On October 30, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with his Japanese and South Korean counterparts Toshimitsu Motegi and Cho Hyun on the sidelines of the G20 foreign ministers meeting in Atlanta. Together they established the Trilateral Arctic Pacific Partnership (TAPP), an initiative focused on maritime safety, emergency response and economic cooperation in the North.
There are good reasons for the United States to pursue this now. Japan and South Korea are developing their commercial interests in the region and both countries are experts in polar research and maritime operations. This initiative opens up new diplomatic options for Washington in the Arctic, particularly as relations have been tense with other Arctic nations.
Much of that tension, of course, has been self-inflicted, with recent threats by President Donald Trump to take over Greenland, provoking a diplomatic crisis with Denmark and the rest of the European Union. While the agreement between the U.S., Denmark and Greenland has eased tensions, it didn’t fully heal the damage done to transatlantic trust.
Now, with TAPP, Washington can show it can still form constructive partnerships in the Arctic, this time with its Pacific allies. But the way this partnership has so far been presented is concerning.
The State Department’s summary of the trilateral meeting places the Arctic initiative alongside criticism of China’s activities in its neighboring seas and “Russia-China cooperation undermining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.” This framing was echoed by some Japanese and South Korean media outlets, but the official readouts from the Foreign Ministries of Japan and South Korea avoided such language.
If the U.S. views this initiative purely as another means to pressure Russia and China, Japan and South Korea may not be fully on board. Both nations have commercial interests that require working relationships with Russia and China.
Balancing economic interests
Seoul plans to use the Northern Sea Route as a shipping route between Northeast Asia and Europe, with Busan as a logistics hub.It aims to operate regular commercial shipping in the Arctic by 2030 and has already ran a test: the Panstar Arco left Busan on August 22 and returned from Europe 50 days later.
However, this route transits largely Russian waters, meaning Korean shipping companies will need Russian infrastructure, logistical support and icebreakers. While South Korean officials stress that their Arctic shipping policy will comply with Western sanctions on Russia, they know they cannot operate in the Arctic without a working relationship with Moscow.
Seoul also has a careful relationship with China. Korean experts noted the differences in wording between the U.S. and Korean statements regarding the October meeting. While Seoul sees China as a major economic partner, it wants “Washington to focus on deterring North Korea and facilitating dialogue with Pyongyang rather than containing China.”
Japan also treads carefully. While it has joined Western sanctions on Russia, Tokyo has not cut energy ties. Sakhalin-2, a Russian natural gas project, provides around 10% of Japan’s gas imports. Japanese companies Mitsui and Mitsubishi have a combined 22.5% stake in the project. Japan purchased around 58% of the project’s output in 2025.
Mitsui also has a 10% stake in Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project, along with the state-backed Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security. The project has been affected by Western sanctions, and it’s not currently supplying gas to Japan, but Tokyo has not backed out of its investment. Clearly, energy security is a concern for Japanese policymakers.
None of this means that Tokyo and Seoul are about to abandon their security relationship with Washington. But it would be unreasonable to expect Japan and South Korea to view the Arctic solely through an American security lens.
As expected, Beijing and Moscow are wary of the new initiative. Chinese experts cited by the Global Times have warned that the trilateral partnership risks “turning the Arctic into an arena for geopolitical and security competition” and that “Washington seeks to work through its alliances to constrain China-Russia cooperation.” Russia’s Foreign Ministry has warned of “countermeasures” if it considers the arrangement a threat.
Those reactions aren’t surprising, but they do highlight a potential problem: if TAPP becomes all about confrontation, then the practical work may be overshadowed by strategic signaling. Japan and South Korea could find themselves pulled into a U.S.-led initiative that does not fit with their economic interests.
Keep it practical
The U.S., Japan, and South Korea do not need a common enemy to work together in the Pacific Arctic. The region has enough real challenges: shipping traffic is increasing, sea ice conditions are changing, and emergency response infrastructure remains thin across much of the region.
This is where TAPP can make a difference. The three nations could organize joint search and rescue exercises, agree on procedures for sharing information, and coordinate on oil spill and disaster response. The U.S., Japan and South Korea all have substantial and complementary maritime capabilities to contribute.
There’s also no need to start from scratch. The Arctic Council’s working groups are already conducting important work on environmental protection, scientific research, and emergency preparedness. The Arctic Coast Guard Forum and North Pacific Coast Guard Forum also provide channels for practical cooperation in these areas, though they have been strained by political disagreements related to the war in Ukraine and Japanese-Russian relations. TAPP could help revive that work, with increased Japanese and Korean expertise and funding. Arctic communities should be involved in decision making on all of these issues. Shipping and energy projects have a direct impact on local economies and ecosystems.
Overall, the U.S. should avoid trying to make this initiative a strategic move against Moscow and Beijing. Japan and South Korea will continue to have their own business interests with Russia. A partnership that takes this into account will be more sustainable.
The Arctic needs safe shipping lanes as well as stronger environmental protection and disaster management. Strong institutions are needed to ensure cooperation continues despite political divides. The TAPP initiative can help with this, and the U.S. should take the lead.
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