On its way out, the lame duck Biden administration is going for broke, maybe literally, on aid for Ukraine.
According to AP reporting and a State Department statement, the U.S. plans to send Ukraine another $725 million worth of military assistance, including HIMARs and Stinger missiles, and more anti-personnel landmines, among other munitions.
The assistance, part of over the $7 billion Congress authorized as part of an aid package in April, follows recent and controversial Biden administration decisions to allow the use of long-range missile systems inside Russia, and the use of anti-personnel landmines on the battlefield in Ukraine. The weapons will come from already depleting U.S. stockpiles.
With time ticking, Biden officials have taken to the media to make their case for arming Ukraine until the last day of the administration. “We are going to do everything in our power for these 50 days to get Ukraine all the tools we possibly can to strengthen their position on the battlefield,” White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told ABC News on Sunday.
“President Biden directed me to oversee a massive surge in the military equipment that we are delivering to Ukraine so that we have spent every dollar that Congress has appropriated to us by the time that President Biden leaves office,” Sullivan explained.
But public opinion appears to be running in the opposite direction.
According to a September Institute of Global Affairs (IGA) survey, 66% of Americans support a U.S./NATO push towards negotiation settlements in Ukraine. A recent Gallup poll found 52% of Ukrainians preferred a negotiated peace over continued fighting. And signaling a possible diplomatic shift in kind, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has said Ukraine could support ceding territory to Russia — in exchange for NATO membership.
In tandem with its aid efforts, the Biden administration is simultaneously pressuring Ukraine to lower its conscription age to 18. Diplomatic hopes aside, Ukrainians will continue fighting if the outgoing administration has its way.
Stavroula Pabst is a reporter for Responsible Statecraft.
Top Image Credit: President Joe Biden delivers remarks about the situation in Ukraine, Friday, February 18, 2022, in the Roosevelt Room at the White House. (Official White House Photo by Erin Scott)
Top image credit: German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, Ukranian President Voloydmyr Zelensky, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk walk in the grounds of the Mariynsky Palace, in Kyiv, Ukraine, May 10, 2025. Ludovic Marin/Pool via REUTERS/File Photo
As the Istanbul peace talks get underway, Europe’s response to the Russia-Ukraine war exposes its profound weakness and reliance on U.S. support, with leaders like France’s Emmanuel Macron, Britain’s Keir Starmer, and Germany’s Friedrich Merz resorting to bluffs that lack substance.
The European trio, after visiting Kyiv and meeting with the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on May 10, issued Russiaa 30-day ceasefire ultimatum to begin on May 12, threatening severe sanctions in case of Moscow’s non-compliance. Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed it, offering talks in Istanbul without a truce instead, in line with Russia’s insistence that the “root causes” of the conflict be addressed, including Ukraine’s potential NATO membership.
Kyiv and its European alliesinsisted that a ceasefire should precede talks. However, U.S. President Donald Trump’s call for immediate negotiations, sidestepping the ceasefire, upended their strategy and forced Zelenskyy’s attendance. Europe has exposed itself as being increasingly irrelevant, its strategies crumbling without American backing.
Zelenskyy plans to attend the talks in Istanbul aiming to appear peace-seeking and avoid being blamed by Trump for the failure to use the chance to end the war. Putin, for his part, scoffed at the threat of new sanctions, declaring, in reference to the Europeans: “They harm themselves with these moves, but they do it anyway, the fools.”
However, Moscow is also reluctant to alienate Trump and provoke an end of its nascent dialogue with Washington. So, while Putin will not attend the talks, he will send his aide Vladimir Medinsky who already was the head of the Russian delegation at the Istanbul talks in Spring 2022, where both sides reached a draft agreement. This signals Moscow’s determination to resume talks based on the same parameters as in 2022: Ukraine’s neutral status, security guarantees from all five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (U.S., UK, France, Russia, and China) and reduction of Ukraine’s armed forces.
