memorandum committed Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom to abstain from military and economic coercion against these three newly independent post-Soviet states. Its lessons offer important clues for how to bring peace to what has tragically become a war-torn region.
The memorandum has become the source of considerable mythmaking following Russia’s brazen violation of Ukrainian sovereignty on February 24, 2022 (though some have asserted that the United States was the first to violate the memorandum with its sanctions against Belarus). Most notably, Atlanticists and pro-Ukrainian advocates often insist that Kyiv gave up its nuclear weapons — the ultimate deterrent and guarantee of one’s own security — in exchange for promises that its borders would be respected.
Of course, these missiles were Soviet — they were never functionally Ukrainian and were beyond Kyiv’s ability to maintain. Lost even more often in this discussion is the fact that the newly minted Ukrainian state prohibited itself from accepting, producing or acquiring nuclear weapons in its 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty, the same declaration in which Kyiv announced its “intention of becoming a permanently neutral state.”
Famously, the memorandum offered Ukraine security assurances rather than legally binding security guarantees, a distinction explicitly stressed by American diplomats during the talks. Indeed, the memorandum was never approved by the U.S. Senate, as treaties must be, because it did not proffer any security guarantees to Ukraine. Nor did it commit the U.S. — or any other signatory — to any specific punitive action in the event of aggression against Ukraine, affirming instead a “commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance” to Kyiv in case of an armed attack.
Given the history of the drafting process, Washington cannot be accused of pulling a fast one on Ukraine with ambiguous language or by using terms that may have been lost in translation. Simply put, the United States has never promised to fight for Ukraine — a position held in 1994 and reaffirmed by the Biden administration since Russia’s full-scale invasion. Any security guarantees offered to Ukraine aimed at bringing current hostilities to a close will be novel ones, not compensation for the West having supposedly failed to uphold its existing obligations.
In this context, Western states will need to weigh carefully just how far they are prepared to go, since Russia has demonstrated its willingness to fight for Ukraine while the West — initial suggestions of European peacekeepers aside — has not. French President Emmanuel Macron’s discussion earlier this year of sending European troops to Ukraine to prevent a Russian victory was promptly shut down by Western allies. One could argue that Ukraine’s status as a security “gray area” is what prompted Russia’s invasion, but permanent neutrality is just as plausible a resolution to this dilemma as NATO membership.
But perhaps the greatest lesson to derive from the history of the Budapest Memorandum is that context matters. The memorandum was agreed at a time when relations between Russia and the West were much more favorable (although by the end of 1994, Boris Yeltsin was already warning of the risk of a “cold peace”). The conclusion is that diplomacy — an evolving mixture of deterrence and reassurance — is consistently needed to tend to international relationships to ensure that agreements are upheld. The same will be true when it comes to “guaranteeing” that Russia will never invade Ukraine again.
By contrast, the Western approach to relations with Russia in the post-Cold War era has often been more legalistic than diplomatic — “throwing the book” at Moscow by pointing out the alleged ways in which it has failed to live up to its international commitments. Yet Kyiv was all too happy not to implement the Minsk agreements, which brought the initial rounds of fighting in the Donbas conflict to a halt, using the intervening years between 2015 and 2022 to strengthen its hand. Similarly, Moscow believed that the post-Cold War status quo was imposed upon it at a time of national weakness — something it sought to rectify by way of its “draft treaties.”
It is easy to say pacta sunt servanda, that agreements must be kept. But this requires building and maintaining trust. Doing so will require all sides to stop airing their tired narratives in public — such as when Moscow dismisses the perspectives of Central and Eastern European states as Russophobic or when Western countries pointlessly insist that NATO expansion is directed against no one — and recognize one another’s security concerns as legitimate.
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Top photo credit: Donald Trump disembarking from Air Force One, February 2019. (White House photo/public domain)
President-elect Donald Trump spent the holidays mocking Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, suggesting that the U.S. could annex and make Canada the 51st state. He then went on to propose that the U.S. retake the Panama Canal, and buy Greenland.
Trump’s remarks brought the usual outcries and exhortations, but, in all seriousness, Trump will have more immediate foreign policy challenges on Day One, beginning with the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, as well as Washington’s overall relationship with China.
Experts at the Quincy Institute have assembled several key priorities, keeping in mind Trump’s stated desires to pursue foreign policy in the national interest and reduce Washington’s foreign entanglements and new wars abroad. Can he keep to his own goals, considering the hot wars in Israel and Ukraine and Washington’s continued involvement in them — and growing tensions with Beijing?
According to QI’s Eurasia and Grand Strategy fellows, Trump should maintain his commitment to putting U.S. interests first. This would mean pursuing a European balance of power strategy that avoids unnecessarily provoking Russia; rather, bringing all parties to the table and ending the war through negotiations.
This path to peace would focus on a new European security relationship that takes into account Russia’s longstanding aversion to NATO expansion, emphasizing instead expediting Ukrainian admission to the European Union and providing strong guarantees for Kyiv to deter future Russian aggression.
