The surprise attack on Bashar Assad's Syrian strongholds in December led to an almost immediate collapse of his family's dynasty and his dictatorship. This, after the Middle East had already been rocked by Israeli wars against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. As of December, over 45,000 Palestinians in Gaza and over 4,000 people in Lebanon, mostly civilians, have been killed and millions displaced.
Top photo credit: The fall of the Syrian regime, Syrians celebrate Bashar al-Assad's escape. Damascus, Syria, December 8, 2024 (Mohammad Bash/Shutterstock)
Should the US take credit for Assad's downfall?Top image credit: Damascus University students stand on the toppled statue of the late Syria's President Hafez al-Assad, father of Bashar al-Assad, after Syria's Bashar al-Assad was ousted, in Damascus, Syria, December 15, 2024. REUTERS/Ammar Awad
Assad's fall in December was heralded by Sunni Syrians, many of whom had been victims of Assad's brutality and displaced in the country's Civil War, which began in 2011 after Arab Spring related uprisings.
Top Image Credit: A rebel fighter stands atop a military vehicle as he carries a Hayat Tahrir al-Sham flag in Saraqeb town in northwestern Idlib province, Syria December 1, 2024. REUTERS/Mahmoud Hassano/File Photo
External forces are at work all over this conflict. Turkey, Israel, the United States — news reports after Assad's fall suggested that even Ukraine had a hand in sending HTS drones for the battlefield.
Members of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) a flag in Deir al-Zor, after U.S.-backed alliance led by Syrian Kurdish fighters captured Deir el-Zor, the government's main foothold in the vast desert, according to Syrian sources, in Syria December 7, 2024. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman
The fate of the Kurdish independence movement, which has been backed by the U.S., is at the end of the year unknown. The Turks want to extinguish it, while the Kurdish Syrian Defense Forces have held on to valuable, oil rich territory in the northeast of Syria and are not likely to go easily. There are also 2,000 U.S. troops in the region and the U.S. has been engaging in airstrikes inside the country, reportedly against ISIS.
top photo credit: Men hold a Syrian opposition flag on the top of a vehicle as people celebrate after Syrian rebels announced that they have ousted President Bashar al-Assad, in Damascus, Syria December 8, 2024. REUTERS/Firas Makdesi
The world watches as HTS claims power and wants the U.S. terror designation and sanctions lifted in order to begin rebuilding the country after more than a decade of war. Despite the calls by new leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, who leads HTS, for moderation and amnesty, reports in the waning days of 2024 tell of revenge crimes and raids by militias against Assadists in villages and towns. Meanwhile, al-Sharaa has said it may take up to four years for new elections in Syria.
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The fall of the Syrian regime, Syrians celebrate Bashar al-Assad's escape. Damascus, Syria, December 8, 2024 (Mohammad Bash/Shutterstock)
Earlier this week, European leaders including newly-minted EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and several prime ministers; including Greece’s Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Italy’s Georgia Meloni, and Finnish PM Petteri Orpo, met in Finland’s Lapland region for the North-South Summit on European security.
A major theme of the meeting: Bolstering Europe’s defenses to counter Russia’s “direct threat.”
"To prevent war we really need to do more on defense. We have to invest in critical capabilities," Kallas said. "Russia poses a direct threat to European security, but security comprises different elements, and they are different in east, south, north and west, but we can tackle these issues if we act together.”
Meloni likewise posited that Russia poses a holistic threat to European Union security, spanning not only defense, but ultimately vis-à-vis politics and society at large.
"We have to understand the threat [from Russia] is much wider than we imagine," Meloni explained. "It's about our democracy, it's about influencing our public opinion, it's about what happens in Africa, it's about raw materials, it's about the instrumentalization of immigration. We need to know it's a very wide idea of security.”
NATO countries “will need to spend more than 2%” of GDP on defense, Mitsotakis concurred at Lapland. “It will become clear, once we interact with the new [U.S.] president, what is the figure that we will agree on within NATO.”