The question now is whether Zelensky will accept to negotiate with Medinsky, or will send his own aides, such as his foreign minister or the head of the presidential administration. Either way, it would only further expose Europe’s inability to steer the process.
Regardless of Kyiv’s decision, the EU’s 17th sanctions package, approved on May, exemplifies this lack of leverage. Including a ban on chemical exports for weapons, visa bans and asset freezes for Russian officials, trade restrictions on companies evading sanctions, and measures against nearly 200 oil tankers in Russia’s “shadow fleet,” the package was deemed so weak that Hungary and Slovakia — who long advocated for negotiations with Moscow to end the war — didn’t bother blocking it. Sweden and Finland noted parliamentary approval is needed, but no delays are expected.
EU diplomats admit that “massive” sanctions of the sort threatened by Macron or escalatory steps like sending German Taurus missiles to Ukraine lack credibility without U.S. support and would take too long to implement, allowing Moscow to dismiss them as a bluff. With gas phase-outs delayed until 2027 and internal divisions — Hungary’s and Slovakia’s resistance chief among them — Europe’s economic leverage seems even less convincing.
Macron’s posturing further underscores this weakness. He admitted France has exhausted its aid to Ukraine and cannot escalate support. He noted that frozen Russian assets cannot be confiscated due to legal barriers, warning that Moscow could reclaim them if sanctions falter — a damning admission of Europe’s fragility.
His proposal to deploy European troops in Ukraine, framed as an alternative to NATO membership, is another empty gesture. “We cannot leave Ukraine alone. Since it will not join NATO, we offer alternative guarantees,” Macron claimed, suggesting troops be placed in “strategically important points” away from the front for joint operations to create a “deterrence effect.”
Yet, he confirmed no combat role, and Russia’s repeated opposition to Western troops renders the idea toothless. Macron and Starmer concede the plan hinges on Kyiv-Moscow agreements, admitting its speculative nature. Starmer, echoing Macron’s rhetoric, offers no concrete commitments, while Merz, Germany’s new chancellor, pushes for sanctions and aid but lacks the fiscal or political clout to act unilaterally. Their collective strategy — threatening Russia with sanctions or troops — collapses without U.S. muscle. It also diverts the focus from what should be a serious conversation on realistic, achievable security guarantees for Ukraine.
As the EU threatens sanctions if Russia rejects a ceasefire, Europe’s diluted measures and lack of coordination with Washington expose the bluff. Trump’s proximity to Istanbul during a Middle East visit could see him intervene if talks show promise, reinforcing his role as the decisive player. Without U.S.-driven terms or a U.S.-Russia deal, Europe’s calls for peace along current lines are futile, as neither Moscow nor Kyiv sees their respective positions as too weak to agree to unfavorable terms.
If the Istanbul talks lead to some sort of an agreement, it is Trump who’ll be in a position to claim credit as he insisted on the talks to take place in the first place. If the talks fail, Trump’s reaction — escalating arms deliveries to Ukraine, pressuring Kyiv, maintaining limited support, or disengaging — will impact the war’s trajectory.
Europe, shackled by weak sanctions, exhausted resources, hollow proposals, and stubborn refusal to talk to Moscow has no independent path.
The biggest achievement of today’s Istanbul talks is that they are even taking place. U.S. engagement will remain vital to getting a peace deal over the line. Russia’s desire for a reset with Washingtonmay keep them on track.
I have a sense of déjà vu as I contemplate these long-overdue peace talks between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul. In April 2022, Ukraine and Russia were close to agreeing a peace treaty, less than two months after war started. However, this came crashing down amid claims that western governments, in particular the United States and the United Kingdom encouraged Ukraine to keep fighting.
It’s worth recapping very briefly what was close to having been agreed. By far the best summary of negotiations between both sides was produced by the New York Times in June 2024. Those negotiations ranfor almost two months. The talks started with Ukrainian officials being spirited over the border into Belarus on February 29, 2022 while the fighting raged around Kyiv, and eventually led to the now famous talks in Istanbul in March and April.