Furthermore, says QI experts, the U.S. should play “the China card” by taking into account Beijing’s interest in seeing the war in Ukraine end, including some of the ancillary dynamics — like North Korea’s military support of Moscow. Including China in coming to a negotiated peace would help bind the parties and could help improve the rocky relations between Washington and Beijing, and lay the foundations for future diplomatic cooperation
Middle East
Trump is facing a number of different fronts here, and all concern U.S. interests. On Syria, according to QI Middle East experts, the U.S. should pursue talks with the emerging new government in Damascus, as well as Turkey, to begin the process of withdrawing its 2,000 troops from the country. This should be a priority.
In Israel, there is no certainty that Tel Aviv’s military dominance will continue, much less lead to peace in the region. Trump needs to convince the Netanyahu government to follow through with a ceasefire agreement in Gaza to stop the fighting, and the U.S must limit the number of lethal weapon transfers to Israel, particularly 2,000-pound bombs, which have led to violations of international law and U.S. law regarding the transfer of weapons that are likely to be used to commit serious abuses of human rights.
Washington should continue to push for a two-state solution and stand in firm opposition to Israel annexing the West Bank, says QI senior fellow Annelle Sheline. Netanyahu must be convinced that his maximalist policies in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon will backfire against Israel’s own relations and with the broader Arab World. In the worst-case scenario, she said, Israel’s actions will continue to fuel the potential for broader regional conflict and drag the U.S. in, despite the stated desire of multiple administrations to start reducing the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East.
“It would be in Trump's own self interest to rein in the Netanyahu government and its extremist agenda, which is destabilizing the region and increasing the likelihood of dragging the U.S. into an unnecessary war,” says Sheline.
“Trump should make clear to Netanyahu that he wants the regional conflict to wind down, which will require Israel to stop attacking its neighbors and stop killing Palestinians. In particular, Trump should tell Netanyahu not to annex the West Bank, which would likely drive Palestinians across the border and therefore violate Israel's treaty with Jordan, possibly sparking yet another conflict, when Trump campaigned on the promise that he could bring order to the region.”
On Iran, her colleagues say, Trump should resist efforts by some in his orbit to reimpose his “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran and instead engage in talks to both curb Tehran’s nuclear program and help end the conflict with the Houthis in the Red Sea.
China
Trump should recommit to the “One China” policy in order to avoid a war with Beijing over Taiwan, according to QI’s East Asia experts. This is the greatest potential flashpoint between the two countries today. The U.S. should continue to encourage a peaceful resolution to the China-Taiwan reunification issue, helping to reduce its own military tensions with Beijing in the Taiwan Strait while assuring Taipei that it will continue to receive the tools it needs to defend itself.
In this vein, Washington should be willing to enhance crisis management mechanisms with Beijing. Quincy Institute senior Fellow Michael Swaine has formulated a series of recommendations on this front, calling out the current infrastructure as “critically deficient in carrying out this balancing act.”
“Such a process requires a delicate balancing act between achieving resolution without provocation and fostering accommodation without signaling weakness,” Swaine writes.
The other front is, of course, trade and economic engagement. Trump has threatened new tariffs against Chinese-made imports even as President Biden has expanded efforts to limit or ban certain exports to China, particularly in the realm of advanced technology, in order to prevent Beijing from achieving market dominance.
Washington should pursue less exclusionary and more reciprocal policies, say QI experts because in actuality the former ends up hurting U.S. competitiveness and business. In that vein, Trump should pursue policies that help revitalize U.S. industry at home while avoiding a decoupling strategy that could end up hurting the very American interests he has vowed to serve.
For more on the various approaches to economic competition with China, read QI Karthik Sankaran’s latest on RS.
Global South
Trump may seem uninterested in the vast outreaches of U.S. spheres of influences, including Africa and Southeast Asia, but he should be aware that in many of these places, governments are seeking better trade and development deals than they are currently getting from the West, or from Washington’s peer competitor, China.
Moreover, according to Sarang Shidore, director of QI’s Global South program, Washington needs to move away from a security-first approach that has typically seen the pursuit of blocs and has resulted in militarizing foreign policy. Not only does it not help the countries in question, but it also risks pulling the U.S. into other governments’ conflicts.
“We have seen this pattern in American history before, with Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq 2003 as being among the best examples. Chasing rivals and inflating local threats in these postcolonial societies through military interventions, regime change, and deep militarization generates blowback and insurgency more often than it wins friends and influences people,” he says.
“Unless there is a demonstrable threat to U.S. vital interests, the support should be for generating sustainable partnerships and creating win-win economic opportunities in the Global South rather than arming and basing.”
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Trump will face a number of urgent issues (Ukraine, Israel) and long-term challenges (Global South, China competition) after his January 20 inauguration. No doubt, a combination of personnel, priorities, and Trump’s own impulsiveness will be engaged immediately, with results varying, leaving 2025 foreign policy just as much in question as it is today at the end of the Biden era.
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