Mitsotakis’ comments echo new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s recent calls for NATO alliance members to commit to Cold War levels of military spending by 2030 — a call that has been critiqued by some, including former diplomat Ian Proud, writing for RS, as undoable and unnecessary relative to the actual threat levels to the alliance today.
Kallas and friends may be doubling down on the Russia threat, however, other European leaders are starting to break ranks.
Notably, Hungarian PM Vitkor Orban emphasized last week that fellow EU leaders must fundamentally change their Ukraine strategy. Indeed, Orban said 2025 would bring about an end to the conflict; “Either it will end with peace negotiations, or one of the warring sides will be destroyed.”
Noting that incoming U.S. President Donald Trump’s re-election “has changed the state of the war,” Orban also argued in a television appearance that the over $300 billion Europe had put into the war effort could have instead bolstered its infrastructure, economy, and military capacities for them all. “European people would be living much better than today,” he charged.
Meanwhile, Slovak PM Robert Fico met with Putin last weekend to discuss the war and Russian natural gas deliveries. The move was quickly and thoroughly slammed by myriad European leaders, some of whom questioned Fico’s political allegiances outright.
“Robert Fico just kissed the ring of a mass murderer in the Kremlin,” Czech EPP MEP Danuše Nerudová wrote on X. “It is a betrayal and another immoral step that will serve Russian interests. Robert Fico is a security risk for us.”
"Leaders observed that Mr. Fico does not want to participate in the common European work on energy independence or seek replacement for Russian gas, but rather wants to assist Russia in pushing American gas and energy resources of other partners away from Europe,” Zelensky said on X. “Implying that he wants to help Putin earn money to fund the war and weaken Europe.”
“Why is this leader so dependent on Moscow? What is being paid to him, and what does he pay with?,” asked Zelensky.
Interestingly, Zelensky’s comments come amid fresh allegations from PM Fico that he’s refused a bribe from Zelensky, worth over $500 million in Russian assets, in exchange for a vote in favor of Ukraine joining NATO.
As European leaders chart paths forward, one constant appears to be discord.
Six Ukrainian drones hit a residential building in the Russian city Kazan on Saturday, with another hitting an industrial facility, according to Al Jazeera. Putin hinted at possible retaliation in a subsequent statement, saying “Whoever, and however much they try to destroy, they will face many times more destruction themselves and will regret what they are trying to do in our country.”
CNN reported that a Russian ship sunk in the Mediterranean after an apparent engine room explosion on Monday evening. Russian shipping company Oboronlogistika, in charge of Russia’s Defense Ministry cargo, claimed the vessel was bound for Vladivostok, Russia; Ukrainian officials conversely allege the ship was headed for Syria to salvage myriad military materiel following Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s ouster.
Russia launched an energy infrastructure attack against Ukraine on December 25 with over 100 strike drones and 70 ballistic and cruise missiles, according to the New York Times, leading to at least six injuries and one death. Ukrainian air defense teams reportedly intercepted or otherwise disabled many projectiles utilized in the attack, which still caused major energy outages across a war-embattled nation.
In a developing story, Ukraine says its air forces have struck a military facility in Russia’s Rostov region.
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Top photo credit: Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command C4 Maj. Gen. Byung gi Park watches a video during the Combined Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore 2015 exercise, July 5, 2015, Anmyeon Beach, Republic of Korea. (U.S. Army photo by: Maricris C. McLane)label_outline
As word of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s surprise declaration of martial law spread across Washington, the message from the outgoing administration was surprising but clear. Despite “grave concerns” about the political turmoil, “our alliance with the ROK [or Republic of Korea] is ironclad,” said Deputy Undersecretary of State Kurt Campbell.
As other Biden acolytes repeated the refrain, any serious public discussion of the implications of Yoon’s move for the U.S.-South Korea alliance were largely brushed aside.