What has changed since then?
Ukraine will enter the Istanbul talks in a weaker position than it held in 2022.
Western support for Ukraine financially and economically is not as sound as it was then. No big ticket economic aid and assistance has been made available since the G7 agreement of a $50 billion package of loans, in June 2024. While European states scratched together new economic aid to Ukraine in April, this cannot make up for the reduction in US support.
In territorial terms, Russia withdrew from Kyiv as a concession to the first Istanbul talks and lost ground in Kharkiv and in Kherson in late 2022. However, Russia has gone on steadily to gain further territory in the Donbas since the end of 2023. So while both sides have scores on the board, Russia now maintains the military upper hand on the battlefield and that seems unlikely to change. These two factors in particular were behind President Trump’s February assertion that Ukraine has no cards to play.
What has stayed the same?
NATO membership is still off the table
The verified documents shared by the New York Times last June confirmed that Ukraine’s neutrality and non-membership of NATO was the central issue agreed upon in 2022. Ukraine was ready to become a “permanently neutral state” that would never join NATO or allow foreign forces to be based on its soil.
There seems no route for Ukraine to resile from that given its currently weakened negotiating position and President Trump’s stated view that NATO membership for Ukraine is not practical. Although Germany’s new foreign Minister, Johann Wadephul recently repeated the line that Ukraine’s path to NATO is irreversible, most have agreed, privately and publicly, that Ukraine’s path to NATO is a fraught if not impossible one.
Right now, just having the talks is a huge breakthrough
The Istanbul talks would not be happening had the Trump administration not pushed for it so hard. We don’t need to rehash the “did they or didn’t they” debate around why Ukraine abandoned the Istanbul agreement in April 2022. What is clear, is that Ukraine became entrenched, not only in not negotiating with Russia, but in excluding Russia from all discussions on peace in Ukraine from then onward.
Having agreed in principle for Ukraine to accept neutral status Zelensky was soon pushing his own ten point peace plan. This included, among other things, Russia withdrawing its troops to the pre-2014 border, i.e. giving up Crimea and the Donbass and creating a Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture, by which he meant Ukraine joining NATO. Peace summits were organized in various countries that explicitly excluded Russia, culminating in the Switzerland event on June 15, 2024.
At this event, President Zelensky was dug in deeper on resisting any engagement with Russia until a full withdrawal of its troops from Ukraine, which was a completely unrealistic proposal. “Russia can start negotiations with us even tomorrow without waiting for anything – if they leave our legal territories,” he said.
Even after President Trump was elected, European leaders clung to the line that “only Ukraine can decide what peace means.”’ I see no circumstances in which a Kamala Harris presidency would have cajoled President Zelensky to enter into negotiations. The talks wouldn’t be happening unless the Trump administration broke a whole load of Ukrainian and European eggshells to get to this point.
The biggest issue now is territory
Even though he was wrongly derided at the time by mainstream media, Steve Witkoff correctly pointed out in his March interview with Tucker Carlson that the territorial issues in Ukraine will be most intractable. Russia’s decision in October 2022 to formally annex the four oblasts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk changed the calculus. However, Russia does not have full territorial control of any of those oblasts, which are cut through the middle by a hotly contested front line.
Resolving the line of control when the war ends is, by some margin, the most problematic challenge. This will be a hugely sensitive topic, and European allies will shoot down any major concessions to Russia, as they did when the idea surfaced that the U.S.might de jure recognise Russia’s occupation of Crimea.
The most obvious settlement is a de facto recognition of occupation, a Cyprus-style scenario, that does not stand in the way of Ukraine’s future membership of the European Union. Even that will require detailed agreement on issues around demilitarization of the line of control and enforcing any ceasefire.