That is a mistake. The ongoing political upheaval in a country that the Biden administration positioned in the heart of its Indo-Pacific strategy and that the United States is committed to defend should trigger alarm bells in Washington. Not only does the incident raise questions about the health of the alliance, but it also suggests that the potential for U.S. military entanglement on the Korean Peninsula may be higher than previously assessed. The incoming administration should critically reevaluate the benefits and risks of the U.S.-South Korea relationship and recalibrate accordingly.
Even among the vast portfolio of security guarantees the United States has on its books, the U.S.-South Korea alliance stands out. No less than 28,500 U.S. military personnel permanently based in South Korea, with others rotating through. The 1953 mutual defense treaty commits the United States to support South Korea in the event of an attack, and the two countries share a combined command that integrates their forces and is led by a U.S. four-star general with a South Korean deputy. The bilateral relationship is thus based on a high level of trust and presumes constant communication.
Yoon’s abuse of power and subsequent impeachment raise questions about the U.S.-South Korea relationship on three levels. First, there is new uncertainty about the benefits of the alliance for the United States. Over the past four years, the Biden administration leaned hard into the relationship with South Korea, viewing the strategically positioned and militarily capable country as a valuable chess piece in its efforts to balance Chinese power. Biden also cast South Korea as a member of his global coalition of democracies.
Both roles have now been placed in doubt. South Korea’s position as a leading liberal democracy has been irreparably damaged. Although the declaration of martial law was met with massive popular protests and failed under pressure from the country’s lawmakers, the events before and after are a reminder of the country’s authoritarian past and just how fragile its democracy remains.
South Korea’s continued role as a counterweight to China also seems tenuous. Yoon’s likely successor, Lee Jae-myung, has already indicated that he wants a more constructive relationship with China. While the extent of any rapprochement remains to be determined, a shift by Seoul toward Beijing could compromise U.S. military and economic plans in Asia. For instance, a less hawkish Lee might restrict U.S. military contingency access to bases in South Korea during a regional conflict, turn back the clock on the nascent U.S.-led trilateral cooperation with Japan, or resist U.S. pressure to cooperate with export controls and trade restrictions aimed at China. Going forward, South Korea’s strategic value to the United States could be much diminished.
Second, the events surrounding Yoon’s martial law declaration challenge the Biden administration’s narrative that the U.S.-South Korea alliance is “stronger than ever” and raise troubling concerns about its readiness to “fight tonight,” as promised by the South Korea-based U.S. Eighth Army. The Biden administration invested heavily in alliance coordination with South Korea, with frequent high-level visits, combined military drills, and new mechanisms for information sharing and integration, such as the Washington Declaration’s “enhanced dialogue” around nuclear issues.
Despite these efforts, Yoon did not notify the White House before his political maneuver, nor did his defense chief warn his counterpart in the Pentagon. U.S. Forces Korea and the Combined Forces Command were also left in the dark, even as South Korean military forces were sent to block lawmakers from entering the National Assembly building.
This complete breakdown in communication suggests both a lack of transparency and serious alliance management issues. Had North Korea taken advantage of the political unrest, the U.S. general at the helm of Combined Forces Command would have found some portion of South Korean personnel under his operational command unexpectedly already deployed elsewhere. It is not clear that the United States and South Korea are primed to work in lockstep during peacetime, let alone operate together under the pressure of a crisis. The consequences of this breach of trust are far-reaching; not just U.S. policymakers, but also adversaries, now have reason to be skeptical of the alliance’s readiness and effectiveness in war.
Finally, Yoon’s rash move and the apparent complicity of his defense chief, who subsequently attempted suicide, may arouse new worries about Seoul’s reliability as a military ally and the risks the Korea alliance poses to the United States. Although U.S. forces have no role in South Korea’s internal security, the unrest following the martial law declaration still left them vulnerable. Worse, U.S. policymakers must now grapple with fears about an imprudent ally dragging the United States into major war.