Sanctions are probably tricky, but also tractable
As I have said before, there is enormous scope to a plan that allows for the immediate lifting of the bulk of zero-impact measures, phasing out the remainder at points agreed to by both sides. The toughest issue remains the $300 billion in frozen Russian assets, mostly held in Belgium. Russia has shown a willingness to concede this funding to support reconstruction in Ukraine, including those parts that Russia occupies.
But there is texture here. Freeing up those funds for reconstruction would immediately remove the source of interest payments that are meeting Ukraine’s obligations on its $50 billion in debt to the G7, agreed to in June 2024. But the more general policy question arises, how much of the freed up funding would be spent in Ukraine itself and how much in Russian-occupied Ukraine, where most of the war damage has occurred? The U.S. must keep the pressure on to ensure the talks stay on track.
A U.S. presence in Istanbul will be vital, to prevent, in particular, Ukraine from bailing on the talks. That’s why sending Steve Witkoff and Keith Kellogg makes sense. The former is trusted by the Russian side while the latter has built relationships in Ukraine. Their presence serves to keep the process moving forward until a deal can be pushed over the line and the fighting can stop.
Bear in mind that the 2022 talks ran for a month and a half and the circumstances have materially changed as I have indicated above. While there has been speculation that President Trump might drop into Istanbul, I am not sure that this is necessary if President Putin doesn’t himself attend. Knowing the Russians, I assess that Putin will want his own “‘meeting moment” with the U.S. President on terms that the Russian side can better choreograph. Indeed, that may be a prize for Russia’s engagement in the process, given its desire for a more comprehensive reset of relations with the U.S.
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Top photo credit: Dislocated Palestinians wait in line with pots in their hands to receive relief meals from a charity kitchen in Gaza City, on May 3, 2025. (Photo by Majdi Fathi/NurPhoto)
As the risk of famine spreads across Gaza — and as shocking images of overcrowded soup lines stream from Gaza daily — an influential network of Israeli government defenders has emerged to tell you that none of this is happening at all.
The Free Press — a pro-Israel media outlet often sympathetic to the neoconservative worldview — published a highly circulated article last week from journalist Michael Ames titled, “The Gaza Famine Myth,” which purports to demonstrate that food security in Gaza has been far above the famine and crisis levels that international humanitarian organizations have observed since at least early 2024.
The Israeli blockade, which the Israeli government openly admits has restricted all aid from entering the strip since March 2, 2025, has once again pushed Gaza to the edge of famine, with U.N. reports warning of starvation levels far surpassing 2024’s severity.
But Israel and its supporters are downplaying the unanimous chorus of famine warnings from international monitors, alleging that accusations of an Israeli starvation campaign have been overstated, accusing journalists of systematically exaggerating the hunger crisis in Gaza.
“The Gaza Famine Myth” focuses on a single statement from President Biden’s USAID Administrator Samantha Power, who said in May 2024 that there was a famine in northern Gaza, based on data from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC).
“There were serious problems with Power’s sensational testimony,” Ames writes. “Foremost among them: The IPC never declared a famine in Gaza.”
Ames argues that Power and USAID did not have authority to declare a famine in Gaza because only the IPC can only issue that declaration based on its data. But the IPC itself saysthat it “does not ‘declare Famine’ or issue ‘Famine declarations,” but rather facilitates the analysis that allows governments, international/regional organizations and humanitarian agencies to issue more prominent statements or declarations.”
But it wasn’t just USAID declaring famine. Cindy McCain, director of the World Food Program, which distributes aid and monitors food security in Gaza, said in May, 2024 that there was a “full-blown famine” in northern Gaza and that it was “moving its way south.”
And in July, 2024, as Israel began to allow slightly more aid into the strip — though nowhere near the pre-war levels which were already to put the Palestinians “on a diet” — a group of U.N. experts declared that famine had spread throughout Gaza.
Each of these separate opinions reaffirmed USAID’s rationale for declaring a famine in northern Gaza and yet Ames never mentions them.
Despite these other famine declarations by reputable sources, Ames instead focuses only on the USAID statements and claims the IPC’s governing authority, the Famine Review Committee (FRC), had actually “rebuked” its analysis.
But the FRC did not “rebuke” the USAID analysis. It merely said it could not endorse USAID’s conclusions because the FRC lacked the access necessary to gather “essential up to date data on human well-being in Gaza.”
As U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator Jamie McGoldrick said on April 11, 2024, only three roads into Gaza were technically open — none consistently — and all in “very poor condition.” Visiting Kamal Adwan Hospital, he said “every single patient” in the children’s ward faced “life-threatening hunger.”
Ames does not address what the FRC said about its access limitations and instead claims the FRC report definitively debunks USAID’s famine statement — he points to a passage within the FRC report that criticizes USAID for discounting U.N. donations to bakeries and some private sector donations in its calculations of food insecurity to allege that, “north Gaza actually had 10 times more food last April than USAID had claimed,” and that “a famine had been averted.”
Ames derives his “10 times more food” claim by taking the highest end of the FRC’s estimate for bakery donations and private sector contributions during the month of April, 2024, a guess which the FRC discloses from the outset of the report it makes with limited evidence. But the idea that, through the exclusion of bakery donations and private sector contributions from its analysis, USAID had overestimated food insecurity in Gaza by such a wide margin is both intuitively implausible and directly contradicted by the reports of humanitarian organizations.
The World Food Program reported on April 19, 2024 that it had opened 3 bakeries in northern Gaza, “the only bakeries working in the north,” and “the first bakeries producing bread after more than 170 days.”
Oxfam reported in April based on IPC data that Palestinians in northern Gaza were “forced to survive on 245 calories a day.” WFP had documented how the Israeli blockade inflicted starvation conditions that approached famine levels in northern Gaza as early as January and February of that year.
Ames does not address any of this data. Instead, he suggests, mostly based on social media posts from an Israeli-British citizen who told Ames she is “not a journalist,” that Gaza is stocked with food.
There has been no evidence that any of these international humanitarian organizations exaggerated their food security data. Rather, there has been substantial evidence demonstrating that the number of Palestinians who have already died from starvation have been vastly undercounted.
Testimonies from healthcare professionals in Gaza support that conclusion. In October, a group of 99 American physicians, surgeons, nurses, and midwives who volunteered in the Gaza strip wrote an open letter to President Biden presenting even more evidence, using IPC data, that the human toll in Gaza was far higher than we understood.
“The scale of this starvation is not widely appreciated,” they wrote. “In total it is likely that 62,413 people have died of starvation and its complications in Gaza from October 7, 2023 to September 30, 2024. Most of these will have been young children.”
Ames’ apparent goal — to suggest that famine in Gaza has been oversold to the public — is directly at odds with the reports and opinions of independent humanitarian groups, their aid workers on the ground, healthcare providers, and starving Palestinians in Gaza.
Additionally, Ames’ article comes as international aid groups — and Israelis themselves — warn of impending catastrophe unless Israel’s more than two month-long total siege is lifted. On Tuesday, the New York Times reported that some Israeli military officials “have privately concluded that Palestinians in Gaza face widespread starvation unless aid deliveries are restored within weeks.”
Meanwhile, The U.N. declared that food stocks have already run out and that water access has become impossible. Last Thursday, Abdul Nasser Al-Ajrami, head of the Bakery Owners Association of Gaza, reported that “all bakeries have shut down due to a total lack of flour and fuel. Bread has run out completely, and half of Gaza’s homes have no flour left.”
The Free Press is determined to draw attention away from the human tragedy on the ground in Gaza by debating what is and what isn’t an officially declared famine. That is their right of course, but the rest of the world shouldn’t waste another minute on this nonsense when the real focus should be on saving civilian lives now.
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