This risk is not far-fetched. There are reports that in October 2024, South Korea’s defense chief sent drones over North Korean territory hoping to provoke a response from Pyongyang that would give cover for Yoon’s martial law announcement. But a North Korean response also could have triggered the U.S.-South Korea mutual defense commitment and almost certainly would have placed U.S. forces in harm’s way.
U.S. officials may now be wondering whether ongoing political machinations in South Korea disguise future threats of entanglement — or entrapment — for the United States.
During his first term, President-elect Donald Trump was critical of the U.S.-South Korea relationship, but his concerns were centered on burden-sharing. As he returns to the White House, Trump and his foreign policy team should ask a more fundamental question: Given changed political and military realities after the martial law declaration, does the alliance still serve American interests?
Though the events of the past month likely do not warrant an immediate termination of the U.S.- South Korea alliance, there is certainly justification for a recalibration to protect U.S. interests and preserve military assets. With more uncertain strategic benefits, lower than expected readiness, and substantially higher risks, the U.S. alliance commitment should also be scaled back.
The incoming administration has several options. It might adopt new safeguards, including additional crisis communication mechanisms, or apply limitations and conditions to the terms of the mutual defense agreement effectively limiting U.S. obligations. It could reduce the number of soldiers and systems permanently based in South Korea to decrease U.S. exposure to events on the Peninsula or harden existing base infrastructure to better protect U.S. personnel based there.
Finally, Trump might simply decide to invest less in the alliance, matching lower outlays with the lower expected returns. This might mean holding fewer consultations and military exercises and pausing efforts to deepen operational, logistical, and industrial integration.
Critics will argue that any pullback from South Korea will damage U.S. credibility and encourage opportunistic aggression from adversaries. But U.S. alliances are not sacrosanct; all should be treated as means to an end. Given recent events in Seoul, it would be strategically foolish for Washington to proceed with South Korea as if nothing has changed.
This article was adapted from remarks made by the author for the Institute of China-America Studies on December 12, 2024.
Overall, the primary threat to U.S. (and global) interests derives not from China or the United States separately, but from the deeply negative and worsening nature of the U.S and Chinese interaction, in which each side: worst cases the motives and intentions of the other, ignores how they themselves contribute to this spiral, and one-sidedly stresses deterrence over reassurance in many policy spheres (especially regarding Taiwan), which could lead to conflict.
This interactive dynamic is driven by two sets of largely zero-sum views:
In the U.S.: the quixotic U.S. belief that it still retains Cold War-level dominance or absolutely needs such dominance or sole leadership to sustain an acceptable global order. In fact, the conditions allowing for such dominance are disappearing; and there is no effort underway to define a shared structure of leadership between the U.S., China, and other major powers for the future; the stress in the current U.S. administration is on keeping talking with China, and little else.
In China: a belief that U.S. decline is underway, is systemic, and benefits China, and (more importantly) a belief that the U.S. is committed to undermining China’s overall development and collapsing the Chinese Communist Party. This set of beliefs drive Beijing more toward seeking dominance and undermining the U.S. in the process.
Overall, this interactive dynamic inclines both sides toward ever-greater levels of suspicion and zero-sum thinking and increases risk taking, making crises more likely.
In this environment, the incentives for continued peace and prosperity through a stable form of mutually beneficial and peaceful coexistence among the two powers exceed any possible incentives for engaging in zero-sum military, political, and economic rivalry and a sharp, open-ended competition for dominance and control.
So, given this general context, what should China be doing?
First: Beijing should not overreact to Trump’s posturing and threats, or his promises of what he will achieve in relations with China. He speaks and acts for effect, often moving in contradictory directions, responding to what he thinks will make him look good or please his base, or what he sees as challenges from others to his self-image.
He could move toward a basic deal-making approach, possibly based on mutual benefits and the idea that he and Xi Jinping have a good relationship, or he could adopt a more confrontational, reckless, high-pressure approach that reflects the hardline China views of many of his subordinates. But his major focus will likely be on trade, investment, and technology issues.
Whatever direction Trump moves toward will depend on several factors: domestic political developments (and in particular the reaction of his base), what China (and in particular Xi) does, and in general how he views events influencing his image as a tough, no-nonsense, “America First” leader.
Beijing needs to resist the temptation to engage in rigid tit-for-tat actions in response to Trump, and instead convey an image of restraint, prudence, pragmatism, and support for international law, while making it clear where certain red lines are, e.g., regarding Taiwan.
In particular, Beijing needs to become more credible in its support for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and its support for international law-based regimes in the areas of trade and investment, technology development and legal protections, human rights, and an overall free, open, and inclusive economic and security order in Asia and beyond. Chinese leaders often make statements supporting such policies and values. But Beijing does not do enough to convince others that it is truly committed to them.
Of course, the U.S. is also falling short in many of these areas. But rather than use this fact as a way of arguing for the weakness or decline of the U.S. or America’s opposition to other nations, Beijing should offer to work with the United States and other nations on specific issues, to strengthen these values.
Regarding Taiwan, Beijing should take actions designed to counter the growing U.S. assumption that Xi Jinping is more likely to employ force against the island while he is in office, perhaps to bolster his legacy. But it also needs to convey the notion that Taiwan is a war or peace issue for China, while also acting to reduce the chances of conflict – a difficult balancing act.
Several actions need to be taken to achieve these objectives:
First, make it unambiguously clear, via repeated statements by Xi Jinping (NOT a subordinate) that there is no deadline for resolving the Taiwan issue, and that China remains committed to resolving the issue peacefully, as a first priority
Second, indicate a willingness to reduce military deployments and exercises around Taiwan in response to greater U.S. reassurances regarding the One China Policy, e.g.,
Clarification that the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) does not constitute a security guarantee to Taiwan
A reaffirmation that the U.S. remains supportive of any resolution of the Taiwan issue by peaceful, uncoerced means
A reaffirmation of US limits on ties with Taiwan, by clearly stating: no senior Cabinet trips to Taiwan; no invitations to senior Taiwan leaders to visit Washington; and no “official-designated” trips to Taiwan by senior U.S. politicians or Congressional entities;
Beijing should also be receptive to neutralizing Taiwan as a source of strategic competition between the U.S. and China, by rejecting the notion that the island is a strategic location essential to either the U.S. or Chinese security posture in Asia. It should also call on the U.S. to take a similar action.
Finally, to stabilize the Taiwan situation, and enhance overall stability in the relationship, Beijing should overcome its current resistance to engaging in extensive, substantive crisis prevention and management dialogues with the U.S, at both the Track One and Track Two levels.
There has been some progress recently on this issue, but it remains slowed and obstructed by mutual suspicions, the basic definition of the issue as a military-to-military problem involving incidents at sea or in the air, and Beijing’s stress on crisis prevention, defined as ending U.S. policies that could create a crisis.
Regarding the last point, the two sides need to reach agreement on how to define both crisis prevention and crisis management. Beijing should be willing to define crisis prevention in ways that do not require impossible changes in basic U.S. security policies in Asia;
Moving the Sino-American crisis dialogue forward requires a clear signal from the very top. In support of this, Beijing should convey a desire for the two presidents to make a clear statement to subordinate officials on both sides supporting more extensive crisis dialogues, with significant civilian involvement beyond the two respective military systems.
I have offered ideas on how to move forward in this area in a recent Quincy Paper, an article appearing in War on the Rocks, and in a Sinica podcast with Kaiser Kuo.
There is probably no other issue in the relationship that demands greater attention.
In conclusion, these are all difficult actions, especially in the face of an initially unpredictable and potentially reckless Trump administration.
But I believe Beijing has an opportunity to take actions that might significantly improve the relationship if it has the courage and willpower to undertake these and other initiatives, and not merely point a finger at the U.S. and expect Washington to do all the heavy lifting.
In short, Beijing needs to show its willingness to work with the United States to achieve specific, mutually beneficial ends, not only via words but through repeated and persistent actions.
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